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ABSTRACT 
Communication infrastructure underlies all group interaction in an extended 
republic, yet the role of its evolution in the development of American political 
parties remains relatively unexplored. Rather than examine how attributes of this 
infrastructure might act as variables shaping organization and behavior, 
traditional models of party development assume it to be a neutral element of the 
larger context within which partisan actors operate. The model developed here 
brings the evolution of infrastructure into the foreground, exploring its role in 
shaping American political parties over time. 
The most widely accepted models of parties locate the source of change with 
the actors who create and control party institutions, but by viewing control itself 
as a potential variable, the model developed here is able to isolate how 
infrastructure development itself alters power relations over time. The central 
contention of this work is that changes to the nation’s communication and 
information infrastructures alter the opportunities and constraints for political 
  vi 
action, driving the evolution of parties over time. As new infrastructures are 
deployed, the patterns of partisan interaction throughout society change, 
opening windows of opportunity during which party leadership is more likely to 
change hands. Particularly important are decentralizing infrastructural changes, 
which can provide previously marginalized actors with the tools necessary to 
challenge their exclusion from party activity. Citizen involvement in party 
politics is thus demonstrated to vary with both the nature of the available 
infrastructure and the content that infrastructure carries. 
This new infrastructure-driven model of change is tested through an 
examination of party development in two eras: 1790-1835, between the expansion 
of the post office and the development of the telegraph; and 2000-2012, when the 
Internet first became an important infrastructure for organizing party activity. 
The model is found to be quite useful in explaining the evolution of party conflict 
in both eras, highlighting similarities that demonstrate how the decentralization 
of communication infrastructure creates opportunities for political outsiders to 
drive change. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction:  
Information, Communication, and Infrastructure 
 
“If you overesteem great men, people become powerless.” 
-- Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching 
 
“When, after many efforts, a legislator succeeds in exercising an indirect influence 
upon the destiny of nations, his genius is lauded by mankind, while, in point of fact, the 
geographical position of the country, which he is unable to change, a social condition 
which arose without his co-operation, customs and opinions which he cannot trace to 
their source, and an origin with which he is unacquainted exercise so irresistible an 
influence over the courses of society that he is himself borne away by the current after an 
ineffectual resistance. Like the navigator, he may direct the vessel which bears him 
along but he can neither change its structure, nor raise the winds, nor lull the waters 
which swell beneath him.” 
-- Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 
 
 
On the morning of March 4, 2010, Georgetown Law Professor Peter Tague 
began the day’s lecture with a lie: John Roberts, Chief Justice of the United States, 
was planning to shock the political world by announcing his retirement. 
Although Tague insisted he could not disclose his sources, he assured his 
students that the news was legitimate, asked that they not share it with anyone 
until Roberts had made his announcement, and then moved on to the day’s 
lecture as best he could. Thirty minutes later he revealed the truth: the Roberts 
story was a lie in service of a lesson on the problems that arise when informants 
refuse to reveal their sources. This exercise was an annual ritual for Tague, and 
according to former students it fooled many in the room every time. In past years 
the rumor had stayed confined to the classroom, but laptops and mobile phones 
meant the walls of the classroom no longer contained the story, and within 
minutes it had escaped into the wider world to take on a life of its own. 
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RadarOnline became the first national media organization to report the “news,” 
and within minutes it was being covered by some of the web’s most influential 
news sites. But less than thirty minutes later Radar updated their story with an 
“exclusive” correction: Roberts was neither sick nor resigning, and he was 
baffled why anyone thought he was.1 The next day’s editions of the Los Angeles 
Times and All Things Considered offered post-mortems on the story, but even here 
these traditional providers of political news had been scooped. Thanks to the 
work of David Lat, editor of the Above the Law blog, Tague’s role in the affair had 
already been so well documented that it was an interview with Lat, and not the 
editors of Radar or the professor himself, that served as the centerpiece of their 
follow-up reports. All that was left for established journalists to do the day after 
the story was to provide readers with a wrap-up of an event that had already 
become old news.2 
Compare this to the way news of the signing of the Declaration of 
Independence spread through the American Colonies in the summer of 1776. 
After adopting the Declaration on July 4, Congress ordered it printed and 
distributed to the assemblies and committees in each state, as well as to the 
                                                
1 For the original report see RadarOnline, "Exclusive: U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice 
John Roberts Considering Stepping Down." For a detailed timeline on how the rumor 
spread, including comments from numerous students in Tague’s class, see Lat, 
"Anatomy of a Rumor: The Story Behind Chief Justice John Roberts’s ‘Retirement’."; Lat 
and Hill, "The John Roberts Retirement Rumor: A Postscript." The Huffington Post, 
"Update: John Roberts Not Resigning; 'Radaronline' Retracts Claim Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Considering Quitting."  
2 All Things Considered, "Tracing Rumor of John Roberts' Retirement."; Gold, "How a 
Law Class Exercise Triggered a Media Flurry About Chief Justice John Roberts."; Hill, 
"Everybody Learns a Lesson from Georgetown Professor Peter Tague." 
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commanding officers in Washington’s army so that it might be “proclaimed in 
each of the United States.”3 Later that same evening, 200 copies of the document 
were printed by John Dunlap under the supervision of Benjamin Franklin, 
Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams, and by the next morning couriers on 
horseback were riding far and wide to deliver the news of revolution to the 
people whose representatives had just ordered it so declared.4 On July 6 the text 
was published for the first time in a newspaper, activating a second information-
distribution system, the network of newspapers that shared reports via a system 
of publically funded post roads and offices. On July 9, the Declaration was 
published in Baltimore by Dunlap's Maryland Gazette and read aloud to the army 
stationed in New York under Washington’s command. The following day it was 
printed by New York City’s Constitutional Gazette, and not long after by papers in 
Annapolis, New London, Providence, and Hartford. But it wasn’t until a full two 
weeks after its singing that it was finally printed in Boston, just one day before it 
was engrossed on parchment in Dunlap’s Philadelphia print shop, an event that 
triggered yet another round of distribution throughout the colonies. By the end 
of the month it had appeared in dozens of newspapers, been posted in hundreds 
of taverns and public houses, and been read aloud in countless town squares 
                                                
3 United States Continental Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789. 
Edited from the Original Records in the Library of Congress, 516 
4 Boyd, "The Declaration of Independence: The Mystery of the Lost Original," The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 
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across all thirteen colonies, marking the point at which it can be safely assumed 
that citizens in all of the colonies had finally heard the news.5 
 In the first story, a rumor planted as part of a classroom exercise rockets 
around the political world in 24 hours; in the second, the announcement of a 
revolution that would reshape the lives of millions takes two weeks to travel to 
the city remembered as the place where the revolution itself was born. In colonial 
America information could travel no faster than a horse and rider, but in the 
modern world it can pass through walls and cross political borders in the blink 
of an eye. Few things about these systems of political communication are the 
same, and yet flowing through each of them are messages of remarkably similar 
character. Take a random sample from each of these streams of communication 
and you will find messages calling individuals to action, organizing group 
meetings, and spreading information about current events, intrigues, and 
elections. Is all that matters about these messages the information they contain, 
or does the system through which they are traveling have role in the political 
outcomes they inspire, too? Can the message and the medium be considered 
wholly separate from one another, or do the attributes of these communication 
                                                
5 It is unknown when the first copy of the Declaration arrived in England. Vice Admiral 
Lord Richard Howe was known to have transmitted two copies to England, dated 28 
July and 11 August 1776, but it is not known when they arrived. For an extensive 
background on the printing and distribution of the Declaration of Independence, see 
Dube, A Multitude of Amendments, Alterations and Additions: The Writing and Publicizing of 
the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution of the 
United States; Walsh, "Contemporary Broadside Editions of the Declaration of 
Independence," Harvard Library Bulletin. 
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systems affect messages and messengers independent of the content of the 
messages they carry?  
We live in an era in which questions about the political impact of new forms 
of communication have become commonplace. How are the Tea Party and the 
Occupy movements using Twitter? Did Sarah Palin post something to Facebook today? 
How much money did the Obama campaign raise over the web in 2012? And what role 
did information systems failures play in Romney’s loss to Obama? In these questions 
and countless others, pundits and politicians implicitly signal their acceptance of 
the idea that political behaviors and attitudes are being reshaped by the new 
opportunities for communication we all share. But is it true? Political scientists 
have worked for decades to uncover the roles individual, group, and mass 
communications play in our political system, asking questions that have 
included: What, if anything, do voters learn from the coverage of campaigns?6 
How do candidates and government officials use media to shape citizen 
behavior?7 And how does mass opinion form, and what role does the press play 
                                                
6 Benoit, "Presidential Debate Watching, Issue Knowledge, Character Evaluation, and 
Vote Choice," Human Communication Research; Drew and Weaver, "Voter Learning in the 
2004 Presidential Election: Did the Media Matter?," Journalism & Mass Communication 
Quarterly; Jamieson and Birdsell, Presidential Debates: The Challenge of Creating an Informed 
Electorate; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Guadet, The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up 
His Mind in a Presidential Campaign; Lemert, "Do Televised Presidential Debates Help 
Inform Voters?," Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media; McCombs, Mass 
Communication in Political Campaigns: Information, Gratification and Persuasion; McCombs, 
"Building Consensus: The News Media's Agenda-Setting Roles," Political Communication; 
Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns 
7 Ansolabehere, Behr and Iyengar, The Media Game: American Politics in the Television Age; 
Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States," Journal of 
Communication; Bennett and Entman, Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of 
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in this process?8 At the same time, scholars have also worked to uncover the 
mechanisms that drive long-term political change. In literatures as diverse as 
those on political parties, public opinion formation, campaigns and elections, and 
presidential leadership, patterns of punctuated equilibrium have been identified, 
with long periods of relative stasis broken suddenly by unexpected bursts of 
transformative change. Party systems stand relatively unchanged for decades, 
until one constellation of groups gives way to another. 9  Elections follow 
relatively predictable patterns, until “once in a generation” contests appear to 
rewrite the rules of the game.10 Even presidential leadership appears to unfold in 
this pattern of regular irregularity, with transformative presidents constructing 
strategies and creating modes of operation that shape the behavior of subsequent 
administrations for a generation or more.11Amazingly, despite enormous changes 
in the methods and modes of communication over the nation’s history, political 
science has only very rarely and in the most indirect ways connected the 
                                                                                                                                            
Democracy; Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston, When the Press Fails: Political Power and the 
News Media from Iraq to Katrina 
8 Bennett, News: The Politics of Illusion; Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, Voting: A Study 
of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign; McCombs, "A Look at Agenda-Setting: 
Past, Present Ad Future," Journalism Studies; McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 
Communication and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory; 
Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion; Zaller and Chiu, Government's Little 
Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1945-1999 
9 Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look; Keller, America's Three Regimes: A New Political 
History; Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System 
10 Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics; Mayhew, Electoral 
Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre 
11 Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership; Skowronek, The Politics 
Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton; Skowronek and Orren, The 
Search for American Political Development; Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency 
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literatures on political communication and long-term political change. The 
potential for processes of communication to operate as causal mechanisms has 
long been implicit in many of the most influential studies of this kind, but it has 
only very rarely been made explicit. Rather than consider properties of the 
communication system as potential variables, scholars have instead focused on 
its individual elements in isolation, assumed changes act as preconditions to the 
phenomena under study, or ignored them in their entirety. As this project will 
demonstrate, this oversight has produced a blind spot in our understanding of 
American political development, obscuring a number of interesting and 
important research questions. To correct these errors, a new focus on the features 
of communication and information at the systemic level is needed, including the 
development of new theoretical models and the reassessment of old ones. 
 
Project Background and Goals 
The goal of this project is to begin to address this gap in the literature by 
examining the role systems of communication have played in the creation and 
evolution of political parties in the United States. It is the central contention of 
this work that changes to the nation’s systems of communication and 
information can significantly alter the opportunities and constraints for political 
action, altering the nature of the power relations across the political system. If, as 
media scholar Clay Shirky argues, “media is the connective tissue of society,” 
then it follows that the precise configuration of the media at any given historical 
moment will affect both the overall shape of the polity and the interconnections 
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among its various component parts. 12  This should be particularly true for 
political parties, which act as the “connective tissue” of the democratic process, 
linking individuals and groups to the formal political process through a set of 
extra-constitutional institutions that facilitate collective action.  
As will be demonstrated, communication networks lie at the heart of political 
parties, for it is only through such networks that action and organization in an 
extended republic can take place. After reviewing two traditional models of 
party organization and behavior, this work offers a new alternative. In this new 
infrastructure-driven model of party change, the importance of the 
communication infrastructure in party politics will be identified. Traditional 
models locate the source of party change with the actors who control party 
institutions, but by remaining agnostic on the question of control, the model 
developed here is able to isolate how communication infrastructure development 
alters the power relations among all manner of partisan actors. As new 
infrastructures are deployed, the behaviors of partisans change as they react to 
the new opportunities and constraints those infrastructures afford. This alters 
patterns of interaction throughout political society, opening windows of 
opportunity during which party leadership can change hands. Particularly 
important are infrastructural changes that decentralize communication, which 
afford political outsiders opportunities to come together and challenge their 
exclusion from party activities and leadership positions. Citizen involvement in 
                                                
12 Shirky, Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age, 51-56 
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party politics is thus demonstrated to vary with the nature of the infrastructure 
available to them, an important new variable in political behavior. This new 
model will be evaluated in comparison to the two traditional models through a 
detailed examination of the history of party development in two eras: 1790-1840, 
the period prior to the development of the telegraph; and 1998-2012, the period 
in which the use of the Internet first became an important part of party politics.  
The story of the first era will be told over four separate chapters, but a brief 
version is as follows: The group of men we remember collectively as the 
Founders hoped to create a system free from the influence of parties, one in 
which a group of virtuous elites led the government with the backing of a 
supportive people. But within a few years of the ratification of the constitution, 
factional conflict had nearly split the Washington Administration in two. In an 
effort to build support for their respective groups, leaders on both sides of the 
divide turned to newspapers, hoping to use them to mobilize the huge numbers 
of citizens who lived outside of the nation’s capital. This was the first step 
towards building information networks capable of organizing partisans 
throughout the nation for action, but on both sides of the aisle the effort failed 
badly. Not long after a new party network began to form, as local activists used 
the postal service’s free newspaper exchange to build system that took full 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the postal network. Thanks to the 
Post Office Act of 1792, that network was undergoing a process of rapid 
transformation, bringing access to national politics to every corner of the nation. 
By using that infrastructure to link dozens of independently developed party 
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newspapers into a single network, partisans around the nation created the 
national party infrastructure that made Jefferson’s victory in 1800 possible. 
Before his election, however, Democratic-Republican Party organizers would be 
forced to fend of attempts to criminalize their methods of organization, a 
challenge they were able to survive thanks to their innovative use of the postal 
infrastructure. 
Network innovations continued after Jefferson’s election, but rather than 
bring party members into tighter coordination, the continued growth of the post 
office system created the conditions that tore the party apart. Local political 
machines had been central to the party’s victory in 1800, and although the editors 
who led them expected to continue in positions of leadership following their 
historic win, many of their allies had other plans. The party network they 
constructed together had survived the Federalist assault because of its 
decentralized structure, but now the absence of centralization allowed competing 
factions within the party to tear that network apart. This significantly set back 
national party development, as various factions within each of the states engaged 
in a series of brutal interparty battles unlike anything seen at the national level. 
This factional conflict drove a decoupling of state and national politics, leading to 
an era in which the good feelings shared among national elites were matched by 
bitter recriminations among local party leaders. But a new generation of party 
leaders emerged in the aftermath of the nation’s first economic depression, and 
together they built a new set of partisan information systems that transformed 
politics once more.    
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The 1828 presidential election proved to be the final test for these new editor-
led political machines. Having vanquished two coalitions of elites intent on 
delegitimizing their chosen method of organization, these editors came together 
to build a new and far more powerful national party network. Once again the 
postal system proved central to the party-building process. The recent 
completion of the postal network everywhere but along the frontier allowed 
these new party leaders to focus their efforts on coordinating with one another, 
rather than on racing to keep up with the establishment of new post offices 
throughout their regions. Within each of the states, local party leaders used their 
newspapers to organize events, educate citizens, and mobilize voters. These 
newspapers were organized into state networks by more powerful editors 
working from their state’s capital city, and together these state leaders used the 
postal exchange to coordinate ideas and actions across state lines. At the top of 
the network sat Duff Green, the editor of the most important paper in 
Washington, DC. Under Green’s direction these men built a truly national 
campaign, using the national postal network to build a national party network 
that conducted a successful multi-year campaign to win the White House for 
Andrew Jackson.  
After the election, the place of editors atop the nation’s political parties was 
finally secure. Two generations of activist-editors had faced down attempts to 
keep them from positions of power, but through their control over the nation’s 
political information networks they were able not only to survive but to thrive. 
Editors and printers had been considered unfit for politics just three decades 
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before, but thanks to their creative use of the nation’s rapidly expanding 
communication infrastructure, they challenged this exclusion, defeated their 
opponents, and become masters of the political world. Over the next decade 
hundreds of editors were appointed and elected to office, serving in positions 
from local customs houses all the way to the presidential cabinet. 1828 therefore 
marked the coming of age of a new form of politics, one that forced the older 
norms of comity and deference to give way to far more raucous and 
participatory form of democracy. It was the development of a truly national 
communication infrastructure that had made this transformation possible. 
Thanks to the rapid expansion of the post office and its heavily subsidized 
system of newspaper exchange, political activists found themselves with a means 
for organizing that simply did not exist a decade before. The design of the postal 
system favored the development of a party system largely outside of the control 
of national elites, and using the opportunities this new infrastructure presented, 
local and state party leaders developed the network that became the Democratic 
Party. In the end their method of political organization triumphed, ushering in 
an era of vibrant, two-party competition organized atop national information 
networks that were only possible because of the nation’s new postal service. 
The story of the modern era will be told in a single chapter, and although 
many of the details will obviously be quite different from those just told, the 
general pattern of infrastructure-driven party development will be strikingly 
similar. The system in the earliest years of this period was largely dominated by 
a relatively small group of party elites, men and women who used their 
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privileged positions to shape the flows of political information throughout 
society. But the widespread adoption of digital networks at the end of the 
twentieth century marked a transformation as profound as the one sparked by 
the expansion of the post office at the end of the eighteenth century, and soon 
citizens across the nation were organizing themselves for action without the 
involvement of elites. This newfound capacity was a direct result of the adoption 
of new communication platforms, and it transformed the interactions both 
within and among the nation’s parties. Soon new forms of organization and 
action were springing up everywhere, with citizens engaging in forms of 
participation that would not have been possible just a decade before. This set up 
a number of fierce clashes between party elites and citizen activists, and despite 
their best efforts longtime party leaders quickly found themselves forced to share 
power with many political newcomers. Although the process of change is still 
very much underway, there are signs everywhere of parties transformed. 
Partisan information sources are becoming increasingly common and popular, 
replacing the long-standing system of nonpartisan news organized around a 
handful of powerful newspapers and television networks. This has driven a 
wave of polarization, leading to the fierce inter-party conflict that marked 
President Obama’s first term. By examining the history of this period and 
connecting it to the patterns of development of the late-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth centuries, the new infrastructure-driven model of party change will 
be tested and explored. Before turning to a discussion of that theory and the 
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models against which it will be compared, a few final notes on terms and 
methodologies are in order. 
 
Definitions of Terms and Notes on Methodologies 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines information as “knowledge 
communicated concerning some particular fact, subject, or event; intelligence, 
news.”13 Add political – “relating to or concerned with public life and affairs as 
involving questions of authority and government”14 – as a descriptor of a type of 
knowledge and you have the definition of political information as it will be used 
throughout this text. Notice that although the definition mentions the possibility 
that information may be factual, it does not require that the information actually 
be true. Concepts such as truth, opinion, fact, falsehood, and objectivity may be used 
to describe certain kinds of information, but they are not included in the 
definition of information itself. Note as well that the concept of communication is 
embedded within the definition of information. The reverse is true with 
communication, which is defined by the OED as “the transmission or exchange 
of information, knowledge, or ideas, by means of speech, writing, mechanical or 
electronic media, etc.”15 Information, in short, is meant to be communicated, 
while communication cannot take place without an attempt to impart 
information. Although other, more narrow definitions that allow for a complete 
                                                
13 Oxford English Dictionary, "Information, N" 
14 Oxford English Dictionary, "Political, Adj" 
15 Oxford English Dictionary, "Communication, N" 
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disentanglement of these two concepts do exist, they are generally only used 
when describing communication among machines, so I have chosen not to apply 
them here.16 
In this context, the term information infrastructure will be used to refer to one 
of the many systems of communication available throughout society at any given 
historical moment. This infrastructure can and often will be made up of a 
number of different platforms, but taken together these platforms present a 
unique set of opportunities for and constraints on the communication they 
enable. Examples of individual infrastructures include telephones, telegraphs, 
handbills, newspapers, magazines, letters, radio, and television. Note that 
although some of these technologies, such as the telegraph, include a mechanism 
for the transmission of messages, others, such as newspapers or letters, require 
separate delivery infrastructures to complete the communication. Some 
platforms will therefore have to be considered in tandem with others, such as the 
synergistic pairing of newspapers and the postal system in the early American 
republic. 
Although the information infrastructure has a specific set of characteristics 
when viewed at the aggregate level, due to uneven distribution, access, and 
development of the various technologies that make up the infrastructure, 
individuals and groups will have unequal access to its various components at 
                                                
16 The most interesting and influential definition of this sort is Claude Shannon’s 
interpretation of information and communication through the concept of entropy. 
Shannon’s work serves as one of the cornerstones for the field of information theory. For 
more, see Shannon and Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication 
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any given historical moment. Moreover, methods of communication will be 
unevenly adopted by individuals and groups at all levels of polity, so even after 
a technology has become available its use will often be quite uneven throughout 
the population. This uneven distribution and usage, which is driven at least in 
part by the various opportunities and constraints imposed by the individual 
technologies themselves, will create different patterns of communication in the 
polity over time. As will be detailed throughout this work, these shifting patterns 
can and often do drive changes in individual political behavior and group 
formation, evolution, and decline. 
Information policy refers to legislation that creates or alters one or more of the 
institutions or platforms that make up the infrastructure. As an example, various 
Postal Service Acts will be discussed here, each of which altered the available 
infrastructure in some significant way. Political information networks are systems 
created by actors to organize the distribution of information through the 
available infrastructures. As will be demonstrated, these networks are central to 
the operation of political parties in an extended republic. These networks are 
likely to change over time, both in response to the actions of political actors and 
to changes in the available infrastructure. Examples include Committees of 
Correspondence and partisan newspaper exchanges. Finally, the information 
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environment represents the collection of infrastructures, policies, and networks 
available to political actors at a given historical moment.17  
This project faces two significant methodological hurdles regarding its 
sources of evidence. Sources of reliable evidence are always a challenge for 
studies of eras beyond the recent past, but in this project the problem is 
particularly acute. Until the advent of digital communication networks, it was 
extraordinarily difficult to preserve an accurate and complete record of most 
forms of human communication. Over the years archivists have been able to 
accumulate sizable collections of written communication, but in nearly every 
case these archives remain substantially incomplete. Worse, oral communication 
of any sort, whether in person, over the telephone, or by broadcast technology, 
has until very recently been utterly impossible to preserve. The relative 
impermanence of communication is a problem that partisan information 
networks are in part designed to solve, and although this in some sense confirms 
the theory that will be outlined here, it makes verification of other aspects of the 
model a significant challenge. A second, related evidentiary challenge arises 
from the fact that many political actors work quite hard to keep their most 
important communications private. Compounding this is the fact that in many 
instances, the records that have been preserved are not necessarily representative 
of those that have been lost. Elites in America’s Founding generation were often 
quite good about preserving their correspondence for posterity, and although 
                                                
17 For a detailed discussion of similar concepts, see John, Recasting the Information 
Infrastructure for the Industrial Age. 
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this has in some respects been a boon to scholars, it has unfortunately also come 
with a high cost. The relative size and completeness of these elite records has led 
to their widespread use by scholars, and as a result, to the overrepresentation of 
elite views and perspectives in our histories of the period. As will be 
demonstrated throughout this work, this has improperly colored our 
understanding of the role of elites in the formation and evolution of parties, 
forcing non-elite actors whose communication went unpreserved  into the 
background of our investigations. Thanks to recent efforts by archivists to collect 
and digitize the era’s newspapers into searchable databases, however, the 
activities of a far larger segment of party actors can now be investigated, and it is 
to that task that a major portion of this work is dedicated. 
If an empirical examination of party history is the primary task of this work, 
its underlying motivation is explicitly normative. My goal, both generally as a 
scholar and specifically in this work, is to find a way to bring the people back in 
to the story of their politics, since it is they, and not the small group of elites to 
whom they grant temporary political authority, who necessarily comprise the 
overwhelming majority of history’s actors. Their individual actions may seem 
insignificant when viewed in isolation, but bound together in common cause 
they can and often do remake their political world. As both the theoretical and 
empirical analyses throughout this work will demonstrate, change comes more 
often than not from the hard work of activist citizens, the vast majority of whom 
participate in politics no more than part-time. Elites may often deliberately blur 
the distinction between aligning themselves with a growing movement and 
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having been instrumental in its creation, but as scholars and citizens we must not 
let their claims distract us from the truth of our own shared history. 
 
A Note on Technological Determinism 
Before turning to the plan for this work, a brief note on technological 
determinism. Works that focus on the role of technology in processes of change 
often and perhaps inevitably face charges of making deterministic arguments 
where, it is alleged, the properties of technology become responsible for the 
change being studied, leaving no room for the role of human actors. Although 
technologically deterministic arguments take a variety of forms, they have in 
common the idea that individual technologies act as powerful and fully 
independent causal forces on human cognition and behavior. For example, in The 
Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains, Pulitzer Prize winning author 
Nicholas Carr argues that use of the Internet diminishes an individual’s capacity 
for concentration and contemplation. In Carr’s telling, the processes by which we 
gather information, combined with the manner in which information is shared 
and stored on the Internet, are causing dramatic changes in human 
neuropsychology and neurobiology. Although individuals are free under this 
explanation to determine whether or not they use the Internet, once they choose 
to use it they are largely powerless to stop the damage it creates. Thus, the use of 
the technological determines the outcome irrespective of the wishes of its user. 
Whatever else this work is, it is most certainly not a work of technological 
determinism. Although it focuses on the roles of information and communication 
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technologies in politics, it does not at any point argue that a given technology 
requires anyone to do anything in particular, nor does it suggest that any specific 
technology can determine that certain forms of organization must exist. 
Although technology can and often does alter the opportunities and constraints 
for action, it cannot on its own make anyone act. Given that, this is not a study of 
technology in and of itself, but of the uses to which new technologies are put by 
actors seeking to create political change. From the development of post roads, 
telegraphy, and broadcast communication, to the adoption of lithography, 
linotype, and laser printing, the history of political communication in America is 
one of ever-increasing speed, complexity, and choice. New technologies have at 
important historical moments altered the opportunities for action, but the actors 
involved have always retained the ability to choose how best to act. Although the 
displacement of one communication technology by another may have created 
conditions potentially privileging one set of actors while disadvantaging others, 
it has not yet ever determined what those actors do in response. Infrastructure 
change may have made new forms of organization and organizational behavior 
possible, but it could not determine which groups would arise. And most 
fundamentally, although new technology may have opened the possibility for 
new voices to be heard, it could not compel them to speak nor at any point 
determine what they would say. Agency, in short, always has and always will 
reside in the individuals who make up the political system. 
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Plan for the Work 
Chapter Two begins by developing a new theoretical account for political 
parties built around an understanding of the role of communication in their 
development and evolution. The chapter begins with a general overview of the 
two traditional approaches used to describe parties, comparing in detail the elite-
led and group-centric models that have dominated scholarship on American 
parties. Although both models address the role of communication in party 
development in different respects, neither is able to account for the possibility 
that new forms of coordination premised on new opportunities for 
communication might alter the organization and behaviors of parties. To account 
for this possibility, a new model of party change is offered in which the nation’s 
communication infrastructure acts as a force for change. This model will be this 
work’s major theoretical contribution, and although it will only be applied to the 
study of political parties here, it has been constructed in a way that should allow 
its use in a variety of research contexts. 
Chapters Three, Four, Five, and Six deploy this new model to detail how the 
rapid evolution of communication altered the patterns of organization and 
participation in the pre-telegraphic United States. Chapter Three details the role 
the Post Office Act of 1792 played in undermining attempts by elites to control 
the nation’s political information environment. As this legislation was 
implemented, party leaders on both sides of the aisle attempted to create and 
control the flows of political information throughout society. Their efforts failed, 
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however, because the institutions they constructed for this task were 
incompatible with the infrastructures through which they were run.  
Chapter Four then explores the development of partisan networks outside of 
the control of elites. These networks were built by local party activists with little 
central direction, with individual activists using the postal system to connect 
their newspaper-backed political organization to the national party network. 
Thanks to the network’s decentralized structure, it survived Federalist attempts 
to criminalize the organization of opposition, becoming the network through 
which the new Democratic-Republican Party was brought into existence.  
But as Chapter Five demonstrates, that network’s greatest strength quickly 
became its greatest weakness. With the Federalists vanquished, the tensions 
latent within the Democratic-Republican coalition began to emerge, and as 
factions began organizing to fight for control, the lack of a mechanism for central 
control led to the rapid fragmentation of the network. This ushered in nearly two 
decades of fierce intra-party conflict at the state and local levels, decoupling state 
and national information networks and depolarizing national politics.  
As Chapter Six will show, however, by the early 1820s a series of important 
shifts in the nation’s information environment had allowed local partisan editors 
to become powerful political leaders within their states. As their attention turned 
to national politics following the 1824 presidential election, they used the 
dramatically improved postal network to create a sophisticated national party 
structure that swept Andrew Jackson into power in 1828. Having once been 
political outsiders persecuted for their attempts to participate on equal terms, 
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partisan editors became powerful political insiders, using their control of 
political information networks to control the party itself.  
Chapter Seven then concludes the empirical portion of the work by reviewing 
developments in the modern era. Although the details of the technologies, 
parties, and actors involved are all utterly unlike those presented in previous 
chapters, the patterns of party development show some striking similarities. 
These will be investigated in detail through a detailed examination of the history 
of factional conflict within the Democratic Party from 2002 to 2008. 
Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the book by reviewing the details of the 
infrastructure-driven model of party development and summarizing five major 
findings that have emerged from its application to the history of parties 
presented here. The chapter then ends with an extended discussion of the 
implications of the model for areas of research beyond political parties, including 
the study of public opinion, social movements, and political associations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Political Parties and Information: 
Communication, Conversation, Coordination 
 
“How exactly does a party go about nominating candidates and determining planks on a 
platform? It involves extensive, messy deliberation and coordination among political 
activists, major donors, some officeholders, party elders, interest group leaders, and 
others. In other words, it involves the community. That's what a party is. A party is 
not an alien presence imposing its will on the democratic process. Quite the contrary: a 
party emerges organically from the democratic process.” 
-- Seth Masket, “Here Comes Friedman's Radical Center.” 
 
 
“Each party has a platform, a prix fixe menu of beliefs making up its worldview. The 
candidate can choose one of the two platforms, but remember - no substitutions. For 
example, do you support universal health care? Then you must also want a ban on 
assaults weapons. Pro-limited government? Congratulations, you are also anti-abortion. 
Luckily, all human opinion falls neatly into one of the two clearly defined camps. Thus, 
the two-party system elegantly reflects the bichromatic rainbow that is American political 
thought.” 
-- Jon Stewart, America. 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a new theoretical account of political 
parties that identifies the role of information, communication, and infrastructure 
in party formation and evolution. This chapter begins with a general overview of 
the two traditional approaches used by political scientists to describe parties in 
the United States. Next, it explores how each of these approaches conceives of 
change within both individual parties and systems of parties. Following the logic 
of each model, a series of hypotheses is offered to describe how the party leaders 
identified in each model are likely to respond to changing opportunities for 
communication. In both models, changes to party organization come as a result 
of party leaders, and although other actors participate in whatever new methods 
of communication are implemented, party leaders remain in control of the 
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processes of change. However, because new patterns of communication often 
arise as a result of of technological changes that originate outside of politics, it is 
conceivable that changes in party organization and behavior will be driven by 
forces outside of the control of party leadership. To account for this possibility, 
the chapter concludes by developing a new model of party change, one in which 
changes to the nation’s communication infrastructure alters the opportunities 
and constraints for coordination faced by all three types of party actors 
simultaneously. The hypotheses generated by each of these three models will 
then be explored in detail through historical empirical analysis in subsequent 
chapters. 
Scholars have traditionally followed one of two approaches in their studies of 
who controls parties and how parties operate in the United States, and each 
approach has its own implications for the role of communication and 
information in the political process.18 The first school of thought views parties 
                                                
18 Scholars have developed a number of additional theories and frameworks to describe 
parties, but for a variety of reasons they cannot be applied here. Some, including the 
works of Duverger, Sartori, von Beyme, Mair, and Lijphart, are quite useful when 
examining changes in party organization in multi-party systems and cross-national 
analyses, but they are not applicable to the analysis of the evolution of a two-party 
system within a single country. For more, see Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic 
Systems," Comparative Political Studies; Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies; Lijphart, 
Electoral Systems and Party Systems : A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990; Mair, 
The West European Party System; von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies; Katz 
and Mair, How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western 
Democracies; Mair, Party System Change; Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems; 
Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.  
Many more frameworks have been developed to guide analyses of parties in a modern 
context. For a comprehensive overview of those, including a thorough assessment of 
existing concepts, typologies, and methodological approaches to dealing with 
contemporary parties, see Gunther, Montero and Linz, Political Parties: Old Concepts and 
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through the lens of individual action, generating models that describe parties as 
the creations of self-interested elites who organize primarily to manage electoral 
competition. Because these models are almost universally built atop rational 
choice theory, they offer important insights into the role of information and 
communication in the political process. But due to their narrow focus on the 
behavior of a tiny group of elites, they tend not to explore the role of 
communication beyond the interactions elites have with one another and with 
the benefit-seekers whom they attract. This leaves little room for the enormous 
volume of communication taking place among party activists, interest groups, 
social movements, and the electorate, limiting the ability of these models to 
generate insights into non-elite activity. Even more importantly, because these 
models hold parties to be exogenous to the mass public, they have great 
difficulty handling moments when the boundaries break down between political 
insiders and outsiders. Thus, although these models can generate insights into 
                                                                                                                                            
New Challenges; Webb, Farrell and Holliday, Political Parties in Advanced Industrial 
Democracies.  
There have of course been a number of outstanding studies over the years of party 
organization within the American context. Because many of these works focus on a 
single time period or region, however, they cannot be used to guide an analysis covering 
the full scope of American history. For excellent examples of these, see American 
Political Science Association, "Apsa Responsible Parties Project, 1950-2000."; Eldersveld, 
Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis; Mayhew, Planning Parties in American Politics: 
Organization, Electoral Settings, and Government Activity in the Twentieth Century; 
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter; Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and 
Pressure Groups; Key Jr, Southern Politics; Schattschneider, Party Government; Gerring, 
Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996. 
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party behavior during times of relative stasis, they are less well equipped to 
describe moments marked by instability and change. 
The second school of thought views parties through the lens of group action. 
In these models, parties act as institutions that join a diverse array of political 
groups into coalitions organized around shared understandings and goals. 
Rather than focus on a small group of elites, these models significantly widen 
their scope to bring the activities of a far more diverse set of groups and 
individuals into view. This leads to explanations that capture far more of the 
day-to-day activity taking place within the network of groups that make up a 
party, including the information they create and share. Recently, Cohen et al., 
have proposed an important reformulation of group-centered theory, updating it 
to build a new model that better captures the full range of party activity taking 
place in our modern political system. As will be demonstrated, this parties-as-
networks model significantly expands our understanding of the processes that 
guide the formation and evolution of parties. By focusing on the role of 
communication, it captures a far more complete picture of party activity as it 
occurs in an extended republic. However, because the model does not explicitly 
examine the conditions that make this communication possible, it remains 
incomplete.  
To address this gap, the chapter concludes by offering a new interpretation of 
party and party system change centered on the role the nation’s communication 
infrastructure plays in structuring party activity. This model is based on two 
straightforward premises. The first is that coordination in a large, geographically 
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dispersed republic (hereafter referred to as an extended republic) requires the 
development and use of a common communication infrastructure. In a small 
republic, individuals will inevitably be closely interlinked, but in an extended 
republic the vast majority of citizens are unlikely to ever directly interact with 
one another. Communication systems thus become the precursor to political 
association, allowing individuals to discover their common interests and 
coordinate on solutions to their shared problems. The second premise is that 
every communication system presents a unique set of opportunities and 
constraints for interaction which are based on the technological attributes of the 
network, including its geographic deployment. Because these networks are 
frequently the only mechanism through which actors can play an active role in 
partisan politics, their ability to participate in the party is at least partially 
dependent upon the state of infrastructure development in their local community. 
The resulting combination of uneven access to infrastructure and unique 
attributes of available networks can be expected to shape the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of political groups throughout society, giving rise to patterns of 
behavior within the parties that have in part been determined by the properties 
of the networks they use to coordinate. Because our models of parties have 
looked internally for the drivers of change, they have missed this potentially 
important mechanism for change within and among parties. 
Before turning to a consideration of these competing models, however, a few 
key terms must be defined. 
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Definitions 
Following Cohen et al., this work adopts the definition of political party 
offered by John Aldrich, who sees political parties as institutionalized coalitions 
meeting four important criteria. First, a party is a coalition or alliance of actors 
who share a set of common interests. Because these interests are broadly defined, 
however, the actors making up a party often pursue divergent goals, leading to 
tensions within their coalition. Second, a party is a coalition of political actors, 
and thus a subset of the mass public that makes up the polity. Depending on the 
specific model of parties, some subset of the voting population may be included 
as members, but in no model are all citizens included, as at least some portion of 
the population is assumed to have little or no interest in politics. Third, a party is 
an institutionalized coalition structured to operate over the long-term, with 
norms, rules, and procedures designed to maintain internal cohesion, guide 
action, and overcome external institutional obstacles. And fourth, parties aim to 
achieve their common interest through the control of government, defining 
themselves in part by the opponents they face.19 This final criterion suggests the 
importance of party interaction, and for this reason the concept of party systems 
has been developed. Returning to Aldrich, a party system is defined as, “(t)he 
system of political parties consists of all and only those parties whose actions 
                                                
19 For more, see Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look, 295-299; Cohen, Karol, Noel and 
Zaller, The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform, 20. For other 
influential definitions of parties, see Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France; Downs, 
An Economic Theory of Democracy; Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National 
Elections; Schattschneider, Party Government 
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help determine the outcome, and whose actions are contingent upon the 
(anticipated) actions of all other parties, and vice versa.” Given the diversity of 
the American political system across its many levels and jurisdictions, any study 
of party system change must examine not only the number of parties in 
competition with one another, but also the variations in their institutional 
structures across the numerous districts and levels that make up the complex 
federalist system that are these United States.20 
 Within the literature on parties, a key point of disagreement centers on how 
broadly to define the concept of a “partisan political actor.” Three different types 
of actors can be identified, each associated with a different aspect of day-to-day 
party activity. The first group, known the party-in-government, is made up of the 
individual actors who are either seeking or currently holding political office. This 
is the most narrow classification of the three, and it is therefore included in every 
model. The second group, the party-as-organization, refers to the professionals, 
activists, and volunteers who regularly act on behalf of or in concert with the 
party to which they have a standing commitment. Nearly every model includes 
this component in some form, although there is widespread disagreement among 
models over precisely what role this group plays in party life. Finally, the party-
in-the-electorate refers to the members of the polity who consistently vote for one 
party over another. This is by far the broadest of the three classifications, but 
                                                
20 Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look, 56-60. For a comprehensive look at the different 
types of party systems, see Sartori and Mair, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for 
Analysis 
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because the members of this group are defined by most models to play little or 
no role in politics beyond voting, their role in party politics is generally 
considered the most minimal of the three.21  
Broadly speaking, the literature on political parties can be organized based on 
which of these three groups are understood to be dominant within parties. In one 
set of models, the office-seeking elites of the party-in-government are in control, 
with the party-as-organization acting as their supporting cast in a competition for 
political power. In another set of models, the activists that collectively make up 
the party-as-organization direct parties, with members of the party-in-government 
competing for the privilege to represent their interests within the party. The 
literature largely lacks models that define the party-in-the-electorate as the primary 
force shaping party politics, in no small part because active participation in 
politics inexorably draws individuals out of the electorate and into the party’s 
organization within and around government.22 Before turning to an examination 
                                                
21 For more on each of these components, see Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups; 
Sorauf, Party Politics in America 
22 The closest the literature comes to a theory of parties where the party-in-the-electorate 
acts as the primary driver of party activity is with the theories of electoral realignments 
and critical elections. In these models, American political parties change as coalitions of 
voters shift allegiance from one party to another, driving wholesale changes in party 
behavior, leadership, ideology, and organization. Although these models address long-
term patterns in party behavior, because they are not primarily concerned with 
processes of party leadership, they will not be considered in detail here. For more, see 
Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System; Brewer and Stonecash, Dynamics of American 
Political Parties; Mayhew, Electoral Realignments; Burnham, Critical Elections and the 
Mainsprings of American Politics; Key Jr, "A Theory of Critical Elections," The Journal of 
Politics; Chambers and Burnham, American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development    
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of the processes by which this shift takes place, an overview of each of the 
competing models is in order.    
 
Two Models of Parties 
On Parties as Elite-led Institutions 
The first perspective on parties sees them as institutions created and 
controlled by the office-seeking and office-holding elites who make up the party-
in-government. These models grow out of the world of rational choice theory, and 
can be traced most clearly through the works of Joseph Schumpeter, Anthony 
Downs, Joseph Schlesinger, and John Aldrich.23 Seeing parties first and foremost 
as vehicles for organizing electoral competition, they place a small set of political 
actors at the center of party life, with the actions of affiliated groups and 
individuals interpreted through the support they provide to candidates and 
elected officials.24 This is party politics as viewed from the top-down, with elites 
directing the activity of their allies in much the same way as a general orders 
                                                
23  Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look; Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy; 
Schlesinger, "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory," 
The American Political Science Review; Schlesinger, "On the Theory of Party Organization," 
The Journal of Politics; Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office; Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
24 See, for example, Cotter and Bibby, "Institutional Development of Parties and the 
Thesis of Party Decline," Political Science Quarterly; Mayhew, Placing Parties in American 
Politics. An extreme version of this interpretation can be seen in the “party decline” 
literature of the 1970s and 1980s, which posited that party organization had become 
almost entirely focused on candidate-centered campaigns. For more, see Fiorina, "The 
Decline of Collective Responsibility in American Politics," Daedalus; Mayhew, Congress: 
The Electoral Connection, Second Edition; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, The Personal Vote: 
Constituency Service and Electoral Independence; Burnham, The Current Crisis in American 
Politics 
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troops into battle. Although this view of parties has undoubtedly been around in 
some form for as long as parties have existed, its first complete formulation in 
the literature can be found in Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy.25 For 
Downs, a party is best understood as “a team seeking to control the governing 
apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election,” with individual team 
members operating, to borrow and modify a phrase from David Mayhew, as 
single-minded seekers of election and reelection.26 In this model a relatively large 
party-in-government directs a relatively small party-as-organization, with the party-
in-the-electorate defined to be entirely outside the scope of party organization. 
Downs’ interpretation has influenced a generation of scholars, leading to a 
number of reformulations and expansions, none more important than John 
Aldrich’s Why Parties?27 Rather than define elites so single-mindedly, Aldrich 
grants the possibility that they may hold multiple, overlapping motivations, 
including policy-specific motives that exist independent of their desires to win 
election. Electoral success in this more nuanced model thus becomes both a 
                                                
25  Downs’ work was preceded by Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy, which was intended as a rebuttal to those who held what the author believed 
was an overly romantic notion of democracy. In his definition, democracy was an elite-
centered phenomenon in which the public’s only real form of participation came during 
the competition for electoral support. Although parties are featured in his analysis, his 
primary focus is on office-seekers and elected officials, so it was left to Downs and 
others to identify the precise role parties played in an elite-dominated understanding. 
26 Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 25. For more on elites as “single-minded 
seekers of reelection,” see Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, Second Edition. 
27 For some examples of this view of parties interpreted in a legislative context, see Cox, 
The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England ; 
Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of 
Representatives; Cox and McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House 
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means and an end, allowing elites to hold and exercise power as they pursue 
their policy goals.  
Whatever the motivation of elites, the party-as-organization in these models is 
understood to exist for the benefit of the party-in-government. Given the 
enormous geographic size of the American republic, the scope of its federalist 
structures, the diversity of its population, and the complexity of its information 
environment, the elites who make up the party-in-government have no choice but 
to ally with politically motivated actors outside of the formal institutions of 
government. This need is what drives the creation of the party-as-organization, a 
group that includes both the powerful men and women who control large stores 
of money, information, and expertise, and the less powerful but equally 
important individuals who volunteer their time, money, and effort to advance 
the party’s cause. These “benefit seekers,” as Schlesinger terms them, are a 
collective resource that the party-in-government actively cultivates in order to win 
elections and pursue policy goals.28 By organizing them into a coherent alliance 
and directing them towards specific tasks, elites are able to mobilize the 
resources necessary to conduct national campaigns. 
Voters are of course the ultimate target of these campaigns, but they are 
nevertheless explicitly excluded from these models. As Aldrich explains, it is 
elites who “produce” the candidates, platforms, and policies that citizens 
                                                
28 Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look; Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers 
in the United States; Schlesinger, "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of 
Positive Theory"; Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office 
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“consume,” so no matter how strongly voters identify with a party, their roles 
are understood to be passive until and unless they become active members in at 
least one of the allied groups that make up the party-as-organization.29 Thus 
defined, elections become elite-led battles for attention and interest, with parties 
working feverishly to shape and control the information flowing to the voting 
public. Just as manufacturers use media networks to attract potential buyers to 
their products, so too do parties in this model use media networks to sell 
candidates and policies to the voting public. Voters may of course share 
information with one another, but when they do their actions are understood as 
an extended effect of elite communication and action. Thus defined, the party-in-
the-electorate plays almost no direct role in party politics.  
 
On Parties as Activist Coalitions 
If the elite-centric view of parties captures the perspective of those who make 
up the party-in-government, the group-centric view captures that of the much 
more diverse party-as-organization. Rather than focus very narrowly on a small 
group of self-interested elites, group-based models widen the frame to explore 
the motivations and actions of the myriad groups that populate the political 
world. The picture of parties these models paint is much more diverse and 
chaotic, with the members of the party-in-government caught in a web of 
                                                
29 Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look, 18-19; Popkin, Gorman, Phillips and Smith, 
"Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of 
Voting," American Political Science Review 
  
36 
conflicting demands spun by the groups competing for influence within the 
party-as-organization. Unlike the party-in-government, which is organized around a 
limited number of elected and appointed offices, the party-as-organization has no 
obvious limiting factor beyond resource and coordination constraints. This 
makes its boundaries far more porous, resulting in a dynamic system that is far 
more open to influence from outsiders, including activists intent on creating 
transformational change. Like the elite-based models, however, the citizens who 
choose to remain within the party-in-the-electorate are understood to play only a 
minor role in party politics, with their participation limited to voting in party 
primaries and the general election.30 
The roots of the group-centric model can be seen in the writings of James 
Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville, but its first full formulation in the political 
science literature is found in the works of V.O. Key Jr., Samuel Eldersveld, and 
E.E. Schattschneider.31 Instead of unitary organizations operated by and for 
office-holding elites, parties in this model are understood as loosely knit 
coalitions of groups united under a shared set of goals, ideas, symbols, traditions, 
and narratives. Because the groups that make up the party-as-organization are 
                                                
30 For an excellent overview of this approach to parties, see Eldersveld and Walton, 
Political Parties in American Society, 107-108. 
31 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 166-172; Madison, 1792, Parties, National Gazette, 
January 23; Madison, No 10: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction 
and Insurrection (Continued); Bonetto, "Alexis De Tocqueville's Concept of Political 
Parties," American Studies; Connelly Jr., James Madison Rules America: The Constitutional 
Origins of Congressional Partisanship. For examples of the modern approach, see 
Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis; Hershey, Party Politics in America, 15th 
Edition; Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups; Schattschneider, Party Government 
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semiautonomous, elites within the party-in-government must compete for 
influence and authority, creating a dynamic system in which some level of 
tension among allies is the norm. Rather than view parties as a unified team with 
clearly identifiable leaders, these models instead see parties as “dispersed 
clusters” of activists and interests who work together to “push candidates, frame 
issues, recruit workers, make alliances, and devise campaigns.”32 Where the elite-
led models argue parties answer to officeholders, group-led models counter that 
they belong to the ever-shifting coalitions of activists using them to solve 
problems of coordination, collaboration, and competition. Party leadership in 
group models thus becomes an emergent phenomenon, with a wide variety 
actors potentially serving as leaders, including party officers, elected officials, 
business and interest group leaders, newspaper editors and journalists, political 
consultants, local volunteers, and myriad other citizen activists.  
Although this view of parties as massive coordination and communication 
enterprises fell out of favor among political scientists in the second half of the 
twentieth century, it has recently been revived in the work of party networks 
scholars, most noticeably in the theory of parties proposed by Cohen, Karol, Noel, 
and Zaller in The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform.33 
                                                
32 Key Jr, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 329; Schlesinger, "On the Theory of Party 
Organization" 390 
33 For some excellent examples of the parties-as-networks approach, see Bawn, Cohen, 
Karol, Masket, Noel and Zaller, "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands 
and Nominations in American Politics," Perspectives on Politics; Cohen, Karol, Noel and 
Zaller, The Party Decides; Karol, Party Position Change in American Politics; Koger, Masket 
and Noel, "Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks," British Journal of 
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Their model, which is offered as an explicit alternative to Aldrich’s elite-centered 
framework, describes parties as diverse, loosely affiliated coalitions joined 
together around a shared set of ideals and goals. Here members of the party-in-
government are far more likely to be followers than leaders, with the party-as-
organization keeping a careful watch over both current and future office holders 
to make sure they faithfully advance their party’s goals. To illustrate just how 
thorough a change in perspective this is from the elite-centric models, the 
authors employ a fishing metaphor. Elite-centric theories, they argue, 
misunderstand parties the way most people misunderstand fishing tournaments: 
working under the assumption that it is the contestants, rather than the fish, who 
determine the outcome, they focus their attention solely on the activity above the 
water. The contestants in the tournament, however, recognize that the fish have 
agency, so they employ sophisticated and often highly idiosyncratic techniques 
to catch the fish. These fisherman recognize that if they do not take the interests 
of the fish into account, they will have no hope of winning the tournament. Elite-
centric theories follow a similar fisherman-centric logic in that they assume it is 
the candidates, rather than the groups these candidates are trying to “catch,” 
who determine the outcome of party contests. But people, of course, have 
                                                                                                                                            
Political Science; Koger, Masket and Noel, "Cooperative Party Factions in American 
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considerably more agency than fish, and beneath the surface of candidate activity 
lies the complex world of party activism, where a diverse array of participants 
work to determine who will be granted the temporary distinction of being 
named among the party’s elite. In the world of parties, the “fish” not only have 
agency, but they can and nearly always do collaborate behind the scenes to 
organize the contest, set its rules, and coordinate its outcomes.34 
 By focusing on this large and largely opaque world of party activity, rather 
than on the candidates who most obviously represent it, the group-based models 
make clear that parties exist for reasons far more complex than the needs of 
office-seeking elites. Candidates might choose under which party’s banner to run, 
but it is up to the active and informed membership of each party to determine 
which among them are worthy of support. From this perspective, parties belong 
to the allied groups of the party-as-organization, each of which is made up of large 
numbers of intense policy demanders (IPDs) who actively participate in party 
politics.35 Nearly all of the individuals who work within the system to create 
political change can be described as IPDs, and although some join parties only 
for brief periods, others commit themselves to a lifetime’s work. Across 
American history, IPDs have organized to defend slavery and oppose 
                                                
34 Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller, The Party Decides, 190-191 
35 Intense Policy Demander (IPD) is the term used by Cohen et al. to describe the 
individuals who make up the party-as-organization. To qualify as an IPD, an individual 
must meet three criteria: they must be driven to participate in politics by a policy-related 
demand or set of demands; they must be active participants in the political process on 
behalf of those demands; and they must exist in sufficient numbers and strength within 
the polity so as to be influential in some way. Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller, The Party 
Decides, 19-32, 47-80 
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segregation, to fight for the rights of gun owners and against the sale of alcohol, 
and to guarantee universal health insurance and oppose the regulation of 
medical care. 
Because no single IPD is powerful enough to drive change on his or her own, 
IPDs inevitably form groups, confirming Tocqueville’s observation that 
associational behavior lies at the heart of American politics.36 These groups may 
be formally organized, but they need not be, and in different eras will take 
different forms depending upon the needs of the individuals involved, the forces 
arrayed against them, and the historical and institutional contexts within which 
they operate. These groups in turn seek out allies, forming the super-coalitions 
that become the party-as-organization. Policy might be an IPDs primary motivator, 
but elections are their primary venue for action, with most of their activity taking 
place in the “invisible primary” among party actors that sets the stage for the 
party primaries that precede the general election. During this period, which is 
typically downplayed in most elite-centric models, numerous candidates seek 
nomination by building support across the various groups that make up their 
party’s coalition. This gives IPDs an enormous opportunity for influence, as they 
are free to work with allies to pick and choose the individuals they believe will 
most reliably represent their party. Formal party leaders often play important 
roles at this stage, but because they have usually been drawn from the associated 
                                                
36 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 180-186 
  
41 
groups that make up the party, they inevitably bring group politics into play as 
they act.37 
It is important to recognize that this model does not ignore the role of office-
seeking elites in parties, nor does it does it reject many of the findings of theories 
that place them at the center of party life. Officeholders and candidates do all of 
the things they are said to do in the elite-centric model: ambitious politicians 
create campaign organizations in advance of elections and form partisan 
legislative institutions in their aftermath, working hand in hand with members of 
the party-as-organization at every step. However, because the party is made up of 
a diverse array of IPDs, and because the motives of those IPDs extend well 
beyond the concerns of what it best for the specific elites who hold power at any 
given moment, it is group goals, actions, and institutions that are understood to 
be central to party activity. Where the elite view of parties sees groups acting as 
agents of ambitious elites, the group view sees these elites acting for the benefit 
of themselves and their allies, with the groups in firm control of party 
organization over the long term.  
 
  
                                                
37 For a discussion of the Invisible Primary, see Cohen et al., 12-14, 102-04, 78-79. 
Although the term was first coined by Arthur Hadley in his book by the same name, 
Cohen et al., take Marjorie R. Hershey’s description of the invisible primary as their own. 
As quoted on page 10, it reads: “Almost all serious candidates begin at least two years 
before the election to take polls, raise money, identify active supporters in the sates with 
early primaries, and compete for the services of respected consultants. Their aim is to 
win a place for themselves in the group of candidates who are described by the media as 
‘front-runners.’” Hershey, Party Politics in America, 177 
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How Parties Change 
Each of these competing models offers a unique explanation for the processes 
that drive changes to party organization and behavior. In keeping with their 
distinctive perspectives, each of these explanations focuses on the leadership of a 
single type of actor, with other members of the party defined by how well they 
follow the path set out before them by their leaders. Because any change in party 
structure or direction requires the coordination of large numbers of 
geographically dispersed actors, intra-party communication must be an essential 
precursor to and component of change. Both Aldrich and Cohen et al. hint at the 
importance of such communication, but because they are focused more on who 
leads parties than on how parties are led, they do not examine such 
communication in any detail. This section takes up that overlooked task, 
following the logic of each model to determine how party leaders will use new 
technologies as they become available, and by extension how such use might 
alter the organization and behavior of the parties they lead. In both the elite-led 
and group-centric models presented here, changes in the patterns of 
communication are the result of the decisions of party leaders, and although 
other actors will undoubtedly participate in whatever new methods of 
communication are implemented, both models insist that such implementation 
within the party only comes because of its leaders. However, because  new 
patterns of communication can and often do arise because of technological 
changes sweeping through the broader society of which parties are a part, it is 
conceivable that changes in party organization and behavior might be driven by 
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forces outside of the control of party leadership. To account for this previously 
unexplored possibility, I will offer a third and entirely new model of party 
change, one in which changes to the nation’s communication infrastructure alter 
the opportunities and constraints for coordination faced by all three types of 
party actors simultaneously. 
 
How Elite-led Models Understand Change 
In the elite-led models, parties change when the elites who make up the party-
in-government become convinced that such change is necessary. As Aldrich 
explains, “it was the actions of political actors that created political parties in the 
first place, and it is the actions of political actors that shape and alter them over 
time.”38 A wide variety of forces can work to convince party leaders that change 
is necessary, but they are generally understood to fall into one of three major 
categories. First, the electoral goals of party leaders might change, leading them 
to develop new forms of organization and behavior to accommodate these new 
ambitions. Second, changes to the institutions of government may drive new 
forms of behavior, leading to the development of new party structures and the 
abandonment of older ones. Third, historical forces might motivate elites to 
change, as the relentless evolution of ideas, norms, and technologies shape and 
                                                
38 Throughout his work, Aldrich uses the phrase “political actors” interchangeably with 
the “ambitious office seekers” he defines as party leaders. Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second 
Look, 17 
  
44 
reshape the realties of political life.39  In all three categories, party leaders bring 
change in response to external events, but under the elite-led model of parties, 
such change always and only comes as a direct result of the actions of elites. In 
this model, the party-in-government was, is, and always will be, in charge. 
Although Aldrich does not explore the subject in detail, it is in this final 
category that the potential for the information environment to act as a force for 
change enters the elite-led model of party politics.40 On the one hand, as new 
forms of communication enable new patterns of interaction among individuals, 
party leaders are likely to find that their ability to oversee and interconnect the 
members of the party-as-organization has changed. On the other hand, they are 
also likely to find that these new forms of communication allow for new forms of 
interaction with the voting public. Following the logic of the elite-led model, 
these leaders can be expected in both circumstances to adapt party organization 
and behavior to account for these new opportunities and constraints, building 
new support systems within the party-as-organization as necessary to support 
their continued quests for electoral and policy success. As one example, the 
transition from newspapers to broadcast networks necessitated the development 
                                                
39 Readers familiar with rational-choice-based “new institutionalism” will recognize 
these as the key components of that framework, which sees political outcomes as the 
result of rational actors seeking to achieve goals by working within and/or altering a 
given set of institutional and historical constraints. For more, see Hall and Taylor, 
"Political Science and the New Institutionalisms," Political Studies; Shepsle, Rational 
Choice Institutionalism 
40 Beyond the brief mention in the introduction of the potential for technology to act as a 
force for change, Aldrich only addresses a single technology – television – in any detail 
in his analysis. Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look, 282-285, 304-305  
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of loyal organizations that could construct technically sophisticated advertising 
campaigns, a task well beyond the abilities of the office-seeking elites of the day. 
As another example, the development of database technologies led elites to 
develop the reliably partisan direct mail operations that revolutionized voter 
contact and fundraising. In these and many other instances, the development of 
new communication technologies altered the opportunities and constraints for 
political interaction, leading elites to alter party organization and behavior in 
response. Following this logic, three specific hypotheses can be offered about 
how members of the party-in-government can be expected to adapt to a changing 
information environment:  
First, in keeping with this top-down view of parties, it will be elites who 
dictate how and when new communication technologies are deployed in 
partisan politics. Given that parties in this model operate under the direction of 
office-seeking elites, the use of communication technologies within parties will 
be driven by the needs of the party-in-government. Although the members of the 
party-as-organization will undoubtedly be involved in these processes of change, 
this model explicitly casts them in the role of expert support staff, building and 
managing the institutions that coordinate the use of these technologies. Because 
elites cannot realistically oversee all of the day-to-day operation of these 
institutions, these institutions are likely to have some degree of flexibility and 
independence. Nevertheless, the model predicts that elites will retain sufficient 
control to bring wayward organizations into line should they fail to consistently 
advance the interests of the party-in-government they are designed to serve.  
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Second, as elites alter their behaviors to take advantage of new opportunities 
for communication, new patterns of interaction among elites and their 
supporters will emerge. As the communication environment changes, some 
individuals are likely to find themselves better equipped to take advantage of the 
shift than others, as the skills needed to effectively communicate differ from 
technology to technology. Just as the shift from newspapers to radio 
broadcasting increased the importance of a certain type of public speaking skill, 
so too did television increase the importance of visual appearance. When 
coupled with the changing preferences of the voters that make up the party-in-
the-electorate, such a shift might alter the balance of power both within and 
among parties. 
Third, as elites alter their patterns of communication, voters will find their 
experience of politics altered, with new forms of messaging replacing older ones 
in the ongoing battle to attract attention and build support. These voters will not, 
however, find their role in party politics expanded beyond that of passive 
consumers, for as the elite-led models of party systems demands, it will be the 
elites in the party-in-government who remain firmly in control of party politics, 
and it will be they alone who alter party institutions and patterns of behavior. As 
Aldrich explains, “it was the actions of political actors that created political 
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parties in the first place,” so it must be the “actions of political actors that shape 
and alter them over time.”41 
Understood together, these hypotheses suggest that the spread of new 
communication technologies should provide opportunities for elites to alter the 
patterns of interaction and organization within their parties, and by extension, 
among their supporters and the electorate as a whole. If and when individuals 
outside the party-in-government choose to engage in partisan communication 
independent of elites, these efforts should not be expected to alter party structure, 
organization, or behavior. In the end, no matter the changes to the 
communication environment, the party-in-government will remain firmly in 
control of the parties.  
 
How Group-Centric Models Understand Change 
 
In the group-centric model, political parties change as a result of the actions 
of the IPDs that make up the party-as-organization. Because policy concerns are by 
definition the primary force motivating IPDs, policy concerns are expected to 
serve as the main driver for changing party behavior and organization. Like the 
elite-led model, the group-centric model also expects institutional and historical 
settings to play important roles in the processes of change, with activists 
adapting party organization to the changing contexts within which they operate. 
But where the elite-led model sees change occurring only through the deliberate 
                                                
41 Although Aldrich uses the phrase “political actors” here, he directly connects this 
elsewhere to the “ambitious office seekers” he has defined as party elites. For more, see 
Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look, 18 
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acts of one or more specific individuals, the group-centric model allows for the 
possibility that it might also be an emergent phenomenon, with new patterns of 
behavior developing organically out of the loosely coordinated actions of allied 
IPDs. Although this model allows for the possibility that clearly identifiable 
leaders might purposefully drive change, it does not require it. Changing group 
dynamics within the party coalition might also constitute clearly identifiable 
change, leading to the emergence of new forms of organization and behavior that 
do not have a single, clearly identifiable source. Because the size, strength, and 
number of active groups within each party coalition are expected to change as 
policy problems, institutions, and historical settings change, the balance of power 
within a given coalition is likely to be dependent in part upon those same factors. 
Given this, it is essential that any study of party change guided by this model 
closely examine the patterns of interaction within the party-as-organization over 
time, and it is here that the information environment enters as a force for change. 
Because political parties in this model operate as long-term alliances among 
actors who are unlikely to ever meet in person, the party’s institutions must find 
ways to facilitate communication among members. As new opportunities for 
communication arise, IPDs will inevitably find ways to put them to good use, 
changing the patterns of interaction within the party-as-organization, and by 
extension, potentially altering the balance of power among the groups that form 
it. At the same time, IPDs are also likely to find new ways to interact with 
members of both the party-in-government and party-in-the-electorate, changing the 
patterns of political communication throughout society. Over time, these 
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informal processes are likely to lead to the development of new formal 
institutions within the party, as support structures are built to help ensure 
information continues to flow from the party throughout society. Although 
Cohen et al. do not explicitly trace the role of communication infrastructure 
change in their model, by following their logic of party growth and development, 
several predictions can be offered about how members of the party-as-organization 
can be expected to adapt when new technologies create new opportunities for 
communication. 
First, in keeping with this inside-out view of parties, it will be members of the 
party-as-organization who primarily dictate how and when new communication 
technologies are deployed in partisan politics. Although the members of the 
party-in-government will undoubtedly participate in these processes of change, 
altering their campaigns and legislative efforts to account for new opportunities 
and constraints, the primary drivers of change will be IPDs working to build 
support for favored issues and candidates by sharing information and 
coordinating action. As the members of the party-as-organization develop 
institutions to build and manage partisan information networks, the members of 
the party-in-government will compete for access to these institutions in precisely 
the same ways the model predicts they will compete for other party resources. 
Second, as these IPDs deploy new forms of communication, either by altering 
existing information networks or creating entirely new ones, new forms of intra-
party coordination and competition are likely to emerge. As Schattschneider has 
observed, “visibility” and “publicity” are central to the processes of pressure 
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group politics, so any technological change that alters the terms of interaction 
among allies and adversaries can be expected to alter the balance of power 
among groups.42  While some groups will find the new environment more 
conducive to their activities, others will find themselves facing challenges they 
are ill-quipped to meet. Over time, such a shift might lead to a new balance of 
power both within and among the parties.  
Third, because party nominations function as the principal means by which 
IPDs exert their influence, the first signs of such change should be found in the 
outcomes of party primaries and state and local elections. On the one hand, 
primaries offer the most direct path for influencing the direction of the party at 
every level of government. On the other, local venues for action frequently 
provide more immediate opportunities for policy influence than national 
elections. The presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court are all important 
prizes for IPDs, but so too are the governorships, state legislatures, county 
commissions, city councils, judgeships, and numerous other state and local 
positions that are elected each year. Any study of party change under this model 
will therefore need to look outside of the nation’s capital if it is to capture a 
complete picture of party activity. 
Fourth, as IPDs alter their patterns of interaction to account for these new 
opportunities, voters will find their experience of politics altered as the 
information distributed by the competing parties changes. Although the average 
                                                
42 Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America, 16-
17 
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voter is not likely to find their role in party politics expanded beyond that of a 
passive consumer, some subset of the population may become active participants 
as they receive new information that motivates them to action. If these 
conversions happen in large enough numbers, they can shift the balance of 
partisan power, both within individual parties and throughout the party system 
as a whole. Moreover, even in the absence of widespread conversion of voters 
from passive to active participation in politics, it is entirely possible that changes 
to the flows of information will lead to changes in attitudes and voting behaviors, 
altering the fates of the parties come Election Day.43  In the end, however, control 
of the parties will remain firmly in the hand of the groups that make up the 
party-as-organization, thus confirming the central premise of these group-based 
models. 
 
The Infrastructure-driven Model of Party Change 
The elite-led and group-centric models stand in direct opposition to another 
on most of the key issues surrounding why parties form and how they evolve, 
but it is important to note that they nevertheless share three related assumptions 
about the relationships among the party-in-government, party-as-organization, and 
party-in-the-electorate. First, both frameworks agree that of the three components 
the party-in-the-electorate has the least significant impact on party organization 
and behavior. Second, they agree that as changes take place within and among 
                                                
43 This follows the logic of Zaller’s theories on the connection between information flows 
and attitude change. For more, see Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion  
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parties, the boundaries between the passive party-in-the-electorate and the active 
party-as-organization remain clear. Third, they assume that when change comes to 
party organization, it comes only from within the party, and more specifically, 
from within the component of the party that the model identifies as controlling. 
Working within these theoretical constraints, both Aldrich and Cohen provide 
rich and detailed accounts of the evolution of parties, but in neither of their 
analyses is any consideration given to the possibility that there may be moments 
when these assumptions fail to hold. There are important theoretical reasons to 
believe that this is a mistake. 
The root of this theoretical problem lies in the assumption that the border 
between the party-in-the-electorate and the party-as-organization will remain clear 
as parties evolve. In both the group-centric and elite-led models of parties, the 
party-as-organization is defined nebulously, and is generally understood to 
include the groups and individuals who play an active and ongoing role in party 
politics. In addition to all of the people holding positions of power within the 
numerous formal party institutions at the state, local, and national levels, the 
party-as-organization in both models includes the interest groups, think tanks, 
social movements, business and labor associations, and activists who directly 
involve themselves in electoral politics and policy through ongoing interactions 
with other partisans. 44   Separate and apart from this component of party 
organization stands the party-in-the-electorate, the voters who hold firm 
                                                
44 Aldrich, Why Parties? A Second Look, 17-19; Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller, The Party 
Decides, 30-36 
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allegiances to a party but who do not participate beyond voting on Election Day. 
Thus defined, the boundary between the two groups becomes a simple and 
enduring fact of partisan organization: active partisans live within the groups 
that make up the party-as-organization; passive partisans live as largely atomized 
individuals within the party-in-the-electorate. Leaving aside the potentially thorny 
problem of how best to define which modes of behavior mark an individual as 
“active,” this model of organization does not allow room for the consideration of 
the systemic problems individuals might face when attempting to participate in 
politics, and by extension, of the impact the resolution of these problems might 
have on parties over time. If such problems could be demonstrated to be either 
largely random or epiphenomenal to partisan politics, the inability of our models 
to account for them would be only a minor concern. However, the realities of 
communication and organization in an extended republic suggest that many of 
these problems of participation are likely to be both nonrandom and therefore 
directly relevant to the operation of party politics.  
As Madison first noted in Federalist 10, the great size of the American republic 
makes problems of political communication an impediment to partisan 
coordination and organization. “Extend the sphere,” he wrote, and you make it 
“difficult for all who feel [a common motive] to discover their own strength, and 
to act in unison with each other.”45 In a small republic, individuals will inevitably 
be closely interlinked, allowing them to easily share information, build 
                                                
45 Madison, No 10: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic Faction and 
Insurrection (Continued) 
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community, and when appropriate find common cause. But in an extended 
republic, the vast majority of citizens are unlikely to ever directly interact, with 
most remaining entirely ignorant of one another’s existence for the entirety of 
their lives. Although many of these atomized individuals are likely to have face 
common problems and share common political interests, their potential to “act in 
unison” remains untapped so long as they cannot communicate. Such 
communication can involve any number of intermediaries and need not be direct, 
but it must exist if these individuals are to join together and form the interest 
groups, social movements, and parties that dominate political life. Madison’s 
claims were later echoed by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America, his 
now-classic study of political behavior in the early American republic. Noting 
the great difficulty individuals faced when coordinating activity over great 
distances, Tocqueville observed that meaningful political association is only 
possible when citizens find consistently reliable ways to communicate despite 
their separation. This led him to posit a necessary relationship between 
newspapers and associations, one in which “the newspaper represents the 
association,” and “speaks to each of its readers in the name of all the 
others...allowing those wandering spirits who had long sought each other in the 
shadows [to] finally meet each other and unite” across the vast distances that 
made up the young American republic.”46 
                                                
46  In his own words: “Newspapers make associations, and associations make 
newspapers.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Harvey C Mansfield and 
Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 493-495. The 
consequences of Tocqueville’s observations need not, of course, be limited to the 
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As both of these arguments make clear, coordination in an extended republic 
requires the development and use of a common communication infrastructure, 
for without it the “discovery” necessary for political association and action at a 
distance is simply not possible. Understood in their most basic forms, these 
infrastructures operate as institutions built around a specific set of technologies 
that can be used to send and receive messages at a distance. Over time, these 
institutions change as both the available technologies and needs of society 
change, making both the individual infrastructures and the communication 
environment of which they are a part a variable feature of the political landscape. 
In some cases infrastructures will change because of the work of political actors, 
such as when a new regulatory regime alters the operation of a specific network; 
in others they will change thanks to the efforts of nonpolitical actors, for example 
when entrepreneurs create new businesses and deploy new technologies. Given 
that these infrastructure are precursors to political association and coordinated 
action, and given that each infrastructure shapes and orders the interactions that 
it enables, we must consider the possibility that these infrastructures act as 
independent variables responsible for altering party behavior and organization 
over time.  
                                                                                                                                            
American case. Following a similar line of reasoning, Benedict Anderson places the 
spread of print-capitalism in general, and newspapers in specific, at the heart of the 
origins of national consciousness and the rise of the nation-state in his classic work on 
nationalism, Imagined Communities. Even more broadly, as Bruce Bimber notes in 
Information and American Democracy, this chapter of Tocqueville likely represents the first 
explicit claim by a social scientist that collective action requires the solving of 
information problems. (p. 16) 
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Following this logic, an infrastructure-driven model of party change rests on 
three basic assumptions. First, without a common source of political information, 
geographically dispersed individuals are unlikely to recognize that they share a 
common political purpose. Second, without access to a shared information 
infrastructure, individuals will be unable to coordinate around that common 
purpose. Third, because no two communication systems are alike, no two 
systems will offer the same opportunities and constraints for sharing information 
and organizing action, giving rise to patterns of behavior that are in part 
determined by the properties of the network. Some networks allow for real-time 
two-way communication, while others introduce large delays or do not allow for 
the possibility of a response; some are private networks, others public, yet others 
operate in modes that fall somewhere in between; some allow for the centralized 
control of information, others are structured in ways that resist centralization. At 
any given historical moment, the networks available for use will almost certainly 
be unevenly distributed throughout society, giving some individuals and groups 
an advantage over others simply by virtue of their location. Because these 
networks are frequently the only mechanism through which actors can play an 
active role in partisan politics, the ability of these actors to participate in party 
life is at least partially determined by the state of information infrastructure 
development at their location. Geographically dispersed individuals may not 
have the tools necessary to learn about one another, share information, and 
coordinate action, leaving them atomized not by choice but by circumstance. In 
the most extreme cases, a lack of access to information networks is likely prevent 
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the formation of political community entirely, blocking the creation of new 
parties or preventing the development of interest groups and associations that 
would otherwise join extant party coalitions. In less extreme cases, the 
combination of the uneven access to infrastructure and the unique attributes of 
the available networks will shape the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
political groups throughout society, affecting both the parties themselves and the 
groups that make up their respective organizations. In either scenario, the 
balance of power both within and among the groups will likely be affected, 
leading to different political outcomes than would have occurred under a 
different group equilibrium. 
Following the logic of this model, several specific predictions can be offered. 
First, in historical moments when the nation’s information infrastructure is in a 
state of flux, the distribution of access to the systems necessary to participate in 
partisan politics is likely to be both uneven and changing across the policy, with 
some actors having access to older networks, others having access to newer ones, 
and yet others having access to both. Because no two configurations offer the 
same opportunities for communication, the terms for participation in partisan 
politics-at-a-distance in any given location will reflect the state of infrastructure 
development at that location. As new systems are deployed at that location the 
terms of participation will change, and as this process unfolds throughout the 
polity, long-standing patterns of organization are likely to give way to new ones 
as individuals and groups settle into new modes of behavior adapted to the new 
information environment. Thus, in addition to looking at the deliberate choices 
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made by actors within the party-in-government and the party-as-organization, our 
investigations must also consider the possibility that changing patterns of 
partisan behavior and organization are being driven by changes to the 
information environment that are beyond the control of those involved.  
Second, because new communication technologies offer new opportunities 
for coordination and action, we can expect that individuals and groups who have 
previously found themselves to be excluded from either their party or the 
political system are likely to become early adopters, innovating new forms of 
behavior and organization designed to challenge and overcome their exclusion. 
Their success will depend in part on the uses to which they put the technologies, 
but also in part on the attributes of the technologies themselves, with 
decentralizing communication technologies likely to be particularly useful tools 
for insurgency. Because communication infrastructure directly enables 
coordination and organization, decentralized infrastructures are likely to allow 
for more varieties of local organization and action, allowing outsiders to build 
movements that challenge insiders at precisely the moment when one of their 
mechanisms for control over the party is weakening. Centralizing infrastructures 
are likely to have precisely the opposite effect, allowing insiders to seize greater 
control over the party while weakening ability of outsiders to mount challenges. 
Put more simply, the spread of decentralizing infrastructures should open 
windows of opportunity for outsiders to mount challenges to those in control of 
parties, while centralizing infrastructures should open windows of opportunity 
for insiders to increase their control. 
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Third, as new information technologies spread, voters will find their 
experience of politics altered as the information distributed by the parties 
throughout society changes. In some instances this will continue to be a largely 
passive experience, but in other voters will find themselves presented with 
opportunities that lead to a more active political role. This is because at any given 
historical moment, the party-in-the-electorate is likely to include any number of 
individuals who are among the excluded groups just discussed. Made passive 
more by circumstance than choice, these individuals are likely to jump at new 
opportunities to participate, changing the makeup of the party as they organize 
and cross into the party-as-organization. For this reason, the boundary between the 
party-as-organization and the party-in-the-electorate is likely to blur during periods 
of change, with the barrier for entry into the party raised or lowered depending 
on the precise nature of the change. In a political system dominated by 
decentralized, highly participatory forms of media, greater and more varied 
forms of participation will emerge, while one dominated by centralized forms of 
media in which end-user participation is limited will create a more passive 
electorate. In either instance, the degree of passivity will be in part determined 
by features of the communication environment, and will not be a direct reflection 
of the desires of voters, activists or elites. 
 
Each of the three models presented here produces a different set of 
expectations for the processes that drive party change and the manners in which 
new forms of communication might be involved in those processes. Under the 
  
60 
elite-led model, the members of the party-in-government control parties, with new 
patterns and forms of communication adopted when it will advance their 
electoral and policy interests. Under the group-centric model, the party-as-
organization takes the lead, with new forms of communication deployed and 
utilized by IPDs in their continuing quest to shape the direction of their party 
and support winning candidates. The new infrastructure-driven model remains 
neutral on the question of who leads parties, focusing instead on the ways 
changes to the nation’s information infrastructures will alter the patterns of 
interaction among all three components of the party, setting in motion changes 
that alter party behavior and organization over time. Across the full sweep of 
American history, several eras stand out as prime targets for the investigation of 
these claims. Just as the spread of the telegraph altered the ability of individuals 
to coordinate over great distances in the mid-nineteenth century, so too did the 
rapid adoption of broadcasting and digital information technologies alter the 
opportunities for action in the twenty and twenty-first centuries. In no period, 
however, was the change to the nation’s information environment as great as 
that prior to the spread of the telegraph. Thanks to the rapid development of the 
post office and the spread of inexpensive printing presses, a polity that had been 
largely unable to communicate with itself was interconnected. This process 
transformed the ability of average citizens to participate in politics, allowing 
them to organize a network of newspapers that became the backbone of the 
Democratic-Republican Party. More than two centuries later, a similar process 
allowed a group outsiders to crash the gates of the modern Democratic Party. 
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Through a loosely affiliated network of blogs, web sites, and local organizations, 
they were able to build a movement that altered the direction and organization 
of the party. The remainder of this work is dedicated to examining the history of 
party building and partisan conflict in these two eras. Beginning with an 
exploration of key policy interventions and information technology innovations 
in a given period, each chapter will examine how partisan information networks 
evolved as new innovations were deployed. Next, each chapter will trace the 
different histories of the use of this infrastructure by different groups in each 
period, looking for evidence of changes in party behavior, organization, and 
interaction. As will be demonstrated, the success or failure of competing groups 
of politicians and IPDs can be tied directly to their use or misuse of the nation’s 
rapidly developing information infrastructure. Despite the best efforts of elites 
within the party-in-government to maintain control of the nation’s partisan 
information networks, these elites were repeatedly outmaneuvered by 
individuals who used new communication platforms to organize previously 
marginalized citizens and claim a share of party control. It is to that story we 
now turn. 
 
 
  
62 
CHAPTER THREE 
Trickle-Down Partisanship? 
Fenno, Freneau, and the Failure of Elite Newspaper Networks (1790-1796) 
 
“The power of establishing post roads must, in every view, be a harmless power, and 
may, perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency.” 
 James Madison, Federalist 42 (1788) 
 
“For the purpose of diffusing knowledge, as well as extending the living principle of 
government to every part of the united states—every state—city—county—village—and 
township in the union, should be tied together by means of the post-office. This is the true 
non-electric wire of government. It is the only means of conveying heat and light to every 
individual in the federal commonwealth.” 
 Dr. Benjamin Rush, An Address to the People of the United States (1787) 
 
 
The transmission of political information among citizens and groups in an 
extended republic takes place through the constellation of loosely coordinated 
institutions that collectively make up the nation’s information infrastructure. 
Having explored the relationship between this infrastructure and the 
organization of political parties from a theoretical perspective in the previous 
chapter, it is time to move on to an empirical examination.47  Over the next four 
chapters, this work will explore the role that changes to the nation’s information 
                                                
47 As a reminder, the term information infrastructure as defined in previous chapters refers 
to the constellation of institutions available throughout society for the transmission of 
information. Examples from these chapters include the postal service and printing 
presses. Information policy refers to legislation that creates or alters one or more of the 
institutions that make up the infrastructure. Two examples discussed here are The Postal 
Service Act of 1792 and the Alien and Sedition Acts. Information networks are systems 
created by actors to organize the distribution of information through the available 
infrastructure. Examples include Committees of Correspondence and partisan 
newspaper exchanges. The information environment represents the collection of 
infrastructure, policy, and networks available to political actors at a given historical 
moment. For a detailed discussion of similar concepts, see John, Recasting the Information 
Infrastructure for the Industrial Age 
  
63 
infrastructure have played in the formation and evolution of political parties in 
the pre-telegraphic United States. In this chapter, the response of elites within the 
party-in-government to the opportunities for partisan organization afforded by the 
rapidly expanding post office will be detailed to determine how and why their 
efforts to build national partisan information networks failed. In the next chapter, 
the competing efforts of members of the party-as-organization and party-in-the-
electorate will be examined to determine how and why these efforts succeeded 
despite challenges from powerful elites in both parties. Chapter Five will then 
explore the evolution of this new party organization by taking a deep dive into 
the politics of the state of Pennsylvania. Having helped orchestrate a national 
campaign that swept their Federalists foes from power, the allied factions of the 
state’s Democratic-Republican Party turned on one another, using the 
decentralized information network they had built to fragment their party into 
competing camps. Returning to national politics, Chapter Six will next show how 
after the conclusion of the War of 1812, small groups of partisan leaders within 
each state used their control of partisan newspaper networks to end the 
infighting and build a coalition that became the backbone of Andrew Jackson’s 
campaign in 1828. As these chapters will demonstrate, the creative use and 
misuse of the available communication infrastructure played a central role in the 
evolution of party organization and behavior, with the attributes of the available 
technology shaping behavior throughout this entire period.   
The traditional approach to the study of this era has largely followed the elite-
centric interpretation of parties, using the emergence of leaders and institutions 
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to demonstrate how the party system moved from elite control to mass 
participation in the first few decades of the nineteenth century. 48 Given this era’s 
distinct lack of formal institutions, scholars have almost universally focused on 
national elites as the prime movers of party politics. In this version of the history, 
the nation’s first party system originated entirely in national politics and was a 
direct outgrowth of the deep divisions among the young nation’s leaders. Led by 
Hamilton on one side and Jefferson and Madison on the other, Federalist and 
Democratic-Republican elites worked to gain supporters at the state level, 
gradually yet reluctantly expanding the reach of parties until their effective 
collapse after the War of 1812. Elite competition then reignited party competition 
during the 1820s, as Democrats led by Andrew Jackson and Whigs led by Henry 
Clay did battle, mobilizing voters, popularizing politics, and democratizing the 
                                                
48 For traditional interpretations of partisan activity during the First Party System as an 
elite-led  phenomenon, see Chernow, Alexander Hamilton; Cunningham Jr, "John Beckley: 
An Early American Party Manager," The William and Mary Quarterly; Cunningham Jr, The 
Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1801; Dunn, Jefferson's 
Second Revolution: The Election Crisis of 1800 and the Triumph of Republicanism; Ferling, 
Adams Vs. Jefferson: The Tumultous Election of 1800; Fischer, The Revolution of American 
Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy; Hofstadter, The Idea 
of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840; Larson, 
A Magnificent Catastrophe: The Tumultous Election of 1800, America's First Presidential 
Campaign; Nichols, The Invention of the American Political Parties; Sharp, The Deadlocked 
Election of 1800: Jefferson, Burr, and the Union in the Balance; Wilentz, The Rise of American 
Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. For similar interpretations of the Second Party System, see 
McCormick, The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era; 
McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to 
the Progressive Era; Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System; Parsons, The Birth of Modern 
Politics : Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and the Election of 1828; Wilentz, The Rise of 
American Democracy; Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1828 
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American political system.49 Recognizably modern parties in this version of the 
history then finally emerge in the mid-nineteenth century with the development 
of nominating conventions, party platforms, and rudimentary national 
committees. But as the group-centric approach detailed in the previous chapter 
makes clear, a limited focus on the elites who make up the party-in-government 
often obscures important party activity, hiding contributions made by many 
significant actors in the party-as-organization. Communication and coordination 
are the defining features of party organization in this model, with actors 
operating in a web of mutual interdependence where even the most elite actors 
are forced to exert influence indirectly.50 Viewed from this perspective, the 
actions of the newspaper editors and postmasters who ran local party 
organizations becomes central to party development. Because the histories of this 
period have traditionally been told from the perspective of elites, the stories of 
the men behind the presses and post offices have typically been told from the 
perspective of elites, leading either to the portrayal of these men as docile 
servants to more powerful masters or as wild-eyed radicals too naïve and 
                                                
49 A note on terminology: The period under study is one in which the legitimacy of 
partisanship was being fiercely contested, so both sides in the conflict frequently went to 
great lengths to deny that they had formed a “party” or “faction.” One result of this was 
that for most of the first decade after ratification, neither side had explicitly adopted a 
clear name for their organization. Following the distinctions that first arose during the 
ratification debate, the faction associated with Washington and Hamilton was referred 
to as the Federalists, while the faction associated with Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and 
others was referred to by a variety of names, including Whigs, Democrats, Republicans, 
and Democratic-Republicans. Following the conventions of the day, those names will be 
used interchangeably throughout the remainder of this work.  
50 Koger, Masket and Noel, "Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks" 
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vituperative to build anything of lasting import.51 Evidence for this interpretation 
can clearly be found in the writings of the elites themselves, but recent 
scholarship suggests that the relationship among elites and partisan editors was 
not nearly so one-sided. In his study of newspapers in the early American 
republic, for example, Pasley demonstrates conclusively that partisan editors 
operated as an increasingly powerful center of power within the Democratic-
Republican Party of the early nineteenth century.52 John, meanwhile, uncovers a 
similar dynamic among the men appointed to serve in the nation’s post office 
system during this same time.53 And Cohen et al., not surprisingly, offer their 
own account of the importance of newspaper editors in their study of party 
change.54 Contrary to the traditional elite-led narrative, this new interpretation 
suggests that national political elites at best shared control with the men who 
managed the nation’s communication infrastructure, and at worst lost control of 
the parties and the political system to them entirely.  
                                                
51 The former mirrors the image typical painted by Republican elites, while the later 
matches the views of their Federalist opponents. For examples of the former, see 
Cunningham Jr, "John Beckley: An Early American Party Manager"; Cunningham Jr, The 
Jeffersonian Republicans; Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party 
Operations 1801–1809; Fay, Two Franklins: Fathers of American Democracy, 310-312; Stewart, 
The Opposition Press of the Federalist Period, 9-10. For examples of the later, see Payne, 
History of Journalism in the United States, 169-172; Miller, Crisis in Freedom: The Alien and 
Sedition Acts, 26; Miller, The Federalist Era, 1789-1801, 233; Tagg, "Benjamin Franklin 
Bache's Attack on George Washington," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography 227-230; Tagg, Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia Aurora, esp. 299-300, 
350-352, 401-403. For an excellent overview of this problem of historiography, see Scherr, 
""Vox Populi" Versus the Patriot President: Benjamin Franklin Bache's Philadelphia 
Aurora and John Adams (1797)," Pennsylvania History 
52 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers: Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic 
53 John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse 
54 Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller, The Party Decides, 47-70 
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But as the last chapter demonstrated, there are important theoretical reasons 
to believe that this new interpretation does not go far enough in examining the 
role of communication in party formation and evolution. Like the elite-led 
interpretation that preceded it, this revised interpretation does not consider the 
possibility that the path and pace of infrastructure development might have 
played a direct role in shaping the development of the parties. To address this 
overlooked possibility, and to explore what it can tell us about both 
interpretations of the history of this period, this chapter begins with an 
examination of the nation’s information infrastructure following the ratification 
of the Constitution. After exploring the state of newspapers, print technologies, 
and the postal service in 1790, it identifies two competing philosophies on the 
role of information in a republic that not only guided congressional debates over 
infrastructure development for more than a decade, but also set the approach of 
each of the parties as they responded to that development. Next, it offers a 
detailed discussion of the Postal Service Act of 1792, the first of two major policy 
interventions that altered the nation’s information infrastructure during this 
period. After isolating four specific ways the Act altered the information 
environment, it uses the three models identified in the previous chapter to offer a 
series of hypotheses on the way the nation’s parties might be expected to react. 
To test these hypotheses, it then traces the history of the first serious attempts to 
establish national, public networks for sharing partisan political information. 
Although these networks were backed by some of the most powerful men in the 
nation, they almost immediately failed, doomed by a shared set of flaws that can 
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be traced to a mismatch between the design of the networks and the 
infrastructure through which they were being run. In the aftermath of this 
collapse the two parties parted ways, developing unique approaches to the 
distribution of partisan information and coordination of action at a distance. This 
split, which will be examined in detail in the next chapter, set in motion the 
series of events and innovations that led to the rise of party competition. 
 
The Information Environment of 1790 
As the newly formed United States entered the final decade of the eighteenth 
century, roughly seventy-five post offices and twenty-four hundred miles of post 
roads served approximately three million inhabitants across the nation’s various 
states and territories.55 Although the postal system had grown significantly in the 
years prior to and immediately after the revolution, most of the nation remained 
in a state of profound information isolation.56 Following the British model of 
infrastructure development, post roads existed only in areas where officials were 
certain the offices would generate profits, so they were almost exclusively 
located in commercial centers along the coast, with none serving the growing 
                                                
55 John, Spreading the News, 51; Kielbowicz, "The Press, Post Office, and Flow of News in 
the Early Republic," Journal of the Early Republic, 257 
56 For measures of information isolation, many of which will be discussed below, see 
Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information: The United States System of Cities, 
1790-1840 
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numbers of towns and villages west of the mountains.57 This created extreme 
information disparities between urban and rural areas, leaving travel times and 
information delays between many rural towns equal or greater than those 
between those same urban centers and Liverpool or London.58 Worse still, 
because mail delivery services operated on infrequent and unreliable schedules, 
messages travelling between neighboring towns often took lengths of time that 
seemed absurd even to contemporary observers.59 Given this, the colonial post 
office was almost exclusively used as a vehicle for communication among the 
elites living in urban centers along the seacoast.  
One exception to this rule, however, was the use of the system by newspaper 
printers and editors. Thanks to a policy instituted by Deputy Postmaster 
Benjamin Franklin in the 1750s, printers were allowed free use of the mail to 
exchange one copy per newspaper issue with each of the other printers and 
postmasters in the colonies. Most postmasters in the years prior to the revolution 
located their offices within the print shops they managed and owned, so the 
exchange policy began its life as a mechanism for furthering the self-interest of a 
                                                
57 Bretz, Some Aspects of Postal Extension into the West, 144 For an overview of the history 
of the royal post office system, see Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of 
Modern Communication, 30-41, 47-62 
58 For example, in 1790, the average travel time between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia 
was equal to the time between Philadelphia and London. Fuller, The American Mail: 
Enlarger of the Common Life, 80 
59 For example, the mean lag time in 1790 for the delivery of information between Boston 
and Worcester, two towns located a bit more than 40 miles apart was five days. Pred, 
Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 39 
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group with relatively few political aspirations. 60  But as the revolutionary 
experience politicized printers and their newspapers, postal infrastructure was 
widely seen to have both commercial and political implications.61 During the war, 
committees of correspondence relied heavily on friendly postmasters and post 
riders to deliver messages throughout the colonies, while postmasters on both 
sides censored the exchange of their opponent’s papers. Although the postal 
infrastructure was initially developed to strengthen British control over the 
colonies, insurgents were able to use its highly decentralized and open design to 
undermine British control instead.62 
Both during the war and after, newspapers and pamphlets served as the 
primary source of information for most of the citizens who chose to involve 
themselves in politics. Given the high cost of subscription, most newspapers 
were shared with others, many times widely, such as when taverns and 
coffeehouses offered editions for their patrons to read.63 Nearly all of the nation’s 
                                                
60 Kielbowicz, "Newsgathering by Printers' Exchanges before the Telegraph," Journalism 
History 42; Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 28-33 
61 Frasca, "Benjamin Franklin's Printing Network and the Stamp Act," Pennsylvania 
History; Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 33-40; Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence: The 
Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776, 190-195 
62 Kielbowicz, "Newsgathering by Printers' Exchanges before the Telegraph" 43 For an 
excellent overview of the colonial Post Office, see Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of 
the Common Life, 12-41 For a more general overview of the state of information and 
communication during the colonial period, see Brown, Early American Origins of the 
Information Age, 39-53 
63 For this reason, circulation numbers should be interpreted with care, as they almost 
certainly underestimate the total readership of a newspaper by a wide margin. For more, 
see Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 20; Steffen, "Newspapers for 
Free: The Economies of Newspaper Circulation in the Early Republic," Journal of the Early 
Republic 
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approximately one hundred newspapers were printed in urban centers along the 
coast, with Philadelphia, Boston, and New York serving as the three most 
important hubs for information in an infrastructure that remained as 
decentralized as the political system it served.64 Daily newspapers were still 
atypical, with four publishing in Philadelphia, three in New York, and one in 
Charleston. Elsewhere, newspapers tended to publish only once or twice each 
week.65 Newspapers were exceedingly rare outside of the corridor connecting 
Boston to Baltimore, with the South being particularly information poor. By one 
reliable measure, newspapers were as common in the Deep South in this period 
as they were in the Northwest Territory, setting the stage for a regional 
information inequality that would last for nearly two centuries.66 Although 
printing technology in Europe was beginning to see significant innovation 
during this period, for a variety of reasons none of these new technologies made 
it to North America until the second decade of the nineteenth century. 67 
Moreover, thanks to a high degree of turnover among publishers during the 
decade between the revolution and the ratification, the information environment 
                                                
64 For a detailed analysis of the dominance of these three urban areas in information 
flows, see Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information. For general background 
on the state of the nation’s newspapers during this era, see Hudson, Journalism in the 
United States from 1690 to 1872, 43-139; Lee, The Daily Newspaper in America: The Evolution 
of a Social Instrument, 15-61; Mott, American Journalism: A History of Newspapers in the 
United States through 250 Years, 1690 to 1940, 3-112; Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 24-47 
65 Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 255 
66 Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 63-67 
67 An extended discussion of printing technology, including reasons the United States 
remained essentially innovation-free during this period, can be found in subsequent 
chapters. 
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of 1790 was a paradoxical mix of stasis and change. On the one hand, the cadre of 
newspapermen working in 1790 was made up almost entirely of printers and 
editors who had come of age after the end of the war. Most were focused on 
printing as a commercial enterprise, and although they continued to share 
information through the postal exchange, the sense of political community that 
had bonded the previous generation together had largely disappeared. On the 
other hand, because no changes had been made to either the postal service or 
printing technology since the end of the war, the state of the nation’s information 
technology remained almost entirely unchanged.68  
 
Competing Theories of Information 
Although the dominant ideology among political elites in 1790 saw partisan 
factions as a dysfunction to be avoided at all costs, the faint outlines of a two-
party system were already by that time forming in the nation’s capital. Debate 
over Hamilton’s First Report on the Public Credit had proved contentious, dividing 
Congress into “two parts almost equal,” with Hamilton’s former ally James 
Madison leading opposition to his plan.69 But members aligned largely along 
regional lines on most of the other issues that came before Congress that year, 
                                                
68 Frank L Mott, the dean of American journalism historians, has described the turnover 
of printers during the 1780s as creating “a remarkably clean break” between eras. 
Thomas, The History of Printing in America, with a Biography of Printers & an Account of 
Newspapers, 35 Although the population of the colonial and confederated states doubled 
from roughly two to four million between 1765 to 1790, no more than eight new post 
offices were added. Mott, American Journalism, 113-114 
69 Carroll, Letter Xlviii, Charles Carroll of Carrollton to Mrs. Caton, April 14, 1790, 160-162 
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and in every conflict it became standard practice for the members of each of the 
coalitions involved to accuse the others of forming factions that were self-
evidently dangerous to the republic.70 One area of debate where the divides were 
deepest was on the role of the press in a republic. Two major philosophies had 
developed around the issues since the end of the revolution, and although both 
approaches saw the spread of information as a necessary precursor to effective 
self-government, they were split over what information should be allowed to 
circulate and who should be allowed to circulate it. 71 By the early-1790s this 
dispute had not only become a central point of contention between the nascent 
parties, it was also leading each group to follow a unique path in partisan 
newspaper development, making it an early and important force behind the rise 
of two-party competition in the first few decade of the young republic’s life. 
Because it helps explain why the parties followed such divergent paths to 
infrastructure development and information network design, it is worth pausing 
a moment to examine 
 On one side of the ideological divide were the elites who favored what 
communication scholar Richard John describes as a “logistical” rationale for 
information distribution. The unifying belief among this group was that the 
widespread circulation of news would bolster support for the government and 
                                                
70 Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 3-9 
71 This discussion follows the framework set out by John, Spreading the News, 27. For an 
alternate interpretation of this dispute, see Martin, "Reforming Republicanism: 
Alexander Hamilton's Theory of Republican Citizenship and Press Liberty," Journal of the 
Early Republic 
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its proper ruling class. Because of their experiences with censorship during the 
revolution, however, this group did not think it appropriate to establish a “court 
press.” Instead, they expected that the editors of independent newspapers would 
on their own choose to cover politics in ways that built support for the 
enlightened policies of the state. If and when disputes occurred, they expected 
they would be resolved by the elites themselves, with state governments 
standing by to punish slander and libel if average citizens got too involved.72 
Although it could be said that the clearest statement of this philosophy came 
through the provisions of the Alien & Sedition Acts of 1798, many elites had been 
arguing for a more deferential public sphere since the end of the war. The 
fractious debate over ratification of the constitution brought the argument to the 
foreground of the national political conversation, and as partisan disagreement 
emerged in the years following ratification, a version of the logistical rationale 
appeared as a fairly regular feature in President Washington’s annual 
addresses.73 In these reports to Congress, Washington frequently argued for 
                                                
72 For more on the Federalist conception of the press, see John, Spreading the News, 59-63 
For more on the traditional role of a court press, including comparisons between the 
United States in this era and other nations, see John, Spreading the News, 59-60; Pasley, 
"The Two National" Gazettes": Newspapers and the Embodiment of American Political 
Parties," Early American Literature 53-54 
73 One particular noteworthy statement of this rationale came from Dr. Benjamin Rush. 
As part of a call to the people of the United States to support the newly proposed 
constitution, Rush called for the rapid development of the nation’s information 
infrastructure, including the expansion of the post office and the creation of a national 
university. In explaining the former, Rush wrote, “[t]o conform the principles, morals, 
and manners of our citizens to our republican forms of government, it is absolutely 
necessary that knowledge of every kind, should be disseminated through every part of 
the United States.” Note here that the goal was to conform the people to their 
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more assertive action from Congress on the development of the nation’s 
information infrastructure, suggesting that an expansion in the circulation of 
newspapers carrying accurate information would increase the loyalty of the 
people. But at the same time, the president also frequently inveighed against his 
most vocal critics, suggesting that their criticisms were inherently illegitimate.74 
In the end, although Federalists like Washington supported newspapers as a 
general concept, they were in practice vehemently opposed to the specific 
newspapers that opposed them. In the name of self-government and a free press, 
they paradoxically sought to control or even eliminate papers that criticized their 
policies or questioned their right to rule. Thus, the logistical rationale came with 
a key caveat: information that supported the state and its elected leaders should 
be widely disseminated, but reports that might “destroy the confidence of the 
people” in their government should be actively suppressed.75 
On the other side of the divide were elites who advanced a “civic” rationale 
for the press. Under this philosophy newspapers were to provide citizens with 
the information necessary to fulfill two tasks: making enlightened decisions 
                                                                                                                                            
government, and not vice versa. Hudson, Journalism in the United States from 1690 to 1872, 
230-232 
74 In his 1793 address to Congress, Washington advocated for robust development of the 
nation’s postal service by arguing that there is “no resource so firm for the government 
of the United States as the affections of the people governed by an enlightened policy; 
and to this primary good, nothing can conduce more, than a faithful representation of 
public proceedings, diffused without restraint throughout the United States.” One year 
later, however, he warned that “the arts of delusion” were being practiced by “self-
created societies” intent on undermining the government through a ”tone of 
condemnation.”  
75 Hamilton, Letter to Josiah Ogden Hoffman, November 6, 1799 
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about government, and acting as a check on representatives should they abuse 
power. Rather than work to control or eliminate discordant voices, it argued that 
false reports should be countered with more accurate information. Where the 
logistical rationale led to efforts to shrink the size of the public sphere, limiting 
the involvement of citizens to moments of national crisis, the civic rationale 
pushed for its expansion. Supporters of both rationales saw newspapers as a 
mechanism for aligning the public with their government, but only advocates of 
the civic rationale intended for the circulation of newspapers to also align the 
government with the opinions of the public. 76 By the late-1790s this rationale had 
become one of the key pillars of Democratic-Republican ideology, and among 
Republican printers and editors it had become an article of faith that to choose 
side was to defend republicanism itself. At the grassroots level, printers argued 
that newspapers served as “centinels placed upon the out-posts of the 
constitution,” working to detect and oppose any official action that threatened 
liberty.77 At the elite level, men like Jefferson, Madison, and Gerry became 
forceful advocates for a more diverse public sphere, arguing that government 
would only become respected when supporters of both sides of an issue were 
free to print their thoughts on the issues of the day. 78 
                                                
76 For an overview of the “civic” rationale, see Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 40-47 
77 Boston Independent Chronicle, as quoted in John, Spreading the News, 60-63 
78  Although Jefferson wrote extensively on the subject, one of his most direct 
formulations of the civic rationale for the distribution of information came in a letter 
written to bookseller N.G. Dufief in 1814. “It is an insult to our citizens to question 
whether they are rational beings or not…. If [this] book be false in its facts, disprove 
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As will be demonstrated shortly, because this debate became entangled in 
partisan politics, it helps explain the different approaches party leaders took to 
the rapidly expanding system of partisan newspapers. On the Federalist side of 
the aisle, elites guided by the logistical rationale alternated between railing 
against partisan editors and demanding that these editors do their duty and 
show their government support. On the Republican side, the party’s civic-
minded elites were far more accepting of the growing role of partisan editors, 
making room for their party’s network to grow in ways that Federalist’s network 
would not. But before these differences could take shape, the nation’s 
information infrastructure had to be expanded, one of the few points of 
agreement between the philosophies. Given this, a fight over the proper role of 
the press was largely sidestepped during the first major information policy 
debate in congressional history. Because both sides agreed on the need to 
facilitate the transmission of information, the question of how best to handle 
specific content flowing was temporarily avoided, allowing an aggressive 
expansion of the postal system to take place without much controversy. But by 
fundamentally altering that infrastructure, Congress unwittingly created a set of 
conditions that favored those who sought a civic-minded outcome. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
them; if false in its reasoning, refute it. But, for God's sake, let us freely hear both sides, if 
we choose.” Jefferson, Letter to Nicholas G. Dufief, April 19, 1814 
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Policy Intervention: The Post Office Act of 1792 
 Although Congress did not adopt comprehensive postal legislation until 
1792, debate over the proper method for expanding the service began almost 
immediately in the First Congress. The Articles of Confederation had tasked the 
executive branch with locating new offices and roads, but the new constitution 
delegated that responsibility to Congress. Members of Congress recognized that 
a new local post office would become the primary point of contact between 
average citizens and the federal government, so even individuals not interested 
in abstract debates over the role of information were likely to support service 
expansion for purely practical reasons.79 The final bill that President Washington 
signed into law in February of 1792 contained thirty separate provisions 
governing the establishment of post offices and roads and the conduct of postal 
officials, four of which would have enormous implications for the nation’s 
information infrastructure and the information networks which ran atop it.80 First, 
the law guaranteed privacy of the mail, marking the first time in world history a 
nation’s postal service would not be run in part as a means for surveilling the 
populace. Second, the act established the procedure by which the system of roads 
and office would be expanded, formalizing a process that until then had been 
haphazard. Third, the law set the terms of inclusion for newspapers in the mail 
                                                
79 For example, it was a fierce debate over the more concrete issues of postage rates and 
franking privileges that stalled passage of the legislation until 1792. For an excellent 
overview of the congressional debate leading up to the passage of the act, see John, 
Spreading the News, 25-53 
80 "An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads within the United States," U.S. 
Statutes at Large Statutes at Large, 2nd Congress, 1st Session, Chapter 7, 232-239. 
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delivery system, including both a mechanism for the free exchange of paper 
among printers and a heavily subsidized rate of postage for papers sent to 
subscribers. Fourth, the law formalized the franking policy, opening it to 
congressmen, postmasters, and citizens communicating with members of either 
group. Each provision will now be considered in turn.  
 
Privacy of the Mail 
First, the law guaranteed privacy of the mail, prohibiting postal officials from 
opening letters in their charge unless those letters were undeliverable. In 
addition to marking a change from the colonial era, when royal officials 
frequently used their positions as a means of gathering intelligence and tracking 
subversive elements within the population, this policy also represented a radical 
break from the postal policies of Europe, where surveillance of the mail was so 
routine that most letter writers assumed their correspondence would be read 
multiple times as it worked its way to its intended destination. Although this 
policy was not universally enforced until the widespread adoption of the 
envelope in the mid-nineteenth century, it quickly became accepted as a norm by 
citizens and postmaster alike.81 This change had important implications for 
                                                
81 Envelopes were not widely used until the mid-nineteenth century, and although most 
letters were sealed with wax, the seals often broke during transit, exposing the contents 
for anyone handling the letter to see. Moreover, mail was frequently collected along post 
roads in satchels hung in taverns, where only informal norms prevented curious patrons 
from examining their contents. For more, see John, Spreading the News, 25-37; Larson, 
Internal Improvements: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the 
Early United States, 45-49 
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political communication, as it allowed individuals and groups to reliably use the 
mail to transmit information that they hoped to keep secret. It also was one of 
several changes that insured that the postal network would develop as a 
decentralized system, with no central point through which all communication 
flowed. 
 
Expansion of Postal Infrastructure 
Second, the act established procedures to facilitate the rapid expansion of 
offices and roads throughout the republic. Under the Articles of Confederation, it 
had been unclear if states or the confederal government had final authority over 
local postal policy, so many states developed their own infrastructure, 
connecting it to the National Road in a rather disorganized fashion. Prior to 1792 
the power for designating new roads and offices at the federal level had been 
delegated to the executive branch, which was given great leeway in the 
management of the service. Following traditional postal policies, the guiding 
assumption of the service was that every individual road and office must be self-
sufficient, with postage fees covering the costs of maintenance and delivery. 
Rural development was therefore almost entirely non-existent, forcing 
Americans outside of urban areas to rely on private means of delivery for their 
mail.82 By shifting responsibility for the designation of new roads and office from 
                                                
82 For an overview of the state of postal service infrastructure just prior to and after the 
passage of the act, see Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England, 114-127; Fuller, The 
American Mail: Enlarger of the Common Life, 1-41; Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political 
Origins of Modern Communication, 94-96 
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the executive to the legislative branch, the Act virtually assured the rapid 
expansion of the system into every corner of the nation, as members worked 
furiously to answer petitions from constituents requesting the development of 
new infrastructure in their town or village. Public pressure to grow the system 
was so great, in fact, that by the end of the decade Congress had established 
more than 800 new offices, cutting the nation’s population-to-post-office ratio by 
a factor of ten.83 Along with this first experiment in pork barrel politics came a 
transformation in postal finances: within a single Congress, the principle that 
individual roads and offices must be self-financing had been abandoned, 
replaced by a standard that measured the entire system as a single fiscal unit. 
Although some of the more fiscally conservative members of Congress objected, 
by mid-decade no less a fiscal hawk than Treasury Secretary Alexander 
Hamilton grudgingly accepted the new standard, clearing the last remaining 
budgetary hurdle for rapid postal service expansion.84  
  
                                                
83 John, Spreading the News, 45-52; Kielbowicz, "The Press, Post Office, and Flow of News 
in the Early Republic" 
84 In a letter to Congress written in 1796, Postmaster General Habersham summarized 
the new policy as follows: “The unproductive routes in distant parts of the Union are not 
noticed, as those who are remotely situated appear to have a just claim to that liberal 
establishment of post roads which has been extended in every direction through this 
great and flourishing country. It has been a wise policy to open this useful source of 
information to the settlers of a new country, and the expense will not be considered 
where the object is so important.” As quoted in John, Spreading the News, 50-51 For an 
overview of the debate over postal finances, see Bretz, Some Aspects of Postal Extension 
into the West, 145-146 
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Table 1: Growth of the United States Postal Service, 1790-1810 
Category 1790 1800 1810 1800/1790 1810/1790 
U.S. population   
(1000s) 3,231 4,403 6,032 1.4 1.9 
Post offices 75 903 2,300 12.0 30.7 
Population per post 
office 43,084 4,876 2,623 - - 
Miles of post roads 1,875 20,817 36,406 11.1 19.4 
Settled area per post 
office (sq miles) 3,493 339 180 - - 
Postage revenues 
(1000s of dollars) 38 281 552 7.4 14.6 
Postage revenues per 
capita (dollars) 0.01 0.06 0.09 6.0 9.0 
Note: Population data excludes slaves and Indians. 
Sources: population and settled area: John, Spreading the News: The American 
Postal System from Franklin to Morse 51; post offices, miles of post roads, postage 
revenues: Allan R. Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information: The 
United States System of Cities, 1790-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1973) 80. 
  
As Table 1 demonstrates, the build out of postal infrastructure following the 
Act’s passage was dramatic. Although the nation’s population more than 
doubled from 1790 to 1810, the number of miles of post roads increased nearly 
twenty times over, and the number of offices increased more than thirty-fold. 
The most dramatic expansion came in the period immediately after the Act’s 
passage. In just eight short years, a network that had almost exclusively served 
seacoast residents expanded deep into rural areas, bringing the regular delivery 
of political news and commercial intelligence to towns and villages that had until 
then been almost entirely without it.85 This is not, however, to suggest that 
                                                
85 The rapid expansion and improvements in post roads also had a dramatic impact on 
the nation’s stagecoach industry. Because mail contractors were allowed under the law 
to carry private documents and passengers along with the mail, it quickly became 
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seacoast residents weren’t also affected by the expansion of the service. As 
historical geographer Allen R. Pred demonstrates in his comprehensive study of 
information flows in the pre-telegraphic United States, the rates of information 
transfer among major urban centers increased significantly following the passage 
of the Act. Because information in this era could travel no faster than the human 
that carried it, geography played a central role in determining the time it took for 
news to reach its destination. In late-eighteenth century America, this meant that 
the more well developed the post roads and mail facilities, the more quickly 
information could travel. As Pred’s data make clear, implementation of the Post 
Office Act had an immediate and dramatic impact on the flow of information 
along the nation’s most well-developed and maintained post roads. Where it had 
taken 4.0 days for news to travel from Philadelphia to Baltimore in 1792, for 
example, it took only 1.6 days just two years later. In the same period, the 
Boston-to-Philadelphia gap shrunk from 12.0 to 6.8 days, while the Baltimore-to-
Philadelphia delay fell from 6.0 to 3.6 days. And although many of the nation’s 
rural areas remained extremely isolated, with information delays of 40 days or 
more from the nation’s capital, it seemed a minor miracle to many contemporary 
observers that they were connected to the system at all.86  
                                                                                                                                            
standard practice for contractors to open their carriages for public hire. Although an 
entirely unintended consequence of the legislation, this meant that as the postal service 
expanded, it brought a heavily subsidized system of public transportation along with 
the mail. For more, see Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the Common Life, 151-157; 
John, Spreading the News, 91-100 
86 Although Pred measures changes in the flow of information between 1790 and 1794, as 
he explains, because virtually no postal infrastructure development took place during 
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The expansion of postal service infrastructure thus had three immediate 
effects, each with important implication for the political system. First, it cut the 
time lag for sharing information between seacoast urban areas by 50 percent or 
more, making the coordination of political and economic activity significantly 
easier than in the past. In addition to increasing the timeliness of information 
appearing in local newspapers, the dramatic drop in time-lags substantially 
decreased one of the major barriers to inter-city and inter-state coordination 
among political activists. As the speed for message transmission fell by roughly 
half between the years 1792 and 1794, for example, activists in the nation’s urban 
areas were able to double the number of back-and-forth conversations they 
completed each year, creating a network in which individuals were more tightly 
connected to one another across the nation. Second, in the more rural areas of the 
South and the West, it connected residents to their government and to one 
another for the first time. This brought hundreds of thousands, and eventually 
millions, of individuals into meaningful political community for the first time, 
opening the possibility that they might choose to become active participants in 
the process of self-government. As will soon be demonstrated, this 
unprecedented expansion of the effective size of political community had 
enormous consequences for both state and federal politics. Third, the shift from 
                                                                                                                                            
the first two years of this period, and because virtually all of the development that took 
place during the final two years came as a result of the passage of the Post Office Act, it 
is reasonable to credit the Act as the driving force behind these changes. For more, see 
Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 35-48. For an overview of the 
development that took place during the years immediately following passage of the Act, 
see John, Spreading the News, 46-49.  
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executive to congressional oversight virtually guaranteed that the system would 
continue to develop in a haphazard fashion, with new offices opening across the 
country without any central planning or control. Within just a few short years, a 
system that was heavily concentrated in a handful of cities had been dispersed 
into hundreds and then thousands of towns and villages, rapidly interconnecting 
them all in a network that had no central mechanism for control.  
 
Newspaper Delivery 
The third important provision of the Post Office Act set the terms of inclusion 
for newspapers in the mail delivery system.87 In the earliest days of legislative 
debate, Congress considered admitting only a limited number of approved 
papers to the mail. Proponents of this policy designed it to favor the elite-
friendly newspapers run out of the capital, but advocates from both the logistic 
and civic-minded schools of press-thought immediately and overwhelmingly 
opposed it. Given the importance both groups placed on newspapers, they 
quickly countered with a proposal to offer access to all papers, with postage 
heavily subsidized by letter writers understood to be using a public service for 
private ends. After a fierce debate over competing proposals for a simple, flat-
rate scheme and a more complex distance-based approach, a compromise was 
offered and adopted: one cent for papers carried less than 100 miles, and one and 
one-half cents for those transported further, with fees charged to the recipient 
                                                
87 For an overview of the debate on newspaper policy, see Kielbowicz, "The Press, Post 
Office, and Flow of News in the Early Republic" 
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upon delivery. 88  Whereas printers previously had to negotiate delivery 
arrangements with individual post riders and neighboring postmasters on a 
paper-by-paper basis, this new policy set a common standard for every paper in 
the republic. This had four immediate consequences. First, it opened the 
possibility of a newspaper building a regional or even national subscriber base, 
as delivery was no longer contingent on the agreements a printer was able to 
negotiate on his own. Second, it simultaneously provided a slight advantage to 
local printers, with the increased postage on papers mailed from distant locations 
acting as a small tariff protecting the development of local news providers. Third, 
it tied the spread of newspapers directly to the expansion of postal infrastructure, 
ensuring that access to the postal service also meant access to the news of the day.  
This third effect was compounded by the decision to codify the free exchange 
service instituted under Postmaster Franklin. Although the policy had been 
enormously important to the independence movement, it had only been 
continued as an unofficial norm since the war’s end. Over time this made the 
exchange increasingly unreliable, leading many printers to complain that rival 
postmasters were using control of the mail to exclude competitors. This threat of 
interference was removed by requiring postmasters to treat all papers equally, 
                                                
88 Postage for letters was divided into nine zones, with rates ranging from six to twenty-
five cents per sheet mailed. Newspapers, by contrast, were only charged for distance 
mailed, with no per-sheet surcharge levied. These rates were significantly less than what 
printers were accustomed to paying for private delivery services, so the potential for 
conflict between urban and rural printers over the issue of distance-specific postage was 
largely avoided. Finally, these rates were amended slightly in 1794, when the local rate 
was applied to all papers mailed to an address within the same state. John, Recasting the 
Information Infrastructure for the Industrial Age, 34-36; Kielbowicz, "The Press, Post Office, 
and Flow of News in the Early Republic" 
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creating a truly national system of exchange. 89 By the end of 1794 the average 
Philadelphia printer was receiving more than 600 free exchanges each week, and 
less than two years later than number had skyrocketed to well over 900. Over the 
course of the next few decades the number of exchange papers reaching the 
capital continued to increase rapidly, with growth slowing only when the 
telegraph replaced the exchange as the editor’s favored means of 
newsgathering.90 Until that time, however, the exchange remained the only truly 
reliable for public providers of political information to share news, making it the 
direct forerunner of the wire services that would come to dominate in the mid-
nineteenth century.91  
Beyond altering the circulation of political information, the newly codified 
exchange policy also changed the economics of news printing. By guaranteeing 
the circulation of both urban and rural papers, the policy ensured that editors 
living outside of cities would have access to a constant stream of free information 
from around the nation. Under both the norms and laws of the day, copying 
articles from other papers was strongly encouraged, so by codifying the 
exchange system the Post Office Act was effectively encouraging local printers 
                                                
89 It is impossible at this point to determine with any certainty whether the specific 
nature of these allegations has any validity. However, Kielbowicz suggests that at least 
some of the complaints were almost certainly true, with the rest of the missing papers 
likely due to primitive infrastructure and inferior service quality. Bretz, Some Aspects of 
Postal Extension into the West, 147; Kielbowicz, "The Press, Post Office, and Flow of News 
in the Early Republic" 259-262  
90 By the 1820s, free newspaper made up between one-third and one-half of all mail, and 
by the 1840s the average American newspaper received more than 4,300 exchanges per 
year.  Kielbowicz, "Newsgathering by Printers' Exchanges before the Telegraph" 
91 Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 57 
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and editors to become independent outlets for national news.92 Combined with 
discounted postage for local delivery, the exchange opened a vast market for a 
new breed of entrepreneur: the “country” printer and editor. With secure sources 
of information and methods of delivery, the prospects for a printer living outside 
a major urban area were significantly brightened, leading many apprentice and 
journeymen printers to rush to towns without papers to take advantage of the 
new opportunity.93 Although it had not been their intention to do so, Congress 
had effectively ended the monopoly on political information previously enjoyed 
by printers living in the nation’s capital cities.94  
  
                                                
92 Donald L. Shaw provides the most comprehensive analysis of newspaper exchange in 
the early American republic. Through a content analysis of a national sample of 
newspapers, he found roughly half of all stories in pre-telegraphic newspapers were 
lifted directly from other publications. John, Spreading the News, 37-38; Kielbowicz, 
"Newsgathering by Printers' Exchanges before the Telegraph" 44 
93 Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the Common Life, 112 
94 Shaw, "At the Crossroads: Change and Continuity in American Press News, 1820-
1860," Journalism History 
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Table 2: Growth of Newspaper Publication, 1790-1810 
Category 1790 1800 1810 1800/1790 1810/1790 
U.S. population   
(thousands) 3,231 4,403 6,032 1.4 1.9 
Newspapers 
published 92 235 371 2.6 4.0 
Newspaper editions 
per week 147 389 549 2.6 
3.7 
 
Daily newspapers 8 24 26 3.0 1.1  
Annual circulation 
(thousands) 4,000 12,000 24,000 3.0 6.0 
Annual newspapers 
copies per capita 1.2 2.3 4.0 1.9 3.3 
Note: Population data excludes slaves and Indians. 
Sources: population: John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from 
Franklin to Morse 51; newspaper and circulation data: Allan R. Pred, Urban Growth 
and the Circulation of Information: The United States System of Cities, 1790-1840 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973) 21. 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, by every available measure the number of 
newspapers increased dramatically in the decades following passage of the Post 
Office Act. In the first decade alone the number of published newspapers 
increased by more than 250 percent, while the annual circulation of papers 
jumped by an even more impressive 300 percent.  Although some of these papers 
were located in urban areas with heavy newspaper competition, many more 
were established in towns and villages along the system of post roads rapidly 
expanding throughout the nation.95 And figures within the decade are even more 
impressive. According to historian Jeffrey Pasley, although the rate of creation 
                                                
95 For an extensive analysis of the geographic distribution and growth of newspapers 
during this period, see Kielbowicz, "Newsgathering by Printers' Exchanges before the 
Telegraph," ibid; Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communication, 
89-91 For a discussion focused on differences in rates of development at the state level, 
see Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 20-77 
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remained largely unchanged from 1784 to 1792, it more than doubled from 1792 
to 1796, then nearly doubled again by the end of the decade, setting a record for 
rate of newspaper creation that would not be matched again until the 1820s.96  
 
Franking Privileges  
Fourth, the act codified the procedures for franking, the policy which allowed 
mail to be sent to and from members of congress, postmasters, and cabinet 
officials free of charge. This policy had been widely regarded as one of the great 
successes of postal policy under the Articles of Confederation, so legislators were 
eager to see it formally extended.97 Through the franking privilege, members of 
congress acted as the central node in rudimentary but highly personalized 
information network that connected citizens to the government and 
representatives to their districts. 98 Over the previous decade, members had used 
these networks to distribute huge numbers of circular letters, pamphlets, 
newspapers, and government documents, asking that constituents share them 
widely with friends and neighbors. Because of its extensive use by officials 
                                                
96 Although reliably comparable data for the 1780s is not available at the time of this 
writing, Pasley notes that although the number of newspapers increased fairly 
dramatically from 1780 to 1790, this increase can largely be attributed to the social and 
economic stability brought about by the end of the Revolutionary War. Kielbowicz, "The 
Press, Post Office, and Flow of News in the Early Republic" In his discussion of the 
impact of the Post Office Act on newspaper development, Paul Starr provides a cross-
national perspective. In the decades following passage of the Post Office Act, the system 
of newspapers in the America was utterly transformed, while in Europe it remained 
largely unchanged. For more, see Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 40-47, 404  
97 For an thorough overview of the history of franking policy, see Glassman, Franking 
Privilege: Historical Development and Options for Change. 
98 Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 72-76 
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through the government, Madison had declared it to be the “principal channel” 
through which citizens acquired “general knowledge” of politics.99 
 
Through these four provisions of the Post Office Act of 1792, Congress set in 
motion a complex and rapid transformation of the nation’s information 
infrastructure. By dramatically increasing the reach of the network of post offices 
located throughout the country, it established a national market for information 
and news more than a half-century before a similar market for goods emerged 
with the development of the railroad. By improving the speed at which mail 
travelled through the postal network, it decreased the effective distance between 
citizens, binding them more tightly to one another in both economic and politics. 
By heavily subsidizing the cost of the transmission of newspapers, it radically 
increased the amount of information being shared. And by choosing to move 
from a heavily centralized network focused on coastal towns and cities to a much 
more decentralized network that served rural and urban areas alike, the act set in 
motion a process that expanded the political information environment to include 
millions of previously excluded citizens. In the span of just a few short years, a 
political information environment systematically dominated by coastal elites was 
opened to interested people in every corner of the republic. Where once 
politically motivated citizens had to travel to the seats of power to participate in 
politics, the state now came in the form of the post office to meet them in the 
                                                
99 Madison, Notes on Debates, Dec 6, 1782; Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the 
Common Life, 109-111; John, Spreading the News, 31-32 
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place they called home, and when it arrived it brought with it not only the news 
of the world, but also the opportunity to use that news to become active 
members of their political community. Before examining the impact this had on 
the nation’s politics, we must first pause to consider what each of the three 
theories of party system change outlined in the previous chapter have to say 
about the manner in which this process was most likely to unfold. 
 
Competing Party Model Hypotheses 
To briefly review, the elite-led theory of parties looks to the party-in-
government as the primary driver of party organization, so it expects that as new 
opportunities for communication arise, this group will determine if, when, and 
how those opportunities are pursued. Over time, this may lead to new patterns 
of interaction among elites and their supporters. Although the party-as-
organization may change as elites take advantage of these new opportunities, it 
will do so only under the direction of the party-in-government it has been 
constructed to serve. Finally, as elections unfold, voters will find themselves 
presented with new forms of messaging as part of their largely passive 
experience of electoral politics. In the context of the transformation just described, 
this theory would expect to see elites within the party-in-government as the prime 
movers behind the formation of newspapers dedicated to politics. As 
newspapers grow increasingly important throughout the 1790s, the leaders most 
directly involved with these papers should be expected to use them to shape the 
organization of their party and the behavior of their allies. As the system of 
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papers expands with the postal service, the model predicts that these elites will 
remain firmly in charge, making sure that the information distributed serves 
their interests. Finally, voters are likely to see their experiences of politics change 
as political newspapers become more available, but these experiences will 
remain passive, with the average voter no more involved in the day-to-day 
functioning of parties at the end of the decade than at its start. 
The group-centric theory of parties, by contrast, sees the members of the 
party-as-organization directing the deployment and use of new methods of 
communication within parties. As new opportunities are embraced by different 
groups throughout the system, their levels of “visibility” and “publicity” will 
change, creating new balances of power within and among the parties. As the 
operate, these groups will use the available methods of communication to 
advance their preferred policies and candidates, with elites scrambling to form 
the alliances necessary for a long-term political career. As the communication 
environment changes, voters will find the information they have access to 
changing, leading some subset of them to shift from being passive consumers to 
active participants in partisan politics. In the context just described, this model 
expects that the the rapid expansion of newspapers will have been driven by 
activists operating outside of the party-in-government. As the balance of power 
among these groups and their affiliated papers changes, it predicts that the 
makeup of the party-in-government will change, with evidence of this shift 
appearing first in fights over nominations at the federal, state, and local levels. 
Finally, as the postal system expands, bringing political information to areas that 
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previously did not have it, it predicts that some citizens will choose to take a 
more active role in politics, abandoning passivity to become intense policy 
demanders within the party system. 
The infrastructure-centric view of party change predicts that as the 
communication system changes, patterns of interaction among all three groups 
will change. Although some of these changes are likely to be the result of 
deliberate action by party leaders, others will arise because of the rapid 
transformation of the nation’s information infrastructure. As this happens, 
previously excluded groups are likely to become early adopters of new 
communication technologies, innovating new forms of behavior and 
organization to challenge their exclusion. Decentralizing technologies are likely 
to be particularly useful in this regard, as they open windows of opportunity to 
challenge the status quo at all levels of the party system. Many voters are likely 
to play an active role in this process, as new flows of information lead to new 
opportunities for coordination and action. Throughout the period under 
consideration here, it predicts that elites, activists, and citizens should all have 
become involved in the system of political newspapers as they expand 
throughout the decade.  Although some of these papers are likely to be created 
by individuals already operating inside the political system, others are likely to 
be created by political outsiders intent on altering the terms of participation and 
opening the system to others like themselves. Because the postal system as 
implemented was a fundamentally decentralizing technology, the model expects 
that at least some of these insurgents will be successful, leading to an increase in 
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participation throughout the system.  In the end, it predicts that the boundary 
lines between the party-as-organization and the party-in-the-electorate will shift 
during this process, changing the patterns of interaction within and among the 
parties.  
With these predictions in hand, we now turn to the history of how the 
political system reacted to its new information environment, beginning with the 
stories of a pair of newspapers founded by elites in the period just before the 
passage of the Post Office Act.  
 
The Failure of Top-Down Information Network Organization 
In the years immediately following ratification of the constitution, elites held 
high hopes for national unity. Although opposition to the constitution had been 
fierce in some quarters, most believed that with the debate completed, the new 
nation would rally behind its government and its leaders. To speed this process, 
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton quickly moved to establish a newspaper 
that could provide citizens with updates direct from capital on the policies the 
Washington Administration and the First Congress were enacting. As an 
advocate for the logistical rational of the press, Hamilton abhorred the idea of a 
government-owned press, but saw nothing inappropriate about working behind 
the scenes to establish a paper run by friends of the government. But Hamilton’s 
dreams would quickly be dashed. Within a matter of months deep divisions had 
formed among the nation’s leaders, and with those divisions came the 
establishment of a second semi-official political newspaper. Although both 
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efforts aimed at building a national information network through which the 
powerful could speak truth to the people, within a few short years both networks 
had essentially collapsed. The problems they encountered, along with the 
methods a group of outsiders used to create a competing network that succeeded 
where elites had not, shaped the evolution of partisan competition in this decade 
and beyond. 
In April of 1789, John Fenno, a Federalist merchant with a newspaper and 
literary background from Boston, was asked by Hamilton and Rufus King to 
begin publication of a semi-weekly newspaper devoted to covering public affairs 
in the new nation’s capital. 100  Having been promised regular access to 
government printing contracts, Fenno obliged, and on April 15, 1789, the first 
edition of the new semi-weekly Gazette of the United States was published. Fenno 
represented a deviation from the standard model of newspaper publishing. 
Whereas most of the men behind newspapers served as both their paper’s editor 
and printer, Fenno served as editor only. Printers were widely regarded by the 
nation’s elites as members of the “mechanic class,” laborers unfit to serve in 
positions of leadership, so it was important to the backers of the paper that 
Fenno maintain this distinction if he and his paper were to serve as their 
unofficial spokesperson.  
                                                
100 For an overview on Fenno, Hamilton, and the Gazette, see Starr, The Creation of the 
Media: Political Origins of Modern Communication, 88-90. For more on Fenno’s background, 
include his deep desire to escape his plebian background to become a member of the 
upper class, see Pasley, "The Two National" Gazettes": Newspapers and the 
Embodiment of American Political Parties" 
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As Fenno explained during his negotiations with the paper’s financial backers, 
the purpose of the Gazette was to be “entirely devoted to the support of the 
Constitution, & the Administration formed upon its national principles.” Fenno’s 
goal was to produce articles that would “conciliate the minds of our citizens, to 
the proceedings of the Federal Legislature,” a task that Hamilton, King, John 
Adams, and others promised to support with pseudonymously written articles 
for publication.101 In keeping with Vice President Adams’ desire to build up the 
dignity and splendor of the federal government, early editions of the Gazette 
spent considerable time focused on coverage of ceremony, including, for 
example, an elaborate description of the construction of a barge used to carry 
President Washington across the Hudson River.102 And Fenno made no secret of 
the purpose of such coverage; as he explained to his readers in one of his earliest 
editions, the “plan for the paper” was “to hold up the people’s own government, 
in a favorable point of light…and by every exertion, to endear the GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE.”103 But Fenno’s efforts immediately ran into 
serious problems. Although the paper’s masthead declared its intention to 
become “A NATIONAL PAPER,” in reality it was anything but. In its earliest 
months of publication the paper reached no more than a few hundred 
                                                
101 As quoted in Burns, Infamous Scribblers: The Founding Fathers and the Rowdy Beginnings 
of American Journalism, 262-275; Mott, American Journalism, 122-123; Pasley, The Tyranny of 
Printers, 51-56; Smith, The Press, Politics, and Patronage: The American Government's Use of 
Newspapers, 1789-1875, 12-15 
102 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 51-52 
103 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 54-55 
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subscribers, most of who resided in the nation’s capital.104 Fearing advertising 
would make the paper appear too parochial, Fenno chose to initially rely entirely 
on subscription fees, an unprecedented arrangement that made his paper’s 
finances dependent upon the goodwill of subscribers he almost never saw in 
person.105 Worse yet, Hamilton’s promise of government printing contracts was 
slow to be fulfilled, and by the end of 1789 Fenno was forced to curtail his 
national aspirations and begin accepting advertising.106 
Like all good Federalists Fenno did not see himself as a partisan, so he 
initially refused to use his paper for electioneering of any kind.107 On those rare 
occasions where he did offer thoughts on electoral politics, his articles were 
usually devoted to chastising voters for turning out men he believed 
unquestionably worthy of high office.108 The paper’s explicit mission was to 
defend the nation’s duly constituted authority under the constitution, not to 
                                                
104 At its peak, the Gazette had approximately had top circulation of approximately 1400 
of which several hundred were shared through the postal exchange. Fenno, 1791, 
Untitled, Gazette of the United States, April 27  
105 By Fenno’s own estimate, he never collected more than fifty percent of the money 
owed in a given month, and over the life of the paper rarely exceeded 25 percent. Mott, 
American Journalism, 123 
106 Before adopting this solution, Fenno considered but then rejected a proposal to sell 
his political ideas on the idea of his paper becoming an official publication of the 
Washington Administration. Fenno, Letter to Joseph Ward, November 14, 1793; Pasley, "The 
Two National" Gazettes": Newspapers and the Embodiment of American Political 
Parties" 60-61 
107 Fenno vehemently believed that any printer who could “be made the tool of a party” 
merited “universal contempt.” Fenno, Letter to Joseph Ward, July 5, 1789 For more, see 
Pasley, "The Two National" Gazettes": Newspapers and the Embodiment of American 
Political Parties" 
108 For an excellent series of examples of Fenno chastising voters for making poor choices, 
see Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 56-58 
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advocate on behalf of a political party or faction, so although he was willing to 
accept printing contracts from government officials, and even on a few occasions 
to accept cash grants from men like Hamilton and King, Fenno did not believe it 
appropriate to take sides in political debates. But with the arrival of a competitor 
in the capital that rationalization was tested, and soon Fenno was drawn directly 
into the partisan combat he had initially decried.  
Given that elite politics drove the formation of Fenno’s paper, it should come 
as no surprise that elites were also behind the arrival of Fenno’s competitor to the 
nation’s capital. In the early days of the Washington Administration, Fenno’s 
Gazette was viewed by nearly everyone in the capital as a nonpartisan paper 
backing the government as a whole, but as opposition to Hamilton and his 
policies began to take root, his opponents increasingly viewed the paper as a 
mouthpiece loyal only to him. Within the administration, Secretary of States 
Thomas Jefferson became Hamilton’s most ardent opponent, and as the divide 
between the two men deepened Jefferson grew increasingly convinced of the 
need to counter the Gazette with a paper of his own. But unlike his ally Madison, 
Jefferson was deeply uncomfortable with the idea of personally involving 
himself in newspapers, and it was not until after he had quite accidentally done 
so that he resolved to establish a paper of his own. 
 In March of 1791, the first part of Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man was 
published in Britain. Not long after, John Beckley, clerk of the House of 
Representatives and close Madison ally, secured a copy of the pamphlet and was 
working to have it reprinted and distributed throughout the United States. 
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Before sending it to the printer, however, Beckley lent it to Madison, who then 
forwarded it to Jefferson for his consideration. Jefferson then sent it on to the 
printer directly, including a note with the pamphlet that indicated his approval 
of the fact “that something was at length to be publicly said against the political 
heresies which had of late sprung up among us.”109 Misunderstanding the note’s 
purpose, the printer included it as a foreword to Paine’s writing, placing 
Jefferson’s true thoughts on the growing discord among elites before the public 
in unvarnished form. The political controversy that ensued was ferocious, with 
Fenno’s Gazette leading the charge to defend Hamilton and his allies against 
Jefferson’s attack. Having suddenly and quite accidentally become the public 
face of the opposition to Hamilton’s policies, Jefferson concluded he had no 
choice but to establish a paper that could reliably defend his point of view.110 
Working closely with longtime ally James Madison, Jefferson convinced 
Philip Freneau, the “Poet of the American Revolution” and college roommate of 
                                                
109 Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, May 9, 1791 
110 Given that all of the Founders were actively working to save their writings for 
posterity, we should always be cautious before taking their words at face value. In this 
instance, however, Jefferson’s behind-the-scenes efforts at damage control strongly 
suggest that publication was indeed accidental. On the one hand, Jefferson admitted to 
Madison that although he entirely agreed with everything he had written, he never 
intended to “step into a public newspaper with that in my mouth.” As a result, he felt he 
could not take public steps to disavow its publication, as that might suggest to some that 
he was also distancing himself from its contents. On the other, Jefferson apparently 
thought so little of the note that he did not keep a copy for his records, a remarkable 
aberration for a man so convinced of the need to save everything that he invented his 
own version of a polygraph, a machine capable of generating multiple copies of a letter 
in a single writing. For more on the Paine controversy, see Cunningham Jr, The 
Jeffersonian Republicans, 9-11 
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Madison, to move to the Philadelphia and establish a paper.111 Like Fenno’s 
Gazette, the new National Gazette was explicitly launched with national 
aspirations. Using their contacts throughout the South, Madison and Jefferson 
arranged to have the paper delivered to subscribers throughout the region. At 
first, both men sent representatives from Philadelphia to Virginia with a bundle 
of letters to be delivered to allies such as Daniel Carroll, Henry Lee, and Colonel 
Thomas Bell, requesting that each of them not only subscribe to the paper, but 
also act as subscription agent for the paper in their community. A few months 
later they followed up directly with personal visits, collecting lists of subscribers 
and subscription fees from their allies throughout the South. With their direct 
assistance, the paper began publishing on October 31, 1791, and it was not long 
before it was able to boast of a circulation comparable to Fenno’s.112 Recognizing 
the financial difficulties Fenno was facing with his paper, Jefferson did 
something extraordinary: he offered Freneau a job at the Department of State. 
With the explicit promise that Freneau’s new position as translator would give 
“so little to do as to not interfere with any other calling,” Jefferson crossed a 
threshold Hamilton and his allies would not, making Freneau’s appointment the 
                                                
111 For a brief overview of Freneau’s background, see Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 56. 
For a longer treatment, see Marsh, "Philip Freneau and His Circle," The Pennsylvania 
Magazine of History and Biography 
112 For more on Jefferson’s and Madison’s involvement with the paper, see Cunningham 
Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 17-20 For an overview of the brief history of the National 
Gazette, see Emery and Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass 
Media, 78-79 
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first known case of patronage in the history of the new federal government.113 In 
his new position, Freneau was granted off-hours admittance to Jefferson’s office, 
providing him not only with a large selection of foreign newspapers from which 
articles could be copied, but also direct access to Jefferson’s personal 
correspondence, the contents of which could be used for new articles when 
appropriate. And as if all that were not enough, Jefferson also order his 
department to route all printing contracts to Freneau’s print shop, while Madison 
arranged for a Republican ally to take on all of the financial risk for the project.114 
The direct involvement of Jefferson, Madison, and their allies in the creation 
of a paper designed to build support for a point of view in direct opposition to 
that held by the Vice President and the Treasury Secretary, among others, marks 
a crucial moment in the history of partisan politics in the United States. Although 
instances of individuals acting in a partisan manner can be clearly identified 
before this event, none of them involved a deliberate effort to create an enduring 
institution with national reach. As a result, the creation of this newspaper, 
combined with the personal networks that were activated to support it, is best 
                                                
113 Burns, Infamous Scribblers, 278-292; Mott, American Journalism, 123-127; Pasley, The 
Tyranny of Printers, 63-70; Smith, The Press, Politics, and Patronage, 14-19 
114 As Jefferson explained to Madison in one of their many correspondence on the plan 
for the paper, Freneau would be allowed “the perusal of all my letters of foreign 
intelligence and all foreign newspapers; the publication of all proclamations and other 
public notices within my department, and the printing of laws, which added to his 
salary would have been a considerable aid.” Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, July 21, 
1791. For an excellent overview of Jefferson’s role in establishing and supporting 
Freneau’s paper, see Jefferson, Letter to Philip Freneau, February 28, 1791, 351  For 
additional detail, see also, Lienesch, Thomas Jefferson and the American Democratic 
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understood as the first act of opposition party building by elites in the young 
republic. It predates the first signs of consistent partisan voting blocks in 
Congress by a few months, and the first meeting of a formal party caucus by at 
least two years.115 The formalization of partisan politics, in short, began with the 
creation of a new partisan information network under the direct control of the 
nation’s elites. 
In that regard, if Fenno’s paper served as an embodiment of the logistical 
rationale for the press, Freneau’s acted in a similar capacity for its civic rival. 
Unencumbered by the idea that the role of the press was to support the 
government under all but the most extreme circumstances, the National Gazette 
began its life as a vehicle for opposition. From its earliest issues, the paper 
worked to outline a republican philosophy that it explicitly argued was in direct 
tension with the attitudes of Federalist leaders. Although these essays were 
originally published pseudonymously, in January of 1792 James Madison began 
publishing under his own name. Beginning with a defense of parties as a natural 
consequence of politics, Madison moved in a series of articles to frame the terms 
of national debate by explicitly arguing that the nation had divided itself into 
neatly into two political parties. On the one hand were republicans, the “real 
friends” of the union who could be counted on to defend liberty. On the other 
hand were the anti-republicans, “enemies” of liberty who believed the people too 
                                                
115 Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 22-23, 82-91, 267-272 
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“stupid, suspicious, [and] licentious” to govern themselves.116 Taking one final 
step, Freneau published a series of article weighing in on electoral politics, 
endorsing slates of candidates in both Philadelphia and Western Pennsylvania.117 
Facing a near constant stream of attacks from the National Gazette, Fenno felt 
compelled to take a much more overtly partisan approach in his Gazette. Much 
more consequentially, Hamilton himself was drawn into the fray, and by the end 
of 1792 a full-blown partisan newspaper war was underway in the nation’s 
capital.118 Eventually President Washington himself was forced to intercede, 
setting off a chain of events that would lead to Jefferson’s resignation in late 1793. 
Without Jefferson’s patronage, Freneau’s paper collapsed. Having come out the 
victor in the nation’s first newspaper war, Fenno was nevertheless forced by 
financial circumstances to refocus his attention on the business interests of his 
local readership, a move he announced when he changed the paper’s name to the 
Gazette of the United States & Evening Advertiser. Although the paper remained 
staunchly Federalist until its final edition in June of 1800, it rapidly returned to a 
more restrained method of partisan promotion, focusing more on the 
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government and less on its opponents than it had at the height of the newspaper 
war.119  
 
On the Mismatch Between Networks and Infrastructure 
What can be learned from this intense but brief eruption of partisan conflict in 
the nation’s first newspaper war? First and foremost, this entire episode is best 
understood as an initial attempt by elites to build a national information network 
capable of building support for themselves and their allies in a fierce competition 
for political advantage and control. To be fair, Fenno’s ideology did not allow 
him to see himself as partisan, but from our perspective it is quite clear that he 
was engaged in both the promotion and defense of the one-party system to 
which he was fully committed. About Freneau and his Republican allies, 
however, there can be doubt. In hiring Freneau to build a reliably Republican 
newspaper with national reach, Jefferson and Madison explicitly aimed to create 
an information network committed to their Republican cause. As the content of 
their Gazette makes clear, they understood their project as part of an ongoing 
competition with a competing political philosophy in which electoral politics 
played a central role. Moreover, in their deliberate quest to bring “public 
information” to the “many places not sufficiently supplied with it,” Jefferson and 
                                                
119 For a brief but nevertheless thorough treatment of the battle between the Gazettes, see 
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Madison sought to “reclaim [the people] by enlightening them” of the dangers 
posed by their Federalist foes.120 Although letters written by both men during 
this period make it abundantly clear that they were each personally 
uncomfortable with this new form of politics, their actions make perfectly clear 
that they had come to accept it as necessary.121  
And yet for all the attempts of men on both sides to, in Jefferson’s words, 
bring “full information of [public] affairs thro' the channel of the public papers, 
& to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people,” 
both networks quickly collapsed.122 Why? Two common flaws doomed these 
efforts to build a national information network, and both can be explained by a 
fundamental mismatch between the design of the network and the infrastructure 
through which it was being run. Either flaw would on its own have been enough 
to severely cripple these networks, but combined they made their failure all but 
certain. The first was related to the delivery of newspapers over great distances 
through the mail. When Fenno’s Gazette began publishing in April of 1789, the 
postal service was both rudimentary and unreliable, with little to no reach 
outside of the seacoast towns and cities it was built to serve. Newspaper delivery 
was particularly problematic, and the further a paper had to travel, the less likely 
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it was to ever arrive. This created a serious disincentive for subscribers, who 
frequently reported missing issues to the publisher but were nevertheless 
expected by their full subscription bill.123 Although the quality of the service 
improved significantly following the passage of the Post Office Act of 1792, the 
act neither would nor could address the problem of fee collection. Local papers 
could rely on private agreements with post riders to facilitate collection, but once 
papers travelled outside the printer’s immediate area, it grew increasingly 
difficult for them to arrange for the collection of fees. This frequently put the 
printers at the mercy of their readers, and given the problems with unreliable 
delivery, it is not at all surprising that many readers chose not to re-subscribe, or 
worse, to subscribe but never pay their bills? For these networks to have 
succeeded, both the delivery of newspapers and the collection of subscriber fees 
would have had to been reliable, but the available information infrastructure was 
simply not up to the task. This put enormous financial pressure on the printers 
running the papers, virtually guaranteeing that they would operate their papers 
at a sizable loss. 
The second infrastructure-related mismatch was even more significant, and 
here the Postal Service Act was directly to blame. Following the formalization of 
                                                
123 For example, in a letter to James Madison, Virginia Governor Henry Lee warned in 
early 1792 that the irregularity of mail delivery was making it extraordinarily difficult 
for Lee to recruit new subscriptions. “This precariousness in the reception of [Freneau’s] 
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the free newspaper exchange policy under the act, both Fenno and Freneau made 
extensive and quite deliberate use of the service.124 The premise of both of men’s 
efforts was as always the construction of a truly national information network, so 
the distribution of copies to allied printers throughout the nation appeared to 
make perfect sense. But nothing better illustrates the mismatch between their 
common network design and the information infrastructure atop which these 
networks were run, for in distributing papers far and wide through the exchange, 
both Fenno and Freneau directly undermined their ability to grow a national 
subscriber base. Having received a copy of a prestigious paper from the capital, 
local printers were undoubtedly eager to reprint its most interesting contents for 
their own readers to enjoy. The more reliable the exchange service became, the 
more likely such articles were to be reprinted, but the more frequently articles 
were reprinted, the less need individuals had for a copy of the national paper at 
all. Eventually, dozens of papers around the nation were regularly reprinting the 
best articles from each edition of the paper to which they were allied.125 Worse 
still, this problem was compounded by the act’s graduated postage fees, which 
charged a premium on the delivery of papers from distant locations. From the 
perspective of a potential subscriber, the question was undoubtedly 
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straightforward: why pay more for a paper from the capital when you could read 
the best of its contents in a paper that was less expensive and also occasionally 
covered local affairs? 
Although it would be impossible at this far removed a date to gather accurate 
data on how graduated fees affected subscription rates and revenues, anecdotal 
evidence suggests the effect may have been quite large. During the congressional 
debates over the Post Office Act, both its proponents and opponents assumed 
graduated rates would successfully operate as a protective tariff for local printers. 
Fenno, an advocate for the tariff, argued that it would protect Southern printers 
from falling into a “very disadvantageous positions” relative to their more well-
financed Northern competitors, while Philadelphia’s Benjamin Bache, an 
opponent of the proposal, warned that it would discourage subscriptions to 
“national journals,” leading to what he predicted would be dangerous sectional 
divisions in attitudes and allegiances. In the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, it is reasonable to conclude that these contemporaneous accounts were 
likely correct. 126 More directly, we have evidence provided by Madison and 
Jefferson themselves. Following passage of the Post Office Act, Madison wrote to 
his friend and ally warning of the impact the new fees would have on the 
distribution of their Gazette in their home state of Virginia. “I am afraid the 
subscriptions will soon begin to be withdrawn from the Philadelphia papers, 
unless some step be speedily taken to prevent it. The best that occurs seems to be 
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to advertise that the papers will not be put into the mail, but sent, as heretofore, 
to all who shall not direct them to be put into the mail.”127 It is unclear what 
specific arrangements Madison is referring to here, although it is likely he is 
referencing an arrangement the men had put in place with allied postmasters 
and post riders in the Republican-friendly state. Given their central place within 
the Virginia political establishment, it is almost certain that they were able to 
overcome some of the negative effects of increased fees on subscriptions, but it 
would have been a practical impossibility for them to arrange something similar 
for subscribers throughout the nation. Thus, even if they were successful within 
their home state, their need for these two prominent men to devote their 
immediate attention to this suggests that these fees did indeed work to 
discourage the growth of a national subscriber base. 
 
On the Co-Evolution of Partisan Information Networks and Parties 
Elites from both the nascent Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties 
tried their best to create partisan information networks that could link supporters 
into a single, national system of information, but in the end their efforts failed 
and failed quickly. In the absence of the national networks they were attempting 
to build, political information remained highly decentralized and localized, with 
citizens relying on local newspapers as their primary source for political 
information. Although a majority of the stories within these papers were often 
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reprints from the exchange service, come election time the papers were 
increasingly filled with all manner of local political matter, most notably letters 
from local citizens nominating their neighbors for the upcoming campaign. In 
the absence of other more formal mechanisms, newspapers became one of the 
primary vehicles for publically proposing nominations in every state in the 
nation. And in the places where the postal service and the newspapers were 
more well developed, the information networks grew increasingly stable and 
openly partisan. 
A good illustration of this can be seen in the congressional elections of 1792. 
Taking place both at the height of the war between the national Gazette’s and at a 
moment of rapid but nevertheless deeply uneven postal service development, 
the elections remained highly localized affairs, with widespread regional 
variations that can be largely explained by the state of infrastructure 
development. Relative to the Middle Atlantic, the South featured woefully 
underdeveloped infrastructures and information networks. Elections there were 
chaotic affairs, with individuals relying on almost entirely on face-to-face contact 
for the bulk of their campaign activity. In the relatively few places south of 
Richmond with newspapers, local elites often attempted to guide the 
nominations process, but because they were based entirely on personal 
connections and were not formally recognized or controlled by a specific group, 
they almost universally failed, and cannot be considered the early stages of 
partisan development. Whereas the Southern states elected representatives on a 
local district system, the rural states of New England tended to run elections at 
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the state level. Despite this crucial difference, the mechanics of politics in the two 
regions looked striking similar, with one possible exception.  In Boston, the 
infrastructure was sufficiently developed to allow for a relatively vibrant 
newspaper system. Not unexpectedly, competing groups of local elites took 
advantage of the opportunities these papers provided to engage in a public 
contest to build support for lists of candidates who they argued could be counted 
on to represent the community well. The election results, however, betray their 
inefficacy: although the nine candidates backed by these men received the 
majority of the votes in the race for five positions, another eighteen were 
included in the final vote totals.128  
Two states that broke with the pattern of localized, disorganized, and largely 
nonpartisan politics were Pennsylvania and New York. Not coincidentally, they 
were also the two states with the most highly developed information 
infrastructures and information systems.129 Here the early signs of party activity 
were quite clear, and just as in the nation’s capital, competing partisan 
information networks were at the center of efforts to organize political activities 
across great geographic distance. In New York, the gubernatorial contest 
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between political heavyweights John Jay and George Clinton led to the creation 
of a sophisticated network of newspapers and committees of correspondence, 
with each campaign organizing hierarchies of local, county, and statewide 
committees to build support for their man. Much to the dismay of the elites in 
Albany organizing these efforts, however, the local committees frequently 
demonstrated considerable independence in other races, backing a bewildering 
array of conflicting tickets that led to down-ballot chaos on Election Day. As in 
Boston, the election returns in New York City found twenty-four candidates 
receiving votes for just seven state assembly seats. Included among the men 
receiving votes were six who had not appeared on any of the elite-sanctioned 
lists but who had nevertheless received extensive support in local newspapers.130 
The efforts of elites in Pennsylvania were almost identical to those in New York 
but for one important factor: politics in New York was organized around two 
prominent individuals, while in Pennsylvania it was structured around groups 
of prominent men. Beyond that, however, it functioned essentially the same. 
Committees of correspondence run out of the capital used the postal service to 
distribute circular letters to allies throughout the state, calling on them to 
organize committees at the county and local levels that could assist in the 
creation of a comprehensive ticket for races across the state. Using allied 
newspapers and widely distributed pamphlets, these tickets were promoted 
                                                
130 Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 35-38; Young, The Democratic Republicans 
of New York: The Origins, 1763-1797 
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heavily until Election Day, at which point despite the best efforts of elites 
numerous unaffiliated men received votes and even occasionally won election.131  
In both instances, elites recognized that the outcome of the election would 
rest on their ability to organize information networks capable of organizing and 
distributing information at the local level. Taking advantage of the relatively 
advanced state of the postal service infrastructure in their states, they formed 
committees of correspondence to collect names for nomination, distribute 
circular letters and pamphlets, and organize local campaign events. When 
available, they universally took advantage of allied newspapers, using them to 
promote candidates and events up to and through Election Day. But given the 
still significant delays in sharing information between each state’s major cities, 
coordination problems were rampant, leaving even the local actors directly 
affiliated with each organization free to act in ways counter to the wishes of the 
elites who initially organized the networks. 132 Just as they had at the national 
level, these efforts to create elite-led, partisan information networks failed to 
achieve their goals. Unlike their national counterparts, however, these state-level 
networks proved to be the first step in a process that created the information 
network atop which the new Democratic-Republican Party was built and run. 
This network, a highly decentralized system built by political outsiders, 
                                                
131 Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 38-45; Walters Jr, "The Origins of the 
Jeffersonian Party in Pennsylvania," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 
132 On average, the lag time for transmitting information between New York and Albany 
was just under a week, but between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh it was well over a week. 
Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 36-42 
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succeeded where others would not, laying the foundation for the epic 
presidential contest of 1800.  
Before turning to that history, however, a brief review of the story from the 
perspectives of the three competing theories of party change is in order. The 
elite-led theory of parties predicts that the party-in-government will act as the 
prime movers in adopting new forms of partisan communication, and that as 
they do so, they will bring into being the organizations that make up the party-as-
organization. These predictions hold up quite well in the stories of the creation 
and operation of the two Gazettes. Both papers were undertaken by and for 
competing groups of elites, each of which hired surrogates to build and maintain 
organizations that were expected to operate on behalf of elites. However, as 
additional partisan actors enter the frame, the story grows more complicated, 
with state and local leaders forming papers that undermined the efforts of 
national elites to control the national debate. But the model of course does not 
predict all elite-led efforts will be successful, so it would be incorrect to interpret 
these difficulties as a challenge to this model’s hypotheses. Local members’ 
pursuit of their electoral self-interest led them to support local networks at the 
expense of national ones, creating significant intra-party tension among elites 
working at different levels of the political system. Thus, although these party-
building projects ended in failure, their stories follow the predictions generated 
by the elite-led model. 
Looked at from another perspective, however, there is also evidence 
suggesting that the infrastructure-based model of change fared well. In the 
  
116 
immediate aftermath of the passage of the Post Office Act, the number of post 
offices throughout the country surged, decentralizing the postal network at 
precisely the moment national leaders were attempting to use it to build a 
centralized system for distributing information. In the absence of a mechanism 
for controlling the way this network was used at the state and local levels, party 
leaders found themselves unable to accomplish even the most basic goals of 
directing party nominations and electing reliable allies. Although leaders within 
the national party-in-government tried their best to direct the actions of their 
associates spread throughout the political system, the communication system 
simply did not have the capabilities necessary for these efforts to succeed. 
Moreover, because the decentralization of the network made the transmission of 
information throughout the republic more efficient, it made the newspapers 
national elites were working to establish largely superfluous. Had the free 
exchange service been designed to serve only a limited number of state-
approved papers, or had it required papers be routed through a central hub in 
the capitol, these new national papers might have operated with significant 
advantages over their state-based rivals. This would have provided national 
elites with an important mechanism for managing the flows of information 
throughout the republic, allowing them to exert far more influence over the 
development of state and local parties. But the postal infrastructure had been 
instead been explicitly designed to be open and decentralized, with postage rates 
and methods of distribution set to favor local papers over national ones. This 
meant that as national elites worked to build their newspapers, which would act 
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as the first party institution capable of interacting with voters across the nation, 
they were operating at a significant disadvantage to the men organizing similar 
efforts much closer to home. Put most simply, the post office system as it was 
constructed under the act of 1792 favored the development of local party 
organizations at the expense of national ones, providing a simple explanation for 
why the Gazettes so quickly collapsed that conforms nicely with the 
infrastructure-based model of party development.  
Very little of the evidence presented in this chapter supports the group-
centric explanation. At the federal, state, and local levels, members of party-in-
government were driving the action, and although their efforts were not always 
successful, it was always they who were in charge. Even in the numerous 
instances when state or national party leaders failed to direct their allies, these 
allies themselves were fellow office-seekers, making the conflict one centered 
entirely within the party-in-government. Moreover, although Fenno and Freneau’s 
print shops and papers are evidence of the development of rudimentary party-as-
organizations, these institutions were created and run entirely at the behest of the 
elites. It is of course true that both men did hope to establish themselves as 
gatekeepers within the political system, but there is no evidence to suggest that 
they intended use that position to advance their own political interests or goals. 
In fact, although both men were selected by their patrons for the reliability of the 
political views, they were also chosen because they appeared to have no political 
ambitions of their own, and as a result, could be counted on to faithfully advance 
the goals set out for them. But things would soon change at the state and local 
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levels. As the implementation of the Post Office Act picked up speed through the 
middle part of the decade, the pace of infrastructure change quickened, creating 
new opportunities for coordination and action at every level of the political 
system. Soon independent actors began entering the political fray, building 
organization designed to advance the cause of party before the careers of any 
specific individual, opening the door for a second round of party-building that 
would conform much more closely to pattern predicted by the group-centric 
model. If the first half of the decade featured elite-led efforts to build partisan 
networks, the second half saw the emergence of party organizers with no formal 
powers to call their own. It is to their stories that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Welcome to the Machines:  
Editors, Partisanship, and the Roots of Party Politics (1793-1800) 
 
“A certain federal Senator was heard to say some days ago ‘If the Aurora is not 
blown up soon, Jefferson will be elected in defiance of every thing!” 
 Aurora General Advertiser (A Report 1800) 
 
“You can't win, Darth. If you strike me down, I shall become more powerful than you 
could possibly imagine.” 
 Obi-Wan Kenobi 
 
After elites failed in their quest to build newspapers that could be used to 
control the information flowing to citizens, the local newspapers that had been 
their main source of competition continued to grow. Two loosely allied networks 
had developed among the most political newspapers, each connected by the 
decentralized infrastructure of the post office and its policy of free exchange. The 
Federalist network was by mid-decade larger but less well integrated than its 
Republican counterpart, with Federalist papers sharing far fewer articles and 
operating in much greater isolation than their Republican rivals. This disparity 
was driven largely by the decision of Federalist elites to temporarily abandon 
newspaper network development following the collapse of the Gazettes, a 
decision that led to many local editors with Federalist sympathies to shift their 
focus away from politics and towards the local businessmen who dominated 
their readership. On the Republican side, meanwhile, a group of political 
outsiders evolved a new network of papers that was simultaneously less 
dependent on centralized leadership and more focused on building a truly 
national political movement. With some accidental but nevertheless timely 
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assists from their Federalist opponents, these men were able to build the network 
that became the basis for the new Democratic-Republican Party. 
Scholars have frequently described the rise of partisan conflict in this period 
as the product of competition among elected officials, but as this chapter will 
demonstrate that story of party development is woefully incomplete. Although 
the national leaders who made up the party-in-government undoubtedly played 
the lead role in organizing party politics in the nation’s capital, it was highly 
committed partisan editors and their allies who led the way at the state and local 
levels. Moreover, although Republican elites were often reluctant to engage in 
partisan electioneering, these editors and printers eagerly embraced it, 
innovating news approach to politics that directly engaged citizens in the 
political process. But the path to the creation of new party networks was not an 
obvious one, and for the first few years these outsiders struggled to connect their 
local movements across state lines. Paradoxically, it was the passage of the 
second major information policy reform of the decade, the Alien & Sedition Acts 
of 1798, that finally led to the creation of an information network robust enough 
to support the formation of second national political party. Federalist leaders had 
believed that the strength of the nascent Democratic-Republican network lay in 
its most vitriolic newspapers, but the party’s true power lay in the decentralized 
network connecting its members to one another. In confusing an effect of their 
opponent’s growing power for its source, Federalist leaders misdirected their 
attempts at political repression, leaving in place the infrastructure necessary for 
partisans to share information and build opposition across great distances. 
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Rather than reclaim control of the national information environment, Federalist 
leaders instead lost it, and not long after lost political power too. 
This chapter begins with an analysis of the state of the Republican network in 
the aftermath of the collapse of Freneau’s National Gazette. First, the history of 
Benjamin Bache’s Aurora will be traced to identify how it came to take the place 
of the Gazette in the nation’s first truly viable partisan political information 
network. Next, the role of this network in the presidential election of 1796 will be 
examined. Although Republicans proved remarkably successful at organizing 
political activity within the state of Pennsylvania, their network was simply too 
underdeveloped to have much effect in other states. Nevertheless, following the 
election Federalist elites began moving to eliminate the Republican network 
through the enforcement of the Alien & Sedition Acts, and the reasons for and 
consequences of their failure will be the third major subject of this chapter. Bache 
himself would suffer greatly as a result of Federalist persecution, but his paper 
would survive and thrive, becoming the central node in a national movement 
that swept Republicans into power in 1800. Under the leadership of partisan 
political editors, local party organizations led the Democratic-Republicans to 
victory in 1800, sweeping Jefferson into the White House and beginning the 
rapid decline of the Federalist Party. The chapter then concludes with an analysis 
of what this history tells us about the roles of the party-in-government and party-
as-organization during this period, and by extension, about the competing 
theories of party development and change. As in the previous chapter, 
significant support is found for the predictions generated by the infrastructure-
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based model of party change. Unlike that chapter, however, both the group-
centric and elite-led models also find support, an inconclusive finding that sets 
the stage for the investigations of subsequent chapters. 
 
Bache, His Aurora, and the Beginnings of Networked Politics 
Despite the collapse of the National Gazette in late 1793, a handful of 
Republican editors and printers continued to operate in loose affiliation through 
the postal exchange. Had the Gazette been their only source for national political 
news, it is possible that their nascent efforts to coordinate political activity might 
have been set back significantly. But thanks to the efforts of a second 
Philadelphia newspaper, Benjamin Bache’s National Advertiser, the network 
continued distributing information without interruption. Across the nation 
editors began printing articles from Bache in place of material from Freneau, all 
the while reprinting stories from papers outside of Philadelphia without any 
change. Over time Bache emerged as the leading independent voice of 
republicanism in the nation, with his paper operating as the dominant node in an 
otherwise decentralized network of newspapers and party organizations 
operating independently of elites in the nation’s capital. As the locus of party 
newspaper-building shifted from national elites to local actors, the nature and 
character of party activity changed dramatically, altering the trajectory of 
partisan politics in a number of important ways. But first, the story of Benjamin 
Bache and his Aurora. 
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Benjamin Franklin Bache founded the General Advertiser in 1790 after 
receiving his inheritance, a collection of printing presses and materials, from his 
grandfather, Benjamin Franklin.133 The General Advertiser began life in a manner 
typical of newspapers of the era: local in reach but international in outlook, with 
content focused on the mercantile and foreign news of interest to most local 
businessmen. When his paper did cover politics, the stories usually came in one 
of three forms. First, The Advertiser was from its very earliest days the paper of 
record for the House of Representatives, with Bache himself attending  debates to 
compile the transcripts that would be widely reprinted by both Federalist and 
Republican papers around the nation.134 Second, the paper provided limited 
coverage of local of political events, including reports of meetings to nominate 
candidates for election in the city of Philadelphia.135  Third, Bache’s paper also 
                                                
133 For excellent overviews of the story of Bache and his paper, see Burns, Infamous 
Scribblers, 317-336; Daniel, Scandal & Civility: Journalism and the Birth of American 
Democracy, 109-147; Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 79-104. For a more thorough 
treatment, Tagg, Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia Aurora. For a version of the 
story that includes extensive archival material from the Aurora itself, see Rosenfeld, 
American Aurora: A Democratic-Republican Returns. For a brief but nevertheless thorough 
biography of Bache, see Smith, "The Enlightenment Education of Benjamin Franklin 
Bache," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 
134 Bache’s transcripts of congressional debates are widely regarded as the best of the era. 
In a notice to readers on November 11, 1792, Bache promised his readers  “candour and 
impartiality; brevity as far as is consistent with perspicuity, and accuracy to the extent of 
our abilities.” Bache, 1792, Congress, General Advertiser, Nov 3 By 1794 Bache’s 
transcripts were so widely regarded that other Philadelphia newspapers began 
reprinting them in their own papers, rather than assigning a reporter of their own to 
cover the debates. For more, see Tagg, Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia Aurora, 
99-101 
135 The battle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists in 1792 for control of nominations 
for congressional election was particularly hard fought, leading to some interesting 
coverage in Bache’s paper. For more, see Walters Jr, "The Origins of the Jeffersonian 
Party in Pennsylvania" 
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frequently featured letters from readers offering their take on controversies of the 
day. To avoid entangling the paper in the controversy, however, Bache 
frequently paired letters arguing opposite sides of an issue, an approach he 
apparently hoped would avoid alienating the readers and advertisers who made 
his paper profitable.136 Bache was in fact initially so committed to the ideal of 
printer nonpartisanship that he turned down a personal request from Thomas 
Jefferson to transform the General Advertiser into a reliable Republican voice, 
forgoing the opportunity that Jefferson subsequently offered to Freneau.137  
 This commitment to this neutrality was sorely tested by the events of 1792, 
and by the end of 1793 Bache’s evolution towards open partisanship was 
complete. As the war of words between Fenno and Freneau grew increasingly 
fierce, the General Advertiser grew increasingly political, and by that fall’s election 
campaign the paper had transformed into a reliable ally of Freneau and the 
Republican cause.138 In a matter of months, Bache abandoned the ideology of 
printer neutrality in favor of Madison’s civic conception of the press, becoming 
the leading independent voice for republicanism in the nation’s capital. 
                                                
136 This approach to newspaper publishing can be traced directly to Benjamin Franklin 
himself, who in the early decades of his career worked to establish press norms built 
upon the idea that printers naturally “acquire a vast Unconcernedness as to the right or 
wrong Opinions contain'd in what they print.” Although Franklin argued for this idea 
on a number of different occasions, its best formulation can be found in his “Apology for 
Printers,” an essay first published in his Pennsylvania Gazette in May of 1731. Although 
most printers including Franklin abandoned that neutrality during the years of 
revolution, the norm quickly reestablished itself following the end of the war. For more, 
see Burns, Infamous Scribblers, 84-96; Franklin, 1731, An Apology for Printers, The 
Pennsylvania Gazette, May 27; Isaacson, Benjamin Franklin: An American Life, 64-72  
137 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 63 
138 Tagg, "Benjamin Franklin Bache's Attack on George Washington" 
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Although Bache’s partisanship took many forms, none was more important than 
the use of his paper to support the rise of Democratic-Republican Societies, first 
in Philadelphia but eventually across the country.139 The first such society was 
founded in Philadelphia by German immigrants in April of 1793, and according 
to its founding documents, it was devoted to the dual causes of promoting 
republican ideals and opposing the aristocratic tendencies that its members 
believed had taken hold among Federalist elites. 140 Distributed in pamphlet form, 
the documents quickly attracted the attention of Freneau and Bache, both of who 
promptly republished translations in their newspapers in the hopes of spurring 
the creation of similar groups in other cities. By the end of the summer their 
translations had been reprinted in dozens of local papers, and by the fall dozens 
of organizations were operating across the nation, using the network of 
                                                
139 Bache’s turn away from neutrality and towards civic involvement of the press can 
most clearly be seen in an article published in January of 1793. Echoing Madison’s Public 
Opinion, which had been published a month earlier in the National Gazette, Bache wrote, 
“In a republic of which the public opinion is the basis, it is of very peculiar importance 
as the organ of that opinion, and in many cases the only organ. There are many 
occurrences, properly within the sphere of public investigation, on which the people 
cannot express their sentiments by their representatives.” Bache, 1793, Untitled, General 
Advertiser, January 23; Madison, 1791, Public Opinion, National Gazette, December 19 
140 For a thorough recounting of the history of Democratic-Republican Societies, see Link, 
Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800; Tachau, "The Whiskey Rebellion in Kentucky: 
A Forgotten Episode of Civil Disobedience," Journal of the Early Republic,. For a much 
briefer summary, see Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting 
Tradition in America, 1788-1828, 195-199. For extensive primary source documentation of 
the Societies, see Foner, The Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800: A Documentary 
Sourcebook of Constitutions, Declarations, Addresses, Resolutions, and Toasts 
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newspaper that had first spread the call to action as the primary mechanism for 
coordinating activity and ideas.141  
Although initially devoted to spreading information about republicanism and 
reviving the “Spirit of ‘76” throughout the nation, the clubs rapidly evolved into 
embryonic political parties, debating nominations for elected office, offering 
endorsements of preferred candidates, and even engaging in door-to-door voter 
education and mobilization up to and through the day of election.142 Filled with 
men who the nation’s political and economic elites refused to accept as equals – 
merchants, artisans, laborers, and above all immigrants – the Democratic-
Republican Societies are evidence of the young nation’s first real attempts at 
building political organizations capable of simultaneously expanding the 
political process and organizing it along partisan lines.143 By mid-1794 more than 
thirty of these clubs had formed, with members holding regular meetings to 
passionately debate the issues of the day. The topics of debate varied widely 
from club to club, but a single, unifying theme can nevertheless be seen in their 
deliberations. More than any other issue, these men were animated by their 
                                                
141 The political activities of the Philadelphia Society are closely tracked in Miller, 
Philadelphia, the Federalist City: A Study of Urban Politics, 1789-1801; Tinkcom, The 
Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania, 1790-1801. For a detailed overview of the role 
of craftsmen in the movement, see Shankman, ""A New Thing on Earth": Alexander 
Hamilton, Pro-Manufacturing Republicans, and the Democratization of American 
Political Economy," Journal of the Early Republic 
142 For an excellent overview of Democratic-Republican Societies as proto-parties, see 
Tagg, Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia Aurora, 207-208 
143 For more on the role of immigrants in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Republican 
politics, see Carter II, "A "Wild Irishman" under Every Federalist's Bed: Naturalization in 
Philadelphia, 1789-1806," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 
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desire to elect more Republicans to both their state and federal legislatures, and 
as the fall campaign approached they worked hard to make that goal a reality. 144   
Hoping to gain political power for themselves and their allies, the founders of 
the Democratic-Republican Societies took steps towards building party 
institutions wholly separate from those under the control of the nation’s elites. 
Given the rising popularity and power of these clubs, it is possible to imagine 
Republican elites working to co-opt them. Three events, however, worked 
quickly to undermine the groups’ appeal. First, as the politics of the nation’s 
relationship with France grew increasingly toxic, so too did the clubs, which had 
been early and fervent supporters of the French Revolution. Second, many of the 
clubs had involved themselves directly in the Whiskey Rebellion, with several 
organizing militias in opposition to federal taxing authority in Western 
Pennsylvania.145 Third, in reaction to these and other controversial positions, 
Federalist elites openly worked to discredit the clubs, with President Washington 
himself warning the nation against the formation of “self-created societies” in his 
                                                
144 Although it is difficult to judge how effective their efforts were, anecdotal evidence 
suggests they found some success. Two examples are worth nothing here. First, John 
Swanwick used his membership in the Philadelphia society to springboard in 1794 from 
the state legislature to a seat in Congress. Baumann, "John Swanwick: Spokesman for 
"Merchant-Republicanism" in Philadelphia, 1790-1798," ibid. Second, in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison credited support provided by a club as the primary 
reason for Edward Livingston’s election to congress in 1794. Livingston himself was a 
member of the club, which backed him extensively during the campaign. Madison, Letter 
to Thomas Jefferson, December 21, 1794. For more, see Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian 
Republicans, 62-66 
145 For more on the activities of the clubs during the Whiskey Rebellion, see Link, 
Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800, 145-148 
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annual address to Congress in November of 1794.146 As a result of these three 
forces, Republican elites universally distanced themselves from the societies, 
which rapidly collapsed over the following year.  
In their relatively brief existence, however, these clubs served as important 
training grounds for the men who would later lead the Democratic-Republican 
Party to power, and chief among the leaders of the Democratic-Republican 
Societies was Benjamin Franklin Bache.147 As the publisher of the most pro-
Republican, fully independent newspaper in the capital city, Bache became one 
of the most vocal leaders of the Philadelphia Society, organizing its meetings, 
directing its Committee of Correspondence, and publicizing its activities 
throughout the city and the state.148 The more deeply involved in the society he 
became, the more his paper reflected his political involvement, and within a 
matter of months it was considered by Democratic-Republican organizers 
around the nation to be the movement’s unofficial organ. Although Bache had 
just two years before turned down an offer to transform his paper into a voice for 
elite republicanism, he now eagerly embraced the opportunity to lead the 
                                                
146 Washington’s language clearly illustrates the contempt Federalist leaders had for 
popular politics. In his telling, the problem with the societies was not simply that they 
were opposing his policies; equally important was the fact that members of the 
community had organized themselves into groups devoted to frustrating, rather than 
conforming to, federal policy. Washington, Sixth Annual Message to Congress, November 
19th, 1794 
147  Another notable founding member of the Philadelphia Democratic-Republican 
Societies was Michael Leib, a doctor whose political career will be detailed in later 
chapters. 
148 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 79-90; Tagg, Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia 
Aurora, 205-238 
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development of a new, much more localized form of republicanism independent 
of national elites. But this move to independence came with a cost, as 
Philadelphia elites rallied to systematically ostracized him from Philadelphia’s 
high society despite his family connections. Banished from the social world they 
had been born in to, Bache and his wife set out to create a new one of their own. 
By early 1794 Bache’s paper was becoming the leading voice of republicanism 
in the nation, shared widely by a growing list of subscribers and reprinted 
eagerly by printers and editors around the country affiliated with the republican 
cause. But with this new position of leadership came increased attention from 
Federalist editors such as Fenno, Noah Webster, and William Cobbett, and soon 
Bache found himself the target of attacks in Federalist papers across the land.149 
Bache had initially aimed the bulk of his paper’s criticism at the conduct of the 
Washington Administration, but by the summer of 1794 he had shifted his 
emphasis to the upcoming elections. Although the paper’s primary focus was on 
national politics, it regularly weighed in on contests in state and local politics as 
well, outlining the differences between factions and endorsing the men Bache 
believed most fit to hold office. But Philadelphia was where Bache’s paper had 
the greatest impact, and he used the paper to unabashedly campaign for his 
                                                
149 Republican leaders such as Madison, Jefferson, and James Monroe were all hailing 
Bache’s paper as the leading voice of republicanism by the spring of 1794. Tagg, 
Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia Aurora, 222. Noah Webster was the editor of 
New York's first daily newspaper, American Minerva, a reliably Federalist paper that was 
established with the assistance of Alexander Hamilton. William Cobbett, better known 
as “Peter Porcupine” to the readers of his paper, The Porcupine, was the most 
vituperative of all Federalist editors. For more on the former, see Daniel, Scandal & 
Civility, 148-186; for the later, Burns, Infamous Scribblers, 338-350; Daniel, Scandal & 
Civility, 187-230 
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political allies. Bache’s tactics were openly partisan and strikingly modern. For 
example, on several occasions  he used his paper to organize hostile take-overs of 
Federalist nominating conventions, and although these efforts failed more often 
than they succeeded, they marked a sharp break with the traditional norms of 
deference that had defined politics since the Revolution. In these and other 
tactics, Bache pioneered a new style of politics, one in which citizens outside the 
party-in-government directly engaged the system to advance their own causes and 
meet their own needs. Despite significant opposition from elites on both sides of 
the aisle, Bache’s first coordinated campaign against the Federalists was a success, 
adding five new Democratic-Republicans representatives to the House by the 
end of the year.150 Buoyed by this success, Bache threw himself into a campaign 
to organize a viable alternative to the Federalist Party. As a first step, he changed 
the name of the paper to the Aurora General Advertiser, a move designed to signal 
that he had abandoned any pretense of impartiality in favor of open and 
unabashed support for republicanism. 151  Then, using the postal service’s 
exchange system, he began a process that would drive the development of both a 
new information network and a new model of politics, with newspaper editors 
                                                
150 For more, see Tagg, Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia Aurora, 224-225 
151 Contemporary readers understood the name the word “Aurora” to have connotations 
that tied it directly to republicanism and enlightenment. In case they missed the 
connection, however, and essay published in November of 1794 made it explicit: “The 
AURORA, as far as the editor’s exertions extend, shall diffuse light within the sphere of 
its influence,–dispel the shades of ignorance, and gloom of error and thus tend to 
strengthen the fair fabric of freedom on its surest foundation, publicity and information.” 
Bache, 1794, Aurora, Aurora, November 8 
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and printers serving as professional political organizers and partisan leaders in 
local communities across the nation. 
If a single day could be identified as the day a new, openly partisan 
information network began to take shape, it would be June 29, 1795, the day 
Bache’s Aurora printed details of the previously secret and highly controversial 
Jay Treaty.152 Almost overnight, Bache’s office became the command center for a 
national grassroots effort to block the treaty’s ratification, a fight that would 
permanently split the nation’s newspapers, its citizenry, and its ruling elites into 
two opposing camps. After printing the contents of the treaty in the Aurora, 
Bache set out for New England with hundreds of copies of the treaty in pamphlet 
form, and over the course of the next few weeks he worked his way towards 
Boston, stopping in taverns, coffeehouses, and meeting halls to distribute his 
pamphlets. At numerous stops along the way, he worked with local allies to 
organize a series of raucous town meetings, each aimed at building a national 
movement capable of preventing ratification of the treaty. But as he traveled 
throughout New England, Bache increasingly experienced a problem that had 
plagued both Fenno and Freneau: his pamphlets sold well enough to require a 
second edition, but the efficiencies of the postal exchange frequently allowed 
local papers to break the news before he had even arrived. In letters home to his 
wife Bache can be seen lamenting the affect this was having on sales, but as his 
travels progressed, his complaints give way to a growing recognition of the 
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political opportunity the exchange offered him and his allies. Unlike Fenno and 
Freneau, who had hoped to use their coverage of politics as a means to enrich 
themselves, Bache saw politics an end in and of itself. For him, commitment to 
the Republican cause came before any specific business or network model, so 
rather than lament the business lost because of the rapid reprinting of articles in 
local papers, he adapted, returning home with a new appreciation of the ways 
the exchange could be used to mobilize allies across great distances. His journey 
to organize opposition throughout New England complete, Bache returned home 
never to leave again; from this point forward, he would rely exclusively on his 
paper as a means for spreading the Republican word, leaving it to allies in 
distant cities and towns to organize activities in their hometowns and print word 
print word of the results in papers of their own. 153   
Upon returning to Philadelphia, Bache devoted himself to the cause of 
electing reliable Republican candidates, using his paper to organize and promote 
tickets in a wide variety of local, state, and federal elections across the nation 
over the next few years. Demonstrating the lessons he learned during his trip 
north, he made deliberate and extensive use of the postal exchange service to 
distribute his message, regularly sharing his articles with eighteen other reliably 
Republican papers throughout the nation.154 Within the pages of his paper, Bache 
                                                
153 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 94-104 
154 According to both Pasley and Stewart, nearly all of these papers were located in 
urban centers, and although all were considered allies to the cause, only a handful were 
at this point in history as staunchly partisan as the Aurora. Among the most important 
were Thomas Greenleaf’s New York Journal, Boston’s Independent Chronicle and Gazette, 
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made a self-consciously transparent effort to present information of interest to a 
group he now understood as a national Republican political community, 
providing extensive coverage of political meetings, banquets, and elections in 
every state of the nation. By early 1796, Bache’s efforts had transformed his paper 
into a highly effective instrument for the promotion of republican ideals and the 
candidates that supported them. Through the postal exchange, the Aurora 
became the unofficial leader of a loosely affiliated network of Republican papers, 
each of which was run by a like-minded individual working to advance the 
cause within his local community.  
Before turning to a review of the efforts of this new organization during the 
election of 1796, a brief review of the story as told so far from the perspective of 
the competing theories of parties. If the last chapter saw elites within the party-in-
government failing in their efforts to build partisan information networks, this 
chapter features the development of an independent party-as-organization by a 
man with no interest in securing elected office for himself. By all accounts, Bache 
saw politics as both his profession and his personal mission, and although he 
frequently involved himself in elections, it was always to advance a cause rather 
than to improve his own position. Undeterred by the efforts of Philadelphia high 
society to tarnish his reputation, Bache used his position as head of an 
independent newspaper to build a rudimentary party organization. In the stories 
                                                                                                                                            
the Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, the Hartford American Mercury, the Bennington 
Vermont Gazette, and the Elizabeth Town New-Jersey Journal. For more, see Pasley, The 
Tyranny of Printers, 106-109; Stewart, The Opposition Press of the Federalist Period, 868-893 
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of both the Democratic-Republican Societies and the Jay Treaty, Bache and his 
allies can be seen mobilizing to affect the actions of the party-in-government, 
providing evidence that supports the group-centric theory of parties at the 
expense of the elite-led frameworks. At the same time, these stories also provide 
preliminary support for the infrastructure-based model of party change. 
Although the Democratic-Republican Societies eventually took a direct role in 
party politics, they began as organizations devoted to increasing the political 
participation and knowledge of average citizens. Much more importantly, their 
establishment in cities throughout the nation can be traced directly through the 
spread of the call to action carried by republican newspapers through the postal 
exchange. As the groups matured, they increasingly used the postal system to 
coordinate activities, and although they eventually collapsed in the face of 
intense elite opposition, in their brief lives they played an important role in 
shaping the nation’s political debate. Last but not least, in the story of Bache’s 
efforts to organize opposition to the Jay Treaty, we can see clear evidence of the 
decentralizing impact the postal network was beginning to have on politics. 
After publishing the treaty in the Aurora, Bache headed to New England to 
spread the word. But as he travelled he discovered that the news he had 
personally broken was outpacing him, allowing local actors to take the lead in 
building opposition movements in their home cities. Had the news travelled 
more slowly, Bache undoubtedly would have been able to take a much more 
direct role in group formation in each of the cities he visited. Instead, he was 
forced to quickly adapt his plans, and the fact that he was able to do so 
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successfully should not distract from the fact that an unexpected feature of the 
information environment had forced Bache to follow a new path. But as the 
presidential and congressional contests of 1796 would soon demonstrate, Bache’s 
new party-as-organization was not yet up to the task to which he had set it.  
 
Bache, Beckley, and the Election of 1796 
The presidential election of 1796 was the first of two consecutive contests that 
pitted Thomas Jefferson against John Adams. In the first Adams would prevail, 
but in the second Jefferson and his Republican allies would come out on top. 
More importantly from the perspective of party development, where the first 
election would highlight the relative weakness of the information network atop 
which the new Republican Party was built, the second election would 
demonstrate that network’s rapid evolution to a position of overwhelming 
strength that allowed for the creation of the nation’s first successful opposition 
party-as-organization. The election season of 1796 began with the publication of 
Washington’s Farewell Address in newspapers throughout the nation, an event 
arch-Federalist Fisher Ames described as “a signal, like dropping a hat, for the 
party racers to start.”155 Unlike that of 1792, candidates in this election were quite 
likely to declare allegiance to one of the two candidates for president, marking a 
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significant turn towards open partisanship in a nation where the virtue of parties 
was still an open question.156  
Pennsylvania was the central battleground in this presidential contest, and at 
the request of Madison and Jefferson, John J. Beckley, a staunch Republican who 
had proven himself to be a skilled administrator in his time as Clerk of the House, 
took the lead in coordinating efforts across the state.157 But Beckley was not 
selected for this task based on his administrative skills alone; equally important 
were his deep connections within the world of Republican printers and editors, 
including a long-running relationship with Bache and his affiliated political 
organizations.158 Beckley had over the years proven himself a masterful political 
tactician, and together with Bache he conducted an elaborate publicity campaign 
                                                
156 Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans, 94-95 
157 Although Beckley was one of the most important Democratic-Republican Party 
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historians until relatively recently. For the only complete biography of Beckley, see 
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that won the state of Pennsylvania for Jefferson during the fall campaign.159 
While Bache was building the influence of his paper through the postal exchange, 
Beckley was building a network of reliable republican allies who could be 
counted on to distribute pamphlets and circular letters throughout the state. 
Using the postal service to distribute a circular letter to local allies, they develop 
local networks of “popular men” who could be counted on to distribute printed 
materials throughout the campaign.160 With this network in place, the men then 
bombarded the state with pamphlets and handbills, distributing more than 
50,000 handwritten ballots to all of the state’s towns, villages, and hamlets in the 
final weeks of the campaign.161 It was an act of information distribution aimed 
squarely at average voters with no precedent in American electoral history, and 
it proved decisive in the final days of the campaign. Not only did Jefferson carry 
the state and win its electors, but all of the votes cast in down-ticket races for 
Republicans went to candidates whose name’s appeared on the ballots 
                                                
159 Beckley’s campaign methods look surprisingly modern when compared to those of 
today, and included the development of extensive, precinct-level get-out-the-vote effort 
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distributed by Beckley and Bache. Unlike past elections, not a single vote went to 
candidates who had not been named by their party’s organization. 162  
But as successful as Bache and Beckley’s efforts were within the state of 
Pennsylvania, they were equally ineffective outside of it. Why? The answer to 
that question lies in the nature of the infrastructure through which their 
campaign was run. Four information distribution problems were of particular 
importance. First was a problem of geography. Although the network of 
Republican papers was significantly stronger than it had been just a few years 
previously, individual papers were still largely confined to the urban centers that 
were dominated by Federalist newspapers and voters. The rural towns and 
villages that served as strongholds of republicanism outside of Pennsylvania 
almost universally went without local newspapers, and although the rapid 
expansion of the postal service meant residents could subscribe to out-of-town 
papers, few could afford the expense. As a result, the Republican message 
frequently was unable to reach the populations most likely to be receptive to it, 
leaving many potential Republican voters entirely disconnected from the 
organization to which they were most likely to want to belong.163 Directly related 
to this was a second problem, one best illustrated by returning to the story of the 
Aurora. Although Bache had long since given up his claims to professional 
printer neutrality, he had not yet abandoned his reluctance to create a “country 
                                                
162 Berkeley and Berkeley, John Beckley: Zealous Partisan in a Nation Divided, 135-139, 143-
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edition” of his paper, a format commonly produced by editors who sought 
distant subscribers. Country editions were typically printed three times each 
week, combining the content from multiple daily editions into a single-page, 
advertising-free newspaper. Although production of a country edition increased 
the potential reach of a newspaper, it greatly increased the financial risk for the 
paper’s production, as the printer could no longer directly control the collection 
of subscription fees. Like most of his Republican allies, and in contrast with 
many of his Federalist foes, Bache received no direct financial support from the 
elites allied with his cause, so he had deliberately focused his circulation efforts 
on Philadelphians who could be personally visited should their bill become past 
due. But in the relatively short campaign of 1796, the decision to forgo the 
production of a country edition created an insurmountable problem for Bache 
and Beckley. Using their personal contacts, they were able in a matter of weeks to 
distribute the Aurora as needed throughout Pennsylvania, but in other regions of 
the country they were left without a product that could be distributed through 
the postal service at a price citizens could afford.164  
These first two problems were then compounded by the relative dearth of 
Republican papers nationwide. Although the Republican network connected as 
many as twenty papers during the campaign, there were roughly three times as 
many newspapers that remained either apolitical or allied with the Federalist 
                                                
164 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 101. For more on Jefferson’s interest in a country 
edition of the Aurora, see Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, June 15, 1797; Jefferson, To 
Peregrine Fitzhugh, June 4, 1797  
  
140 
cause. This disparity meant that even when the Republican message reached a 
population, it was frequently drowned out by competing sources, adding to the 
already significant difficulties faced by an opposition movement in an era when 
entrenched elites defined opposition itself as illegitimate.165 Finally, fourth was 
the problem of local distribution of non-newspaper material. As the story of 
Beckley’s distribution of tickets demonstrates, the postal system and its exchange 
service were on their own not enough to support the full range of party activity 
needed to win an election. Equally important were reliable allies who were able 
to make certain that the information distributed through the postal system was 
put into the appropriate hands. On a national level, the development of such a 
network was simply not technically possible. Travel times and communication 
lags were simply too great at this point in history to allow for the organization of 
a similar network in other states in a matter of months. As a result, Bache’s 
efforts outside of the state of Pennsylvania were limited to whatever material his 
paper could carry to allied editors through the newspaper exchange. Bache made 
extraordinary efforts in that regard, producing pro-Jefferson and anti-Adams 
propaganda that was widely distributed throughout the nation, but he and 
Beckley were utterly unable to replicate their success with pamphlets and tickets 
in other states.166  
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Understood together, these four distribution problems illustrate a simple fact: 
although the nation’s information infrastructure was by this point sufficiently 
advanced to create a truly national network for the distribution of some types of 
information, partisan organizers had not yet located enough reliable allies in the 
local communities where elections would be fought. In the aftermath of 
Jefferson’s narrow loss, Republican printers, editors, and elites recognized this 
problem and began working to correct it. Convinced that information 
distribution problems were the primary reason for their loss, they launched a 
concerted effort to establish reliably Republican editors and their newspapers in 
places where they did not yet exist, both inside the state of Pennsylvania and 
elsewhere. Whereas Beckley had led their efforts during the election campaign, 
on this project Bache clearly took the lead. After several new Republican papers 
began operation in Philadelphia in 1797, Bache and his assistant William Duane 
organized their relocation to areas inside and outside the state that they believed 
ripe for conversion to the Republican cause. They also worked to establish new 
papers in western Pennsylvania by providing assistance to both current and 
former apprentices and journeymen in Bache’s shop. For example, John Israel, 
the teenage son of tavern keeper and Democratic-Republican Society organizer 
Israel Israel, was sent by Bache to establish a new paper in Washington, 
Pennsylvania, a small town on the outskirts of Pittsburgh. Once established, his 
Herald of Liberty immediately became the vehicle driving the successful elections 
of both Albert Gallatin and William Findley, and not long after Israel expanded 
his reach by establishing a second paper in the heart of Federalist-controlled 
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Pittsburgh. Following Bache’s lead, he used his papers to advance the campaigns 
that he managed, building excitement for his candidates that brought new voters 
to the polls. With Israel’s help, Pittsburgh was transformed in a just a few short 
years from a city with Federalist leanings to a staunchly Republican town.167 But 
despite the best efforts of Bache and his allies, the Republican network was after 
more than a year’s worth of effort still no match for its Federalist adversaries. 
Although more than two dozen new papers had been successfully founded, this 
number was only enough to keep pace with the overall level of newspaper 
growth nationwide, leaving the Republicans as badly outnumbered as they had 
been before the project began. Of the fifty or so Republican papers operating in 
the spring of 1798, far fewer than half were run in as explicitly partisan a manner 
as Bache’s Aurora and Israel’s Herald of Liberty. And although it is true that the 
Federalists could only count on a similar number of fully committed partisan 
organs, because even nonpartisan commercial papers tended to reprint as news 
any official pronouncements, speeches, or proposals of members of the 
Washington Administration, the Federalist interpretation of events was far more 
widely distributed than the Republican alternative.168  
From the perspective of the competing theories of parties, Bache’s alliance 
with Beckley illustrates the growing importance of Bache’s independent 
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organization, a development clearly in line with the predictions of group-centric 
theories. Moreover, although Beckley’s involvement includes a formal request 
from Madison and Jefferson, his deep involvement in Pennsylvania politics well 
predates their request that he become involved. Understood from Beckley’s 
perspective, their appeal represents little more than a formal acknowledgement 
by the leading members of the party-in-government of the largely independent 
role he was already playing in the party-as-organization he had helped Bache 
build. Although these two great men and their allies undoubtedly had resources 
that proved valuable to Beckley, so too did Beckley have access to the assets that 
they needed to achieve their own goals. This mutual interdependence is in line 
with both the group-centric and infrastructure-driven theories of party change; it 
is in clear contradiction, however, to the predictions of the elite-centric models.  
At the same time, Bache and Beckley’s inability to expand their organization 
outside of Pennsylvania demonstrates the limiting role information of 
infrastructure development in the evolution of national party organization. 
Although the Post Office Act of 1792 set in motion a process that would bring the 
postal network to every corner of the nation, the system’s expansion was in 1796 
still in its very early phases. Hundreds of post offices had already been opened 
since the act’s passage, allowing newspapers to travel to communities that had 
previously been without them, but as of mid-1796 only a small handful of 
journeymen had moved to establish papers in these underserved areas. As a 
result, both Federalist and Republican papers were in 1796 largely confined to 
the urban areas where infrastructure development pre-dated the Post Office Act. 
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In Pennsylvania, Bache and Beckley could build their organization around allied 
printers and editors already located throughout the state, but in other states with 
less well-developed infrastructures, those potential allies were nearly always 
located only in urban areas. Every printer and editor, no matter their political 
affiliation, was dependent upon the postal infrastructure and its system of 
newspaper exchange for the delivery of their products beyond their immediate 
area, so until and unless an office was established in a community, that 
community was almost certain to remain without a printer and a paper. More 
fundamentally, because the establishment of a new post office represented the 
first physical connection between the state and that community, the expansion of 
postal infrastructure in very real ways meant the expansion of the national 
political community itself. And outside of Pennsylvania in 1796, that community 
had in only a handful of instances expanded beyond the major cities and towns 
in each state, precisely the areas most likely to support Federalist candidates. 
Thus, the history of infrastructure development as of that campaign placed 
Republican Party organizers at a severe disadvantage relative to their Federalist 
counterparts. But thanks to the rash actions of Federalist legislators, that was 
about to change.  
 
Policy Intervention: The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 
The move towards passage of the laws collectively known as the Alien and 
Sedition Acts began during the events that came to be known as the “XYZ 
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Affair.”169 After newspapers revealed French officials had deported a group of 
American diplomats who had refused to pay bribes to extend diplomatic 
negotiations, an undeclared naval war known as the Quasi-War broke out 
between the two nations. As French privateers seized American ships bound for 
British ports, both Congress and the American people began beating the drum 
for open war. Federalist leaders had previously used charges of divided loyalty 
to destroy the Democratic-Republican Societies, so it is no surprise that they 
deployed similar rhetoric throughout this crisis. In the past the Federalists had 
been content to use the charge as a political weapon, but this time they went 
much further, turning it into a powerful legal one as well. In the very short run 
the Alien and Sedition Acts provided an enormous boost to the Federalist cause, 
but by 1800 it was clear that they had utterly backfired. Rather than destroy the 
opposition, the acts unleashed forces that vaulted Republicans into political 
power. 
The laws commonly known as the Alien and Sedition Acts were four separate 
pieces of legislation: the Naturalization Act, the Alien Friends Act, the Alien 
Enemies Act, and the Sedition Act. Although the first three acts can be 
understood as a response to the general xenophobia that had been building since 
the Jay Treaty crisis, their individual provisions were drafted and discussed in 
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ways that left no doubt of their specific targets. 170  The most prominent 
Republican printers were all American citizens, but many of the apprentices and 
journeymen who labored in their print shops and supported their political 
campaigns were refugees who had only recently come to the America.171 In 
congressional debates and newspaper articles, Federalist legislators and their 
allies singled out “wild Irishmen” and other allegedly “vicious and disorganized 
characters” as men “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,” the 
standard set by the Alien Act for lawful deportation.172 Combined with the 
Sedition Act, which made it a crime to “write, print, utter, or publish…false, 
scandalous, and malicious writing” against the government or its officials, it was 
clear that the Federalists intended to destroy their Republican opponents by 
                                                
170 Ridgway, "Fries in the Federalist Imagination: A Crisis of Republican Society," 
Pennsylvania History 
171 Bache’s headquarters provides a perfect illustration of this phenomenon. Over the 
years, it played host to a wide variety of Irish radicals, including James Thomas 
Callendar, William Duane, Dr. James Reynolds, and Theobald Wolfe Tone. The role of 
Irish immigrants in Pennsylvania politics will be discussed at length in subsequent 
chapters. For more, see Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 91-93 For comprehensive 
treatments of the role of immigrants in the Republican movement in this decade, see 
Durey, With the Hammer of Truth; Durey, Transatlantic Radicals and the Early American 
Republic; Twomey, Jacobins and Jeffersonians: Anglo-American Radicalism in the United States, 
1790-1820 
172 Under the Alien Friends Act, deportation was at the sole discretion of the President, 
who merely had to declare a person “dangerous” to begin proceedings. "An Act 
Concerning Aliens," U.S. Statutes at Large; Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 118; Smith, 
"The Enforcement of the Alien Friends Act of 1798," The Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review For a lengthy overview of the debate over the Acts, see Smith, Freedom's Fetters: 
The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties, 3-93. Although the act did not 
single out the Irish for special mistreatment, statements by leading Federalists at the 
time suggest that they were in fact its primary intended targets. Since the fight over the 
Jay Treaty, Irish immigrants had become a key source of support for Democratic-
Republicans. For more, see Carter II, "A "Wild Irishman" under Every Federalist's Bed: 
Naturalization in Philadelphia, 1789-1806"; Smith, Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and 
Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties, 107-108 
  
147 
destroying the network of newspaper and print shops that disseminated the 
Republican point of view.173 
The debate over passage of the acts played out as a direct extension of the 
conversation surrounding the passage of the Post Office Act of 1792, with one 
major exception. Last time advocates of the civic and logistical rationales had 
been allies, but this time they became bitter opponents on opposite sides of what 
looked to be a fight to the death. Leading opposition to the acts was Rep. Albert 
Gallatin of Pennsylvania, a civic-minded Republican who had been elected with 
the help of a Republican printer, and who believed in the power of enlightened 
public opinion to guide policy and check government excess.174 From the floor of 
the House, Gallatin charged the Federalists with seeking to maintain their hold 
on power by depriving people of “the means of obtaining information” 
necessary to evaluate the conduct of elected officials. In a rousing defense of the 
constitution and free speech, Gallatin warned his colleagues that “laws against 
writings of this kind had uniformly been one of the most powerful engines used 
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by tyrants to prevent the diffusion of knowledge…and to perpetuate their own 
tyranny.” The “proper weapon to combat error,” he concluded, “was truth.”175  
Federalists countered with a novel reinterpretation of their logistical rationale. 
Having learned through experience that printers could not be counted on to 
publish materials that supported the “dignity and splendor” of the government 
and its officials, they argued that the output of presses must be restricted to 
ensure that harmful materials never reached wide circulation. Under this revised 
standard, the presses and the postal service would continue to circulate 
information to the greatest extent possible, but the government would monitor 
the flows of information to make certain that speech it deemed threatening 
would be eliminated before it could do harm. To justify this shift in thinking, 
supporters of the acts relied on three related arguments.176 Citing the example of 
the French Revolution, they argued first that in times of crisis the press became a 
dangerous weapon that must be carefully guarded, lest the enemy seize it and 
lead the masses to their doom. Congressman John Allen, for example, warned 
that “the Jacobins of our country” were determined to use the press to sway “the 
poor, the ignorant, the passionate, and the vicious” to make “the virtuous, the 
pacific, and the rich” their victims.177 This hinted at a second argument, which 
centered on a perceived disrespect for class and station among some in society. 
Connecticut Senator Uriah Tracy, for example, lamented how growing prosperity 
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among farmers was providing them with so much disposable income that they 
could now afford newspapers. “Having the leisure to read,” he sarcastically 
concluded, “they of course become mighty politicians, acquainted beforehand 
with all that ought to be done by government & with all that ought not to be 
done.” 178  Most fantastically, Federalists alleged the existence of a complex 
international conspiracy, one that used ignorant printers as a front to disseminate 
articles aimed at ending the American experiment in self-government. 
Suggesting that men of such low station were not sophisticated enough to 
produce the complex arguments that appeared in their newspapers, 
congressman Harrison Gray Otis argued that the papers themselves were 
evidence that a “crowd of spies and inflammatory agents” dedicated to 
“fomenting hostilities” and “alienating the affections of our own citizens” had 
taken over many of the nation’s political presses.179 Bringing all three arguments 
together as one, Congressman Allen warned, “liberty of the press and of opinion 
is calculated to destroy all confidence between man and man; it leads to a 
dissolution of every bond of union; it cuts asunder every ligament that unites 
man to his family, man to his neighbor, man to society, and to Government.”180 
Although Congress did not vote on final passage of the acts until mid-July, 
warrants for the arrests of printers suspected of sedition began issuing in late-
June. As Jefferson himself had warned in advance of passage, Bache and his 
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Aurora were the first to be targeted, but it was not long before prosecutions were 
opened against Republican printers and papers across the nation. 181 Over the 
following two years, more than forty men were arrested and charged with 
sedition, with more than twenty-five convicted and either fined or sentenced to 
jail.182 Many others were prosecuted under the Alien Acts, including a number of 
prominent Republican writers across the nation.183 All of the major Republican 
printers and editors were targeted, leaving most financially ruined, their papers 
forced to abandon politics or fold altogether.184 Republican pamphleteers were 
attacked as well, with particular attention paid to those who had openly engaged 
                                                
181 In a letter to James Madison in April of 1798, Jefferson warned, “The object…is the 
suppression of the Whig presses. Bache’s particularly has been named.” Jefferson, Letter 
to James Madison, April 26, 1798 Moreover, as Smith notes, the final draft of the Sedition 
Act was not submitted in the Senate until hours after Bache had been arrested. It 
included new provisions that appear to have been written explicitly to cover Bache’s 
impending prosecution. Smith, "The "Aurora" and the Alien and Sedition Laws: Part I: 
The Editorship of Benjamin Franklin Bache," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography 19-20 
182 The four major Republican papers of the era – the Boston Independent Chronicle, the 
New York Argus, the Richmond Examiner, and the Philadelphia Aurora – were among 
the first papers targeted. In the end, twenty-five men were charged with seditious libel 
under the Sedition Act. The remaining, including Bache and a handful of others arrested 
prior to passage, were charged under the common law. Anderson, The Enforcement of the 
Alien and Sediton Laws; Tagg, Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia Aurora, 386-388 
183 Although a number of men were targeted under the provisions of the Alien Friends 
Act, for a variety of reasons none were ever deported. For more, see  Mott, American 
Journalism, 149-152; Stone, Perilous Times, 44-48, 63-64; Smith, "The Enforcement of the 
Alien Friends Act of 1798" 
184 In one extreme instance, the experience of fighting sedition charges led one of the 
most important Republican authors, James Callender, to turn against his former allies. 
Callender believed Jefferson to be partly responsible for his downfall, and his bitterness 
over this led him to turn against his former patron in 1802 by publishing a series of 
scandalous reports alleging Jefferson’s relationship with his slave, Sally Hemings. 
Although rumors of such a relationship had been circulating for several years, Callender 
was the first to put them in print. Durey, With the Hammer of Truth, 157-160. For more on 
prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition Acts, see Stone, Perilous Times, 48-63. Tagg, 
Benjamin Franklin Bache and the Philadelphia Aurora, 374-390 
  
151 
in activities the Federalists regarded as “electioneering.”185 By all appearances, 
the Federalists had accomplished everything they had hoped for and more. With 
the exception of the Aurora and a handful of other papers, all of the major 
Republican journals had been silenced or driven into insolvency, with many of 
the men behind them fleeing the field of politics forever.  
And yet, just two short years after the Alien and Sedition Acts were first 
enacted, Jefferson swept into power in an election that both sides immediately 
credited to the power of the press. If the Alien and Sedition Acts had destroyed 
most of the most important Republican newspapers, how could this be so? The 
answer once again lies in the interactions among information policy, networks, 
and infrastructure. From this perspective, to focus on the fate of specific 
Republican papers is to mistake a handful of trees for the forest, for the strength 
of the Republican movement was not in its individual papers but in the 
interconnections among them, and in the ways their editors took advantage of 
the infrastructure through which the network they formed was run. In the debate 
over the Alien and Sedition Acts, both sides recognized the central role the 
circulation of information through newspapers was playing in creating partisan 
conflict. But rather than craft legislation to attack both the sources of information 
                                                
185 Many, like Philadelphia’s Thomas Cooper, used the notoriety created by their sedition 
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argued for the election of Republicans to end the injustices of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts. Later in life, Cooper would serve as a judge in the Pennsylvania court system.  
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and their means of conveyance, Federalist legislators mistakenly focused only on 
the sources, leaving the rapidly expanding post office and its system of free 
newspaper exchange entirely unmentioned and unchanged. Having previously 
failed in their efforts to create a centralized network for the distribution of 
political information, they looked out at the Republican system of papers and 
assumed they were dealing with a similar approach. Attack the leading 
spokesmen of republicanism, they assumed, and you will leave the movement 
leaderless and adrift. But the network Republicans had developed was far more 
decentralized than the Federalists recognized, operating with no central direction 
and no elite control. This decentralized structure, which was possible only 
because of the manner in which the postal service was developed, gave the 
network enormous flexibility and resiliency, allowing it to survive a sustained 
attack on its most prominent papers.  
Had the Federalists coupled their assault on Republican papers with a change 
in postal policy, limiting, for example, the manner in which papers were 
exchanged among printers or distributed directly to subscribers, it is possible 
and perhaps even likely that they could have prevented the eruption in printer-
led party building that came next. Instead, they focused their attention solely on 
the most visible and bothersome newspapers, assuming that if these papers were 
to be silenced the entire movement around them would fall. But they were 
wrong. Rather than silence the movement their attacks led dozens of new 
newspapers to take up the republican cause, setting off a rapid expansion in both 
the size and scope of their party network and placing highly committed and 
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passionate political organizers in precisely the locations the Republican 
movement had until then never been able to reach. 
 
Generation Next: William Duane and the Democratic-Republicans 
As Pasley points out in his history of the partisan press in early America, one 
of the most curious features of the story of the Alien and Sedition Acts is that in 
their aftermath, the number of reliably Republican newspapers skyrocketed.186 In 
the two and a half years between the Acts’ passage and the election of 1800, more 
than forty-five new Republican papers were launched, roughly double the 
number that had been founded in the previous eight years combined. Even more 
surprisingly, nearly all of these new papers were staunchly partisan, with their 
coverage of politics as thoroughly Republican as the papers targeted for 
prosecution by Federalist elites. Rather than reverse the growing influence of 
partisanship within the nation’s newspaper networks, the implementation of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts appears to have dramatically accelerated it.187  
Scholars following the elite-led interpretation of parties typically concluded 
this activity was the result of elite action, but a close look at the historical record 
suggests otherwise. Republican elites undoubtedly organized a variety of direct 
responses to Federalist efforts to criminalize dissent, most notably in efforts to 
pass the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions declaring the Acts unconstitutional, 
                                                
186 For a summary of Pasley’s argument, see Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 124-131. For 
his overview of the history of newspaper growth during this period, see Ibid., 153-175. 
187 For complete details of the newspapers founded during this period, see the Appendix. 
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but in only a small handful of cases did they get personally involved in creating 
either newspapers or local party structures, and in nearly every instance these 
efforts were ineffective. Instead, it was working class printers, editors, and their 
supporters who succeeded where elites could not, creating papers and party 
structures simultaneously in places that until their efforts had neither. Unlike the 
vast majority of newspapers begun prior to the passage of the Acts, these papers 
never hid their partisan commitments, and were from their first issues meant to 
be a direct reflection of the commitment their editors had made to the Republican 
cause. Determined to force the political system to recognize them as equals, these 
men saw their newspapers as the first step towards organizing their local 
communities for the upcoming campaigns, elections they believed would 
determine the fate of American democracy itself. Through the careful use of the 
postal exchange service, these men quickly formed a tight, interlocking 
community, building a rudimentary party organization that reached deep into 
every state in the nation, creating a new model of politics that would last for 
more than a generation. While the Federalists were busy focusing their efforts on 
the destruction of the most prominent Republican papers in the nation’s largest 
cities, a cohort of young, idealistic men with no ties to elite politics were forming 
newspapers and building party organizations in small towns and villages across 
the nation. Believing that Federalist elites were preventing them from taking 
rightful place in political society, they turned to the Democratic-Republicans, 
convinced that a party led by the man who had written the Declaration of 
Independence would not deliberately shut them out. Flipping traditional 
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arguments about the role of republican virtue and impartiality on their heads, 
they argued forcefully that in the face of repression, a virtuous man has no choice 
but to choose sides and make a stand.188 Echoing the rhetoric of a revolution they 
were born too late to join, they demanded that the political system recognize 
their right to participate as equals and on their own terms. Most entered the 
partisan political print trade expecting little or no financial reward, but were 
motivated instead by a fierce desire to set the political system right.189  
From the very first issues, these men dedicated their papers to open 
partisanship, committing not simply to reporting on their local communities, but 
also to organizing and acting in them too.190 At both the local and state levels, 
they worked feverishly to build support for their candidates and causes, 
managing campaigns, running committees of correspondence, organizing public 
meetings and nomination conventions, printing and distributing election 
materials and tickets, and organizing election day rallies and get-out-the-vote 
                                                
188 Alexander Martin of the Baltimore American illustrated this trend well when he wrote, 
“American people have long enough been imposed upon by the pretended impartiality 
of printers; it is all delusion; every party will have its printer, as well as every sect its 
preacher.” As quoted in Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 162 
189 For example, after becoming something of a town outcast for consistently speaking 
his mind in opposition to town elders, Samuel Morse bought a newspaper in Danbury, 
CT, and dedicated it to building support for Jefferson and other Republicans in a state 
that Jefferson almost surely would lose. Rather than see the paper as a business venture, 
Morse clearly intended the paper as his own personal political platform, to be used to 
mock town elders and build support for the replacement by republican means. For more, 
see Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 162-166 
190 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 164-165 
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activities.191 Their papers were filled on a daily basis with the minutiae of 
campaigning, producing a running record of campaigns that would be 
immediately familiar to the media consultants who are attached to our 
campaigns today. To keep their readers excited and involved, their papers 
frequently printed letters from local supporters, and in the months before the 
election there are countless examples from papers across the country of readers 
thanking the editors for their work organizing activities for the Democratic-
Republicans in their areas.192 As might be expected, many of these men faced 
severe harassment by Federalist operatives and their allies in government. Many 
had their print shops attacked and their presses stolen or damaged, and some 
even faced serious physical violence. Many more were brought up on sedition 
charges by state and local officials, with trials frequently held in courts run by 
Federalist judges who decided cases without even hearing evidence presented on 
behalf of the defense. 193  The goal of these prosecutions was to break the 
                                                
191 These committees were highly modified versions of the ones used in previous eras. In 
the past, committees had been dominated by elites, but beginning in this period, they 
came under the control of editors and their allies in middle class. This created a new 
model, one which come to thoroughly dominate in the following decades. For a detailed 
overview of their operation, see Kehl, Ill Feeling in the Era of Good Feeling: Western 
Pennsylvania Political Battles, 1815-1825; Kehl, Ill Feeling in the Era of Good Feeling 
192 Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 167 
193 In addition to being arrested on charges of sedition, Benjamin Bache was physically 
assaulted on several occasions, and his wife and children were terrorized when a 
drunken mob of Federalist supporters attacked his home. Congressman Matthew Lyon 
of Vermont was tried and convicted for the publication of an anti-Federalist magazine 
after the supervising judge, Associate Justice William Patterson of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, explicitly directed the grand jury to quickly hand down an indictment. Anthony 
Haswell, a printer and Postmaster General of in Vermont, was then sentenced to two 
months in prison for publicizing a lottery designed to raise funds to pay Lyon’s fines. 
And in the most severe sentence handed down for sedition, David Brown, an itinerant 
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Democratic-Republican movement, not by criminalizing the actions of elites, but 
by silencing its most vocal supporters among the lower classes.194 But for every 
newspaper or printer silenced by a prosecution, two or three new ones would 
appear, and by time the election of 1800 was fast approaching, even the most 
ardent of Federalists began to realize that their campaign to criminalize dissent 
had badly backfired. 
Through the decentralized, open, and heavily subsidized infrastructure of the 
postal service, Republican printers and editors had become part of a new 
national political community outside of the control of elites.  The combination of 
free newspaper exchange, cheap and timely delivery, and rapid post office 
expansion allowed them to respond to Federalist attacks by rapidly expanding 
the Republican information network into previously untapped political markets, 
expanding the scope of partisan conflict by bringing new allies into the political 
arena.  As each new paper was founded, it was effortlessly linked into the 
exchange service, the information network through which Republicans 
exchanged stories for their papers compared strategies for mobilizing voters, and 
                                                                                                                                            
radical known throughout New England for preaching the evils of Federalist rule, was 
sentenced to eighteen months in prison for the construction of a liberty pole in Dedham 
near the home of Fisher Ames. For more, see Stone, Perilous Times, 48-64; Smith, "The 
"Aurora" and the Alien and Sedition Laws: Part I: The Editorship of Benjamin Franklin 
Bache" 
194  With the exception of Congressman Lyon, not a single Republican elite was 
prosecuted under the Sedition Act, and even Lyon’s prosecution helps to prove the rule 
that the act was aimed only at immigrants and the working classes. Lyon was an 
Irishmen by birth and printer by trade, a man of low birth widely mocked among 
Federalists as a “beast” who had no business serving alongside them in Congress. For 
more, see Stone, Perilous Times, 48-52 
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provided logistical support for managing day to day affairs. Republican papers 
frequently advertised in one another’s papers, accepted subscriptions requests 
and payments for their allies, and monitored local delivery of distant papers to 
ensure that subscribers received issues in a timely manner.195 Last but not least, 
many of these men also offered their print shops as local meeting houses and 
reading rooms, where their fellow partisans could gather to plan the next major 
political event or read the news from distant places that had arrived through the 
postal service newspaper exchange.196 Over time, the value of coordination 
through the infrastructure of the postal service became so clear that a new 
national organization of Republican printers and editors was proposed. James 
Lyon, son of Representative Matthew Lyon, was the primary force behind the 
scheme, which aimed to standardize the Republican message throughout the 
states. In a prospectus that he circulated among his fellow printers, he wrote,  
“In every state of the union, be it said that there are a number of 
uncorrupted and firm republicans. In most instances, their exertions are 
seconded by the aid of a Press. But this is too frequently involved in a 
certain circle of local politics and personal affairs that it often forms an 
imperfect link in the shattered chain of political intelligence. [My goal is 
to] render this chain more complete in the United States, to rally, 
concentrate, and nationalize the efforts and opinions of those unorganized, 
persecuted, and worthy republicans.”197  
 
But as in the past, this project to centralize the system of information distribution 
failed because it was simply unnecessary. Using the Aurora as their common 
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source for news from the capitol, and other exchanged papers as sources from 
other locales, Republican editors and printers were already promoting common 
themes and interpretations of the day’s most pressing issues, using the freedom 
provided by the absence of any central leadership to tailor their message to the 
local audience that they interacted with every day.  
As one prominent Republican editor described at the time, the Aurora and the 
exchanges served as a “common reservoir from which many aqueducts [were] 
continually replenished.”198 Although every paper relied on the exchanges for 
their content, the further the papers were from their state’s political center, the 
more they relied on the exchange, with papers in the small towns near the 
western frontier printing little else but exchanged content.199 With the expansion 
of the postal service came newspaper, and with those newspapers came politics. 
Republican activists worked feverishly to take advantage of this, establishing a 
local presence for their party well before the Federalists were even aware of what 
was going on. And all of this activity happened prior to the formation of 
anything resembling a national political organization. In fact, as will be 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters of this work, this is precisely how these 
state and national organizations first began.  
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199 In a study of postal expansion in the West, Bretz concludes that without the exchange 
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Although dozens of new papers were founded following the passage of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, nothing better illustrates the dramatic shift in tone and 
style of Republican editors than the transformation of the Aurora following its 
transfer to William Duane after Benjamin Bache’s death in late 1798. Despite 
Federalist persecution, Bache had managed to keep his paper running during the 
summer of 1798, but the battle had left him on the knife’s edge of financial ruin. 
While he was waiting to stand trial for sedition, an outbreak of yellow fever 
swept through Philadelphia, and on September 10, 1798, Benjamin Bache passed 
away. Earlier that summer Bache had asked William Duane, an assistant who 
had become a close political confidante, to assist his wife in continuing the paper 
should anything happen to him, and after a brief transition in which Margaret 
ran the paper on her own, in November Duane took control of the Aurora and 
made it his own.200 
Duane was born in upstate New York in 1760, but he spent much of his life 
abroad, first in Ireland and England and then eventually in Calcutta, where he 
worked as the printer and editor of a newspaper so radical that the Royal 
Governor had his presses confiscated and him expelled.201 Upon returning to 
                                                
200 Parker and Duane, "Notes and Documents: The Revival of the "Aurora": A Letter to 
Tench Coxe," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography; Phillips, William Duane, 
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England he took up with a newspaper associated with a group of radical 
working-class reformers, a decision that within months had him fleeing London 
for America. By late-1796 he had established himself as an important new 
Republican voice through a series of scathing anti-Federalist pamphlets, and 
with Bache’s help he began a very successful American newspaper career.202 But 
Duane’s career would start under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. 
By the time Duane began his work with the Aurora, the Bache’s lives as anti-
establishment editors and organizers had left them socially outcast and 
financially ruined. In the months just prior to Benjamin’s passing, however, their 
printing and newspaper businesses was finally growing, as persecution by his 
Federalist foes turned them into a nationally known hero for the Republican 
cause. Bache’s sudden notoriety led to a surge in national subscription requests 
and bill payments, but Benjamin tragically would not live to see the results of his 
labors, so it was left to Duane and Margaret to take up Benjamin’s life’s work. 203 
Upon taking control of the Aurora, Duane immediately stepped up the paper’s 
                                                                                                                                            
Duane, Radical Journalist in the Age of Jefferson; Phillips, "William Duane, Philadelphia's 
Democratic Republicans, and the Origins of Modern Politics," The Pennsylvania Magazine 
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202 Duane’s first significant pamphlet, A Letter to George Washington, was published in 
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assault on Federalists across the nation, using documents leaked by allies within 
the government to charge them with corruption, most notably through 
allegations of the misuse of public funds.204 More importantly, he took Bache’s 
efforts to organize the local community in new directions, forming a Republican 
militia that would be used on Election Day to protect polling places and round 
up wayward voters. Like Bache before him, Duane faced a fierce counterattack 
from his Federalist opponents, who used the legal system to repeatedly hound 
him with charges of libel and sedition, and Federalist militias to openly threaten 
his life and his livelihood.205 But through it all Duane persisted, and on the eve of 
the presidential campaign of 1800 he had become one of the nation’s most feared 
and respected political professionals, widely acknowledged by men on both 
sides as the leader of a new political party that sought to end more than a decade 
of Federalist rule. 
Beyond his efforts to organize Republicans in and around Philadelphia, 
Duane also worked tirelessly to strengthen the network that connected 
Republican printers across the nation. Whereas Bache had been content to let the 
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network operate on its own, Duane sought to improve it, launching a project to 
track Republican papers using the exchange. As Election Day neared, Duane 
stayed in close contact with Jefferson’s closest ally, James Madison, to advise him 
on how the network was performing. Hoping to ensure the integrity of the 
network after the election, Duane even went so far as to suggest to Madison that 
should Jefferson win, he ought to provide patronage positions as postmasters 
and printers to the most loyal and effective printers around the nation.206 Finally, 
Duane worked hard to continue to improve the Aurora. With both a daily and a 
country edition to produce, his print shop ran from dawn until well past dusk six 
days each week. From a subscription base of several hundred in the early part of 
the decade, the paper had more than 1,700 subscribers by the decade’s end, with 
readers in every state of the union, including a growing number in the Federalist 
stronghold of New England.207 And this number represents only a small fraction 
of the total number of individuals who would read the papers contents. Not only 
was the Aurora a common feature in public reading rooms, taverns, and coffee 
houses throughout the nation, but its articles were also shared via the newspaper 
exchange and reprinted in every Republican paper across the land. As the 
Federalist Connecticut Courant described in the summer of 1800,  
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207 In a letter written in 1800 to Ephraim Kirby, a Republican leader in Connecticut, 
Duane remarked that “application for ‘the Aurora’ from all parts of New England 
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Briceland, "The Philadelphia Aurora, the New England Illuminati, and the Election of 
1800," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography. For more, see also Stewart, The 
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The Aurora acted as chief, the others as subalterns. Whatever appeared in 
that, was faithfully copied into the others…the main sentiments were 
repeated to others; & in this way the sentiments were not only scattered, 
but a perfect union of opinion was established…This was the heart, the 
seat of life. From thence the blood has flowed to the extremities by a sure 
and rapid circulation, and the life and strength of the party have thus been 
supported and nourished. It is even astonishing to remark, with how 
much punctuality and rapidity, the same opinion has been circulated and 
repeated by these people from the highest to lowest. By means like these, 
the greatest part of the mischief which we now experience, has been 
occasioned…If so much mischief can be brought to pass, by one Aurora, 
and its few underling papers, what would happen, provided publications 
of a similar tendency were scattered thro’ the country, sent into every 
town and placed in almost every hand?”208 
 
Elite Party-Building Activity 
To argue that elites were not ultimately in control of the process of building a 
new party is not to suggest that they were not heavily involved. They were, and 
in many instances their actions undoubtedly proved important to the final 
outcome of the election. Without Madison’s successful efforts to alter the process 
for selecting elector in several states, for example, Jefferson would almost surely 
have lost the election. But in the same way that focusing on the few successful 
efforts of Federalist elites to silence Republican printers misses the vast scope of 
activity that took place through smaller journals, focusing solely on the work 
done by Republican elites at the national level ignores entirely the role played by 
hundreds of local activists in creating the conditions necessary for Jefferson’s win. 
Moreover, because elites including Madison and Jefferson got directly involved 
in the process of newspaper-based party building on a few occasions, we can 
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compare the outcome of their efforts to those of the men who acted without elite 
support. Whereas the actions of these elites proved largely inconsequential over 
both the short and long terms, the efforts of local activists were truly 
transformational, placing them in positions of local power that would serve as 
platforms for successful political campaigns of their own in the coming decades. 
The most significant failure of elite-led newspaper building was spearheaded 
once again by Thomas Jefferson. Ignoring the fact that the Aurora already headed 
a rapidly growing and deeply loyal partisan organization already developing on 
its own, Jefferson sought once again to establish a newspaper that could be used 
to shape party activity. His plan was to raise startup capital from a number of 
prominent allies, but despite his best efforts it fell through when he was unable 
to line up even a fraction of the funds necessary to get the project off the ground. 
Albert Gallatin attempted to follow a similar strategy in western Pennsylvania, 
but he too was unable to secure the necessary startup capital. And although a 
group of prominent Virginia Republican in Richmond got a bit farther with yet 
another plan for a national paper, their paper only lasted a handful of issues after 
they discovered the newspaper business was far more costly than they 
anticipated. This pattern of grand plans followed by almost immediate failure 
was repeated throughout the nation, as republican elites unsuccessfully flirted 
with grand plans for launching new newspapers under their direct control.209  
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A few of these elite-led efforts did succeed, but as a group they are notable for 
the fact that they followed a different model than the one just described. Rather 
than build papers from scratch, these efforts sought instead to recruit already 
successful editors and printers to relocate their papers to new areas. One such 
recruit was Joseph Gales, a printer and editor who moved to Raleigh at the 
request of Nathaniel Macon, one of the most prominent Republicans in North 
Carolina. Macon aimed to reverse the surprising gains made by Federalists 
during the elections of 1798, and he was convinced that the first and most 
important step was to overhaul Republican newspaper and printing capabilities 
in the capital city. However, a stroke of bad luck temporarily derailed Macon’s 
project, as Gales took seriously ill during the fall of 1800. Although the Raleigh 
Register would go on after the election to play an important role in state politics, 
by all accounts it had very little impact on the fall campaign. Republican elites in 
other areas, including rural Pennsylvania and New York, followed similar plans 
with mixed results.210  
Although there were obviously a variety of context-specific reasons why 
some of these projects succeeded while others did not, the common thread that 
connects them all is the reluctance of Republican elites to get directly involved in 
the creation of the newspaper product itself. Members of the gentry were willing 
to raise funds, buy subscriptions, promote papers, recruit new editors, and at 
times even write articles for publication, but they had no interest whatsoever in 
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the day to day operations of a newspaper. Given the extensive efforts they were 
willing to undertake to support papers behind the scenes, this was clearly not a 
reflection of their unwillingness to devote time to the cause of newspaper 
building. Instead, it reveals the contradiction at the heart of Republican elite 
ideology about the role of the press in society. Although they were much more 
willing than their Federalist counterparts to allow for press freedom, they shared 
their belief that the work of printing and editing was meant for the men of the 
working classes. But having recruited editors to their towns to work on their 
behalf, elites frequently found the editors and printers demanding an equal say 
in not only the content to be printed, but also the political strategy to be 
employed in local campaigns. In nearly every instance, control of the press 
decided the argument, allowing the printers and editors to quite literally have 
the last word.211 
As before, elite involvement with newspapers was far more successful when 
it was behind the scenes, and more importantly, when it did not seek to control 
the papers or the network. As early as January of 1799, Jefferson was already 
deep into planning for his next presidential campaign. Reflecting his long-held 
belief that the distribution of “correct” information was the essential prerequisite 
to the triumph of republicanism over monarchism, Jefferson began coordinating 
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the development of a nationwide information campaign that had three major 
components. First, with Madison and Beckley’s assistance, Jefferson coordinated 
the drafting and distribution of pamphlets and handbills throughout the nation. 
At his direction, hundreds of bundles of pro-Republican propaganda were 
distributed throughout the nation, first via the postal service and eventually by 
private messenger. This was in many ways a direct extension of the work done 
by Bache and Beckley in Pennsylvania during the previous presidential 
campaign, only this time conducted across many different states at once. As 
before, printers were involved in the creation of the handbills and pamphlets, but 
they played little role in the distribution of the materials.212  
The second part of the plan centered on newspapers. After failing in his 
previous attempts to establish a newspaper under his control, Jefferson decided 
instead to make use of the papers that already existed by encouraging his friends 
and allies to provide them with articles that could be run during the campaign. 
At long last, accidentally or otherwise, Jefferson adopted a newspaper strategy 
that matched the nation’s political information networks and infrastructure, and 
unlike previous efforts this strategy was a success. Working closely with his 
allies Madison and Monroe, Jefferson sent letters to allies across the nation 
asking that they lend their pen to the Republican cause. His letter to Madison 
explaining the campaign is typical of the effort. 
“…we are sensible that this summer is the season for systematic energies 
& sacrifices. The engine is the press. Every man must lay his purse & his 
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pen under contribution. As to the former, it is possible I may be obliged to 
assume something for you. As to the latter, let me pray & beseech you to 
set apart a certain portion of every post day to write what may be proper 
for the public. Send it to me while here, & when I go away I will let you 
know to whom you may send, so that your name shall be sacredly 
secret.”213 
 
As Jefferson’s reference to “post days” indicated, the plan originally relied on the 
post office for distribution of the requests to allies and articles to editors, but over 
time Jefferson grew deeply suspicious of the mail. Worrying that “a single 
sentence, got hold of by the Porcupines, will suffice to abuse and persecute me in 
their papers for months,” he warned Madison in a series of letters in late-1799 to 
“trust the post offices with nothing confidential, persuaded that during the 
ensuing twelve months they will lend their inquisitorial aid to furnish matter for 
newspapers.”214 It is not clear from the historical record if Jefferson’s worries of 
interference by Federalist postmasters were misplaced, but regardless, he and his 
allies nevertheless took some fairly extreme measures to ensure that their 
political communications stayed private.215 As a result, communication among 
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Republican elites in different states became increasingly difficult as the election 
approached, hampering their ability to interact directly with printers and 
editors.216 
The third and final component of the campaign relied on a network of 
committees of correspondence in Virginia “to communicate useful information to 
the people relative to the election.”217 Unlike Beckley and Bache’s efforts in 
Pennsylvania in 1796, however, the Virginia committees were entirely a top-
down affair. Where the previous system had relied heavily on local allies to 
select the final means of distribution for pamphlets, handbills, and tickets, the 
Virginia system was much more tightly controlled from the center by Jefferson’s 
allies in Richmond. Over the course of the campaign, the Virginia committees 
effectively acted as a well-oiled party machine, raising funds for campaign 
activities, distributing propaganda and election tickets, organizing local speeches 
and dinners in support of Jefferson and other Republican candidates, and placing 
articles in the most important Republican journals in Richmond.218 
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Printers, Partisans, and the Triumph of the Party-as-Organization 
 
As significant as these efforts of Jefferson and his allies were in coordinating 
partisan activities, they touched only a small fraction of the work done by 
Democratic-Republican activists across the nation. Leading the way once again 
were independent printers and editors, a group of committed activists whose 
numbers were growing at an unprecedented rate.219 In the twelve months prior to 
the first electoral contest in New York in April, Republicans established more 
than twenty new papers nationwide, each of which was staffed by an editor and 
a number of journeymen and apprentices whose collective goal was to organize 
their new community for political action. Although some papers were 
established independently, many were started with the assistance of other 
politically important printers and editors who selected the location for new 
papers to ensure they would be located in places of most value to the party in 
their state. In addition to providing a new source of political news, the editors of 
these papers were expected by both their fellow editors and local partisans to 
organize party activities, identify key allies, plan meetings, distribute handbills 
and pamphlets, suggest nominations for office, and print and distribute tickets 
on Election Day. New papers were established in every state of the union, 
including Connecticut, the center of Federalist strength.220 In a very real sense, 
the establishment of each of these papers was the first concrete step towards 
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building a party organization at the local level, and their emergence as a network 
of affiliated institutions within a state represented the early stages of state party 
building.221 
As in the past, printers and editors became intimately involved in efforts to 
arrange and run committees of correspondence within their states. Following the 
pattern of activity previously detailed for Pennsylvania, the primary committee 
within a state usually operated as a joint venture between the state’s most 
prominent politicians and its most prominent editors and newspapers. Just as 
Beckley worked closely with Bache and Duane and their Aurora, Aaron Burr 
allied with James Cheetam and his American Citizen in New York, Philip 
Norborne Nicholas partnered with Samuel Pleasants and his Virginia Argus, and 
so on around the nation. In nearly every state, these committees drew up 
statements of party principles, and then featured them repeatedly in local 
newspapers and mailed them as pamphlets to local organizers and individual 
citizens. In New Jersey, the office of the state’s leading Republican paper, the 
Centinel of Freedom, became the primary venue for organizing the state, with 
more than one hundred committees reporting in on efforts to distribute handbills 
and tickets and throughout the state.222 In Virginia, the committee in Richmond 
ordered the widespread distribution of Madison’s Report on the Virginia 
Resolutions, using the postal service to deliver copies directly to more than 5,000 
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voters in the state.223 And in one parish in South Carolina, the information 
campaign became so overwhelming that many citizens began writing to local 
papers to complain.224 As one correspondent wrote, 
I have lived in this parish twenty three years, and we have never been so 
pestered with politics as we are at this day. For my part, I am for good 
government; but we are so beset with and run down by Federalist, Federal 
Republicans, and their pamphlets, that I began to think, for the first time, 
there is something rotten in the system they attempt to support, or why all 
this violence and electioneering? This printing of long, dull pamphlets? 
This forming into parties to pay the expense of the printing? And all this, 
to instruct us poor countrymen in the politics of the nation!225 
 
Amazingly, Republican efforts to expand their network and grow their party 
were given one last accidental assist by their Federalist foes prior to the election. 
Although the postal service infrastructure had been dramatically expanded over 
the past eight years in the states along the Atlantic seaboard, as of January 1, 1800, 
there were only two post roads into the region west of the mountains: one 
connecting Wheeling, Virginia to western Kentucky, and another running 
through the Shenandoah Valley to Knoxville and on to Nashville, Tennessee.226 
As a result of this lack of infrastructure, there were very few papers in either 
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Tennessee or Kentucky, and those that did exist had very limited circulation and 
geographic reach. But in late April, the Federalist controlled Congress approved 
a major and immediate expansion of post roads and mail services in every state 
and territory throughout the nation. 227  The measure passed with no 
congressional debate, so it is impossible to know precisely what motivated this 
expansion during a crucial election season, but judging from the geographic 
distribution of the roads, the act appears to have had three primary purposes. 
First, it aimed to connect the new nation’s capital in Washington, DC to the seats 
of government in the various states and territories. Second, it established dozens 
of new cross posts within each state, connecting state capitals to most if not all of 
the major towns they governed. Third, it established a series of interconnections 
among Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Northwest Territory. So dramatic was the 
expansion of the postal network that just one year later, Postmaster General 
Habersham remarked, “crossroads are now established so extensively that there 
is scarcely a village courthouse or public place of any consequence but is 
accommodated with the mail.”228 
We will likely never know why the Federalists chose that precise moment to 
dramatically increase the efficiency of the infrastructure through which their 
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opponents’ pamphlets and newspapers flowed. But increase the network’s 
efficiency they did, declaring new roads and interconnections throughout 
precisely the same rural areas that their foes had declared central to the 
campaign that was already underway. In a matter of months, Republican papers 
in every state in the nation were flowing more freely than they ever had before, 
increasing the reach and the speed of all the papers shared throughout the 
system. And although Federalist leaders apparently remained unaware of the 
role they had played in expanding the Republican network, first in the passage of 
the Alien and Sedition Acts and then in the expansion of the postal service, they 
did notice the results. After the act’s passage, Federalist papers and letters were 
filled with complaints of the power of the new Republican presses across the 
nation. Federalist editors were often first to sound the alarm, printing ominous 
columns that warned, “In all the states new presses are established, from 
Portsmouth in New-Hampshire to Savannah in Georgia; through which the 
orders of the Generals of the faction are transmitted with professional 
punctuality.”229 In their private correspondence, Federalist leaders like Uriah 
Tracy began reporting of a great increase in printers everywhere they travelled, 
warning their allies that “Democrats are without a doubt increasing… They are 
establishing Democratic presses and newspapers in almost every town and 
county of the country; and the Federal presses are failing for want of support.”230  
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The final line of Tracy’s warning highlights another major failing of the 
campaign run by Federalist elites. Unlike their Republican counterparts, who 
worked in a variety of ways to encourage the growth of Republican presses and 
papers, Federalist elites did almost nothing to encourage the development of a 
partisan information network of their own. 231  Working from the dual 
assumptions that newspapers owed an allegiance to whatever government had 
been legitimately elected, and that printers and editors were not fit for direct 
involvement in the political world, they focused their efforts on destroying any 
papers and persons that dared object to their rule. In those rare instances after 
the war between the Gazettes when Federalist papers did directly engage in open 
partisanship, they nearly always did so gently, apologizing to readers for the 
need to do stoop to a tactic so low. In addition to pulling their partisan punches, 
this made their content ill suited for sharing, as it rarely offered information or 
arguments that would be of interest to readers in other locations. As a result, 
although there were more than twice as many papers in late-1800 nominally 
allied with the Federalist cause, they tended to operate in almost complete 
isolation from one another, sharing business information and foreign reporting 
liberally but rarely if ever reprinting political news. Of the approximately 200 
papers publishing in October of 1800, roughly half were Federalist, one-third 
Republican, and one-sixth unaligned. But partisanship within the Federalist 
network was weak, with only one out of every five journals publishing under a 
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declared political allegiance. Their Republican counterparts, meanwhile, had 
built a much more thoroughly partisan network, with four out of every five of 
the papers circulating under an openly declared political allegiance. Thus, where 
the Federalists could count on fewer than twenty papers to reliably advance their 
cause in the months prior to the election, the Republicans had nearly fifty. This 
led to a dramatic imbalance in the partisan character of information circulating 
throughout the country, leading Virginia Federalist leader John Nicholas to 
lament that Federalist papers “seldom republish from each other; while on the 
other hand, their antagonists never get hold of any thing, however trivial in 
reality, but they make it ring thro’ all their papers from one end of the Continent to 
the other.”232 
In the end, having tried but failed to criminalize the partisan activities of 
average citizens, Federalist elites found themselves without any means to 
counter these citizens’ growing influence. Although Republicans entered the 
campaign of 1800 with far fewer papers than their Federalist foes, their network 
was in aggregate far better organized, far more unified, and far more powerful 
than that of their rivals. The national contest between Jefferson and Adams was 
hard-fought, but on Election Day, less than two years after the party in power 
had attempted to destroy them, the Democratic-Republicans won the day. 
Although the presidential campaign would eventually be decided by the 
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Congress because of a quirk in the rules of the Electoral College, at the local level 
Republicans won in a landslide, picking up twenty-two seats in the U.S. House 
for a commanding thirty-five seat majority. 233 If the activity of elites played a 
central role in Jefferson’s victory at the national level, it was local printers and 
editors who took the lead at the local level, building organizations for the 
candidates whose campaigns they aided and quite frequently managed.  
In the aftermath of the election, elites on both sides of the campaign 
concluded that the press had been the deciding factor in the election.234 Looking 
back on the campaign, Fisher Ames declared, “The Jacobins owe their triumph to 
the unceasing use of this engine.”235 Reflecting the conviction of Federalist 
leaders the Aurora had proved central to the outcome in Pennsylvania, men like 
Secretary of War James McHenry began referring to Republicans in that state as 
“Duane & his party,” treating Duane as the leader of the party rather than the 
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gentry or the newly elected representatives.236 And judging from the reactions of 
the Philadelphia Republicans themselves, McHenry was right to do so. 
Following the successful completion of the Pennsylvania campaign, Republican 
high society in Philadelphia embraced Duane as never before, hosting a dinner in 
his honor at a prestigious hotel where they toasted him as “the firm and 
enlightened Editor of the Aurora; virtuous and undaunted in the worst of times, 
the friend of his country, and the scourge of her enemies.”237 And although 
Duane would later place himself in opposition to Jefferson and his allies, no less 
than Jefferson himself credited Duane, the Aurora, and it distribution to reliable 
Republican editors across the land as central to his own election. Writing to 
James Monroe in 1823, Jefferson asked his friend to forgive Duane’s recent break, 
reminding him that “the energy of his press, when our cause was laboring, and 
all but lost, under the overwhelming weight of its powerful adversaries, its 
unquestionable effect in the revolution produced on the public mind, which 
arrested the rapid march of our government toward monarchy, overweigh in fact 
the demerit of his desertion.”238  Perhaps most tellingly, the words of both 
Duane’s friends and foes were soon backed by deeds. Over the coming years the 
number of newspapers in the United States skyrocketed, growing from just over 
260 in 1800 to nearly 400 in 1810 and more than 580 in 1820. And although the 
1790s began with no partisanship whatsoever in the nation’s papers, there were 
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nearly 360 papers openly attached to a political party by 1810, representing more 
than ninety percent of all newspapers in publication.239 By the end of the 
century’s second decade, newspaper growth had proceeded so rapidly that the 
United States had more newspapers in wider circulation than all of the papers of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland combined.240 
Given the role newspapers and their editors played in the triumph of 
Jeffersonian Republicanism in 1800, it is not surprising that their newspaper 
network continued to grow at a furious pace following the election. What is 
surprising is that despite the hatred Federalist elites had expressed for partisan 
newspapers, they at long last made a serious attempt to build a network of their 
own. Following Fisher Ames’ new motto towards the role of partisan presses in 
politics – “Fas est et ab hoste doceri,” or “It is perfectly proper to be taught by one’s 
enemy”- Federalist elites set out to build a network of papers controlled by “able 
men, who have had a concern in the transaction of affairs, who understand the 
interest, and who will, and ever will, when they try to produce a deep national 
impression.”241 The effort began with Hamilton’s establishment of the New York 
Evening Post, a daily that like his previous Gazette was meant to provide a vehicle 
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for disseminating Federalist arguments and ideas.242 Following his lead, other 
Federalist leaders around the nation began forming or purchasing papers of their 
own, efforts that were soon matched by more radical, independent Federalist 
printers who sought to directly counter the openly partisan tone of the 
Republican adversaries.243  
By 1804 the Post was on a firm enough footing to survive the death of its 
founder, but the network that was growing around it could not. It then briefly 
surged back to life in 1807 again under the direction of Harrison Gray Otis, but 
like the party it represented the network had difficulty spreading beyond New 
England.244 Jefferson’s embargo and Madison’s war both proved to be powerful 
motivators for the creation of new papers, but when the war’s result led to the 
collapse of the Federalist Party nationwide, their newspaper network was no 
more. In the final analysis, although the Federalists did indeed briefly produce 
their own version of a partisan newspaper network, it was fatally weakened by 
the their conviction that political newspapers, like average citizens, should 
remain subservient to the elites meant to rule them.   
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On the Emergence of Non-Elite Politics & the Competing Theories of Parties 
At the beginning of the decade, the average citizen in the United States was in 
a state of profound information isolation. Although a national post road 
connected the major towns and cities along the Eastern seaboard, the rest of the 
nation was without mail service, and as a result without any easy means of 
sharing information or staying abreast of the news of the day. With the passage 
of the Post Office Act of 1792, however, the nation’s information infrastructure 
was radically altered, setting in motion a process that within a few short years 
united most the nation’s towns and cities into a single information environment. 
In the early years of this transformation, both the Federalists and the Democratic-
Republicans attempted to build information networks capable of connecting 
their supporters throughout the nation. Although both of these attempts ended 
in failure, in their aftermath Democratic-Republican printers and editors began 
constructing a new network from the bottom up. Using the free exchange policy 
of the postal service, they built a network of newspapers across the country that 
together with direct community action paved the way for true two-party 
competition. In the early part of the decade elites had hoped to create a 
centralized system of political information, but by decade’s end a group of 
political outsiders had taken advantage of the expanding information 
infrastructure to build a decentralized system for sharing information that 
supported their efforts to organize party activity in their local areas. Through this 
new form of newspaper-based politics, an entirely new class of men became 
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involved in the political system, paving the way for the much more broad-based 
democratization of the system that would soon come.   
From the perspective of the competing theories of party politics, this first 
decade paints a complex picture of party building. Although the elite-led model 
fared well in the history of the first half of the decade, most notably in the stories 
of the creation of the Gazettes, its predictions found far less support in the 
decade’s later years. Member of the party-in-government played lead roles in the 
creation of party organization early on, but over time their efforts were swamped 
by those of men with no claim to formal power. As the decade progressed, elites 
like Madison and Jefferson continued to play important roles in developing their 
party’s newspaper-based networks, but they were increasingly working from 
behind-the-scenes to provide assistance to organizations that had developed 
from the grassroots. Although their histories were not presented here, state party 
leaders in the later half of the decade followed a similar approach, working 
alongside partisan editors to build the Democratic-Republican Party. What began 
as a means for distributing the party’s message had by the end of the decade 
evolved into something far more complex, with editors acting as managers of 
local party machines that had in most cases come into being without the direct 
involvement of the party’s elite. 
The group-driven theories, therefore, began the decade faring poorly but 
finished quite strong. Elites may have led the most important instances of party 
building in the earliest years, founding newspapers to coordinate activities and 
ideas across great distances, but by mid-decade independent actors like Bache 
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and Beckley were in the lead, building a sophisticated party organization that 
Republican elites sought to ally with and Federalist elites sought to destroy.  
On balance, the group-centric model clearly fares better than the elite-led 
model, but neither model is able on its own to capture the full range of activity. 
This is particularly true in the period following the passage of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, when partisan politics expanded into regions of the country where 
it had previously not existed. The acts spurred dozens of previously uninvolved 
citizens to launch newspapers, form party organizations, and join the Republican 
movement. By connecting their local efforts to activists around the nation 
through the newly expanded postal system, they strengthened the party at a 
moment when its very survival was at stake. Had the postal network and its 
exchange service not been available, Federalist efforts to destroy the Republican 
movement prior to the 1800 election would have been far more likely to succeed. 
More importantly from the perspective of this study, had the postal system and 
its exchange service not been made newly available to these activists who joined 
the movement in its hour of need, it is difficult to imagine how they would have 
been able to join the movement at all. Without the postal network, news of 
Federalist efforts to criminalize dissent would have reached them much more 
slowly. Without the postal network, these activists would have had a much more 
difficult time organizing their communities to respond. And without the postal 
network, these activists would have found it nearly impossible to join forces with 
other likeminded partisans throughout the nation.  
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Although it is true that members of both Bache and Beckley’s party-as-
organization and Madison and Jefferson’s party-in-government welcomed the 
support of this new generation activists, both groups were nearly always unable 
control the strategies and tactics adopted by the newest members of their 
movement. As we will see shortly, this inability to regulate the conduct of 
members of their political network had serious consequences for the movement 
after the election, but for now it is enough to simply note that only the 
infrastructure-driven theory of party change is able to account for these 
dynamics. Under the elite-led models, new party organizations come into being 
only at the behest of members of the party-in-government, and they nearly always 
remain firmly under their control. Group-driven models allow for much more 
complex interactions among party organizations, but they nevertheless assume 
that members of the party-as-organization will coordinate the expansion of party 
activity. But following the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts, it was the 
independent involvement of previously uninvolved citizens that proved decisive 
to the outcome of the conflict. Federalist prosecutions under the acts proved 
quite successful at ending the involvement of most of the major Republican 
newspapers, but they utterly failed to stem the tide of new papers that formed in 
opposition to their actions.  
Looking more broadly at the decade as a whole, only the infrastructure-
driven framework is able to account for the manner in which party activity 
expanded at each stage. In the decade’s earliest years, elites within the party-in-
government attempted to build networks to coordinate partisan activity across the 
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nation, but their efforts failed when they did not account for the effects of the 
rapidly expanding postal network. As these top-down efforts collapsed, Bache, 
Beckley, and their allies moved to create an independent party-as-organization, 
building the networks that became the backbone of future party activity. 
However, when Federalist elites temporarily sidelined the network’s most 
prominent voices through the enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
independent actors used the available infrastructure to organize a grassroots 
movement that neither the party-in-government nor the party-as-organization 
controlled. In the decade’s final years, new partisan newspapers and their 
affiliated organizations were established in dozens of towns in every state, and 
although they inevitably joined forces with the organizations established by and 
for more well-established party actors, they did so entirely by their own choice. 
Properly understood, the party organizations that existed at the turn of the 
century were outgrowths of both elite and activist activity, with the boundaries 
between the party-as-organization and the party-in-the-electorate shifting as the 
postal infrastructure expanded throughout the nation. As the postal network 
expanded, so too did partisan politics, creating the conditions necessary for a 
new generation of activists to join the political system.  
But after their historic victory in 1800, these men faced a new and wholly 
unexpected fight. With the Federalists vanquished, they suddenly found 
themselves under attack from their own allies. The terms of the alliance between 
Republican newspapermen and the gentry had never been openly tested, and in 
the aftermath of the election some of the party’s upper class began working to 
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sideline the very same men who had made their victory possible. While elites at 
the national level were rallying behind Jefferson’s Inaugural call to unite as 
“brethren of the same principle,” many were also maneuvering to exclude the 
men whose work had given them the opportunity to serve in national politics. 
Over the next decade a series of fierce intra-party battles would be waged, with 
Philadelphia emerging as the site of the most important of them all. In this battle 
William Duane and the Aurora would once again take center stage, leading a 
diverse coalition of merchants, immigrants, and radicals in a struggle to retain 
control of the party they had helped create. It is to that story we now turn. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Partisan Editors and Intra-Party Conflict: 
Are We All Federalists? Are We Even All Republicans? 
 
“Never was there a more singular and mysterious state of parties. The plot of an old 
Spanish play is not more complicated with underplot. I scarcely trust myself with the 
attempt to unfold it.”  
 Fisher Ames to Rufus King (1800) 
 
“Excellent in their use, intolerable in their abuse, we are forced to ponder about 
newspapers, whether we can do without them or endure them. Liberty would be a goddess, 
and really immortal, if she could be thus dieted on poisons; if she could play unhurt with 
the forky tongues of the Chronicle and Aurora”  
The Mercury and New-England Palladium (1801) 
 
 
As the political system slipped from Federalist control with Jefferson’s 
“Revolution of 1800,” the terms of partisan competition changed rapidly. 
Federalist leaders had hoped to destroy the network Republicans had used to 
organize opposition, but as the previous chapter demonstrated, their scheme 
backfired badly. The Republican network not only survived but thrived in the 
face of these attacks, with dozens of new papers and political organizations 
forming in response. While Federalist elites had worked to centralize and control 
political information, Republicans had organically built a network that was 
almost entirely decentralized, and in the aftermath of the election this network 
grew while their rival’s one collapsed. With the Federalist threat fading, the 
contradictions latent within the Republican coalition quickly emerged. 
Republican elites had always been more willing then their Federalist 
counterparts to work with members of the lower classes, but they had always 
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made sure to keep a “respectable” distance between themselves and their allies 
as they did so. Republican editors had quietly accepted this arrangement, as it 
gave them the independence necessary to run their newspapers and build their 
party organizations as they saw fit. But in the aftermath of their shared victory 
this arrangement proved untenable, and soon the two sides were engaged in a 
series of fierce intra-party conflicts in nearly every state in the nation.  
On one side of the fight were the wealthy Republican merchants, planters, 
and lawyers who dominated the party’s leadership at the state and national level. 
Having been largely excluded from upper class society by the Federalist gentry, 
these men hoped to use their party’s victory as a path to social respectability. 
Partisanship had for them always been a means to other ends, and so long as 
their goals could be accomplished without sacrificing principles, they hoped to 
put the conflict with Federalists behind them and move forward in common 
cause. On the other side were the Republican printers, editors, and activists for 
whom politics had become a way of life. Rather than aim for social respectability, 
these men sought political equality, and until they won it they would be in no 
mood for accommodation. This put the two sides at odds with one another, and 
when the gentry began openly questioning their right of editors to hold positions 
of leadership, their coalition split in two. In the previous decade the Republican 
network had been used to bring the party together, but in this era that same 
network would be used to tear the party apart. As factional conflict broke open 
across the nation, printers and editors mobilized to fight off a second attempt to 
marginalize them. Many Republican elites had intended to build a new party 
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around ideals of deference and disinterestedness, but under the direction of these 
editors, the party instead continued moving towards unapologetic partisanship.  
This chapter begins with a look at the state of the nation’s information 
infrastructure in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Although there were 
no major information policy interventions in this period, development of the 
infrastructure continued at a furious pace. Through the spread of the postal 
service’s newspaper exchange service, competing partisan information networks 
were becoming an increasingly stable and accepted part of the political landscape, 
so much so that by the decade’s end this system of political information 
provision was accepted by nearly everyone as a natural and unavoidable fact. 
Recognizing the central role newspapers played in their victory, Republicans 
everywhere worked to expand their network, bringing political papers to places 
further and further from the seaboard cities that had always dominated 
American politics. Establishing a newspaper became widely understood as the 
first step towards organizing a community for political action, and the details of 
this new model will be explored here at length. However, as the tensions hidden 
within the Republican coalition began to emerge, the Republican information 
network began to fragment. Fierce intra-party battles were fought across the 
nation, with each faction taking the portion of the network under its control and 
using it to create rival political organizations within their state. The most 
important of these conflicts was located in the Pennsylvania, with elites making 
one final and ultimately futile attempt to gain control of the party within the 
state. Having fought to legitimize partisan opposition in the previous decade, 
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partisan editors now began battling to integrate lower class voters and 
immigrants into the political system. By tracing the details of this fight and 
connecting them to trends taking place throughout the nation, this chapter will 
detail the role partisan editors and their newspapers played in creating the 
conditions necessary for the Jacksonian transformations that will be explored in 
the following chapter.  
 
The Information Environment of Early Nineteenth Century America 
Table 3: Growth of the United States Postal Service, 1790-1820 
Category 1790 1800 1810 1820 1800/1790 1810/1800 
U.S. population   
(1000s) 3,231 4,403 6,032 8,082 1.4 1.4 
Post offices 75 903 2,300 4,500 12.0 2.5 
Population per post 
office 43,084 4,876 2,623 1,796 - - 
Miles of post roads 1,875 20,817 36,406 73,492 11.1 1.8 
Settled area per post 
office (sq. miles) 3,493 339 180 116 - - 
Postage revenues 
(1000s of dollars) 38 281 552 1,112 7.4 2.0 
Postage revenues 
per capita (dollars) 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.14 6.0 1.5 
Note: Population data excludes slaves and Indians. 
Sources: population and settled area: John, Spreading the News: The American 
Postal System from Franklin to Morse 51; post offices, miles of post roads, postage 
revenues: Allan R. Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information: The 
United States System of Cities, 1790-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1973) 80. 
 
America’s information infrastructure continued to expand at a rapid pace in 
the first decade of the nineteenth century. Although growth rates were markedly 
slower than in the previous decade, infrastructure growth in absolute measures 
was nevertheless quite significant. Nearly 1,400 new post offices were added 
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serving more than 15,000 additional miles of post road, cutting the population 
per office and settled area per office ratios in half by the decade’s end. More 
importantly, where development in the previous decade focused on the cities 
and towns located in the coastal states, development now reached much deeper 
into the rapidly expanding western states. Republican lawmakers continued 
what Federalist lawmakers began with the Act to Alter and Establish Sundry Post 
Roads, passing nine additional acts by the end of the decade that spread post 
roads and offices much deeper into every state in the union.245  
Three major administrative changes were made to the postal service during 
this period, each of which significantly improved the transmission of information. 
First, postal management underwent a major reorganization, creating the first 
recognizably modern bureaucratic structure in the federal government. Prior to 
1800, all post offices operated on an essentially equal footing, with only a single 
headquarters in the capital overseeing the entire system. After 1800, the system 
was reorganized into three levels, with headquarters overseeing a series of 
distribution offices that interconnected smaller branch offices into a hub-and-
spoke system. This change dramatically improved the speed at which mail could 
                                                
245 "An Act Further to Alter and to Establish Certain Post-Roads.," U.S. Statutes at Large; 
"An Act Further to Alter and Establish Certain Post-Roads, and for the More Secure 
Carriage of the Mail of the United States," U.S. Statutes at Large; "An Act Further to Alter 
and Establish Certain Post-Roads, and for Other Purposes," U.S. Statutes at Large; "An 
Act Further to Alter and Establish Certain Post-Roads, and for Other Purposes," U.S. 
Statutes at Large; "An Act Further to Alter and Establish Certain Post-Roads, and for 
Other Purposes," U.S. Statutes at Large; "An Act Further to Alter and Establish Certain 
Post-Roads, and for Other Purposes," U.S. Statutes at Large; "An Act to Establish Certain 
Post-Roads in the States of Georgia and Ohio," U.S. Statutes at Large; "An Act to Establish 
Post-Roads," U.S. Statutes at Large; "An Act Regulating the Post-Office Establishment," 
U.S. Statutes at Large 
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be delivered throughout the entire system. In the past all mail was carried from 
branch to branch, and at each stop a postmaster was required to resort the mail 
to determine what should be set aside for local delivery and what should be sent 
to the next office down the line. This meant individual pieces of mail were often 
sorted dozens of times, adding days and sometimes even weeks to the delivery 
process. With the advent of the hub-and-spoke system, however, mail was only 
sorted twice, once at a distribution office nearest to branch where it was mailed, 
and then again at the distribution office nearest to its final destination. Through a 
relatively simple administrative change, the speed of mail delivery was vastly 
improved, the first time in the history of the nation’s information infrastructure 
that such an improvement was made independent of changes in travel 
technology.246 
Second, Postmaster General Granger ordered local postmasters in 1804 to 
encourage customers to subscribe to locally produced papers whenever possible. 
Granger’s primary goal with this policy was to reduce the immense volume of 
newspapers that were flooding the mail system. According to his reports, 
newspapers made up nearly fifty percent of all mail carried by the post office in 
1803, but their postage accounted for less than ten percent of all postal revenues. 
Given that newspaper delivery and exchange was one of the primary purposes 
                                                
246 Through this reform, the post office became the first bureaucracy in the United States 
with a layer of middle managers, the distributing postmasters, with whom the general 
public would never interact. This hub-and-spoke model would remain unchanged until 
the Civil War. For more on these reforms, see Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the 
Common Life, 47-51; John, Spreading the News 
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of the post office, Granger had little interest in reducing the number of papers in 
the system, so to reduce costs he instead focused on limiting the distance the 
average paper would have to be carried. And although Granger, like Jefferson, 
frequently wrote of his desire to minimize the “rage of party” that was sweeping 
the nation, it was more than a happy coincidence that his policy benefited the 
dozens of small papers that had recently joined the Republican network at the 
expense of the larger Federalist papers that still dominated in many urban areas. 
Postmaster positions had as far back as the Revolution been used for a variety of 
partisan purposes, but this shift marked the first time that the postal service’s 
administrative policy was explicitly used to further partisan ends.247   
Third, in the later half of the decade Congress ordered the expansion of the 
mail stagecoach system throughout the western states. Granger’s order of 1804 
notwithstanding, the volume and weight of newspaper mail had held steady, 
and along major post roads the carriage of mail by horseback was simply no 
longer feasible. Stagecoaches had been used throughout the coastal states for 
nearly a decade, but they had not yet reached into the West, and by adding 
regular stagecoach service throughout Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, the 
                                                
247  Granger’s traveled extensively while Postmaster, and his letters to Jefferson 
frequently reflect his concern over the lack of Republican papers in many areas. For 
much more, see Kielbowicz, "The Press, Post Office, and Flow of News in the Early 
Republic" 269-271; Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 203-206 
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information infrastructure in these states was brought up to par with those of the 
states along the coast.248  
Understood together, these legislative and administrative changes combined 
to produce a series of incremental improvements to the nation’s information 
infrastructure, increasing the efficiency of its various networks in a number of 
subtle but important ways. Rather than add new methods of delivery or modes 
of information sharing to its system, the post office instead focused on expanding 
the reach of its current services to an ever-wider circle of Americans. Of the three 
major changes, two improved the delivery of letters and newspapers while one 
affected only newspapers, demonstrating the central place newspaper delivery 
held in the management of the nation’s information infrastructure. As the reach 
and reliability of the postal system increased, the collection of subscription fees 
replaced inconsistent delivery as the primary worry facing newspaper editors, 
but bit by bit the increasing dependability of the exchange generated a solution 
this problem. Through the partisan information networks created by the service, 
editors were put in direct contact with dozens and eventually hundreds of allies 
who they would otherwise have never had the opportunity to meet. This created 
opportunities for alliances that went well beyond the basic information-sharing 
needs the exchange had been created to serve. By agreeing to act as subscription 
agents for one another, allied editors were able to expand the reach of their paper 
while also making it more profitable. In the short term, this increasingly common 
                                                
248 Bretz, Some Aspects of Postal Extension into the West, 148; Kielbowicz, "The Press, Post 
Office, and Flow of News in the Early Republic" 275-277 
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arrangement improved the likelihood of collecting subscription fees from distant 
subscribers, but in the long term it also deepened the connections among editors, 
adding a layer of economic interdependence to their already deep partisan ties. 
The bonds of community among the nation’s most committed partisan activists 
were strengthened through the exchange, giving its members a shared sense of 
purpose and political destiny that strengthened their party nationwide. 249 
 
Table 4: Growth of Newspaper Publication, 1790-1820 
Category 1790 1800 1810 1820 1810/1800 
1820/180
0 
U.S. population   
(thousands) 3,231 4,403 6,032 8,082 1.4 1.8 
Newspapers 
published 92 235 371 512 1.6 2.2 
Newspaper 
editions per 
week 
147 389 549 759 1.4 2.0 
Daily newspapers 8 24 26 42 1.1 1.8 
Annual 
circulation 
(thousands) 
4,000 12,000 24,000 50,000 2.0 4.2 
Annual 
newspapers 
copies per capita 
1.2 2.3 4.0 6.2 1.7 2.7 
Note: Population data excludes slaves and Indians. 
Sources: population: John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from 
Franklin to Morse 51; newspaper and circulation data: Allan R. Pred, Urban Growth 
and the Circulation of Information: The United States System of Cities, 1790-1840 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973) 21. 
 
Table 4 demonstrates the continued growth of newspapers during this period. 
In nearly every category, their growth outpaced the population, with only the 
                                                
249  Kielbowicz, "Newsgathering by Printers' Exchanges before the Telegraph"; 
Kielbowicz, "The Press, Post Office, and Flow of News in the Early Republic" 
  
197 
rate of increase in daily editions failing to keep pace. This reflects the expansion 
of newspaper networks into increasingly rural areas, where low population 
densities made the publication of daily editions an economic impossibility. This 
shift towards rural areas can also be seen in the doubling of the annual 
circulation totals during each of the first two decades of the nineteenth century. 
Whether it was by subscribing to distant journals that were accessible through 
the postal system or by taking new journals recently been established in their 
local areas, Americans came to on partisan papers as their primary source for 
political news and information. Although there had only been a small handful of 
openly partisan journals in the early 1790s, by 1810 more than ninety percent of 
all papers had made an explicit public commitment to partisanship.250  
 
Expanding the Republican Information Network 
Thanks to the nation’s rapidly improving information infrastructure, partisan 
newspaper networks developed into stable institutions interconnecting like-
minded partisans across enormous geographic distances, and for the first four 
decades of the nineteenth century, these networks were in fact the only partisan 
institutions with truly national reach. Although the caucus system was 
increasingly used to organize the party-in-government in the capital, it had no 
ability to affect politics outside of the capital. Committees of correspondence and 
nominating conventions were much more likely to create direct points of contact 
                                                
250 Of the 359 newspapers catalogued by Isaiah Thomas in 1810, only 33 were not 
identifiably partisan. Thomas, History of Printing in America, 2nd Ed, 517-525 
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with voters, but in most instances they operated only in the months preceding 
each election. It was therefore left to local newspapers and their editors to 
advance their party, its principles, and its people on a daily basis. Recognizing 
their dependence upon these local organizations, many members of Congress 
formed open alliances with the most prominent printers and editors in their 
districts, a relationship that provided members with a ready source of 
intelligence from reliable allies who remained in the district year-round. The 
local partisan editor became for both current and aspiring elected officials an 
indispensible partner in the process of representation, making him, in the words 
of one contemporary observer, “an ally to be sought and an adversary to be 
feared.” In every state and district in the nation, partisan editors became party 
leaders by connecting citizens to one another, to their leaders, and to their 
government. It is thus no exaggeration to say that without these networks of 
newspapers, national and state political parties would have been impossible in 
this era.251 
As America moved westward, country printers and editors became an 
increasingly important force within the Republican Party. Although no single 
country paper was as powerful as the major party organs in New York, 
Washington, and Philadelphia, they as a group represented the overwhelming 
bulk of papers that populated the network.252 These country papers became 
                                                
251 Hamilton, The Country Printer, 119 
252 See Appendix for details of papers during this era. 
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representatives for their party in their new home towns, filling their pages with 
reports from the cities and deliberately packaging the news of the day in a format 
meant to built support for Republican policies and politicians. Establishing a new 
paper was widely understood by both citizens and elites as the first step towards 
organizing the community for political action, and voters expected and 
demanded that their local editors act as a link between state and national party 
leaders and their community. Unlike in the mid- to late-twentieth century, when 
journalists were expected to act as neutral observers of political life, partisan 
editors in this period were expected by everyone to provide a vigorous defense 
of their party and its candidates. Partisan electioneering was widely regarded as 
their primary mission, and should their party and its candidates succeed at the 
polls, these editors were granted positions of status and power within the local 
community.253 Republican partisans also worked diligently to build out their 
network in states where Federalists still had a strong base of support. New 
England thus began a key venue for action. Republicans remained a minority in 
many of the districts in this region, and their papers were nevertheless expected 
to act as representatives for the new Jefferson Administration within their home 
states. National elites and partisan editors from neighboring states stepped up 
efforts to provide materials to even the smallest of Republican papers in New 
England, integrating papers that had previously been operating at the margins 
                                                
253  Over the course of the decade, printers and editors increasingly referred to 
themselves as “politicians” in the pages of the papers, a clear reflection of the central 
place politics now played in their lives. For more, including examples from both articles 
and obituaries, see Hamilton, The Country Printer, 94-110. 
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much more deeply into the national network. By decade’s end, all of the New 
England states but for Connecticut elected Republican legislatures and governors, 
with the Republican share of the vote increasing in lockstep with the circulation 
of new papers throughout the state.254 
By the beginning of Jefferson’s second term in office, a general pattern had 
emerged for the operation of partisan politics nationwide. At the top of the 
political system sat federal officials, a group of men who, despite their recent 
victories, were at best uncomfortable with and at worst openly hostile to 
electioneering and partisanship. Although they often made efforts to control the 
newspapers that distributed information to the public, these efforts nearly 
always failed, leaving partisan information networks heavily localized. 
Leadership within the network was an emergent property, and it came about as a 
result of an accumulation of thousands of independent decisions, rather than 
through a directed, centralized process. At the local level, elites had no choice but 
to rely on a diverse array of largely independent intermediaries for the collection 
and distribution of information. Traditionally, printing had been the work of 
artisans and laborers, occupational classes that sat alongside laborers and 
mechanics at the bottom of society. But the emergence of partisan editors had 
created an entirely new type of print professional, one who worked in the world 
of ideas while his assistants performed the manual labor necessary to create print 
products. This fact, plus the increasingly profitable nature of partisan printing, 
                                                
254 Adams, New England in the Republic 1776 to 1850, 230-239; Pasley, The Tyranny of 
Printers, 214-215; Robinson, Jeffersonian Democracy in New England, 36-51. 
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meant that as these men organized party activity in their communities, they were 
increasingly recognized by fellow citizens as local political leaders worthy of 
respect. Over time, the most successful among them moved to positions of 
leadership in state and national politics, running important political machines, 
serving in a wide variety of appointed positions, and holding elective office. 
Using their editorships as springboards, they served as sheriffs, judges, and 
county clerks; census officer, justices of the peace, and district attorneys; and 
coroners, assessors, and postmasters. 255  And among just the group of men 
serving as Republican editors in the single year of 1810, more than fifty, or 
roughly forty percent of the entire group, went on eventually to hold elective 
office later in their career.256 
Even more remarkable is the fact that roughly eighty percent of these future 
officeholders began their newspaper careers as apprentices, a clear indication 
both of their start among society’s lower class and of the ways the partisan 
printing trade was changing political society. In the past, young men worked 
their way up through a grueling series of apprenticeships, “tramping” from city 
to city until they had the experience and the money necessary to start an urban 
shop of their own.257 Increasingly, however, apprentices and journeymen were 
                                                
255 Hamilton, The Country Printer, 122-126 
256 For a complete list, see Appendix. For more, see Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 228; 
Thomas, History of Printing in America: With a Biography of Printers & an Account of 
Newspapers, 515-524 
257 The typical print shop in this era had four or five apprentices, plus a journeyman, an 
experienced printer who acted as manager for the apprentices in the shop. As the 
position of editor grew increasingly political, journeymen became largely responsible for 
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leaving the cities to set up businesses in the towns and villages of the West, 
establishing bookstores, newspapers, and print shops in places that did not yet 
have one of their own. Although some of these men were sent as emissaries of 
editors with whom they had closely worked, many more struck out on their own, 
determined to build a life for themselves in a new community.258 In previous 
decades these men had been driven almost entirely by economic motives; both 
John Fenno and Benjamin Bache, for example, began their careers seeking profits 
rather than power. But the shared experience of the Alien and Sedition Acts 
radicalized a generation of print professionals, and by the early nineteenth 
century partisanship had become the main motivator for the establishment of 
new papers. Rather than look for locations where they could profit, these men 
instead gravitated towards towns ripe for political influence, expecting that the 
management of a party paper would lead to other professional political 
opportunities. Doing so was always an economic gamble, for only very rarely 
were printers called to a specific community by its residents, and there was no 
guarantee that town’s longtime residents would accept a new political leader. 
But hundreds of men went forth anyway, determined to make their mark on the 
political world.259  
                                                                                                                                            
the day to day operation of the shop, allowing the editor-owner to spend most of his day 
out in the community at political events. For more, see Hamilton, The Country Printer, 26-
46; Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 223-228 
258 Hamilton, The Country Printer, 83-88 
259 Hamilton, The Country Printer, iv-vii, 49-64. For an example of young man working his 
way from apprentice to journeyman to powerful political editor, see Van Deusen, 
Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby, 6-37 For an example of an editor being asked by 
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And make their political mark they did. It was during this period, for 
example, that Thurlow Weed, John Norvell, and Amos Kendall each began their 
printing apprenticeships, learning the trade that would soon carry them to 
national prominence. Over the course of the next four decades, Weed became 
one of the most important party leaders in the nation, first for the Anti-Masonic 
Party, and then the Whigs, and eventually the new Republican Party. Norvell 
first became force in Kentucky politics as an ally of Henry Clay, then moved to 
Washington to take a position within the Treasury Department, and eventually 
settled in Michigan, where he first served as the postmaster of Detroit and 
eventually as the state’s first U.S. Senator. And after establishing one of 
Kentucky’s most important newspapers in 1808, The Argus of Western America, 
Kendall became a close ally of both Martin Van Buren and Andrew Jackson, 
eventually serving as the key member and organizer of Jackson’s “Kitchen 
Cabinet.”260 National political elites were only very rarely involved in launching 
the careers of these men, but beginning in Jefferson’s first term they grew 
increasingly comfortable supporting them. Secretary of State James Madison was 
particularly fond of using government printing contracts to support printers and 
editors, and with William Duane’s help he targeted key Republican newspapers 
in every state. Beginning with well-established papers like the Virginia Argus, 
                                                                                                                                            
members of a community to establish a paper in their town, see Cole, A Jackson Man: 
Amos Kendall and the Rise of American Democracy, 50-61. For a series of examples of 
journeymen founding papers without outside assistance, see Pasley, The Tyranny of 
Printers, 321-347 
260 Each of these men will be covered in detail in the next chapter of this work. 
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Virginia Examiner, Philadelphia Aurora, he moved on to smaller papers, 
deliberately aiming to shore up the parts of the Republican network that most 
needed support. As the system developed, he used patronage to reward loyal 
papers following closely fought elections, a practice that soon had editors 
competing with one another to demonstrate their influence. 261  Over time, 
Republican lawmakers began lobbying for contracts for editors living in their 
districts, with some state delegations working together to submit complete slates 
of papers and editors for Madison’s quick approval.262 
At the level of the network, a regular pattern of interaction among member 
newspapers began to emerge. As before, local papers used the postal service 
exchange to gather articles for republication, supplementing them with letters 
from elected officials as well as local citizens. Individual editors worked with 
local allies to direct party building within their communities, reporting in to 
editors at the big city papers who monitored and reported the results. Following 
each election, state leaders would review the results to identify communities 
where their party’s candidates had underperformed. If a paper already existed in 
that location, editors from neighboring communities would be expected to 
                                                
261 During Jefferson’s second term, for example, Madison rewarded John Israel for the 
work his Tree of Liberty did to Jefferson win the western part of the state by large 
margins. Smith, The Press, Politics, and Patronage, 44 
262 For more on Madison and patronage, see Smith, The Press, Politics, and Patronage, 42-55 
One form of patronage that Madison was unwilling to use was the appointment of 
editors to positions as postmaster. Although his Federalist predecessors had at one point 
filled more than twenty of the available positions with loyal editors, Madison only 
appointed a single Republican editor to a position of postmaster during his time in office. 
Cunningham Jr, The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power, 258-267; Pasley, The Tyranny of 
Printers, 297 
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provide the support necessary to improve it; if the town or village did not have a 
paper of its own, these same editors would mobilize to locate a journeyman or 
apprentice who could establish one. In this manner, the party-as-organization 
grew one newspaper at a time, with individual members of the national party-in-
government leaving the operation of both the papers and the network entirely in 
the hands of local leaders. The result was a national network made up of a 
diverse array of local papers, each taking content from across the political world 
and tailoring it to the needs of their party in their local community. This gave the 
network enormous flexibility, allowing it to survive the rapid turnover of papers 
and editors that was typical of the ear. Rather than develop a system with a few 
large circulation papers as elites initially envisioned, parties instead grew up 
around decentralized networks of hundreds of small circulation papers, each run 
by an activist whose career was tied directly to his party’s success.263 Not all 
papers within the network were equal, however, and those located at the seats of 
state and federal power continued to have significant advantages over their 
country allies. Whether it was because of their direct access to government actors, 
opportunities for eyewitness reporting, or access to the political rumor mill, 
capitol city papers were widely regarded as more authoritative by their fellow 
editors and citizens alike, leading them to have higher subscription totals and 
more frequent exchange service reprints than other papers. But throughout the 
network, country and city editors recognized the invaluable role each played in 
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building their party, a joint venture they all agreed combined into far more than 
the sum of its parts.264 
Returning to the competing theories of party formation and evolution, there 
is once again very little in these stories that confirms the predictions offered by 
the elite-led models. Members of the national party-in-government frequently 
formed alliances with local party leaders, but they rarely if ever played a direct 
role in selecting the men, locating them within individual communities, or 
overseeing their activities. Although there were some notable instances when 
elites provided direct support to local organizations, such as when Madison used 
his power as Secretary of State to direct federal printing contracts to allied 
newspapers, their role was nearly always reactive, and only in the most 
extraordinary instances involved them directly in the operation of these papers 
or their affiliated political organizations. State officials were often more directly 
involved, but here too they nearly always deferred to the editors who were 
responsible for the day-to-day activities of their local party organizations. And 
although many of these editors increasingly served as elected or appointed 
officials themselves, these positions were nearly always secured as a result of 
their editorial positions, and not vice versa. This pattern of local party 
development accords quite well, however, with the predictions generated by 
both the group-centric and infrastructure-driven models. Throughout the nation, 
the expansion of partisanship was propelled by activists operating outside of the 
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party-in-government, with the postal system operating as the key mechanism for 
the decentralization of political power. To better test whether these activists were 
operating entirely within the party-as-organization, as the group-centric theories 
predict, or whether they were working at the shifting boundaries between the 
organization and the electorate, as the infrastructure-driven model predicts, a 
deep dive into the activities of local party activity is necessary. Although the 
histories of all of the major coastal cities each offers the opportunity to study the 
evolution of partisanship in details, no city offers a better venue for exploration 
than Philadelphia. Featuring one of the nation’s most well-developed and well-
connected media markets, it tended to export its brand of politics to neighboring 
states, making its political innovations far more important than any other city in 
the nation. Perhaps even more importantly, as the former site of the temporary 
nation’s capital, its politics were well known to members of the national party-in-
government, making it the city in which these elites were likely to have the 
greatest opportunity for involvement in local affairs. This makes it an ideal 
venue for tracing the roles played by elected officials, activists, and average 
citizens in the evolution of partisan politics in this period, and it is to its story we 
now turn.   
 
 
Philadelphia as the Exemplar of Intra-Party Conflict 
 
The men who filled the ranks of the Republican party in Philadelphia at the 
end of the eighteenth century were neither elected officials nor members of the 
upper class. They were tradesmen, merchants, lawyers, doctors, and planters, 
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and their primary base of support in the electorate was among the immigrants, 
laborers, farmers, and mechanics who lived in the communities immediately 
surrounding the city. 265  In the early 1790s, these political outsiders rallied 
together as Anti-Federalists, working to fight the ratification of a new federal 
constitution that they believed was deliberately crafted to keep men like 
themselves on the sidelines. Although their subsequent opposition to the 
Washington Administration was fierce and at times even violent, it was not until 
the expansion of the postal service that these outsiders gained access to a 
mechanism for organizing connecting their local protests into a coherent 
movement that organized activity throughout their state.266 But as this section 
will demonstrate, that same network soon became the tool by which their new 
party was torn apart. With the Federalist Party either unwilling or unable to 
build a comparable party network of its own, Republicans found themselves 
with no one to fight but themselves. In the early part of the decade these clashes 
were visible within the pages of Duane’s Aurora, but as intra-party conflict grew 
increasingly intense, each of the competing factions established papers of their 
own, using them to organize their allies for action. With no mechanism at the 
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center to control the network, factional conflict necessarily took place in full 
public view, spread out over the pages of competing papers for everyone to see. 
The organization of partisan conflict in Philadelphia began with the 
ratification debate, and as early as 1792 John Adams was warning his allies to 
avoid the city’s “clashing grandees” who specialized in the “popular arts” of 
“political intrigue.”267 Thanks to its status as the nation’s capital, Philadelphia 
was home to numerous thriving print shops and booksellers, giving it the 
nation’s most advanced media market at the end of the eighteenth century.268 
Most of the city’s newspapers covered state and national politics equally, but 
following the relocation of the capital to Washington, D.C., their focus shifted 
towards state politics. Duane and his Aurora were already a potent force within 
Pennsylvania politics, but with his attention freed from building the national 
party network and defending himself from Federalist libel and sedition 
prosecutions, he began devoting himself to local party-building like never 
before. 269  Under his leadership, local activists built institutions capable of 
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nominating candidates, crafting publicity campaigns, and mobilizing voters on 
Election Day.270 
The Republican coalition in Philadelphia was comprised of two major groups. 
On one side was the commercial-professional wing of party, a group made up of 
wealthy merchants, lawyers, and businessmen who had been systematically 
excluded from high society by their Federalist foes. On the other side was the 
working class wing of the party, a group led by printers and editors but made up 
largely of men in the middle and lower classes, with a particularly strong base of 
support among recent German and Irish immigrants.271 These two groups were 
led by five men: Alexander J. Dallas, William Duane, Tench Coxe, George Logan, 
and Michael Leib. Dallas, a prominent lawyer and advisor to Governors Mifflin 
and McKean, was the leader of the commercial wing of the party and the most 
important non-elected Republican in state. Coxe and Logan were Dallas’ closest 
allies, the former a prominent merchant and Hamilton ally, the later a gentleman 
farmer and physician who co-founded the city’s Democratic-Republican Society 
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for English speakers in 1793.272 William Duane sat at the head of the working 
class wing of the party was. Duane held neither elected nor appointed office; his 
power came solely from his press and its affiliated political machine. Duane’s 
closest ally was Dr. Michael Leib, a physician who founded the city’s very first 
Democratic-Republican Society. 273  
Although Jefferson dubbed these two groups the "moderates" and the "high-
fliers," the public would come to know them as the Quids and the Democrats.274 
Convinced that politics was a struggle between the common man and a self-
appointed aristocracy, the Duane-led Democrats advocated for an open and 
unrestrained partisanship backed by the mass participation of men from every 
social and economic class. The Dallas-led Quids, by contrast, urged caution, 
warning that if partisanship were pursued as the Democrats intended, the 
United States would at best “never enjoy quiet” and at worst would “involve the 
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hazard of civil war.”275 But Duane and his fellow Democrats rejected this plea for 
calm as a threat to democracy itself. “Like the continual motion of the sea, which 
preserves its sweet and its saline particles from evaporating,” Duane argued, “so 
does a continued roiling of the democratic waters prevent their stinking, 
stagnating, or being converted into a pestilential pool of monarchy, aristocracy or 
priestcraft.”276  
The conflict between the "moderates" and the "high-fliers" simmered quietly 
in the first two years following Jefferson’s victory. During that time, the 
commercial wing of the party led by Dallas was firmly in control of Pennsylvania 
politics, with merchants and lawyers from Philadelphia’s gentry class populating 
most of the elected and appointed positions throughout state and local 
government. The political machine built by Bache and Duane had proved 
essential to organizing opposition to Federalists throughout the nation, but it had 
yet to encounter any significant tensions with its allies. But all of that was about 
to change. The working-class wing of the party had long harbored suspicions 
that their fellow partisans were not committed to true political equality, a fear 
rooted deep in their shared experience as Irish and German exiles. 277 Unlike 
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many of their native-born counterparts, they entered American politics having 
already experienced severe political persecution, and they were determined to 
get the better of their foes in any future conflict by making early and aggressive 
use of the press. 278 Compromise had become unthinkable for these men, making 
them immediately suspicious of anyone who counseled restraint in political 
action. Their goal was to create new political system in which all were equals 
regardless of station or class, and if it took destroying their former allies to 
accomplish this, that was something they were willing to do.279 
The alliance between the two factions was first tested following the election of 
Michael Leib to Congress in 1802. Duane used the power of his newspaper-led 
political machine to get Leib elected, building a sophisticated campaign that 
united the German and Irish immigrant communities into a potent political force. 
Although the moderates privately worried that this represented a dangerous 
mixing of “clans and tribes,” they did not openly object to Duane’s leadership 
until he began aggressively pressing for a purge of Federalists from the 
bureaucracy. Arguing that it would be “political suicide” not to strip the 
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“honours & profits” of government from their opponents, Duane and his 
working-class allies launched a campaign to legitimize political patronage. 280 
This was a direct affront to the classical republican ideals of deference and 
disinterestedness that the moderates held dear, and within months they were 
moving to openly oppose Duane’s leadership. Oddly, this dispute over 
patronage actually began as an agreement. Following his Inauguration, President 
Jefferson had hesitated in removing Federalists from their appointed offices, 
leading both wings of the party to push him to action.281 Jefferson was at first 
slow to address their concerns, but by mid-1802 he had begun to act. 282 
Unfortunately for the working class wing of the party, however, his 
appointments were guided more by a potential appointee’s social status than by 
his skill or experience. Time after time, loyal party activists were passed over for 
individuals selected from the commercial wing of the party, with Beckley himself 
falling victim to this bias.283 As the appointment process progressed, it became 
increasingly clear to the “high fliers” that Jefferson had little interest in turning 
over any of the lower level positions that they felt most qualified for, leaving 
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Federalists in complete control of the customs houses and clerkships they most 
coveted.284 The more senior positions, however, had been filled with almost 
entirely with members of the Republican gentry, creating a deep divide among 
the two wings of the party. 
These tensions finally exploded into public view with a series of editorials 
written and published by Duane in June of 1803. Declaring his opponents to be 
“Tertium Quids” for their efforts to prevent the inclusion of the working classes 
within the political system, he called for an open effort by activists everywhere to 
wrest control of the party from men he argued were more interested in 
defending their former foes than in reforming the political system.285 Duane’s 
editorials had two immediate effects. First, thanks to the rapid republication of 
his articles throughout the national network, “Quid” became the standard label 
used by radical factions everywhere to describe their moderate opponents, a 
branding effort so successful that the name was eventually adopted by the Quids 
themselves. Second, sensing that compromise was impossible, Duane and his 
allies launched an all-out effort to democratize their state’s institutions, an effort 
that immediately split the party in two.286 Recognizing that the source of Duane’s 
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power was his control of their party’s newspaper network, Dallas, Coxe, and 
Logan set out to develop a network of their own. 287 After establishing the 
Freeman’s Journal, a new Philadelphia paper edited by a political ally, they moved 
to oppose the reelection to congress of Duane’s chief ally, Michael Leib.288 But the 
Quids had badly misjudged the power of Duane’s network. Through the Aurora, 
Duane sat at the head of a powerful political machine, with the paper as a focal 
point thorough which allies could be mobilized throughout the city to counter 
the Quids’ efforts to take control of the party. With the assistance of a network of 
correspondents, Duane tracked the Quids’ every move, publishing the details of 
their meetings far enough in advance to allow his supporters to disrupt or even 
hijack them.289 Turning Leib’s reelection into a test of democracy itself, Duane 
used the Aurora to rally working-class voters throughout the city, calling on them 
to become active participants in a fight for political equality. 
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After Leib was successfully reelected, Duane set his sights on the upcoming 
governor’s race.290 Turning on his former ally, he first used the Aurora to repaint 
Governor McKean as unreliable, and then organized his allies to secure his 
party’s nomination for Speaker of the House Simon Snyder.291 Rather than fight 
for control of the party, the Quids instead decided to leave it. Turning the name 
Quid into a badge of honor, they formed a new party called the Society of 
Constitutional Republicans, declaring that “it depends on a third party whether 
we will have liberty or despotism” in Pennsylvania. 292  Duane’s model of 
organization became their template for party building. Using a network of 
papers centered on their Freeman’s Journal, they conducted a state-wide anti-
Duane campaign, distributing more than forty thousand pamphlets and tickets 
through a network of local organizations established by allied editors.293 Duane 
countered with his most sophisticated campaign to date. Using the Aurora and its 
affiliated German-language papers, he interconnected a diverse array of clubs 
and fraternal associations, supplementing them with new newspapers in areas 
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where the Quids had the most support.294 As Election Day grew closer, events 
were organized nearly every night of the week, with the network of papers 
coordinating to make sure they were heavily attended.295 Finally, Duane also 
significantly expanded the size of the Philadelphia Militia Legion, a loyal 
political army of more than 800 members who worked to get turn out voters, 
tickets in hand, on Election Day.296  
But the results of the contest proved paradoxical. Although Duane’s 
candidate lost the election, he won more than two-thirds of the vote in the 
counties that had always been most loyally Republican. McKean owed his 
reelection to the overwhelming support he received from the state’s remaining 
Federalists. Snyder, meanwhile, had run up unprecedented margins in the 
working-class neighborhoods that Duane’s machine called home.297 The Quids 
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had hoped to use the election to discredit Duane, but instead they demonstrated 
that he was the party’s true leader in the state. "I call it victory," Gallatin 
admitted, "for the number of republicans who have opposed him...do not exceed 
one fourth or at most one third of the whole."298 Writing to President Jefferson, 
Governor McKean complained about Duane. “He affects to consider his 
importance, as an Editor of a Newspaper, to be superior to the Governor of a 
state, or even of the President of the United States.”299  
Duane and Leib continued to rule Philadelphia politics through the end of the 
decade, with Duane using the Aurora and its affiliated papers as the mouthpiece 
for a political organization that he had built ground up. After winning reelection 
to Congress, Leib was rewarded first with an appointment to the Untied States 
Senate, and eventually with a position as postmaster for the state. Politics had 
become their full-time occupation, and they kept their party machine running 
year-round to host a never-ending series of picnics, parades, dinners, and tavern 
events across the state. Recognizing the central role of the German and Irish in 
their coalition, they established a series of neighborhood networks to assist 
recent immigrants with naturalization, offering the opportunity to integrate into 
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the community in exchange for support on election day.300 Although the men 
eventually lost control of their machine to rivals, the style of politics they created 
lived on, and for the next two decades editor-led machines waged fierce intra-
party fights in every corner of the state.301 Looking back on the period from his 
position as Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams neatly captured both the role 
partisan editors had come to play in the political process and the discomfort 
many elites still felt about their rise.   
“Pennsylvania has been for about twenty years governed by two 
newspapers in succession; one, the Aurora, edited by Duane…and the 
other, the Democratic Press, edited by John Binns…They are both men of 
considerable talents and profligate principles, always for sale to the 
highest bidder, and always insupportable burdens, by their insatiable 
rapacity, to the parties they support.”302 
 
What can be learned from the story of factional conflict in Philadelphia? 
Although the previous decade’s battle between partisan editors and the elites 
intent on excluding them from politics had ended as a victory for the editors, it 
had not resolved the underlying question of political norms. Republican elites 
had accepted the support of a vigorous partisan press, but after the Federalist 
Party had been defeated they expected their allies to fall in line. But the editors 
controlled their party’s network of newspapers and local campaign committees, 
placing them in command of the resources necessary to organize party activity, 
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and after a series of challenges they once again faced down a foe intent on 
forcing them to the political margins. Rather than return to a model of politics 
based on comity and deference, the political system instead continued its 
evolution towards a model based on the active engagement of all politically 
inclined white men.  
The story of Duane, Leib, and the Pennsylvania Republicans is just one of 
many similar stories that could be traced in the history of state politics in this 
period. In each instance, while elites in Washington were busy organizing 
politics around Congress, state and local leaders were joining forces with average 
citizens to construct political parties of their own. None of this was as the elite-
led model of party politics would predict. In Philadelphia the Democratic-
Republicans were led by a doctor and a printer, two political outsiders who used 
their command of their state’s most important information network to build an 
organization that nominated candidates, conducted campaigns, and fought for 
institutional reform. Although local economic elites attempted to counter their 
growing influence, their efforts ultimately failed. With no way to exert control 
over their state’s information networks, they had no mechanism to exert their 
will over the party. By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century, a 
new form of politics organized around energetic partisan presses had clearly 
emerged. Newspapers had not only become the overwhelmingly dominant 
means for acquiring political information, but also the primary tool for 
organizing a geographically dispersed political community. In state after state, 
editors and their allies were becoming political leaders, each managing political 
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machines that organized the participation of citizens and backed candidates for 
election, always within their home states but sometimes in neighboring ones as 
well.  
If the predictions of elite-led model of party politics fails to predict the events 
described here, those of the group-centric model fare much better. As expected, 
activists outside of the party-in-government were responsible for creating and 
managing the party organizations that dominated Philadelphia politics. It was 
these activists who dictated the use of new communication technologies, 
embracing new opportunities for visibility and publicity as the centerpieces of 
their efforts to control their party. And as expected, nominations and 
appointments became the primary venues for intra-party conflict. What this 
model cannot sufficiently explain, however, is why control over the party slipped 
from the gentry to the working class so quickly during this period. At the 
beginning of the decade, Dallas and his allies had both their party and state 
government under their firm control, and following Jefferson’s election they 
expanded their influence by lobbying Jefferson to appoint many of their 
colleagues to federal office. But just a few short years later the party belonged to 
Duane, Leib, and their working class allies, with the formerly powerful gentry 
forced to mount a largely unsuccessful third party campaign in their efforts to 
retain power. As the infrastructure-driven model predicts, rapid changes to the 
state’s information environment had created the conditions necessary for such a 
sudden and unexpected shift in the balance of power. In the late 1790’s Duane’s 
power within his party came from his position as one of the leading anti-
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Federalist voices in a rapidly growing national network of Republican papers, 
but following Jefferson’s victory Duane turned his attention to state politics. 
When conflict over appointments broke out with the men he labeled Quids, 
Duane used his position as head of the state’s most powerful newspaper to 
mobilize the citizenry, interconnecting a diverse array of clubs and associations 
into a robust party organization capable of expelling the Quids from power. 
Taking advantage of the opportunities for decentralization that the expanded 
postal service provided, he built a state-wide network designed to democratize 
partisan politics, providing an array of new opportunities for average citizens to 
become active participants in politics for the first time. Together they built what 
the Quids could and would not – a party that expected and demanded the full 
participation of all eligible men within the polity.  
But Duane of course was not the only activist capable of taking advantage of 
the new opportunities created by the expanding infrastructure, and just a few 
short years after his near-total victory over his rivals, Duane lost control of the 
party. Across the state, dozens of competing organizations sprang into being, 
each organized by a local activist and built around a newspaper explicitly 
operated as a means to organize their faction for upcoming elections. Just as the 
network’s decentralized character allowed Duane to challenge the gentry, so too 
did it allow his allies to challenge him, and with no mechanism available to any 
of them to bring order to the system, it descended into chaos. For more than a 
decade fierce intra-party conflicts raged across the state, a situation that would 
not be resolved until the infrastructure changed once more. But when the chaos 
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of the 1810s finally passed, a generation of political veterans was ready to step 
forward and build a truly national party network dedicated to bringing a more 
democratic form of politics to every state in the nation. Here the final test of the 
competing theories of party development can be offered, and it is to that task we 
now turn.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Triumph of the Editors: 
He Who Controls the Network, Controls the Party 
 
“The mail and the press are the nerves of the body politic.” 
 John C. Calhoun (1817) 
 
 “The press, like the bar, has become the high road to distinction, and of late to office.”  
Duff Green (1826) 
 
 
If the final decade of the eighteenth century was a time of political 
transformation, the first decade of the nineteenth was a time of transition. During 
the 1790s, the project to connect every town and city in the nation to a single 
communication infrastructure had revolutionized politics, allowing a ragtag 
group of partisan editors to build a new political party and win a fiercely 
contested national election in just a few short years. Following the historic 
victory, however, their coalition crumbled, as the network that had once been 
used to bring their party together became the means by which the new party was 
torn apart. Federalist elites had attempted to craft policy that would establish 
limits on who could use the nation’s information infrastructure and how they 
could use it, but those policies had been so badly constructed that they produced 
the opposite of their intended effects. This left the infrastructure open to all 
comers, allowing rival factions to easily develop information networks and 
compete for party control. In some places factional conflict was driven by 
ideology, in others it was entirely personal, but whatever its causes, it was 
persistent and intense in every state. 
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The War of 1812 forced a temporary halt to the infighting, and for a few years 
the ferocity of partisan infighting waned, and following the war’s conclusion a 
new, more orderly style of partisan politics emerged. In state after state across 
the nation, editor-led movements built powerful political machines, taking 
advantage of a series of policy and technology innovations that favored the 
development of more centralized political networks. As these editors rose to 
power, they focused their initial efforts on state politics, leading campaigns to 
reform state institutions and expand the franchise to all white men. Then, 
following the controversial election of 1824, they joined their machines together 
to create a new political party, using the postal infrastructure to build the 
information network that carried Andrew Jackson to victory in 1828. This was a 
party built atop a truly national chain of partisan newspapers, and although the 
network was coordinated from the center by a single editor, it was flexible 
enough to allow leaders in each state to manage its operations in the ways that 
best suited local conditions. In the aftermath of their shared victory, the editors 
who led these machines found themselves in positions of true power. Some, like 
Amos Kendall and Charles Hammond, became powerful political advisors and 
federal appointees. Others, like Isaac Hill and Martin Van Buren, were elected by 
their fellow citizens to represent them in state and national politics. Yet others, 
like Thurlow Weed and Horace Greely, used the proven power of newspaper 
networks to build the Whig Party, bringing true two-party competition to the 
nation. After nearly a half-century of conflict, editors and their newspaper-based 
system of partisan organization had triumphed. Through their innovative use of 
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the nation’s communication infrastructure, they had not only survived but 
thrived, building sophisticated political machines that expanded the scope of 
politics and redefined the terms of participation. A system that was built by elites 
upon presumptions of deference and hierarchy had been transformed into a truly 
rude republic, where hyper-partisanship and engagement became the norm. 
To examine how this transformation took place, this chapter begins with a 
review of the nation’s information environment in the early 1820s. It was in this 
period that development of the postal network was completed, putting in place 
the infrastructure necessary for a group of former political outsiders to build a 
truly national campaign. After examining the implications of one final set of 
technological changes, the chapter moves on to the politics in this period. In the 
late 1810s and early 1820s, partisan editors became intensely focused on state 
politics, decoupling their organizations both from national politics and from one 
another. Four forces contributed to this change – the rising power of editors in 
local politics, the suspension of federal patronage, the need to democratize state 
institutions, and the Panic of 1819 – and each will be examined in turn. Following 
this, the anti-party politics of Monroe and Adams will be examined, comparing it 
to the unabashed partisanship of their opponents in six key states. After the 
controversial presidential election of 1824, these state leaders joined together to 
create a national political campaign, using the postal system to first build a 
newspaper-based political party with a strong presence in every state, and 
eventually to bring true two-party competition to the nation. The chapter then 
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concludes with an evaluation of the competing models of party organization and 
change in light of the evidence presented here. 
 
The Information Environment of the 1820s 
In the second decade of the nineteenth century, the national information 
environment underwent a series of dramatic changes unlike any that had come 
before. Following the relatively successful conclusion of the War of 1812, which 
effectively removed the twin threats of British and Federalist interference in 
domestic affairs, infrastructure improvements reoriented around the westward 
expansion and internal improvements. As Americans continued their relentless 
quest to bring the postal service to every town, village, and hamlet throughout 
the nation, they expanded their development efforts to include new systems of 
canals, roads, bridges, ports, stagecoaches, and steamboats. By pairing a 
transportation revolution with an already well-underway communications 
revolution, the proponents of these systems hoped to “bind the republic together” 
into a single, national community. “Let us conquer space,” declared Senator John 
C. Calhoun during a debate over internal improvements. “It is thus the most 
distant parts of the Republic will be brought within a few days travel of the 
center; it is thus that a citizen of the West will read the news of Boston still moist 
from the press. The mail and the press are the nerves of the body politic. By them 
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the slightest impression made on the most remote parts is communicated to the 
whole system.”303  
The first order of business in this project was the completion of the postal 
network, and by the mid-1820s its development had at long last caught up to the 
edge of the western frontier. Prior to this moment, development efforts were 
focused on connecting all of the cities, towns, and villages of each of the states to 
the postal network, and by extension, to the political system. Coastal cities had 
long been interconnected by post roads and office, but for much of the nation’s 
rural interior the arrival of a new post office meant the first reliable link to the 
national political community. As has been previously demonstrated, these newly 
connected rural communities tended to be far more Republican than the cities, so 
the expansion of the postal network gradually changed the terms of partisan 
composition throughout the nation. But by the mid-1820s this process of 
expansion had run its course. In the fifteen year-long break between the 
admission of Missouri in 1821 and of Arkansas in 1836, the primary focus of 
development was on the deployment of innovations that would improve service 
for the entire political community. Although this would continue to have 
important political implications, for example by shrinking the time-lag for 
sharing information across distances, the effective completion of the network 
meant that postal expansion was during this period far less likely to as a 
                                                
303 Annals of Congress, United States Senate, 14th Congress, 2nd Session, 851-857. For much 
more on the history of internal improvements during this era, see Howe, What Hath God 
Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848, 203-242; Larson, Internal Improvements 
Emery and Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media 
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destabilizing force within partisan politics, ending a phase began with the 
passage of the Post Office Act of 1792.  
As this was happening, the nation’s printing and newspaper industries also 
underwent a rapid transformation. Printing processes had remained remarkably 
stable since the time of Gutenberg, but as the Industrial Revolution began 
remaking the world’s economy, press technology underwent a series of rapid 
changes. Iron replaced wood in the frames, rollers were traded for cumbersome 
balls to ink type, horse and steam power supplanted manpower, and stereotype 
allowed for the rapid and relatively inexpensive reprinting of content. These 
innovations were imported into America in rapid succession following the war, 
with large urban print shops acting as the early adopters, and as these new 
technologies spread throughout the nation the economics of the newspaper 
industry were transformed. Printing technology would continue to improve over 
the coming decades, allowing ever-larger circulations of papers at lower costs, 
but in no period before or since were the innovations and their consequences so 
sudden or profound.304  
Following a brief period of instability caused by the Panic of 1819, a new, 
much more robust partisan printing system emerged. Although the expansion of 
                                                
304 Historians estimate that the printing industry in America changed more in the first 
twenty five years of the nineteenth century than it had in the previous two hundred 
years combined. For a comparison of changes in printing technology in different eras, 
see Silver, The American Printer, 1787-1825, 40. For an overview of the development of 
press technology, see Moran, Printing Presses: History & Development from the 15th 
Century to Modern Times. For more on the rapidly declining cost of paper, see Hamilton, 
The Country Printer, 20-22 
  
231 
the system of presses and newspapers throughout this period had never stopped, 
individual papers remained remarkably unstable endeavors, with newly 
established papers typically remaining in business for less than three years. The 
flexibility of the heavily decentralized newspaper exchange service had allowed 
partisan information networks to survive and even thrive despite this rapid 
churn, but it undoubtedly made efforts to organize across great distances far 
more difficult than they would have been had the system been more stable. 
Thanks to the combination of rapid technological change and information 
infrastructure development, that stability finally began to emerge in 1824, 
settling into place just in time for party leaders to begin organizing for the 1828 
campaign. Each of these changes will now be considered in turn. 
 
  
  
232 
The Post Office and Internal Improvements 
 
Table 5: Growth of the United States Postal Service, 1810-1830 
Category 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1820/1800 1840/1800 
Population  
(1000s) 4,403 6,032 8,082 10,892 14,640 1.8 3.3 
Post offices 903 2,300 4,500 8,450 13,468 5.0 14.9 
Population 
per post 
office 
4,876 2,623 1,796 1,289 1,087 - - 
Miles of 
post roads 20,817 36,406 73,492 115,176 155,739 3.5 7.5 
Settled area 
per post 
office (sq. 
miles) 
339 180 116 75.5 61.4 - - 
Postage 
revenues 
(1000s of 
dollars) 
281 552 1,112 1,185 4,543 4.0 16.2 
Postage 
revenues 
per capita 
(dollars) 
0.06 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.27 2.3 4.5 
Note: Population excludes slaves and Indians. 
Sources: population and settled area: John, Spreading the News: The American 
Postal System from Franklin to Morse 51; post offices, miles of post roads, postage 
revenues: Allan R. Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information: The 
United States System of Cities, 1790-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1973) 80. 
 
 
As Table 5 demonstrates, the postal service continued its record of 
remarkable growth in this period. Congress had spent the first decade of the new 
century working to connect the urban areas to the towns and villages of the then 
seventeen states making up the union, but with this project complete it shifted its 
attention to the infrastructure in the new states of the West. This led to the 
addition of tens of thousands of miles of roads and thousands of offices, bringing 
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a local office to within a days ride of nearly every citizen in the republic. By the 
mid-1820s, so many new roads and offices had been added that observers 
declared the system “complete,” a designation indicating that nearly every 
citizen had relatively easy access to the postal system and the party networks it 
supported. This development was so thorough, in fact, that by the mid-1820’s 
former President Monroe included its overdevelopment in a retrospective of 
mistakes made during his time in office. Looking back, Monroe lamented that in 
far too many instances postmasters had been appointed to offices so remote that 
“not a single letter is ever sent there, to any person, but themselves.”305 Despite 
his concerns, development continued at a breakneck pace well past the century’s 
midpoint, with each new state serving as a convenient excuse for further 
development of the system nationwide.306  
As before, the spread of the post office meant the spread of newspapers, and 
by 1820 papers made up more than half of the nation’s total mail volume.307 The 
exchange service had created an efficient, nation-wide network for political news, 
with big city dailies receiving as many as fifty papers each day. But this 
efficiency created new problems for political editors, who found themselves 
spending hours each day scanning the “heterogeneous mass” of papers that 
                                                
305 Monroe, Letter to John Mclean, July 15, 1825 
306 Complaints similar to Monroe’s can be found in important postal documents well 
past mid-century. For examples, see John, Spreading the News, 50-52. For a summary of 
postal service development during this period, see  Bretz, Some Aspects of Postal Extension 
into the West; John, Spreading the News, 64-111; John, Recasting the Information 
Infrastructure for the Industrial Age 
307 John, Spreading the News, 37 
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came through the mail. Beyond compiling articles for reprint in the next edition 
of their own papers, these editors were also increasingly expected by their 
readers to be available for political conversation and debate. As the newspaper 
system had become more partisan, and as editors had moved into positions of 
political leadership, it had become a widely accepted norm that newspapers 
offices would serve as open reading rooms where out of town papers could be 
perused and discussed with the paper’s staff. Although editors frequently 
complained of the demands this placed on their time, they nevertheless relished 
the ways it reinforced their prominence within the community.308 
 
  
                                                
308 Steffen, "Newspapers for Free: The Economies of Newspaper Circulation in the Early 
Republic" 409-415 
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Table 6: Growth of Newspaper Publication, 1800-1840 
Category 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1840/1800 
U.S. population   
(thousands) 4,403 6,032 8,082 10,892 14,640 3.3 
Newspapers 
published 235 371 512 861 1,404 6.0 
Newspaper 
editions per 
week 
389 549 759 - 2,281 5.9 
Daily newspapers 24 26 42 49 138 5.6 
Annual 
circulation 
(thousands) 
12,000 24,000 50,000 68,000 148,000 12.3 
Annual 
newspapers 
copies per capita 
2.3 4.0 6.2 6.2 8.6 3.7 
Note: Population excludes slaves and Indians. 
Sources: population: John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from 
Franklin to Morse 51; newspaper and circulation data: Allan R. Pred, Urban Growth 
and the Circulation of Information: The United States System of Cities, 1790-1840 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973) 21. Number of editions per week 
unavailable for 1830. 
 
As Table 6 demonstrates, the number of available newspapers climbed 
dramatically over the first four decades of the nineteenth century, with the rate 
of increase far exceeding population growth along every measure. As papers 
spread throughout the nation, the lag-time for the transfer of information among 
the nation’s cities and towns decreased dramatically. By the end of 1817 the time-
lag for the sharing of information between Boston and New York had been 
reduced to well less than half the rate of two decades prior, shrinking the delay 
from nearly six days to just over two. Where New York and Philadelphia had 
previously been the only major urban areas between which information could be 
shared in under five days, information could be shared by the end of the century 
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at a similar rate among all of the major cities and towns from eastern New 
England to southern Virginia. Lag-times west of the Appalachians remained 
considerably longer than those back East, frequently mirroring times seen a 
decade or two earlier along the seaboard. However, with the advent of 
steamboats and the rapid expansion of roads and stagecoach service throughout 
the West, lag-times decreased substantially, and by the end of the fourth decade 
large parts of the South and the West had been fully integrated into the nation’s 
newspaper exchange system. 309  Although each of the nation’s Postmasters 
General played an important role in developing the nation’s information 
infrastructure, none was more important that John McLean.310 During his tenure 
under Presidents Monroe and Adams, McLean opened more than two thousand 
offices and added more than thirty thousand miles of new roads, bringing 
enormous improvements in the efficiency and reliability of the delivery of 
information throughout the nation. The network of roads and offices finally 
reached full development under his leadership, serving the western and 
southern states as effectively as those along the seacoast. By the mid to late 1820s, 
the regular delivery of mail was generating highly predictable flows of 
information throughout the nation.311 In just under four decades, the post office 
had grown to become one of the largest, most geographically dispersed 
                                                
309 For more on lag-times, see Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Information, 20-77 
310 For more on McLean’s time as Postmaster General, see Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 
254-256; John, Spreading the News, 65-69 
311 John, Spreading the News, 3-5, 50-52, 65 
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organizations in the world, employing more individuals than all of the rest of the 
federal bureaucracy combined, and delivering more mail than any other post 
office in history.312  It was, in the words of de Tocqueville, “that great bond of 
minds” that “reaches to the end of the wilderness,” and its development had 
appeared to observers as “so rapid as to almost stagger belief…it might pass and 
be received as a romantic tale, having no foundation but in the regions of 
fancy.”313 
 
Destabilizing Technological Change 
As the War of 1812 came to a conclusion, so too did the trade war that had 
raged since the passage of the Embargo Act in 1807, allowing commerce to 
quickly resume between the United States and Great Britain. Thanks to a flood of 
new products from British merchants, the cost of paper and printing presses 
dropped dramatically, and along with these cheaper presses came labor saving 
innovations that allowed significantly smaller shops to produce much higher 
volumes of print products than they had just a few short years before. Arriving 
one after another, these innovations destabilized the newspaper and printing 
industries in America, dramatically altering the patterns of apprenticeship, and 
                                                
312 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 223-226 
313 de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 369. National Intelligencer, November 22, 1826, as 
quoted in John, Spreading the News, 8 
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forcing many newly unemployed journeymen to head west to found print shops 
and newspapers of their own.314  
The changes began with the rapid adoption of iron presses following the 
war.315 Prized for their increased printing rates and lower labor costs, iron 
presses were both heavier and more expensive than their wooden forerunners. 
They were therefore initially sold only to printers at large print shops and 
newspapers along the Eastern seaboard, who then sold their older wooden 
presses to local country printers, setting off a chain reaction that eventually led to 
a rapid decline in the cost of used presses throughout the nation. With the cost of 
presses reduced, the prospects for new country printers were substantially 
brightened, setting off a new wave of westward expansion. In 1810 there had 
been fewer than four hundred active print shops, but by 1825 there were more 
than one thousand, with shops located in urban and rural areas in every state in 
the nation.316 These iron presses were immediately followed by the adoption of 
ink roller and stereotyping technologies, innovations that substantially reduced 
the labor involved in printing newspapers and books.317 For editors and print 
shop owners these technologies meant huge gains in efficiency, but for the 
apprentices and journeymen whose labor they were replacing they frequently 
meant unemployment. Forced to adapt, these young men took one of two 
                                                
314 Mott, American Journalism, 167-180; Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of 
Modern Communication, 126-130 
315 Moran, Printing Presses, 47-66 
316 Hamilton, The Country Printer, 11-13 
317 Moran, Printing Presses, 71-91 
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approaches: In states with well-established printing industries they organized, 
creating Typographical Societies that operated as proto-labor unions, fighting to 
protect the jobs and wages of members by engaging in collective bargaining with 
print shop owners throughout the state; in smaller or more rural states, most of 
the displaced had no choice but to head out on their own, looking for small 
towns that did not yet have their own newspapers where they could set down 
roots, establish new businesses, and in most instances begin their political careers, 
too.318  
As the economics of the newspaper business were transformed, newspaper 
editorships became both politically and economically enticing to ambitious 
young men. Where before most young men entered the world of partisan 
newspapers knowing that profits would only follow political success, now 
enterprising editors could expect their papers to profit even in years when their 
local branch of the party did not thrive. Thus, although the period from 1815 to 
1825 was one of profound and wrenching change, leading many to abandon their 
dreams of printing and political careers, when this era of change was over the 
system as a whole was far more stable and thoroughly partisan than it had every 
been before. This process of transformation had been painful, but for those 
editors who survived, the future looked bright. Before turning to their story, 
                                                
318 Hamilton, The Country Printer, 21-46. One of the leaders of the movement to create the 
New York Typographical Society was Thurlow Weed, the editor who would go on to 
play a central role in the formation of both the Whig and Republican Parties. For more 
on Weed’s role, see Pomper, Thurlow Weed: A Hero in Party Politics; Van Deusen, Thurlow 
Weed; Weed, The Life of Thurlow Weed: Volume 1, Autobiography; Weed, The Life of Thurlow 
Weed: Volume 2, a Memoir 
  
240 
however, we must first examine the effect this time of transition had on party 
organization, setting the stage for the analysis of 1820s partisan politics that is to 
come. 319 
 
The Decoupling of State and Federal Party Politics 
To briefly review the history told so far: the first decade of the nineteenth 
century had been a time of turbulence for the nation’s system of political parties. 
As the decade began, Republicans and Federalists were locked in a fight to the 
political death, with each side working in their own way through competing 
networks of newspapers to mobilize voters. Having failed to end political dissent 
by criminalizing it, the Federalist Party was effectively destroyed by it, as 
Republican printers and editors used the postal service’s free exchange service to 
build a highly flexible, heavily decentralize movement that connected local 
political activities into a national movement. In the aftermath of their victory, 
however, Republicans found themselves fighting one another, with editor-led 
factions competing against coalitions of economic elites for control of their party. 
Although the editors once again won the day, their fight shattered the illusion of 
Republican unity, exposing deep divisions within the party through very public 
fights engaged in the pages of the newspapers that previously served as the 
primary vehicle for party unity throughout the nation. 
                                                
319 Steffen, "Newspapers for Free: The Economies of Newspaper Circulation in the Early 
Republic"; Emery and Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass 
Media, 103; Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers, 52 
  
241 
The War of 1812 put a temporary halt to many of these disputes, but they 
rapidly reemerged following its successful completion in 1815. For the next 
decade a new form of partisanship raged, as local editors fought protracted 
battles for control of their state’s political machines. This rapidly accelerated the 
decoupling of federal and state-level party organizations that had begun in the 
previous decade, and although the precise details of each state’s story were 
unique, four common themes can be identified among them. First, over the 
course of the century’s first decade, many editors had become important local 
leaders, running small political machines that were supported by patronage 
provided by allies in state government. This inexorably shifted the focus of their 
efforts towards state and local politics, leading to a long and steady decline in the 
inclusion of national political stories in their newspapers. Second, changes to 
federal patronage policies during the Monroe Administration left many local 
editors without the financial incentives that had previously spurred them to 
focus on national party building. Coupled with the continuing provision of 
patronage at the state level, this further shifted the focus of party organization 
towards local politics. Third, partisan editors grew increasingly focused on the 
need to bring democratic reforms to their individual state’s institutions. Because 
these fights were highly idiosyncratic, they did not transport well across state 
lines, leading to a gradual erosion of the interstate party networks that had been 
created through the use of the post office exchange. Fourth, the panic years of 
1819 to 1823 upended already weakened partisan institutions at both the state 
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and national levels, shattering the system that made coherent partisan politics 
possible across state lines. Each of these forces will now be considered in turn. 
 
Editors as Local Political Leaders 
If the election of 1800 proved that partisan editors could spearhead a 
successful electoral campaign, the decade after made equally clear they could 
lead party organizations in the mundane work necessary to organize partisans 
on an ongoing basis. Although the institutional structures they developed 
inevitably took on unique local character – for example, with militias forming the 
backbone of party activity in Kentucky, and Tammany Societies taking the lead 
in New York – a common theme throughout the states was the central role of 
committees of Correspondence and Vigilance.320 Committees of Correspondence 
had long been important in American politics, but in the nineteenth century they 
took on a new, far more democratic form. By the end of the first decade, every 
county in the nation had at least one committee for each of the major factions 
competing for control of their party. Made up of somewhere between four and 
ten locally prominent citizens, the primary purpose of these committees was to 
produce material for publication in the local partisan newspaper. Given this, they 
were almost inevitably helmed by the county’s most prominent local editor, and 
when he was not available by one of his allies. Rather than only operate in the 
months just prior to each election, these new committees became year-round 
                                                
320 For more on these forms of organization, see Kehl, Ill Feeling in the Era of Good Feeling, 
140-157 
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affairs, an institutional innovation made possible in part by the near-complete 
reach of the postal service. In past years, local leaders spent much of their time 
racing to keep up with the postal service’s expansion, focusing their efforts on 
expanding newspaper delivery into new communities. But the nearer the postal 
network came to completion within each state, the more that state’s leading 
organizers were able to shift their efforts towards building durable institutions 
capable of connecting state, county, and local politics. Thus, as the postal 
network stabilized within each state, so too did party institutions, placing 
partisan editors at the heart of each party’s network.  
Committees of Vigilance were even more innovative. As the precursors to 
modern party wards, these organizations were responsible for hosting a regular 
schedule of local events, distributing party materials, and selecting delegates for 
county conventions. Here too editors came almost immediately to play a key role, 
setting committee agendas, publicizing their meetings, and reporting on the 
results. With their active, year-round involvement in both types of committees, 
editors gained an important tool for managing the day-to-day affairs of their 
local party, so much so that by the end second decade these committees and their 
affiliated newspapers had become the key institutions for organizing partisan 
politics at the local level in every state in the nation. By engaging citizens directly 
in their home towns, they served as training grounds for activism and 
engagement in a society that was only just beginning to accept mass political 
participation, and as a new addition to their state’s party networks, they served 
as the central transmission mechanisms through which state and national leaders 
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could be made aware of local causes and concerns. Information flowed up the 
chain, first from the town to the county, then from the county to the state, and 
eventually from the state to the nation’s capital, creating an orderly flow of 
partisan information in many areas of the nation for the very first time.321 
In addition to leading committees, editors were also increasingly holding 
formal positions of power, another innovation that tended to push each state’s 
party organization towards stability. In state after state, Republican victories 
were followed by a purge of Federalist loyalists from the hundreds of appointed 
positions that made up local government. Given the central role partisan editors 
played in state politics, they were always among the first to be rewarded with 
appointments, and the more important the editor, the more important the 
appointment they would receive. Within each state, the most prominent 
newspaper would frequently track and report on the progress of appointments, 
passing the information along to other papers within their state in ways that 
reinforced the power and prestige of everyone involved. During election season, 
wayward editors were often brought into line with additional appointments, 
encouraging them to remain loyal in the face of factional conflict. In this manner 
hundreds of editors became justices of the peace, clerks of the county courts, 
county registers, and recorders of deeds, providing them with additional sources 
                                                
321 William Duane and Michael Leib, who were detailed extensively in the previous 
chapter, are just one example of a relationship in which power was shared. Duane and 
Leib made extensive use of both types of committees, although they did not always refer 
to them by these names. For more, see Phillips, William Duane, Radical Journalist in the 
Age of Jefferson, 191-235 
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of income, power, and prestige in their local communities. With their well-being 
tied more closely to the state and to one another, the patterns of partisan 
interaction in each state became more regular, reinforcing the growth of stable 
party institutions within each state.322  
Finally, in the late 1810s and early 1820s, many editors began using their 
influence to win elected office for themselves. Although this phenomenon will be 
covered in far more detail at later in this chapter, two examples here will help 
illustrate the trend. The first is Thomas Atkinson, a local activist who used his 
Crawford Weekly Messenger to establish himself as an important leader in the 
north-western corner of Pennsylvania. Using a hand press bought from the shop 
of William Duane, Atkinson published his county’s most prominent newspaper 
for nearly three decades. After successfully establishing a paper mill in the area 
he turned his attention to politics, organizing a variety of local political 
committees and directing the creation of “cattle bureau” to solve problems facing 
local ranchers. Along the way he was elected to positions as county 
commissioner, burgess of Meadville, and state assemblyman, with his newspaper 
serving as the vehicle for organizing each of his campaigns. A second example is 
John M. Snowden, a printer from Philadelphia who was sent west by Duane 
during the fights over the Alien & Sedition Act. After helping lead the 
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Democratic-Republicans to victory in 1800, he moved further west to Greensburg, 
a town on the outskirts of Pittsburgh in the southwestern corner of the state. 
After using his Farmers’ Register to lead a successful campaign for a seat in the 
state assembly, he sold the paper to an ally, only to find that without it he was 
without the party organization necessary to win reelection. Moving on to 
Pittsburgh, he purchased a leading local paper, the Mercury, and used it to win a 
series of elections, first for alderman, then for mayor, and eventually for county 
judge. In both of these examples, local newspapermen used their position as 
editors to advance their parties and their political careers, a story that was 
repeated hundreds of times during this period across the nation.323 
 
The Suspension of Federal Patronage 
Beginning with Secretary of State Madison, government printing contracts 
were assigned to state printers based on partisan affiliation. In the early years 
five printers were selected from each state to assist in the publication of federal 
laws, but as the country grew, so too did the number of printers need to assist 
with distribution. By the end of Madison’s time as Secretary, he was responsible 
for as many as one hundred appointments each year. Although some papers 
received contracts for only a year or two, others, including the most prominent 
papers in each state, were granted patronage on an ongoing basis, contingent on 
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their continued loyalty to the administration and its party. Over time this process 
grew increasingly organized, with congressional delegations consulting the 
state’s largest printers and editors to determine which new printers were most 
worthy of support. But the growth of factional conflict within the states made 
this process increasingly fraught, and by the time of the Monroe Administration 
it had become a major distraction for State Department officials.324 This lead 
Secretary John Quincy Adams to institute a series of policy shifts, each of which 
had the unintended consequence of weakening the bonds between state 
newspapers and national partisan politics. Adams simplified the process by 
announcing he would change patronage contracts only when absolutely 
necessary, and over time this led him to pay significantly less attention to the 
partisan affiliation of printers. With factional conflict growing increasingly 
complex, printers frequently shifted alliances, something Adam’s new approach 
was unlikely to detect. Rather than correct this mistake, Adams instead narrowed 
his focus to consider only the geographical location of printers, and by the end of 
his term in office patronage had become entirely disconnected from partisan 
politics. This removed one of the key pillars of financial support for party 
printers, severing a key link between state party organizations and their federal 
allies. Although this created financial hardship for many editors, it also granted a 
new level of freedom in local political disputes. Without the incentives provided 
by patronage, one of the only centralizing forces in the national information 
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network was removed, allowing the network to fragment into separate state 
networks.325 
 
The Democratization of State Institutions 
The third major force driving the decoupling of state and federal partisan 
politics was the ongoing fight to democratize state political institutions. As 
demonstrated in the last chapter, one of the major goals of the editor-led factions 
within the Republican Party was the expansion of political participation. Each of 
the constitutions of the original thirteen states had granted suffrage to white 
males, but eight included substantial property-owning requirements, 
dramatically limiting voting rights to little more than half of white men 
nationwide. Although the first order of business for these editors had been the 
expulsion of the elites in both parties who had insisted on a culture of deference, 
once that goal had been accomplished their attention turned towards 
democratizing state institutions. This fight became a common theme in nearly 
every state in the nation during the late 1810s and early 1820s, with editor-led 
factions working everywhere to achieve political equality for all white men.326 By 
1825 only three of twenty-four states had retained their property requirements 
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326 It is worth explicitly noting here that the fight for equality was limited only to white 
men. During this same period, participation rights of women and blacks were 
increasingly restricted. The right of women to vote was removed by reformers in the 
state of New Jersey, leaving women without voting rights in every state in the union. 
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owning blacks the right to vote, by 1825 only eight of twenty four states retained that 
right. Thus, although the men involved in this fight frequently described the process as 
“democratization,” it was only a democratization of a very specific and limited sort.   
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for voter eligibility, and although thirteen of the states retained taxpaying 
requirements, most were so lenient as to be effectively irrelevant. Reformers 
successfully led fights in more than a dozen states to allow for the direct election 
of Presidential Electors, removing the power from the state legislature and 
vesting it directly in the people.327 Fierce fights in several states, including 
Pennsylvania and New York, eventually led to state constitutional conventions. 
Beyond liberalizing voting laws, these conventions expanded opportunities for 
participation by dramatically increasing the number of political jurisdictions and 
elected offices.328 Victories in each of these battles were hard won, with editors 
and their allies devoting years to building the party organizations necessary to 
build public support for reforms. Although reformers often learned from allies in 
neighboring states, each state had a unique set of institutions that required a 
unique fight. This led editors to produce content for their newspapers that did 
not travel well across state lines, eroding the interconnections among party 
organizations in different states. At the same time, because members of each 
reform movement shared content heavily within their own state, they tended to 
strengthened intrastate ties. State information networks therefore simultaneously 
grew increasingly organized internally but disconnected externally, weakening 
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national partisan information networks at the expense of those within the 
states.329  
 
The Panic of 1819 
The fourth and final force driving the decoupling of state and federal party 
politics was the Panic of 1819. This was the first major depression since the 
ratification of the constitution, and although its causes were complex and 
multidimensional, its effects on the system of party networks that had developed 
since 1800 were quite clear.330 Across the nation, papers went out of business at 
unprecedented rates, as subscription fees grew increasingly difficult to collect 
from subscribers and advertisers grew increasingly reluctant to place ads. 
Annual newspaper failure rates at the height of the depression reached sixty 
percent in some regions of the country, leading to a near-complete turnover of 
papers in many states by 1821.331 In an effort to cut costs, editors were frequently 
forced to reduce and even eliminate their use of the free postal exchange service. 
This led to a rapid decline in the number of stories being shared nationwide, and 
by extension to a near-complete collapse of the party networks that the exchange 
supported. In previous years papers had devoted twenty percent or more of their 
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available space to stories about out-of-state politics collected through the 
exchange, but in the years of the panic this number fell to below five percent.332  
On a very small timescale, the effects of this panic-induced collapse of 
partisan information networks offers strong support for the infrastructure-driven 
theory of party politics. As the depression dragged on into and through 1822, the 
position of many papers became so precarious that editors began demanding 
subscription fees from distant papers, with editors forming regional 
organizations to seek compensation for exchanged news from editors in other 
states.333 These organizations were nearly always led by several of the most 
prominent editors in each state or region, with country editors joining the 
movement after it was underway. This had a number of effects on party 
organization. On the one hand it strengthened intra-state coordination among 
editors by country and city editors, creating political and economic ties that 
strengthened their shared political community. On the other hand it weakened 
inter-state ties by turning potential political allies into economic adversaries, 
leading to the near-total breakdown of partisan coordination across state lines.  
Understood together, these four forces – the growing interest of editors in 
local politics, the suspension of federal patronage, the fight to democratize state 
institutions, and the Panic of 1819 – go a long way towards explaining the 
emergence of the “Era of Good Feelings” at the federal level. As previous 
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chapters have demonstrated, there was widespread agreement in the immediate 
aftermath of the election of 1800 that partisan editors had transformed politics, 
making it more harsh and vitriolic but also more democratic. As the threat of 
Federalism faded, politics became increasingly factionalized and localized, a 
process that accelerated through the second decade. Then, as financial panic 
gripped the nation, state politics became almost exclusively local in orientation, 
with intrastate factional disputes breaking out over how local government 
should respond to the crisis. Whether it was the emergence of Pro- and Anti-
Relief Bill factions in Kentucky, or the organization of New School and Old 
School Democrats in Pennsylvania, the divisions that surfaced neither 
transported well across state lines nor served as meaningful measures for the 
performance of federal officials. This dramatically raised the stakes of local 
politics while lowering the importance of federal elections, deepening the 
divisions among editors and their papers, and reorienting their readers to state 
and local politics. As a result, while turnout in state contests often surged above 
seventy percent, presidential and congressional elections rarely broke thirty 
percent.334  
If activist editors had played a lead role in the processes that increased 
partisanship in national politics in previous decades, it follows that partisanship 
in national politics would decline as the focus of these same editors turned away 
from federal politics towards their own states. When combined with President 
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Monroe’s decision to pursue a post-partisan approach to governing, all of the 
forces necessary to precipitate a collapse in the national partisan information 
networks were in place. In truth, by the time Monroe’s decision to abdicate his 
role as party leader had been translated into policy, the networks were already 
substantially diminished, and it is unlikely that they could have survived the ill 
effects of the panic even if Monroe had chosen to pursue another course. But the 
decline of one set of networks does not mean their total destruction, and with all 
of the necessary infrastructure still in place, it was only a matter of time before a 
group of political entrepreneurs rebuilt the network from the ground up. As the 
panic faded and economic growth resumed, a new movement began building 
across state lines, fueled as before by a desire to democratize the political system. 
Many of the editors involved were veterans of the old fights, political leaders 
who had survived the hard times of the depression and emerged at the head of 
increasingly robust state party networks. But as before, a group of elites would 
mobilize to stop them, setting in motion a final fight to determine the place of 
partisanship in politics. 
 
The Anti-Party Politics of Monroe and Adams 
While editors and local political leaders were focused on building party 
organizations to fight for state government reform, federal leaders were working 
to build a new system of post-partisan politics. Republican elites had never been 
entirely comfortable with the style of partisanship practiced by editors and 
activists, and were it not for their continued influence it is quite likely that 
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partisanship in the nation’s capital would have faded far sooner than it did. The 
successful outcome of the War of 1812 had substantially reduced infighting 
among Washington elites, and following his election, James Monroe began 
working to eliminate it entirely. Although he managed for a time build a more 
inclusive politics, by the end of his second term deep rifts had emerged among 
the members of his cabinet, leading to the tumultuous election of 1824. Unable to 
negotiate a clear line of succession prior to the contest, Monroe accidentally 
produced an outcome that led to a permanent resurgence of partisanship at the 
federal level. Following a contest among four rival candidates in which none 
received a majority of the electoral votes, the House of Representatives decided 
in favor of John Quincy Adams. In response, Andrew Jackson declared his defeat 
to have been the result of a “corrupt bargain,” then returned home to Tennessee 
to begin planning his next campaign.335 Adams then delivered an Inaugural 
steeped in non-partisanship, declaring “collisions of party spirit” to be at best 
“transitory” and at worst “dangerous.”336 Once in office he appointed a number 
of rivals to his cabinet, bringing men more loyal to themselves than to him into 
his administration. Ironically, this at first helped him consolidate control over his 
party, as his willingness to appoint potential rivals convinced the nation’s most 
important partisan editors to tentatively back his leadership. In rapid succession, 
the National Intelligencer, National Journal, and Niles’ Weekly Register rallied behind 
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Adams, leading to a brief and entirely accidental coalition among all of the major 
partisan papers publishing within Washington, D.C.. 337 
Recognizing the likelihood that this coalition would not hold, Secretary of 
State Henry Clay, an Adams loyalist, began building a network that the 
administration could reliably call its own. Unlike Adams, Clay was quite 
comfortable with all forms of electioneering, so he reinstituted the use of 
patronage by the Department of State to reward loyal editors in each of the 
state’s. Launching an extensive purge of Anti-Adams papers, he turned over 
nearly half of all of the patronage contracts during his first year in office. 
However, like so many national elites before him, Clay was deeply 
uncomfortable with the vituperative style of politics practiced by independent 
editors, so he worked whenever possible to give patronage to men who 
promised to pursue a more moderate course. At the same time, he also worked to 
build a national network of papers under his direct control, a top-down model of 
development that failed in precisely the same manner as every similarly directed 
effort before it. Although Clay initially found some success in building his 
network, his efforts were ultimately limited by his desire to maintain control 
over a system built atop a decentralized information infrastructure. Just as the 
Gazettes had failed in the face of local competition, so too did Clay’s network.338  
                                                
337 Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 37-38 
338 Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 57-67 
  
256 
At the other end of the spectrum of loyalty was Postmaster General John 
McLean. McLean was initially appointed by President Monroe and asked to stay 
on by President Adams. Although he entered the job as a relatively unknown 
former congressman from Ohio, by the end of his appointment he was one of the 
nation’s most famous and well-respected politicians, a fact that demonstrates 
both his personal political skill and the importance of the postal service to 
general public. McLean began his tenure with a successful fight to wrest control 
of postmaster appointments away from Congress. Rather than confer with the 
president on new appointments, however, McLean decided that all but the 
highest level selections were his to make alone. Although Monroe initially 
resisted McLean’s consolidation of power, his patronage-averse successor was 
happy to let McLean take the lead, and soon the Postmaster General was 
appointing loyalists throughout the postal system. The problem for President 
Adams, however, was that as McLean came to align himself with Jackson, the 
loyalties of these appointees were frequently to Jackson. Unable to believe that 
McLean would act so brazenly, Adams refused to intervene, setting up a series of 
fights in the months just prior to the election between Adams and his most loyal 
newspapermen, many of whom used their papers to criticize the president for 
refusing to recognize the threat posed by the opposition’s increasingly powerful 
information network. 339  McLean’s willingness to use the postal service for 
partisan purposes proved to be a key element in the construction of the party 
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organization that carried Jackson to power. At key moments, he appointed local 
printers running pro-Jackson newspapers to postmaster positions, and many of 
these men eventually went on to fill key positions within Jackson’s 
administration. Following Jackson’s victory, McLean himself was also 
handsomely rewarded, accepting to an appointment to the Supreme Court just 
three days after the president’s Inauguration.340 
In the end, however, it was neither the failure of Clay and his allies to build a 
vibrant partisan information network from the top down nor the efforts of 
McLean to use the power of patronage to assist his allies that proved central to 
the development of the network through which Jackson’s political movement 
was built. Although both factors played a role, as before it was the efforts of a 
diverse array of local editors interconnected by the nation’s post office that 
forced the political system open. This time, rather than build the network from 
scratch atop a rapidly expanding information infrastructure, state and local party 
leaders would use a far more stable infrastructure to integrate their individual 
state party organizations. This allowed them to pursue a far more coordinated 
approach to party building than in decade’s past, including the formation of a 
central committee in the nation’s capital responsible for setting party strategy for 
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the entire presidential campaign. But just as before, the battle shaped up as a 
contest between competing models of party organization, with one built from the 
top-down by members of the party-in-government and another integrated from 
the bottom-up by members of the party-as-organization. 
 
Setting the Stage in the States 
By the mid-1820s, most states had completed reforms to open their political 
systems to the participation of all white men, and the worst of the depression 
had passed. The presidential election of 1824 had not been a major focus for most 
of the partisan editors who had survived the hard times, but its outcome and 
aftermath swiftly refocused their attention towards national politics. That contest 
had ultimately been decided by the House of Representatives, and its members 
had chosen to elect a consummate insider rather than the candidate who had 
won a plurality of the votes. This violated the democratic norms that so many of 
these editors had built their careers fighting for, and in response many chose to 
refocus their attention and their efforts on national politics. Although interstate 
party networks had badly deteriorated since the turn of the century, intrastate 
networks were stronger than ever, with at least one major political organization 
in each state built around a robust network of partisan newspapers under the 
control of a powerful political editor. The men running these networks had 
become potent political leaders, each using his position as the head of a powerful 
organization to direct party politics within his state. Beginning in 1825, these 
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largely disconnected state organizations began integrating themselves into a 
single national network designed to advance Andrew Jackson’s candidacy.  
Although Jackson’s allies would eventually transform this network into an 
organization loosely coordinated from the nation’s capital, it initially operated as 
an alliance of independent organizations managed by a small group of powerful 
editors in each state. Each of the men involved had become an important state 
leader prior to throwing his support behind Jackson, and as they came together 
to form a single national party organization, they did so with almost no 
involvement from the candidate himself. Just as the group-centric view of parties 
predicts, each of the party leaders involved joined because they believed Jackson 
the candidate most likely to advance the causes they believed in, and counter to 
the predictions of the elite-led model, not a single one of these men used the 
organization they built to secure elective office in this cycle. This was in sharp 
contrast with the organizations built by their political opponents, which were 
nearly always designed so that members of the party-in-government could stay in 
firm control. In this way the election of 1828 became a replay of the contest of 
1800, with two different parties using two different models of party building to 
coordinate ideas and action across great distances. Unlike 1800, however, the 
outcome of 1828 was total victory for the editor-led model that located the center 
of party power outside of the party-in-government. Eventually, many of the 
editors who led the fight on Jackson’s behalf served as governors, senators, 
congressmen, and cabinet members, but in this round of party-building their 
focus was solely on efforts to elect others.  
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By the 1830s editor-led machines came to dominate politics in nearly every 
state in the union, but party leaders in six states led the way to the creation of 
this new model. Through their efforts, a national coalition of state party 
organizations was built, creating the party networks through which both the 
Democratic and Whig parties were built. This section will review each of their 
efforts during the years 1824 to 1827, leaving the activities of the election to be 
covered in a subsequent section. In four states – Ohio, New Hampshire, 
Kentucky, and Virginia – Jacksonian editors planted firmly within the party-as-
organization used their machines to swing their states for Jackson, first by 
securing control of state institutions and then by winning the race to select 
presidential electors. As the next section in this chapter will demonstrate, it was 
the integration of these organizations that gave birth to the new Democratic 
Party. In the two states in which partisan political institutions were already the 
most well developed – Pennsylvania and New York – a third party network 
developed, setting the stage for the formation of the Whig Party following the 
election. In all of these states but Virginia, a model of party politics in which 
elected officials answered to party bosses was created, setting the stage for the 
emergence of the fierce party competition that defined the antebellum period. 
Each of these states will now be considered in turn. 
 
Ohio 
The base of support for Jackson’s candidacy in Ohio rested on the efforts of 
three editors, each with a small political organization that had been built to 
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mobilize voters for participation in state and local politics. Moses Dawson ran his 
machine through the Inquisitor and Cincinnati Advertiser, the first major paper in 
the state to declare its support for Jackson. Dawson was quickly joined by Caleb 
Atwater and his Chillicothe Friend of Freedom, forming an alliance that covered 
the southern half of the state. Elijah Hayward, a Massachusetts transplant who 
ran the state’s largest paper, the National Republican and Ohio Political Register, 
was the last of the three to announce for Jackson, but his influence in state 
politics allowed him to immediately take control of the network upon attaching 
to it. The Adams party network, meanwhile, was run by Charles Hammond, the 
son of a prosperous Virginia planter who moved to Ohio in 1810 to establish the 
Federalist paper that eventually became his Liberty Hall and Cincinnati Gazette. 
Hammond formed an alliance with Congressman John C. Wright, a printer 
turned politician from Connecticut, and together they worked to counter the 
influence of Jackson’s men throughout the state.341 Preparations for the election of 
1828 were in full swing by mid-1827, with the Jacksonian editors working 
feverishly to build organizations in every major town and village in the state. By 
the end of that year they had more than quadrupled the number of offices and 
newspapers in their network, a feat that would have been impressive but for the 
fact that Hammond had developed a newspaper network several times larger. 
Much to Hammond’s dismay, however, his rivals’ network was far better 
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organized, with allied newspapers reprinting articles and promoting campaign 
events in tight coordination through the extensive use of the postal exchange. 
Further hampering Hammond’s efforts were the interventions of Postmaster 
General McLean, who appointed several Jacksonian editors to important 
postmaster positions, including the most prestigious and powerful position in 
Cincinnati. Because Ohio had been part of the Northwest Territory until 1803, its 
system of post roads and offices was less well developed than those of its eastern 
neighbors, so control of these postmaster positions meant control over the 
continued expansion of the system within the state. This gave Hayward’s 
organization an enormous advantage, allowing it to place post offices in towns 
most advantageous to their cause. Hammond’s candidates were badly defeated 
in state elections during the fall of 1827, leaving Jackson’s men holding all of the 
levers of power as the 1828 election approached.  
As preparations for that campaign began, there was widespread agreement 
among local political observers that Hayward’s use of the postal service had been 
one of the keys to his organization’s success. Following the model pioneered in 
Pennsylvania politics, Hayward and his allies built a network of newspapers that 
stretched deep into every county in the states, using the papers’ offices as a local 
base of operations for party activity. Although the men frequently travelled 
throughout the state to participate in party events and activities, they spent most 
of their time at their headquarters in Cincinnati, the perch from which they 
selected candidates, crafted messages, and directed events. Hammond’s 
organization featured many more newspapers than Hayward’s, but in 1827 these 
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papers operated more as publicity machines than as extensions of a meaningful 
party organization. Recognizing this to have been a mistake, Hammond worked 
after the loss to mimic his opponents’ approach, and by early 1828 there was 
growing concern among Jackson’s men that Hammond’s organization might 
represent a real threat in the upcoming presidential election.  
 
New Hampshire 
Two-party competition began in New Hampshire in 1796. It then intensified 
through the Alien & Sedition crisis, reaching a fever pitch during the election of 
1800. Electoral institutions in the state were a unique mix of town, county, and 
state forms, combining to  encourage the development of strong party 
organizations very early in the state’s history. Although the state had initially 
been a Federalist stronghold, Republicans managed to win their first statewide 
election in 1805, and for the next two decades party competition was among the 
most intense in the nation. Voter turnout was on average quite high relative to 
other states, exceeding eighty percent of eligible voters on more than one 
occasion.342  
By the early 1820s, the state’s political system was firmly under the control of 
Isaac Hill and his Concord Regency, a political organization built by Hill from 
the ground up around his New Hampshire Patriot. Hill’s story is remarkably 
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typical for the era: he began his career as a printer’s apprentice in the late-1790s, 
then worked his way to ownership of a paper by the early 1810s. Over the next 
decade he expanded from one newspaper to a network of them that held 
together one of the most powerful political machines in the nation, using it first 
to defeat the Federalists, and then to fight off a challenge from a group of former 
allies who objected to his aggressive style. Hill remained focused solely on state 
politics until 1825, serving at various moments as his party committee’s secretary, 
a state printer and senator, and a federal printer and mail contractor. As his 
organization spread throughout the state, he consolidated control over the state’s 
political institutions, wresting them away from economic elites in the Old Colony 
by forming alliances with western editors, farmers and businessmen. By 1827, 
Hill’s power in the state was unmatched. According to David L. Morril, the 
incumbent governor Hill’s handpicked candidate defeated in 1827, Hill traversed 
the state “like a flying dragon, attending all caucuses & organizing his 
regulars.”343 Using his position as federal mail contractor to both ensure timely 
distribution of his newspapers, Hill built his party around one of the nation’s 
most well-developed newspaper systems. By early 1827 his network had not 
only blanketed his own state, but it also reached deep into the neighboring states 
of Vermont and Maine too, with Hill using connections he had developed as a 
mail contractor to find allies who could be trusted to build and manage local 
organizations. Not content to remain a regional leader, Hill next established 
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outposts in the rural corners of Tennessee, Ohio, and New York, the first steps in 
his plan to create a truly national political party.  
To counter Hill’s influence, Adams allies in New Hampshire organized a 
newspaper network of their own. Led by a number of prominent elected officials 
and using the Butterfly in Dover and the New Hampshire Journal in Concord to 
coordinate activity, they established Committees of Correspondence and 
Vigilance in most of the major towns and counties throughout states by early 
1828. Despite their best efforts, however, Hill’s hold over the state’s political 
machinery remained firm, with Adams men complaining that the New Hampshire 
Patriot was more widely read throughout the state than all of their papers 
combined.344 As will be demonstrated shortly, this dominance within his home 
state, combined with his experience organizing politics across state lines, allowed 
Hill to take a leadership position in the development of the national party 
organization in the upcoming presidential campaign. In the meantime, it is worth 
noting that in besting his rivals, Hill successfully fought off a challenge by 
members of the party-in-government to take control of the party, leaving it firmly 
in the hands of the party-as-organization that he had built. 
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Kentucky 
The story of the party politics in Kentucky begins with the story of Amos 
Kendall.345 Kendall moved to the state from Massachusetts in 1814, first to teach, 
then to practice law, and eventually to run a post office and newspaper, the 
Western Argus.346 The Argus was known throughout the state for its hard-hitting 
partisanship and easy-to-read prose, a style Kendall explicitly adopted to interest 
and prepare the common man for participation in politics. Kendall began as loyal 
Clay ally – he had worked as a tutor to Clay’s children upon first arriving in the 
state – but after the election of 1824 he drifted inexorably towards Jackson. 
Initially focused far more on state than national politics, Kendall had used his 
paper in previous years to organize the Relief Party, a political party unique to 
Kentucky that appealed to small farmers, businessmen, and veterans by 
demanding an aggressive response from state government to the Panic of 1819. 
Like so many other state conflicts associated with the depression, Kentucky’s 
was organized around cleavages unique to the state, with wealthy planters, men 
of commerce, and former Federalists forming the bulk of the opposition. In part 
because of Clay’s refusal to involve himself in state politics, and in part because 
of Kendall’s organizational skill, the Relief Party secured control of the state’s 
political system with the election of Joseph Desha as governor in 1824. With the 
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depression ended and economic growth resuming, however, the Relief Party lost 
its motivating force, and soon its members split over the choice of Jackson or 
Clay in the upcoming presidential election. At long last shedding his allegiance 
to Clay, Kendall announced for Jackson in the pages of his Argus in 1826, joining 
a rapidly growing state organization led by Arthur Lee Campbell, the editor of 
Louisville’s largest paper, and Francis Preston Blair, the assistant editor of the 
Argus. Like Hayward in Ohio, Kendall immediately took control of the nascent 
political machine, creating a central committee that became known as the 
Frankfort Junto. Through a complex organization of committees, subcommittees, 
and militias through the state, Kendall built a fearsome political machine capable 
of electing favored candidates and keeping them in line once in office.  
As the power of Kendall’s machine grew, it quickly became a model for 
partisanship in other states, most notably Ohio. Beginning with state elections in 
1827, Kendall, his Junto, and his Argus began working relentlessly to connect 
state and federal politics. Kentucky was the home state of Adams stalwart Henry 
Clay, so Kendall knew that a strong showing by his organization in state 
elections was likely to have an effect on party politics nationwide. Using his 
Argus and its affiliated papers throughout the state, Kendall launched a carefully 
coordinated series of attacks on Adams and Clay, leading with a populist assault 
on Adams’ installation of a billiards table in the White House. At the same time 
his papers also offered a vigorous case for Jackson, including the first published 
defenses of Jackson’s controversial conduct in his marriage and as a military 
leader. As he found messages that resonated with the public, Kendall then 
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distributed them to allies across the nation, using the postal exchange to do so 
with very little cost to his organization. Finally, Kentucky’s system of post roads 
and offices, like that of Ohio’s, was significantly underdeveloped compared to 
those of the coastal states, and as a former postmaster Kendall was well aware of 
the importance of locating new offices in the areas most likely to support his 
organization. For this reason, Kendall and his allies worked whenever possible to 
direct the expansion of the postal system into the towns most beneficial to his 
cause. 
Clay’s men, many of whom were elected officials themselves, were 
handicapped by their refusal to embrace open partisanship and electioneering. 
This set in motion a campaign that mirrored the one taking place in New 
Hampshire, with one side enthusiastically engaging in no holds barred 
partisanship and the other lamenting its existence. Despite Clay’s late 
intervention into the contest, Kendall’s candidates won a majority of seats in the 
state legislature, a result that was reported by pro-Jackson newspapers across the 
nation as a harbinger of things to come. Not content to rest after this victory, 
Kendall immediately convened the Frankfort Junto to plan for the following 
year’s campaign. At the meeting, Kendall unveiled a detailed plan for the 
expansion of their organization, including the establishment of militias and 
conventions in every county in the state, each of which would nominate 
delegates for a state convention that would select a full slate of state and federal 
candidates. Although Kendall’s goal was to encourage the participation of as 
many of the state’s citizens as possible, the plan was for the entire party to 
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remain firmly under his control, with tickets selected in advance and sent to local 
committees for approval. A few weeks later the plan was announced to the 
public at a barbecue attended by 700 of Kendall’s most loyal allies, then 
promoted through the pages of the Argus and its affiliates to citizens in every 
corner of the state. Adams’ men attempted to respond with a similar 
organization of their own, but by early 1828 it was quite clear that were falling 
far short of what would be needed to carry the state in the fall.  
 
Virginia 
Like much of Old South, politics in Virginia was dominated by a small group 
of economic elites, with state political parties organized around sectional or 
personal conflicts and led by a central committee directed by. Unlike the states of 
the North and the West, Southern states had resisted the urge to democratize. 
This makes Virginia’s experience with partisan politics the clear outlier among 
the six states presented here. Outside of the South activist editors had risen to 
challenge economic elites for control of party machinery, but inside Virginia and 
the neighboring Carolinas state institutions were deliberately structured to 
ensure that they remained under the control of slave-holding elites. Among other 
things, this meant that all newspaper editorships and post master positions were 
carefully monitored by elites to ensure that they were managed by reliable allies 
at all times. At the head of this system was Thomas Ritchie and his Richmond 
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Enquirer, the paper through which his Richmond Junto made its will known.347 
Much of the Junto’s power was premised on its direct connection to prominent 
members of the Founding generation, so its no surprise that as they began to 
pass away in the mid-1820’s the Junto’s power began to wane.  This created an 
opening for the emergence of a new generation of leaders, including John H. 
Pleasants, the editor of the Lynchburg Virginian and Richmond Constitutional 
Whig. Although their efforts would eventually lead to the creation of the 
Southern branch of the Whig Party, they posed little threat to Ritchie in 1828, 
leaving his Junto one of the most powerful political organizations in the nation as 
the election approached. Rather than rely on a network of newspapers to impose 
its will on the state, the Richmond Junto relied on personal connections, with 
leading men in each county and major town working in close coordination to 
neutralize political threats as they arose. This allowed Ritchie and his allies to 
run the state as if it were a one-party system, a freedom that among other things 
allowed him to bring his machinery into open alliance with New York’s Martin 
Van Buren in support Jackson early in the campaign.  
Although Virginia’s twenty four electoral votes would be essential to 
Jackson’s victory, the unique nature of politics within the state meant that its 
leaders had little interest in assisting the development of a national party 
network during the campaign. Newspapers were a key mechanism for the 
distribution messages in Virginia, but they were never designed nor operated as 
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a means for organizing otherwise disorganized groups and individuals for 
political participation. Quite the opposite, in fact. Unlike the rest of the nation, 
where political newspapers aimed to attract as wide an audience as possible, 
papers in Virginia were carefully distributed among a select group of elites, each 
of whom was then held responsible for getting the party’s message out in their 
local area. This was politics as it was practiced in early 1890’s America, and 
although it served the purpose of its creators in the Old South, it left Virginia’s 
elites on the sidelines as the national Democratic Party network was created over 
the coming months.348  
 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania’s political system at the end of 1824 was deeply divided. 
Beginning with the battles between Duane and the Quids, the state had, in the 
words of John Quincy Adams, been “governed by two newspapers in succession,” 
each of which had developed its own sophisticated political machine. Following 
the War of 1812, they each adopted names they would hold for a decade: the 
New School Republicans backed by John Binns, and the Old School Democratic-
Republicans backed by William Duane and Michael Leib. Following a decade of 
fierce partisan conflict, Jackson carried the state in 1824, with Duane’s Old School 
faction forming an alliance with his former Federalists adversaries that became 
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known throughout the state as the Amalgamators. In response, Binns turned his 
Democratic Press into a vehicle for opposing Jackson, and by late 1827 it had 
become one of Jackson’s fiercest critics in the nation.349 Binns was rewarded for 
his faithful support of Adams during the 1824 election with significant patronage 
contracts, funds he rapidly converted into a growing network of newspapers 
across the state. Binns’ power had until then been largely confined to 
Philadelphia, but with an assist from Secretary of State Henry Clay he rapidly 
expanded his reach, developing a network of more than fifty party offices that 
became, in the words of Clay, “the mainmast of our power in the interior.”350 
Like Duane before him, Binns could be viciously partisan, so much so that he 
eventually ran afoul of his allies in Washington. After a series of smaller 
skirmishes over federal patronage, Binns asked President Adams in late 1827 to 
intervene on his behalf in a dispute with Postmaster General McLean. McLean 
had previously named Richard Bache, a direct descendant of Benjamin, as the 
postmaster of Philadelphia, but during his tenure Bache had demonstrated 
himself to be a firm supporter of Jackson, using the powers of his office to assist 
Jackson’s allies across the state. Despite Binns’ best efforts, however, the 
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president flatly refused to force McLean to remove Bache, writing in his diary 
that “I have observed the tendency of our electioneering to venality, and shall 
not encourage it.” Rather than act to strengthen the party organization dedicated 
to his reelection, Adams chose to rebuff its leader, creating a deep rift between 
less than a year prior to the election.351 
As 1827 turned into 1828, politics within the state remained deeply divided. 
Although Pennsylvania possessed the oldest political machines in the nation, 
their long and complex allegiances to a bewildering array of factions made it 
exceedingly difficult for leaders to align with national campaigns. Binns and his 
allies had constructed a party network rivaled only by Martin Van Buren’s in 
New York, but Adams’ refusal to intervene on behalf of Binns meant that the 
network was not fully mobilized to support Adams reelection campaign. By the 
end of 1827 tensions had grown so bad that Binns was openly criticizing his own 
candidate for president in the pages of his papers. If Adams had any hope of 
carrying Pennsylvania, he would have to find a way to resolve this tension and 
bring Binns’ network into a coalition with others across the nation. 
 
New York 
New York politics in the decade after the War of 1812 focused on the twin 
issues of internal improvements and democratic reform. After a series of fierce 
factional conflicts, the state constitution was revised to open participation to 
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nearly all white men living within the state. The first major reforms came in 1821, 
when revisions were adopted to reduce the role of the governor in political 
appointments, establishing instead the direct election of a wide variety of 
relatively minor political positions throughout the state. This was immediately 
followed by an expansion of the franchise, the direct election of Presidential 
Electors, and the removal of the taxpaying restrictions on the right to vote. By 
1825 this rapid democratization had created competitive elections at every level 
of government, transforming the system just prior to the great contest of 1828.352 
Partisanship within the state was initially organized around two powerful 
political machines, the People’s Party led by Governor DeWitt Clinton, and the 
Bucktails led by Senator Martin Van Buren.353 Clinton’s faction was far more 
aristocratic, with limited use of newspapers and only the most minimal 
connection to national politics. Although quite different in political culture, the 
structure of his organization in many ways mirrored that of parties throughout 
the Old South. Van Buren’s machine, by contrast, was built around one of the 
nation’s largest newspaper networks, with Edwin Crosby’s Albany Argus and 
New York Enquirer acting as hubs for the distribution of information and the 
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coordination of action across the state.354 Led by Van Buren’s central committee, 
the Albany Regency, the Bucktails had representatives in every town in the state, 
creating an urban-rural coalition that brought farmers and merchants together to 
back a policy agenda centered on democratic reforms and infrastructure 
development. In national politics, Van Buren used his machine to support 
William Crawford in 1824, but following Adams’ victory he swung his 
organization firmly behind Jackson.  
Clinton’s lack of interest in developing an extensive newspaper network had 
left his faction at a clear disadvantage following the state’s democratization, but 
thanks to the strength of his personal ties it nevertheless remained an important 
player until his unexpected death in early 1828. Clinton’s passing made room for 
the emergence of a new political party, and soon his former allies were working 
to transform the new and somewhat disorganized Anti-Masonic movement into 
a potent political force.355 Party organization in this period necessarily meant 
newspaper formation, and soon the Anti-Masons had a network of newspapers 
far larger than anything Clinton’s party had ever built. This was almost entirely 
due to the efforts of Thurlow Weed and his Rochester Telegraph.356 Weed, like so 
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many other political editors of his time, began his life as a printer’s apprentice, 
working his away up through the system until he became the editor of the 
Albany Register and a lead organizer of the People’s Party. After helping Adams 
to victory in 1824, Weed moved to Rochester to establish Telegraph. Although the 
began as a staunch supporter of the People’s Party that Weed had helped found, 
by late 1827 he had begun using his paper to organize a new network of Anti-
Masonic newspapers, weakening the Clinton machine badly just prior to the 
state elections of that year.  
The results of the 1827 contests signaled a profound shift in state politics. Van 
Buren’s Bucktails were the clear winners, capturing more than three-fourths of 
the seats in the legislature in a campaign coordinated through the pages of more 
than fifty newspapers. The new Anti-Masonic Party finished second in the voting, 
and when Clinton passed away a few months after the election his party finally 
collapsed.  Recognizing the political opportunity Clinton’s untimely death 
presented, Weed immediately set to work unifying Clinton’s former allies into a 
the anti-Masonic movement, hoping to use the combined power of the two 
groups to aid Adams in the upcoming campaign. But Weed had very little time 
to act, and although the Anti-Masons had begun building a party organization 
prior to Clinton’s death, it was simply no match for Van Buren’s machine. This 
freed Van Buren to focus on national politics, allowing him first to join in an 
alliance with Thomas Ritchie in Virginia, and eventually to work with Jackson 
men in other states to construct a network capable of supporting a truly national 
political party.  
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In each of these six states, the parties that had allied themselves with Jackson 
found themselves entering 1828 with a significant organizational advantage. In 
state after state, committed activists had come together to build complex party 
structures based around carefully coordinated networks of strategically located 
newspapers and party offices. Although the development of each of these 
organizations followed a unique path, one common feature of their history was 
that they all predated Jackson’s involvement in presidential politics. Moreover, 
with the exception of Virginia, all of these organization were run by partisan 
editors who worked for themselves, rather than for political elites. On the Adams 
side, by contrast, the party organizations tended to be controlled by men who 
held elective office, with newspaper editors serving as the expert support staff 
needed to do the distasteful work of campaigning. This left Adam’s party 
network badly underdeveloped, and although local leaders were working hard 
to overcome this disadvantage, their options were limited by the fact that the 
men running the organizations did not want them to take their partisanship too 
far. Among other things, this set up a contest in which a party led by members of 
the party-as-organization faced off against one led by men in the party-in-
government, with both sides using the nation’s postal infrastructure to organize 
their allies throughout the nation. 
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Reconnecting State and Federal Partisan Politics 
As 1828 began, a national movement was coalescing behind Jackson’s 
candidacy. Although it began with the alliance between Van Buren and Ritchie, it 
was not until the involvement of another editor, Duff Green, that a truly national 
campaign began to take shape. Through Duff’s work, both in the pages of his 
United States Telegraph and behind the scenes, a national Democratic party 
network was developed, with independent partisan editors leading the effort at 
every level of the campaign. From the periphery, leading editors were 
responsible for using their machines to organize towns and counties for Jackson, 
using a complex system of newspapers, committees, militias, parades, and 
conventions to educate, engage, and mobilize citizens. From the center, Green 
published editions of the Telegraph packed with campaign-related articles and 
editorials, distributing them to state leaders for republication in every paper 
under their control. Improving on the fully decentralized model that had won 
the election for Jefferson in 1800, Green and his allies developed a far more 
organized network, stitching together the various separately developed state 
party organizations into a single campaign. A mix of top-down and bottom-up 
organization, it represented a new model of politics, one in which elections 
would be won by the group that could best use the nation’s newly stabilized 
information infrastructure to coordinate a collection of allied state campaigns.  
At the center of the effort to coordinate activities lay activist turned partisan 
political editor Duff Green. Green’s political career began in the Missouri 
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Territory following his service in the War of 1812.357 A land speculator, mail 
contractor, merchant, and lawyer, he had been active in state politics in a variety 
of contexts, including participation in the soon-to-be state’s constitutional 
convention of 1820. It was not until his purchase of the St. Louis Enquirer in 1824, 
however, that his direct involvement in party building and organization began. 
After backing Jackson and Calhoun in that fall’s election, Green was recruited by 
Jackson’s allies to establish a new, pro-Jackson newspaper in Washington, D.C.. 
Green made the move in the Spring of 1826, and by early summer the Telegraph 
was operating under his command, its pages attacking the Adams 
administration while Green worked behind the scenes with Van Buren, Kendall, 
Hill, and others to build a national party organization capable of carrying 
Jackson to victory in the upcoming campaign. Although there is some evidence 
that Jackson may have been involved in the process by which Green was 
recruited, once Green had the Telegraph up and running, the paper was his alone 
to lead. Green’s efforts to build a national movement began with the formation of 
the Washington Central Committee. Organized under the direction of Van Buren, 
its goals included an effort to stitch together the various state-level movements 
that had emerged over the previous two years.358 Following the model pioneered 
by Bache’s Aurora and perfected by Hill’s Patriot and Kendall’s Argus, the 
Telegraph would operate at the movement’s center, acting both as a source for 
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new material and an aggregator for the best articles published in papers 
throughout the nation. Under Green’s leadership the circulation of the Telegraph 
skyrocketed, breaking forty thousand paid and unpaid subscribers by Election 
Day.359 Rather than leave subscription growth to chance, Green used his position 
on the Central Committee to build relationships with members of Congress, and 
at Green’s urging they paid to ship large bundles of the Telegraph home to their 
districts for free distribution by allies throughout their district or state.360  
Green’s efforts have sometimes been described as a take-over of state political 
machines, but a much more accurate interpretation of his work would describe it 
as the coordination of a series of voluntary alliances among independent 
network leaders.361 This can best be seen in the way the network functioned, in 
the words of one contemporary, “as a chain of newspaper posts, from the New 
England States to Louisiana, and branching off through Lexington to the Western 
States.”362 The “chain” headed by the Telegraph included more than 160 allied 
newspapers, a collective built not by Duff but by state and local leaders who 
remained firmly in control of their daily operation. Although each of these 
papers was joined directly to Duff’s network through the postal exchange service, 
each was also under the direction of state leaders such as Hill, Kendall, and Van 
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Buren, a relationship that was reinforced, rather than undermined, by their direct 
oversight of the campaign within their individual state. Over the course of 1828, 
Green and his allies fought a series of coordinated campaigns in state and federal 
races all around the nation. Green’s Telegraph covered each contest in detail, 
building a shared sense of community among readers of his paper and every 
other paper that reprinted its content. Within each state, local leaders took the 
lead in the campaign, coordinating their messages with Green and other leaders 
but tailoring them to fit their local needs. State contests were used as previews 
for the upcoming presidential campaign, allowing leaders throughout the 
network to test their machines and tweak their tactics. In each race, leaders from 
across the network would mobilize resources to assist their allies, sending 
newspapers, pamphlets, and other printed materials across state lines for 
distribution. From start to finish, this was to be an organization run by the party-
as-organization. Members of the party-in-government undoubtedly benefited from 
its actions, but outside of the states of the Old South, it was an organization in 
which they were never in charge.  
New Hampshire’s Hill had been the first of the major state party leaders to 
announce for Jackson, so it was fitting that the campaign would begin in his state 
in March of 1828.363 Unfortunately for Hill and his allies, a series of early state 
elections did not go as planned. The Adams network within the state had tripled 
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in size thanks to a timely assist by Daniel Webster, catching Hill off-guard and 
producing a big win for the pro-Adams slate of candidates. Hill recovered 
quickly, however, expanding his network by explicitly following the model of 
local organization pioneered by Kendall in Kentucky.364 Building a multi-layered 
network of Committees and Subcommittees of Correspondence and Vigilance 
connected by his network of newspapers and a new system of conventions, Hill 
increased his organization’s presence in every county in the state. In September 
he extended his efforts to the neighboring states of Vermont and Maine, 
establishing additional newspapers and committees in each that reported back 
through the post office and private couriers directly to him. In the end Hill’s 
efforts were insufficient to carry the states for Jackson, but the contests came 
down to the wire, forcing Adams’ allies to expend enormous effort in areas of the 
state that they had once expected to easily win.  
Kentucky’s contests began shortly after those in New Hampshire, and it was 
here that the full power of Green’s new party network became apparent.365 The 
years prior to the campaign had seen the extensive development of two 
competing newspaper networks in the state, and throughout the campaign both 
worked overtime to play up the national implications of even the smallest of 
state races. With extensive support from editors in New York, Kendall blanketed 
the state with thousands of pamphlets carrying messages carefully crafted by 
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Green, using his various committees to insure that their message reached every 
citizen in the state. Kendall’s network held a significant advantage in local 
organization, and throughout the campaign they used their complex system of 
interconnected newspapers, committees, militias, and conventions to overwhelm 
their opponents. Working from within the Adams Administration, Postmaster 
General McLean began the first in a series of pro-Jackson interventions, 
appointing allies to local post offices, then looking the other way as they 
aggressively blocked the distribution of Adams’ newspapers and election tickets 
in their local areas.366 In the end, Kendall’s network produced a huge win for 
Jackson in a contest with one of the highest turnout rates in the nation. As 
Congressman Thomas P. Moore later told one of his supporters, the Jackson men 
had “organized, & brought out our force & electrified” the state.367 
Ohio’s contests were even more fiercely fought than Kentucky’s.368 The pro-
Adams newspaperman Charles Hammond had been the first editor to float 
rumors about the illegitimacy of Jackson’s marriage to his wife Rachel Donelson, 
and the issue proved so potent that he organized a monthly paper dedicated 
solely to advancing the story. In response, Jackson ally Moses Dawson created a 
monthly of his own, and in short order the stories produced by both men were 
                                                
366 Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 125 
367 As quoted in Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson, 210 
368 For more on this state’s contests, see Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 78, 151, 174-175; 
McCormick, The Second American Party System, 264-270 
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being reprinted across the nation.369 Recognizing that a recent change in the 
state’s information infrastructure provided an opportunity for innovation, 
Jackson’s men expanded their organization by taking advantage of the recently 
extended National Road. Rather than establish new papers in town and villages 
just reached by the road, they instead created a system of local distribution for 
Green’s Telegraph, allowing it to speak on behalf of local campaigns. This new 
technique proved incredibly effective, leading to a series of big wins for Jackson’s 
allies that culminated in his campaign carrying the state. In the aftermath of the 
election the Adams party in the state collapsed, replaced at first by Anti-Masons 
from neighboring Pennsylvania and eventually by the Whigs.  
Pennsylvania’s contests followed a similar pattern.370 As in Ohio, the Adams 
network here was led by one of the most vituperative anti-Jacksonian editors in 
the nation, John Binns. As in Ohio, the election turned in part on an incendiary 
allegation against Jackson, in this case on his record as a military commander. 
Through both his Democratic Press and a series of pamphlets distributed across 
the nation, Binns alleged that Jackson had personally overseen the illegal 
execution of deserters at the Battle of New Orleans. Jackson’s allies were called in 
from across the nation to respond, producing a coordinated campaign of 
rebuttals led from the center by Green. As in Ohio, the Postmaster General 
                                                
369  Hammond’s monthly was known as Truth’s Advocate and Monthly Anti-Jackson 
Expositor, an ironic name given that it was filled almost exclusively with lies. Dawson’s 
paper, the Friend of Reform & Corruption’s Adversary, demonstrated a similarly slippery 
relationship with the truth. 
370 Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 173-174; McCormick, The Second American Party 
System, 141-147 
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played a central role, leaving key Jackson allies in postmaster positions in many 
of the state’s most important cities.371 But unlike Ohio, Pennsylvania’s history of 
factional conflict played an important role in the outcome, as the emergence of 
labor parties in Philadelphia during the final months of the campaign shattered 
Binns’ efforts to hold his network together. State elections ended as a disaster for 
the Adams men, clearing the way for a Jackson victory and setting the stage for 
the emergence of the Anti-Masons and the Whigs over the coming decade. 
Last but not least came New York. 372  Clinton’s party collapsed almost 
immediately following his unexpected death, eliminating the only serious threat 
to Jackson in the state and thereby freeing Van Buren to focus on organizing the 
party network outside of his state. Although Weed did his best to amalgamate 
the Anti-Masonic, Adams, and Clinton factions into a single party, he simply did 
not have enough time to accomplish his goals. But the network of newspapers he 
formed during the campaign proved enduring, and after the election they 
became the backbone of his efforts to organize the Whig Party nationwide. 
The efforts of Adams’ allies, meanwhile, floundered on the familiar problems 
of elite-led, newspaper-averse politics. Deeply uncomfortable with partisanship, 
Adams team refused to embrace a system in which openly partisan editors had 
the freedom to act independently. Rather than allow a network to develop from 
                                                
371 Although Postmaster General McLean eventually replaced Richard Bache as the 
postmaster of Philadelphia, he appointed Bache’s brother-in-law as his replacement, 
further infuriating Binns and deepening the divide between Binns and the Adams 
Administration. Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 101-103 
372 Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 175-178; McCormick, The Second American Party 
System 
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the bottom-up, they instead worked to develop a network they could control, 
selectively recruiting editors who could be trusted while shunning those who 
refused to act with deference towards elected officials. Although the network 
that developed to support Adams did include a number of strongly partisan 
papers, including most notably Binns’ papers in Pennsylvania and Hammond’s 
in Ohio, these papers were the exceptions rather than the rule. Worse still, 
Adams deliberately passed up a number of critical opportunities to act as his 
party’s leader. One crucial omission came when he refused to block Postmaster 
General McLean’s efforts to support a number of Jackson’s most important allies 
with patronage. Compounding this problem, Adams further refused to intervene 
on behalf of his allies, men like Binns’ who were working to organize their 
communities on his behalf. Adams clearly hoped these decisions would allow 
him to pursue a form of principled nonpartisanship, but in a system dominated 
by partisans, even nonpartisan acts can frequently produce partisan results. 
Rather than reduce the influence of party activists over the post office, Adams’ 
policies instead increased the influence of the factions working to defeat him.  
In the end, Adams’ refusal to embrace open partisanship played a direct role 
in his historic defeat. Rather than work to mobilize a national network capable of 
countering the growing influence of Jackson’s machine, Adams instead 
intervened to block its development. Although his allies in several states, 
including most notably New Hampshire, were able to build strong intrastate 
party networks, they made almost no effort to connect their separate networks 
into a single network capable of coordinating a truly national campaign. Even 
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worse, when Adams own Postmaster General began using his position to 
support Jackson, the president refused to act, ceding control of key portions of 
the nation’s information infrastructure to his opponents. This left Adams in a 
situation strikingly similar to the one faced by his father: facing off against a 
well-developed party network with a badly underdeveloped network of his own. 
 
At Long Last: Editors As Equals 
Jackson’s landslide victory in 1828 marked the end of a multi-decade struggle 
by editors and their allies to redefine the norms around democratic participation. 
Beginning with Benjamin Bache’s establishment of an independent partisan press, 
editors across the nation directly challenged the culture of deference demanded 
by political elites. When Adams and his Federalist allies responded with an effort 
to criminalize dissent, Republican editors countered by opening more papers in 
every state in the nation, using the publicly-funded postal service to build the 
heavily decentralized network of newspaper-backed political machines that 
swept Jefferson and his allies into power in 1800. Following the election their 
own Republican allies then sought to wrest control of these machines from them, 
leading to a series of fierce local and state battles that in nearly every case saw 
the editors prevail. In state after state, editor-led machines fought of the 
challenges of their former allies, setting up one final clash in the contest between 
Jackson and Adams in 1828.  
This contest proved to be the final fight between two competing models of 
political organization. On one side was the Jackson campaign, a coalition of 
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largely independent editor-led political machines, each of which had come to 
dominate politics within its state over the previous decade. These machines were 
united under the direction of a core group of editors to form a national network 
of newspapers and committees that became the institutional structure of the new 
Democratic Party. On the other side of the fight were the Adams men, a coalition 
of political and economic elites who actively sought to minimize the role of 
editors and other aggressive partisans in their national organization. Rather than 
use the power of patronage to build up his network, Adams instead allowed 
opponents within his own administration to steer patronage towards his 
opponents. And while Adams spent time writing long lamentations against 
partisanship and electioneering in the pages of his journal, Jackson wrote rousing 
defenses of himself and his allies for publication in newspapers across the land. 
Understood from this perspective, the election of Jackson in 1828 was the 
culmination of a multi-decade effort by political outsiders to develop and defend 
a new model of partisanship and participation. Although elites such as Jackson 
were often the beneficiaries of this new approach to politics, they were neither its 
instigators nor its architects. That designation belonged to men like Duane, Bache, 
Kendall, and Hill, state leaders who pioneered a new style of aggressively 
partisan politics premised on the equal participation of all white males. Within 
each of their states these men built and managed sophisticated partisan 
information networks, using them to create the state parties that were brought 
together to elect Jackson in 1828.  
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In the aftermath of the election, each of the major state leaders profiled here 
went on to become nationally known political figures, with some of the men 
holding elected or appointed offices and others working as advisors in 
Washington, D.C. who continued to also lead party organizations back home.373 
Ohio’s Elijah Hayward first used his Ohio machine to secure election as a Justice 
on the Ohio Supreme Court, but eventually left to accept an offer by Jackson to 
head up the General Land Office, one of the most important non-postal bureaus 
in the entire government. In New York, Martin Van Buren used his machine to 
continue his meteoric rise, first becoming his state’s governor, then accepting an 
a series of appointment from Jackson, first to become the United States Secretary 
of State, then the Minister to the United Kingdom, and eventually the Vice 
President of the United States. In 1836 Van Buren then marshaled his party’s 
national political machine to secure the presidency for himself. Isaac Hill and 
Amos Kendall both became part of Jackson’s inner circle. Although the men 
officially accepted relatively minor appointed positions - Hill as second 
Comptroller and Kendall as fourth Auditor to the Postmaster General – they 
unofficially became part of the group of advisors known as Jackson’s Kitchen 
Cabinet. Made up of Jackson’s most loyal military advisors and newspaper 
editors, including the Telegraph’s Duff Green, the men of the Kitchen Cabinet 
became Jackson’s most trusted advisors, helping him navigate various political 
                                                
373 For more, see Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 199; McCormick, The Second American 
Party System, 61; Smith, The Press, Politics, and Patronage, 82-113 
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conflicts during his time in office.374 In 1835 Kendall was appointed Postmaster 
General, a position that allowed him to place loyal allies throughout the postal 
system in time for Van Buren’s campaign. Hill, meanwhile, went on to serve first 
as one of his state’s two Senators, and eventually as its Governor, using his time 
in office to make his chain of papers one of the most formidable in the nation. 
If the rise of editors into positions of power had been limited to Jackson’s 
inner circle, it would have fallen well short of a true political transformation. But 
the successes of Jackson’s inner circle represented just the tip of a much larger 
iceberg, as editors across the nation surged into positions of formal power 
nationwide. At the federal level alone, more than seventy were appointed to 
positions during Jackson’s eight years in office, including posts as port collectors, 
postmasters, federal marshals, clerks, and military officers. The more important 
the editor had been to the campaign, the more likely he was to receive a high 
profile post. The Boston Statesman’s Nathaniel Green, for example, was rewarded 
with a position as postmaster of Boston, while the United States Telegraph’s John S. 
Meehan became the Librarian of Congress.375 Even more remarkably, at least 
another forty-five editors used their positions as heads of local machines during 
                                                
374 For an excellent overview of the scholarship on the Kitchen Cabinet, including a 
thorough review of the role of its newspapermen, see Latner, "The Kitchen Cabinet and 
Andrew Jackson's Advisory System," The Journal of American History, 
375 For a review of the men appointed to office, see Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 202; 
Pasley, "President Jackson's Editorial Appointees."; Smith, The Press, Politics, and 
Patronage, 86-88. For contemporaneous accounts of Jackson’s appointments, see National 
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the same period to win seats in the United States Congress for themselves.376 
Recognizing the role the post office had played in his victory, Jackson elevated 
the position of Postmaster General to cabinet status, ranking it third in standing 
behind the Secretaries of Treasury and State but ahead of the Secretary of War, a 
remarkable decision by a President whose political career was built atop his 
success as a military leader.377 Following the appointment of William T. Barry to 
the position, Jackson’s allies moved forward with an aggressive expansion of the 
postal system, nearly doubling the number of miles of mail carriage during 
Jackson’s first term in office.378 Barry was succeeded by former Argus editor and 
Kitchen Cabinet member Amos Kendall just in time for him to direct the 
implementation of the Postal Act of 1836, the most comprehensive reorganization 
of the system since its founding.379 
Following Jackson’s landslide win, many of the Adams men retired from 
politics altogether.380 Those that did not, however, began working to build a 
party capable of countering Jackson’s influence. Once again partisan editors took 
the lead in organizing opposition, none more so than Thurlow Weed. Rather 
than view his failure to unite the People’s Party and the Anti-Masons as a 
                                                
376 Pasley, "Printer, Editors, and Publishers of Political Journals Elected to the U.S. 
Congress, 1789-1861." 
377 John, Spreading the News, 67 
378 Fuller, The American Mail: Enlarger of the Common Life, 54-57 
379 Although the act fundamentally transformed postal finances and contracting, it did 
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permanent defeat, Weed instead chose to understand it as the start of a long-term 
process to build a new political party. Joining forces with a core group of editors 
around the country, including Horace Greely and Duff Green, Weed built a 
system of newspapers and committees that was in every way equal to that of the 
Democrats.381 This network became the vehicle for organizing the Whig Party, 
and by the early 1840’s the Whigs and the Democrats were engaged in spirited 
partisan competition across the nation. At long last, editors were leading the 
charge on both sides of the aisle, their papers filled from front to back with 
material glorifying partisanship and the participation of the common man. After 
nearly a half-century of conflict, the newspaper-based system of partisan 
organization had finally won the day. 
Although advocates of the civic-minded rationale for the press could not have 
envisioned this specific outcome as they were debating the passage of the Post 
Office Act in 1792, it was very much in line with the system of politics that they 
had hoped to create. By extending offices and roads into every corner of the 
nation, Congress had created the infrastructure necessary to bring all Americans 
into the political process. By creating a heavily subsidized rate for newspaper 
delivery, it had crafted a policy that ensured every citizen would have access to a 
flood of information about both their local and national political communities. By 
opening the policy of free newspaper exchange to all papers regardless of their 
partisan affiliation or political style, it had virtually guaranteed that opposition 
                                                
381 Green had split with Jackson during the Nullification Crisis. For more, see Smith, The 
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newspapers would proliferate throughout the nation. Initially, the expansion of 
the postal service had acted as a source of political instability, with the effective 
size of the political community expanding unevenly from state to state as the 
postal network grew. But by the mid-1820s the network was effectively complete 
in all but the most western states, allowing it function as a predictable and 
reliable system for organizing political activity at a distance. Initially, activists in 
each of the states used the system to build sophisticated state party organizations 
that were mobilized to respond to the depression and reform state political 
institutions. But after the election of 1824 ended with the infamous “corrupt 
bargain,” they focused their attention on national politics, using the postal 
system to interconnect their organization into a truly national campaign.  
 
 Evaluating Theories of Party Development 
And what does this long history of partisan struggle tell us about the 
competing theories of partisan politics outlined in Chapter Two? On the one 
hand, much of the evidence from the history of Democratic-Republican politics 
confirms the predictions of the group-centric model of party building. On the 
other hand, the stories of the organizations these activists sought to oppose 
provide considerable support for the predictions of the elite-led model. To very 
briefly review: Beginning with the efforts of Bache and Duane and stretching in 
an unbroken line to those of Hill, Kendall, Weed, and Van Buren, activists 
outside the party-in-government who devoted their lives to building the 
institutions that became both the Democratic-Republican and Democratic parties. 
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Newspapers were the vehicles through which they coordinated their activities, 
advancing the candidacies of the men they believed most likely to reliably 
support their policy goals and agendas. Just as the framework predicts, they 
focused their efforts first on state and local politics, using their newspapers to 
shape both voter and elite behaviors. Federalist politics was premised on the rule 
of a small set of enlightened elites, and when the Democratic-Republicans 
organized to challenge this system, Federalist elites countered with a renewed 
effort to organize political activity from the top-down. After these efforts failed, 
Republican elites picked up this model of organization, using it in a largely 
unsuccessful attempt to wrest control of the party away from activists. Then, in 
the years between the War of 1812 and the election of Andrew Jackson, many 
national political elites continued pushing this form of organization, culminating 
in their work to organize Adams’ campaign in 1828. And lest it appear that this 
method of organization followed a neat partisan divide, it is worth remembering 
that it was pursued by Republican elites throughout the Old South too. In each of 
these instances, elites within the party-in-government dictated how the party 
would be organized, who it would nominate for office, and in what manner its 
newspapers would be used.  
Given that both the elite-led and group-centric models aim to provide 
comprehensive explanations for party organization and change, it is problematic 
for both that they each find significant support in the evidence provided. The 
group-led model does include the reminder that elites within the party-in-
government should be expected to compete with members of the party-as-
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organization for influence, but the history of the elite-centric Federalist Party and 
Adams campaign organization pushes this caveat well beyond any reasonable 
limits. However, a close look at the histories presented here suggests an 
interpretation that might account for this outcome. In the very earliest years of 
the republic, party formation was quite clearly driven by elites. Before outsiders 
could get significantly involved in party politics, this elite-led system of party 
politics fractured in two, leading to the creation of competing newspaper 
organizations and party caucuses. But almost immediately a group of activists 
entered this fray, motivated by their anger at the perceived injustice of elites-only 
party leadership to mount the challenge that would create true two-party 
competition. From that point forward, the contours of party competition 
followed a relatively stable pattern. On one side, elites organized a series of top-
down campaigns to block the development of a more inclusive model of party 
activity; on the other, activists used their command of their party’s most 
important resource, its newspapers, to conduct a multi-decade long insurgency 
against the elite-led model. If the history of this period is viewed as multiple 
battles within a single campaign, rather than as a series of consecutive but 
separate wars, it becomes clear that while elites were first responsible for 
creating the parties, activists were subsequently responsible for changing them. 
Under this interpretation, the elite-led model accurately captures the history of 
party formation, while the group-centric model best describes the history of party 
change. 
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There is, however, one obvious flaw with this reinterpretation: nothing in 
either the elite-led or group-centric models can explain why the early history of 
party activity in America would have followed this pattern, and without such an 
explanation it would be impossible to generalize from this specific instance of 
party-building to party activity more generally. Fortunately, the infrastructure-
driven model outlined in this work can provide just such an explanation. In the 
earliest stage of party development, it can offer unique insights into not only 
why all of the most significant efforts to organize party activity were led by elites, 
but also why these elite-led efforts quickly failed. In the period of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, it can explain why activists began entering the system in such 
great numbers, and much more importantly, why they were able to survive 
Federalist attempts to criminalize their activities. Following their great victories 
in 1800, the infrastructure-driven model can then account for how and why their 
party descended into factional conflict, as well as why that conflict eventually 
faded. And finally, in the period leading to the formation of Jacksonian 
democracy, it can explain why party building took on new dimensions, and why 
the elite-led model of parties at long last faded from the scene. 
Prior to 1792, a vast majority of the nation’s citizens lived in a state of 
profound isolation. Post offices and roads were limited to the seacoast states, 
with the system designed quite purposefully to be useful only to political and 
economic elites living within major cities. The first clear political effects of this 
were felt during the fight over the ratification of the constitution, when the pro-
ratification elites living in the nation’s major cities used newspapers and the 
  
297 
postal service to organize opposition to the far more fragmented anti-federalist 
movements located largely outside of cities and therefore away from the access 
points to the nation’s system of political information. Although the pro-
ratification forces won the battle over ratification, their coalition fractured once in 
power, leading to the very earliest stages of elite-led two-party competition. But 
as Chapters Three and Four demonstrate, the passage and implementation of the 
Post Office Act of 1792 changed everything. By rapidly and dramatically 
expanding the size and reach of the postal network, it altered the terms of 
partisan competition across the nation. After the first elite-led efforts to create a 
national party network collapsed, activists outside of the nation’s formal political 
institutions began organizing, using the post office and its system of free 
newspaper exchange to build a party network that took on the Federalists and 
won. No longer cut off from the nation’s political infrastructure, the largely rural 
constituency for republicanism became a potent political force, organized by the 
activist editors of the Democratic-Republican Party to surmount Federalist efforts 
to criminalize the act of opposition itself. A nation that had once been ruled by a 
small group of men connected by a simple, heavily centralized information 
network gave way to a country in which members of a far larger group fought 
for a share of power through a far more complex and decentralized network. Just 
as a centralized information infrastructure supported a centralized political 
system, so too did the transition towards a decentralized infrastructure foster a 
more decentralized and democratic politics. The domination of partisan activity 
in the earliest years of the republic by the members of the party-in-government is 
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therefore properly understood as an effect of the underdeveloped nature of the 
nation’s information infrastructure. As the widespread failure of rural anti-
Federalist movements illustrates, citizens without access to the infrastructure 
necessary for connecting with potential allies cannot effectively mobilize for 
action in an extended republic. This gives those who do have access an enormous 
advantage should conflict arise. But as the infrastructure decentralized, the tools 
necessary for meaningful interconnection were made accessible to these 
previously excluded populations, creating the conditions necessary for them to 
organize, in President Washington’s famous words, the “self-created societies” 
that drove the Federalists for power. With the development of a more 
decentralized system of communication came the possibility of a party system 
driven not by elites but by the people themselves, opening a window of 
opportunity during which men who had been excluded from politics organized 
party institutions that were firmly under their control.  
But as the postal network continued to expand, it opened the door wider to 
factional conflict. By bringing an ever-wider circle of citizens into meaningful 
political community, it increased the size and scope of conflict, including a 
dizzying array of local issues that had in previous years been largely ignored. 
With postal policy specifically crafted to prevent anyone from controlling the use 
of the network or the content it carried, party leaders were left without any 
means for imposing their will on the system. As Chapter Five demonstrates, this 
allowed the number of factions in each state to proliferate, sowing the seeds for a 
decade of intra-party strife that ended only when the young nation entered its 
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war with Great Britain. In some areas these factions divided around policy 
disputes, in others they were organized around personalities, but in every 
location they were led by a new cadre of editors for whom partisan politics had 
become a vocation. In the information environment of 1792, such a group simply 
could not have come into existence; in the environment of 1812, they had so 
thoroughly transformed the political system that many wished them out of 
existence. Eventually, however, this factional conflict faded, a consequence of a 
series of transformations that brought a new form of order to the nation’s 
information infrastructure. As the pace of change slowed the nation’s system of 
partisan politics stabilized, allowing party leaders to develop a new model of 
party politics in which each state’s most powerful editors were able to guide 
partisan politics, building the network of organizations that overcame one last 
attempt by anti-party elites to regain control of the system they had first created.  
Just as the infrastructure-driven model of party organization predicts, the 
precise nature of party change in each decade mirrored the manner in which the 
infrastructure changed. In the very earliest years, the underdevelopment of the 
infrastructure led to a system in which elites at the nation’s centers of 
communication controlled politics. As the infrastructure decentralized and 
expanded, so too did political participation, opening a window of opportunity 
during which activists outside of formal positions of power were able to become 
important political leaders. This shifted control from the party-in-government to 
the party-as-organization, providing an explanation for why one form of 
organization would give way to another that neither the elite-led nor the group-
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centric models can account for. But as the pace of infrastructure development 
slowed and the system stabilized, centralization began to reemerge, with 
partisan editors in each state’s most important communication centers stepping 
forward to dominate politics for more than a generation. As the story of the 
Jackson campaign suggests, the next few decades were ones in which such 
leaders grew increasingly powerful, a trend that was dramatically reinforced by 
the rise of the electric telegraph. That story, along with the histories of party 
politics in the eras of the telephone, radio, and television, are well beyond the 
scope of this project. However, before moving to draw generalizations from the 
history of the pre-telegraphic era to party politics more generally, it is worth 
considering what we can learn from applying these competing theories to 
partisanship in our own time. Thanks to the rapid deployment of digital 
information technologies, yet another significant transformation of the nation’s 
information environment has occurred, and like the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries it is one in which the rapid decentralization of political 
communication is the overriding theme. This suggests that as unlikely as it might 
first seem, there might be important parallels between that era and our own. It is 
to the history of that much more recent past that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Digital Decentralization: 
The Return of Mass Partisanship and Direct Participation (1996-2013) 
 
"It was as though the pent-up pressure of a century's worth of unpublished letters to 
the editor had suddenly exploded online in a fury of indignation and complaint." 
 Scott Rosen (2009) 
 
 “Rather than rail against the media, we are becoming the media. Rather than bitch 
about the political establishment, we are taking it over…We have the technology and the 
collaborative spirit to find each other, pool our talents, and press for real systemic change. 
No longer content with being spectators, we are becoming players. No longer content to 
merely receive messages, we now send them as well.”  
Markos Moulitsas Zúniga (2008) 
 
 
Like the earliest years of American political history, our modern era has been 
a time of rapid infrastructure change, with a diverse array of new opportunities 
for communication developing in quick succession over the last two decades. 
This era therefore offers an excellent opportunity to test the competing models of 
party change in a second historical setting. To set the stage for this analysis, the 
chapter begins with a brief overview of communication system development in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, providing the background necessary for 
a more thorough overview of the information environment in early twenty first 
century America. From there, it moves to offer a set of competing hypotheses for 
how parties can be expected to evolve under the elite-led, group-led, and 
infrastructure-driven models of party change. Next, the history of the evolution 
of party information networks in this era is detailed, including an examination of 
the role of social media technologies in electoral politics. In this section, the 
stories of the MoveOn movement, the Daily Kos blogging community, and 
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Talking Points Memo will each be detailed, culminating in a discussion of their 
collective roles in the election of a new Democratic Party chair in 2006 and the 
nomination and election of Barack Obama in 2008. The chapter then ends with a 
review of the hypotheses in light of the evidence presented. As in previous 
chapters, only the infrastructure-driven model of party change is able to account 
for the full range of party activity examined, with both the elite- and group-
driven models failing badly on several counts. 
 
A Very Brief History of Infrastructure from the Telegraph to the Television 
The newspaper-based system of partisan organization detailed in the 
previous chapters reached its apex in the mid-nineteenth century. In the 
aftermath of Jackson’s election in 1828, opposition forces organized a new 
partisan information network that became the backbone of the Whig Party, 
giving the nation two equally robust party networks for the first time in its 
history. Democrats and Whigs used their competing newspaper system for the 
next two decades to organize political participation, and although this method of 
organization outlasted the replacement of the Whigs with the Know-Nothings 
and the Republicans, it could not survive the transformations wrought by the 
electric telegraph. As this new network spread from coast to coast during the 
1850s and 1860s, it opened the possibility of a new form of organization, one 
based on the centralization of information in the hands of a small group of 
powerful elites. Rather than rely solely on the decentralized postal infrastructure 
to transmit and share information, party leaders for the first time had access to a 
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system that allowed them to communicate with one another in near-real-time 
regardless of distance. The use of this new technology over the coming decades 
produced a dramatic transformation in the nation’s political parties, allowing 
small groups of elites to exercise ever-increasing levels of control over their state 
party organizations. This trend was reinforced by the rise of the wire services, 
most notably the Associated Press, that rapidly replaced the decentralized postal 
exchange as the primary means for local editors to acquire news from distant 
locations. Although these services undoubtedly represented a significant 
improvement for individuals seeking timely information, their widespread use 
gradually severed the interconnections among partisan newspapers, destroying 
the networks that had served as the backbone of party activity since the 
republic’s earliest days. 
As the same time, rapid innovations in printing technology transformed the 
newspaper business. The advent of high-speed rotary presses allowed urban 
newspaper circulations to grow far faster than the nation’s urban population, 
opening the possibility of true mass market publications. Freed by technology to 
pursue the entire urban market, editors increasingly disconnected their papers 
from party politics in order to appeal to readers regardless of their ideological 
affiliation. Guided by a new norm of “objectivity,” the nation’s newspapers 
increasingly covered politics from a perspective imagined to be outside of the 
political process itself. Rather than serve as information networks within the 
political system, newspapers transformed into commercial enterprises that 
provided information about the political system. Where papers in the early part 
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of the century had been an integral part of the national partisan political 
conversation, newspapers at the end of the century had become the domain of a 
small group of professionals who saw information as product to be sold to 
individuals regardless of their political affiliation. This severed the direct 
connection between newspapers and partisan politics, closing one of the most 
important entry points for individuals and groups hoping to affect partisan 
politics. 
The collapse of decentralized partisan information networks did not, however, 
eliminate the need for them, and as new technologies were developed activists 
quickly found ways to put them to use. Telephone networks became an 
important infrastructure for conducting party business, with their adoption 
reinforcing the shift from public to private conversation that had first begun with 
the arrival of the telegraph. Early telephone infrastructure was heavily 
fragmented, with each urban area served by one or more networks that were 
unlikely to be connected to networks in other cities or states. Thus limited, these 
networks served as the ideal infrastructure for building and strengthening urban 
machines, the form of organization that not coincidentally  dominated party 
politics in the early twentieth century. Following a series of technical advances 
and a wave of industry consolidation in the century’s first two decades, however, 
the telephone system morphed into a truly national network, allowing activists 
and organizers to conduct truly private, real-time conversations from one end of 
the country to the other. At the same time, the development of radio 
broadcasting technologies opened the possibility of real-time mass 
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communication, and as national broadcasting networks formed, so too did truly 
national political parties. These parties looked nothing like those that had existed 
a century before, for with the rise of radio the shift towards thoroughly 
nonpartisan communication networks continued to accelerate. Rather than speak 
directly to and with the people through their affiliated partisan networks, the 
parties had no choice but to rely on networks outside their control to reach their 
publics. 
What radio began, television completed. As highly centralized, expensive and 
technically complex endeavors involving thousands of paid professionals, 
television networks were in many ways the antithesis of the newspaper networks 
of the early American experience. Where once citizens had received their political 
information from one of thousands of local partisans who had personally 
committed to organizing his or her local community for action, in the age of 
television they regularly received information from committed nonpartisans who 
worked within one of three organizations that proudly and loudly declared their 
impartiality. Local newspapers in the eras of Jefferson and Jackson had called on 
their communities to stand up and take action, but local and national television 
networks in the eras of Kennedy and Reagan demanded first and foremost that 
they sit down and watch as others act. Politics in the age of the partisan press 
had been presented to the public in a way that demanded participation, but in 
the age of television it was offered to them as a spectator sport played by 
professionals on the public’s behalf. Although the rise of syndicated talk radio 
and Fox News marked small but nevertheless important moves in the opposite 
  
306 
direction, by the final decade of the twentieth century the average citizen was 
receiving the vast majority of their political information from for-profit 
organizations acting as supposedly nonpartisan gatekeepers to the national 
political conversation. All of this, of course, was about to change. 
 
The Information Environment of Early Twenty-First Century America 
The widespread adoption of digital information technologies in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries marks a transformation to the global 
information environment as profound as the one driven by the spread of 
Gutenberg’s printing press technology in the fifteenth century. Since Gutenberg’s 
invention made possible the spread of the mass-produced word, human 
communication-at-a-distance has been governed by the economics of scarcity. 
Each new page of information requires an additional expenditure by the 
communicator, and although economies of scale can be brought to bear, the 
marginal cost of production in the world of print can never be brought to zero. 
Although quite different from print in any number of ways, broadcasting 
technologies too are governed scarcity, with spectrum scarcity being the most 
important. Here a set of technological constraints limit the number of 
broadcasters that can operate in a given geographic area or network, thus 
limiting the number of messages that can be broadcast through the system at any 
given moment. Because of these scarcities, one of the primary responsibilities of 
the men and women managing political communication networks has been to 
intelligently allocate information within the limited numbers of pages and 
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frequencies available. Over time this has driven the creation of increasingly large 
and sophisticated editorial organizations, gatekeepers that act as mediators 
between those seeking to send and receive messages. In politics, this has meant 
the addition of numerous layers of gatekeepers, many claiming political 
neutrality, between citizens and their political system.  
But the adoption of digital information technologies has upended this system 
by reducing the marginal cost of producing messages so dramatically that in 
many instances it is effectively zero. This has transformed the nation’s 
information environment from one of scarcity to one of extreme abundance, 
setting off the most rapid increase in communicative capacity in human history. 
Beginning with the deployment of national fiber-optic networks in the 1990s, this 
process brought direct network access to tens of millions of American 
households in under a decade. Because network access nearly always came with 
email, this was the rough equivalent of bringing a post office into tens of millions 
of homes and businesses and then reducing the cost of postage to near zero, all in 
less than a decade. With the development of social media technologies in the 
2000s, these networked individuals and groups were then given the equivalent of 
their own printing press, as blogging networks, Facebook, and other similar 
services provided easy-to-use publishing services to the public free of charge. In 
this new environment of abundance, intermediation is no longer necessary. 
Individuals, including political activists, can now talk directly to one another 
regardless of distance, forming groups and organizing actions without any need 
for central coordination. For more than a century, broadcasting technologies had 
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worked to centralize and homogenize the political world, but the near-infinite 
capacity and flexibility of the Internet offers a new alternative, one that political 
activists both inside and outside the political system have rushed to embrace. 
In this new environment, several major new methods of communication have 
become particularly important. First and foremost are blogs, online journals 
made up of a series of entries displayed for readers in reverse chronological 
order. Beginning with the development of the Blogger, Typepad, and Live 
Journal networks in the early 2000s, blogging platforms have provided both 
interested individuals and groups with all of the tools necessary to publish 
original news and commentary, share links to third-party information, and host 
discussions about the issues of the day. In the earliest years of the medium, 
political blogs were nearly always the product of either individuals or very small 
groups, but over time political campaigns, interest groups, media organizations 
and a wide variety of other institutions have embraced this new form of 
information distribution. By any measure, the growth of blogging has been 
astonishing. One of the earliest blogging platforms was Blogger, and although it 
only added approximately one hundred thousand users in its first year, by 2003 
it was hosting well over a million independent publishers. 382  The Blogger 
network continued to grow at exponential rates following its purchase by Google, 
but by the end of the decade it had been surpassed by WordPress, a network that 
currently hosts more than 57 million sites publishing more than a half-million 
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new posts each day.383 According to NMIncite, a subsidiary of the Nielsen 
Company that tracks digital media usage, there were by the end of 2011 more 
than 173 million blogs reaching more than 80 million unique users in the United 
States alone.384 Overall, it is estimated that roughly one in five Americans read 
political blogs on at least a semi-regular basis, with more than one of every three 
readers posting their own thoughts or comments in response.385 
The second important new method of communication falls into the category 
broadly known as “social networking,” and although numerous networks have 
arisen over the past decade, none have been more popular than Facebook and 
Twitter. First launched in 2004 as a site that allowed college students to create 
personal profiles, share information, and join user-created groups, the site now 
boasts more than a billion active users worldwide, with more than 145 million 
active users in the United States alone.386 Facebook users are estimated to share 
nearly 1 billion pieces of content of each day, and more than one-third of all users 
in the United States use the service to share political information.387 Twitter, a 
service that allows users to send and read short text-based messages in both 
public and private formats with others, is used by more than 500 million users 
worldwide to exchange more than 340 million messages each day, with more 
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than 90 million active users in the United States.388 These and other social media 
services have allowed individuals and groups to bypass the gatekeepers that 
dominated the media landscape for much of the twentieth century, opening the 
possibility of unmediated, real-time communication among large numbers of 
citizens of the very first time. As just one recent example, during the Town Hall 
Debate between President Barack Obama and former Massachusetts Governor 
Mitt Romney on October 16, 2012, Americans shared more than 7.2 million 
debate-related messages during the 90-minute event, a truly national and wholly 
unmediated political conversation that would have been absolutely unthinkable 
just a few years before.389 
The third and final major innovation of interest are video sharing services 
such as YouTube and Vimeo. These sites allow users to upload, view, and share 
videos, and have done for video distribution what blogging services have done 
for the printed word, allowing individuals and groups with very little technical 
expertise to distribute content to others around the world free of charge. In the 
United States alone, it is estimated that more than 184 million Americans watch 
more than 36 billion videos each month on YouTube alone, with more than 48 
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hours of new video uploaded to the service every minute.390 According to the 
Pew Research Center, nearly three out of every four Americans use video-
sharing services, with roughly one in four visiting these sites on a daily basis to 
share videos with others.391 
Although nearly all of the communication services just described are under 
some form of corporate control, they function as infrastructure platforms rather 
than information networks, making them more like postal or telephone services 
than newspaper publishers and television broadcasters. Like phone subscribers, 
users of each of these services can send and receive messages whenever they 
wish, with no need to appeal to intermediaries for approval. Although the 
institutions behind these services act as gatekeepers controlling access to their 
networks, they exercise little or no control over the content created by users.  
Operating under an economics of abundance rather than scarcity, they have 
allowed huge numbers of citizens to shift from passive consumers to active 
creators of communication, driving an unprecedented shift in communicative 
behavior in just a few short years.  
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Competing Party Model Hypotheses 
What effect has this change in the nation’s communication environment and 
information infrastructures had on its political parties? Each of the three theories 
of party organization outlined in Chapter Two offer a unique set of predictions. 
From the perspective of the elite-led theory of party evolution, we should 
expect to see elites within the party-in-government using new opportunities to 
communicate in their continuing efforts to win elections and enact policy. As 
before, elites will “produce” new candidates, platforms, and policies for voters to 
“consume,” using new communication platforms to spread the word about new 
developments in their parties to a largely passive public. When new partisan 
information networks arise on these new platforms, they will remain firmly 
under the control of party elites, who will manage them in ways that ensure 
elites remain in control of party activity. If and when party structures are 
adapted to account for these new communication opportunities, it will be party 
elites and their agents who will be responsible for the adaptations. Under this 
model, the primary venue for action will be electoral contests. Elites are expected 
to adapt to the new environment by shifting some of their campaign 
communication to digital networks, using new forms of messaging to achieve 
their electoral and policy goals. Party elites should also be expected to use new 
forms of communication to coordinate with the benefit seekers who have the 
resources needed to run campaigns and coordinate policy. Within the worlds of 
social media and the blogosphere, elites should be found distributing messages 
to a largely passive audience. If and when voters create messages of their own, 
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these can be expected to have no impact on party organization or activity beyond 
influencing future messages sent by elites campaigning for election. 
If the group-driven theory of party evolution is correct, we should see groups 
throughout the political system using new opportunities to communicate in their 
continuing efforts to coordinate with the other groups that make up their party. 
Under this model, existing partisan information networks will be adapted to 
account for the new opportunities and constraints of new communication 
systems, with these networks remaining firmly under the control of groups 
already within the system as they change. Within each of the parties, groups will 
fight for control over the points of access to these networks, with the balance of 
power among them shifting in response to their various capacities to utilize these 
new systems. If and when new groups in society begin mobilizing for political 
action, they will be channeled into the party system by those already inside of it. 
The main venue for new forms of communication will be the invisible primary, 
the period when extant party actors use communication networks to coordinate 
around the candidates, platforms, and policies that will be offered to the public 
in the upcoming elections. When examining blogs and social media, we should 
see their widespread use by the groups making up the party-as-organization, 
with each using these platforms to coordinate support for their preferred 
candidates and policies. As with the elite-led model, individuals outside the 
party-as-organization will remain largely passive, so if and when average 
citizens create messages of their own, these can be expected to have very little 
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impact on party organization or activity beyond whatever influence they have on 
the groups to which these individuals belong.    
If this study’s infrastructure-driven theory of party evolution is correct, we 
should see balance of power among parties shift as individuals and groups 
within existing party structure and outside of them use new communication 
opportunities to organize and mobilize. Under this model, both the elites who 
make up the party-in-government and the actors and groups who make up the 
party-as-organization will take advantage of new technologies to communicate 
among themselves and with voters in new ways. Much more importantly, this 
model also predicts that as the infrastructure changes, the terms of political 
participation both within and among the parties will change, with the 
boundaries that separate the party-as-organization and the party-in-the-electorate 
weakening in response to the disintermediation and decentralization of 
communication throughout society. As politically interested individuals are 
given new opportunities for communication, many will shift from passive 
consumers to active creators of information, taking on a much more direct and 
public role in organizing party politics. Over time, many of these outsiders can 
be expected to mount successful challenges to political insiders, creating a new 
balance of party power in which older groups are forced to share power, pushed 
to the side, or even sidelined entirely from the parties they once controlled. 
Given that parties are understood as ongoing conversations among activists, we 
should expect to see change driven first and foremost in the most conversational 
forms of media, beginning with email in the late-twentieth century and shifting 
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to the blogosphere and social media in the early twenty-first century. Partisan 
blogs should be expected to act as a microcosms of party activity, and should 
networks of blogs become sufficiently popular, they should act as a competing 
centers of power and influence within the party to which they are aligned. 
Through this process, the most influential members of the party-in-the-electorate 
will become leaders within the party-as-organization, using the information 
networks they build as a resource for the party as it works to win elections and 
enact policy. 
 
The Evolution of Party Information Networks in the Digital Age 
Although there are any number of moments that could be used to mark the 
beginning of politics in the digital age, none better illustrates that transition than 
the events surrounding the impeachment of President Bill Clinton. The story first 
entered the national news when a news aggregation website, Drudge Report, 
broke a story about a more traditional news provider, Newsweek, choosing to 
withhold a report detailing the relationship between the President and White 
House intern Monica Lewinsky.392 After a media feeding frenzy led to a series of 
formal investigations, the nation’s parties headed into the 1998 midterm elections 
facing a public conflicted over the issue. Although large majorities held a less 
favorable opinion of Clinton as a person over his behavior, equally large 
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majorities opposed the ongoing efforts of congressional Republicans to impeach 
him.393 Hoping to affect the national debate, two Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, 
Joan Blades and Wes Boyd, launched a web-based petition to "Censure President 
Clinton and Move On to pressing issues facing the country." As Blades later 
explained, they hoped to counter Republican efforts by starting a “flash 
campaign” that would “help everyone connect with leadership…and then get 
back to our regular lives.” 394  But within a week of sending an email 
announcement to one hundred of their friends and family, the petition had 
recorded more than one hundred thousand signatures, and was on its way to 
eventually totaling more than two million. After Democrats unexpectedly picked 
up six House seats in the midterm elections, a lame duck session of Congress 
moved forward with impeachment proceedings, and Blades and Boyd decided 
that rather than “get back to their regular lives,” they would become full-time 
political activists. The pair used the movement they had accidentally built to 
form and fund MoveOnPAC, a political organization dedicated to providing a 
mechanism through which “like-minded, concerned citizens could influence the 
outcome of congressional elections, and in turn, the balance of power in 
Washington, D.C.” Over the next decade, the PAC raised more than $138 million 
from more than eight million individuals, including nearly $32 million for the 
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2004 election alone, a figure larger than the combined totals of the National Rifle 
Association and the American Medical Association during that election cycle. 395 
Remarkably, although their new political organization would eventually 
boast more than three million members, it never had more than a small handful 
of full-time employees, relying instead on the volunteer efforts of hundreds of 
thousands of activists nationwide. Unlike traditional interest group 
organizations, which tend to rely heavily on professional staff for fundraising 
and event coordination, it was these volunteers who organized nearly all of 
MoveOn’s efforts, using the group’s website to make connections, publicize 
events, fundraise for candidates, and organize a wide variety of local events. 
With the membership organizing itself at the local level, the organization’s staff 
could focus on providing the tools and direction necessary for much larger and 
potentially more transformative national efforts. In June of 2003, for example, 
they organized a “virtual primary,” a contest in which the group’s membership 
voted to determine which of the nine Democrats vying for their party’s 
nomination should receive the group’s endorsement and financial support.396 
Then, during the 2004 campaign, the group’s leadership organized an elaborate 
get-out-the-vote campaign on behalf of the party’s nominee, Senator John Kerry. 
Throughout this effort, thousands of volunteer precinct captains used MoveOn’s 
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website to undertake a complex, three-stage voter mobilization effort that 
targeted more than ten million individuals in seventeen swing states. Rather than 
coordinate from the center, the group allowed interested citizens to volunteer for 
positions and take full control of campaigns within their local communities. In 
the end, the campaign proved remarkably successful, raising turnout rates 
among contacted individuals by nearly nine percent.397  
Although the group’s efforts clearly aided the Democratic Party, they also 
caused a series of headaches for its leadership, none more significant than a 
controversy over a contest to produce and air a 30-second television 
advertisement. The competition attracted more than 1,500 submissions, including 
two ads that drew a direct comparison between President Bush and Adolph 
Hitler.398 Although the ads were neither endorsed by the group nor selected by 
its members for broadcast, the ensuing controversy prompted many Democratic 
candidates and Jewish organizations to distance themselves from the group even 
after its leadership condemned the ads’ production and submission. Later that 
fall, the ads were resurrected by the Bush-Cheney campaign for a television spot 
called "Coalition of the Wild-Eyed," an ad suggesting that Democratic party 
leaders were in league with the “radicals” who first had produced the ad.399 
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Despite this and other missteps, the groups influence continued to grow. During 
the 2006 elections, members used the group’s website to organize more than 
5,700 local grassroots initiatives, organizing more than 7,000 “house parties” 
where members gathered to make more than seven million phone calls to voters 
in key congressional districts. In 2008 MoveOn held their second “virtual 
primary,” a contest that led to the overwhelming endorsement of Sen. Barack 
Obama by the group’s membership just one week prior to the pivotal Super 
Tuesday contests. The following week, more than 1.7 million MoveOn members 
headed to the polls and helped Senator Obama extend his delegate lead over his 
rival, Senator Hillary Clinton.400    
While the MoveOn movement was increasingly demonstrating its ability to 
act as a new center of power within the Democratic Party, another important 
change to the nation’s partisan news environment was taking shape. The first 
wave of political bloggers rose in reaction to two major national events: the 
controversial Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election and the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. It was during the 2000 election that Joshua 
Marshall’s TalkingPointsMemo.com, an ideal type first-generation political blog, 
was launched.401 Known as “TPM” to its readers, Marshall’s blog reads very 
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much like a Jacksonian newspaper, offering a running series of articles colored 
strongly by the partisanship and personality of its editor. Rather than rely on the 
research efforts of a staff of trained reporters and editors, Marshall instead 
opened his reporting processes to the public, relying on his community of 
readers to gather and share information as political stories evolved. Just as Amos 
Kendall and Duff Green had before him, Marshall encouraged his readers to 
become active participants in the creation of political reporting, and by extension, 
to take a much more active role in politics itself. The site’s first major political 
success came in 2002 during a controversy surrounding remarks Senate Minority 
Leader Trent Lott made at retiring Sen. Strom Thurmond's 100th birthday party. 
Although ABC and other major news providers chose to ignore the story, 
Marshall and his readers worked together to explore its importance, rapidly 
building a both an interpretation and a backstory that made clear Lott’s remarks 
were part of a longstanding pattern of behavior. Within a few days the story was 
being widely discussed on both conservative and liberal blogs, leading first to 
coverage by major media organizations, and eventually to Lott’s resignation 
from party leadership. Following the 2004 presidential election, the TPM 
community turned its attention to fighting what Marshall described as President 
Bush’s attempts to “bamboozle” the nation into privatizing Social Security. Once 
again relying on readers to do research and take action within their local districts, 
the site successfully pushed hundreds of members of Congress to take public 
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positions on Bush’s plan, building a public record of opposition that eventually 
doomed the initiative. This victory was almost immediately followed by a year-
long effort to uncover political corruption in the Department of Justice, a 
crowdsourced effort that relied on citizens across the country to piece together 
local reporting and analyze thousands of pages of material uncovered through 
Freedom of Information Act requests. Although establishment media initially 
ignored the story, thanks to the dogged pursuit of the TPM community, a pattern 
of systemic corruption was uncovered, leading to the eventual resignation of 
Attorney General Gonzales and the awarding of a prestigious Polk Award to 
Marshall. Since that time, TPM has grown into a full-fledged media organization, 
with dozens of staff members working in a number of different offices around 
the country. 
Marshall’s efforts have all of the hallmarks of the work of an Intense Policy 
Demander, and although his organization is in many ways unique, he has not 
been alone in using the new opportunities provided by the blogs to move rapidly 
from outsider to insider status. In the earliest years of the medium, political blogs 
tended to be very much like Marshall’s: independent efforts run by activists 
interested in affecting the politics. But as the medium grew in popularity, 
networks of blogs devoted to causes, candidates, and issues began to rapidly 
develop, with dense interlinking among blogs a direct result of the ease with 
which the underlying technologies allowed authors to reference one another’s 
content. Just as the partisan newspapers networks of the early republic were able 
to form thanks to the postal exchange service, so too were blog networks able to 
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organize with little or no central coordination thanks to the widespread 
availability of cheap and easy to use digital information technologies. Networks 
on both the left and the right rapidly took form in 2002 and 2003, and although 
the right’s network was initially several times larger than the left’s, by 2005 their 
relative positions had flipped, with the left’s network several times larger than 
the right’s. In yet another parallel with the papers of the early republic, this 
growth came organically, the direct result of the independent decisions of tens of 
thousands of activists dispersed throughout the nation. But just as in that first 
network, some actors played more of a role in the network’s development than 
others. And just as Benjamin Bache and William Duane are singled out for the 
contributions to that first network, so too must Jerome Armstrong and Markos 
Moulitsas Zúniga be highlighted for their roles in this one. 
The pair began as true political outsiders: Armstrong a day trader who used 
his blog to write about financial markets, Moulitsas a refugee of the El Salvador 
civil war and U.S. Army veteran who decided to start a blog about electoral 
politics as a hobby. In the earliest days of their sites, MyDD.com and 
DailyKos.com, their writing focused more on opposition than organization, 
battling bloggers, pundits, and politicians over the coverage and conduct of the 
Bush Administration’s “war on terror” and its push for an invasion of Iraq. But 
as traffic to the sites surged in the early months of 2003, there was a growing 
realization among both men and their legions of readers that they were 
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collectively building something much larger: a mechanism for reforming the 
Democratic Party.402   
Two decisions made by the pair in the early months of 2003 proved fateful to 
the development of the “netroots,” a portmanteau of internet and grassroots 
coined by Armstrong to describe the growing movement of liberal activists using 
blogs and other social media to organize. First, Armstrong began to wind down 
his blogging efforts, sending his community of readers over to Daily Kos in 
preparation for his move to a full-time focus on political organizing. As one of 
the earliest members of Gov. Howard Dean’s presidential campaign, Armstrong 
served as its director of online advertising and blogger outreach, a position he 
landed after introducing Dean advisor Joe Trippi to MeetUp.com, the software 
platform that became the primary organizing infrastructure for the campaign. 
Through the site, Dean supporters could organize local meetings and political 
events without any assistance or oversight from the national campaign, allowing 
them to take full responsibility for building and running local campaign chapters. 
The adoption of MeetUp as a part of the formal campaign fueled its meteoric 
growth: although the campaign had just 3,000 committed volunteers in January 
of 2003, just nine months later it had surpassed 140,000. At the same time, the 
campaign used new Internet fundraising tools such as ActBlue, a site that allows 
activists to easily raise money on behalf of candidates without the involvement 
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of traditional fundraisers, to collect nearly $15 million in a single quarter from 
small donors, shattering the previous record for fundraising in a Democratic 
primary race. Thanks to the power of a truly decentralized, grassroots 
mobilization, Dean went from dark horse to front-runner in just a few short 
months, pioneering a new form of decentralized organization that allowed 
interested citizens to become directly involved in party activities in their 
communities. Although Dean’s quest for the nomination would eventually falter, 
his campaign served as an important test case and training ground for new forms 
organization that would become standard practice over the next decade.403 
The second major decision involved Moulitsas’ plan to migrate his blog to a 
new software platform, one that would allow for much greater participation by 
the community. Having watched other sites devolve into uncontrolled partisan 
bickering, Moulitsas made the controversial decision to begin censoring 
conservative commenters, turning the site into a “’safe zone’ for liberal political 
junkies.”404 Beyond the controversy, this led almost immediately to an explosion 
of interest in and participation on his site, overwhelming the infrastructure on 
which it was run. Forced to adopt new technology, Moulitsas settled on a new 
platform that included much more advanced community moderation features. 
                                                
403 For an overview of the Dean campaign, see Trippi, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: 
Democracy, the Internet, and the Overthrow of Everything, particularly 83-87 for the role of 
Armstrong, blogs, and Meetup.com. For a more extensive look at the role of 
MeetUp.com, see Wolf, How the Internet Invented Howard Dean; Sifry, "From Howard 
Dean to the Tea Party: The Power of Meetup.Com." 
404 Moulitsas Zuniga, "A Brief History."; sardonyx, "Top Comments: The Road to Scoop 
Edition." 
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As a side benefit, it also included features that would transform the site from a 
single blog into a network of blogs, with individual users empowered to create 
their “diaries” that could be integrated into the main site and linked to on their 
own. As Moulitsas later admitted, he “didn't think anyone would use the diaries,” 
but they fast became the site’s most popular feature, and within months the 
community was posting more than 200 diaries per day, a number that surged 
close to 600 as the 2004 election approached.405 With the community now free to 
create their own content, traffic climbed exponentially, growing from tens of 
thousands of monthly users in 2004 to hundreds of thousands in 2006 and 
millions in 2010. Today, just weeks before the 2012 election, the site was visited 
by more than 425,000 individuals and featured more than 350 individual diaries, 
giving it a circulation equal to some of the largest newspapers and magazines in 
the nation.406 
As the size of the Daily Kos community grew, the focus of their activity 
changed. Convinced that the Democratic Party establishment had betrayed its 
principles, activists led by Moulitsas began searching for ways to reform it. The 
Dean campaign initially looked like a promising vehicle for such efforts, but after 
it collapsed in the face of attacks by the party’s establishment, a movement began 
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to grow to reform the party by taking it over.407 It was in this fight that the power 
of the entire netroots community was first put on clear display, and as might be 
expected, it began with an e-mail. On December 9, 2004, the leadership of 
MoveOn sent a message to the group’s more than 3.3 million members calling for 
direct mobilization in the upcoming election of a new party chairman. It began: 
"Who will lead the Democratic Party? The answer may come as soon as 
this weekend, when the state Democratic Party leaders gather to discuss 
who should chair the Democratic National Committee (DNC) for the next 
four years. The election for chair is rarely competitive. But this year, with 
the race wide open, we have the chance to elect a leader who will 
reconnect the Democratic Party with its constituents — us.  
 
For years, the party has been led by elite Washington insiders who are 
closer to corporate lobbyists than they are to the Democratic base. But we 
can't afford four more years of leadership by a consulting class of 
professional election losers…In the last year, grass-roots contributors like 
us gave more than $300 million to the Kerry campaign and the DNC, and 
proved that the party doesn't need corporate cash to be competitive. Now 
it's our party: we bought it, we own it, and we're going to take it back."408 
 
Party leaders, including the recently defeated nominee Sen. John Kerry, Senate 
Minority Leader Harry Reid, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, had 
quickly lined up to support the selection of Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack for the 
role, but the netroots had other ideas. Through the combined power of MoveOn, 
Daily Kos, and hundreds of other loosely affiliated blogs, a movement 
unprecedented in modern political history coalesced to bring pressure to bear on 
                                                
407 For a brief history of the fight between the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), Daily Kos, and the Dean 
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important and highly influential early take on the challenges faced by liberal activists at 
that time, see Daou, "The Triangle: The Limits of Blog Power." 
408  Hananel, 2004, Pac Faults Democratic Leadership, Boston Globe; MoveOn.Org, 
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the 447 voting members of the Democratic National Committee (DNC).409 The 
goal was to convince the DNC to select a “reform candidate,” an outsider who 
was willing to work with the netroots to change the direction of the party. 
Recognizing that the election was going to involve a fight, Vilsack quickly 
withdrew from contention, and in his place several different establishment-
backed candidates emerged. The netroots, by contrast, rapidly settled on a single 
choice: former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean, the presidential candidate the party 
establishment had just worked so hard to undermine.  
With more than two months until the election, liberal blogs threw themselves 
into the DNC election. Jerome Armstrong returned to blogging at MyDD, 
turning the site into a hub for information on a race that was almost entirely 
ignored by traditional media outlets. After drafting a reluctant Dean into the race, 
the netroots then turned their attention to his opponents. One by one they were 
pressured to withdraw from the race, some because of scandal and others 
because of controversial policy positions they had taken in the past. Leo Hindery, 
a candidate backed by former party chairman Terry McAuliffe, Sen. Dick 
Gephardt, and former Sen. Tom Daschle, was targeted for his previously 
undisclosed role in coordinating a series of anti-Dean ads that aired just prior to 
the Iowa caucuses. Former Rep. Tim Roemer, the choice of Pelosi and Reid, was 
attacked by Josh Marshall’s TPM for his opposition of Clinton’s economic 
                                                
409 For more detailed versions of this history, see Armstrong and Moulitsas Zuniga, 
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policies while in Congress. And former Rep. Martin Frost was forced to 
withdraw after an independent blogger, Anna Brosovic, brought attention to 
campaign ads Frost had run attacking fellow Democrats and offering support for 
President Bush. Recognizing the opportunity this unprecedented conflict 
represented, the Association of State Democratic Chairs (ASDC), a subgroup of 
the DNC that had traditionally been a largely powerless group within the party-
as-organization, mobilized to press a series of demands on the candidates. In the 
end, although party elites were able to fight off the challenge presented by the 
ASDC, they were unable to thwart the netroots’ campaign, and on February 12, 
2005 Dean was elected party chairman by a unanimous voice vote of the 
assembled voting members of the DNC. As Chris Bowers, one of the MyDD 
bloggers most instrumental in reporting on the race, summed up the feelings of 
the entire community when he exclaimed, “I can barely believe it. It looks like we 
finally won something. Outside becomes inside.”410 
Following the election, Dean proved a valuable ally for the netroots. His 
adoption of the “50 State Strategy,” a plan that the netroots had been actively 
discussing and  developing for more than two years, played a key role in his 
party’s historic victory in the 2006 midterm elections.411 Over the objections of 
long-time party insiders, Dean established party offices with full-time organizers 
                                                
410 For more on the role of the ASDC in this conflict, see  Lizza, The Outsiders, 13 
411 See, for example, Bowers, "Uncontested."; Seattle, "Always Contest the District."; 
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in every state, tasking local staffers to work directly with local blogs on 
upcoming campaigns. As before, the netroots continued their independent 
fundraising and campaigning, raising more than $1.4 million for seventeen 
“Netroots Candidates” that had selected by the community for support during 
the party’s primaries.412 In one particularly high-profile race, they worked closely 
with MoveOn to back Ned Lamont, a Connecticut businessman, in his 
successfully quest to wrest the party’s nomination away from former vice-
presidential nominee Joseph Lieberman, a sitting United States Senator who had 
run afoul of the netroots in his support for the war in Iraq.413 Taking their offline 
organizing one step further, the Daily Kos community then organized their first 
annual convention, an event that drew over 1,000 attendees and featured 
appearances by Governors Mark Warner, Bill Richardson, and Tom Vilsack, as 
well as a keynote address by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid.414 The following 
year, the convention hosted a forum attended by seven of the eight Democratic 
                                                
412 Victorious netroots candidates included Jim Webb (VA-Sen), Jon Tester (MT-Sen), 
Tim Walz (MN-01), Joe Sestak (PA-07), Ciro Rodriguez (TX-23), Patrick Murphy (PA-08), 
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A Victory for People-Powered Politics, The Christian Science Monitor, November 9, 2006; 
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Democratic Party."; Conason, "Howard Dean, Vindictaed." 
413 Although Lieberman went on to win as an independent, he did so without the 
backing of his former party. For more, see Associated Press, "Lieberman Concedes; 
Lamont Wins Primary."; Dickerson, "Lamont Tv: How Web Videos Dismantled Joe 
Lieberman."; Healy, 2006, Lieberman to Stay in Race after Defeat, The New York Times, 
August 9; Ifill, "Lieberman V. Lamont: The Throw Down."; Moulitsas Zuniga, "Ct-Sen: 
The Big Winner." 
414 Nagourney, 2006, Gathering Highlights Power of the Blog, The New York Times, June 
10, A1 
  
330 
candidates for president, including both Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack 
Obama, setting the stage for the historic nomination contest that was to come the 
following year. Outsiders truly had become insiders.415  
In many ways, the 2008 presidential campaign offered a near-perfect 
illustration of the ways technology had changed party politics. 416  After a 
relatively early winnowing of the field, including a number of candidates who 
made only the most minimal use of new communication technologies, the 
Democratic primaries came down to a months-long battle between Senators 
Clinton and Obama. Clinton, the establishment candidate, developed an 
organization based on older models of party politics, with a close inner circle 
managing the campaign from the top down. Although her campaign did make 
use of new social networking technologies, it did so only very reluctantly, a 
choice senior campaign officials later admitted put them at a very serious 
disadvantage relative to her opponent.417 Senator Obama, the relative newcomer, 
countered with an organization described by former Dean strategist Steve 
McMahon as “Dean 2.0”: an Internet-enabled, grassroots-powered campaign that 
embraced decentralizing technologies. 418  Unlike Clinton’s team, the Obama 
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campaign embraced the new opportunities presented by digital media, including 
its choice to use email and streaming video rather than more traditional media 
channels for Obama’s formal declaration that he would be entering the race.419  
Throughout the election, their goal was to work with voters wherever they 
could be found, using text messages, streaming video, blogs, and dozens of social 
networking sites to encourage active participation by citizens in the campaign. 
Rather than direct everything from the center, the campaign deliberately 
decentralized their organizing efforts by building a campaign website that 
included the organizational capabilities of Meet Up, the publishing features of 
Daily Kos, and the fundraising tools of ActBlue. Although this allowed the 
campaign to gather extensive data about the activities of its supporters, it offered 
only the most nominal means of control, creating an environment where millions 
of citizens could become not just participants in but organizers of campaign 
activities.420 In addition, they encouraged the continued use of independent 
websites, using them in part to identify individuals that could be brought into 
the campaign’s formal organization to help with grassroots outreach. As one 
notable example, Meredith Segal, a student at Bowdoin College, transitioned 
from independent activist to full-time campaign staffer after having 
demonstrated her organizing skills through Facebook. Although her efforts 
began from a simple desire to build support for Obama on her college campus, 
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they rapidly grew into a national movement, with Segal heading an independent 
organization with dozens of chapters and more than 62,000 active members on 
college campuses across the nation. Recognizing her skill as a movement leader, 
Obama’s team named her an official campaign co-chairs, and following 
graduation she accepted a position as office manager of its Philadelphia 
campaign headquarters. In this and hundreds of other instances, the Obama 
campaign embraced the independent organizing efforts of citizens, many of who 
were new to partisan politics, creating a campaign structure unlike any before.421  
 
Evaluating the Competing Theories 
Although this admittedly brief history could be either continued to include 
the 2010 and 2012 elections or expanded to add a discussion of the use of new 
communication technologies by Republican partisans and candidates, the 
evidence offered so far is sufficient to evaluate the competing theories and offer 
some preliminary conclusions.  
To very briefly review, the elite-led theory predicts that elites within the 
party-in-government will react to changes in the nation’s information 
infrastructure by adapting party institutions to take advantage of the new 
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opportunities it provides. The selection of candidates and policies will remain 
under the control of these elites, who market them as “products” to be 
“consumed” by a largely passive public. If and when new partisan information 
networks develop, the model predicts they will remain solely under elite control, 
with communication shifting to these networks if and only if elites conclude it is 
to their benefit to do so. Finally, the model predicts that if and when voters use 
the new infrastructure to create messages, they will little impact on party 
organization or activity. Although evidence supporting the first of these 
predictions can be found in the use of digital media technologies by both the 
Dean and Obama campaigns, each of the remaining predictions is clearly 
contradicted by the evidence presented. In candidate selection and promotion, 
the netroots community has exerted substantial influence, up to and including 
successfully backing an anti-establishment candidate for party chairman. If 
parties exist for the benefit of the elites who control them, then surely this 
example of the loss of control of the party’s formal institutions represents a fatal 
blow to the elite-led model. But that is not all. This challenge to elite authority 
was made possible by their development of new information networks that were 
started without the assistance of elites, and that to this day remain entirely 
outside of their control. This too represents a direct refutation of the elite-led 
model, which foresees networks being developed solely at the discretion of elites 
and being used by those elites to interact with a largely passive public. But in the 
stories of the rise of Daily Kos, MoveOn, and Segal’s network of campus groups 
for Obama, there is overwhelming evidence for the direct and unmediated 
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participation of citizens in important and influential party-building activities. 
Thus, it is clear that in this new digital information environment, the elite-led 
theory of parties largely fails as a model of party organization and behavior. 
The predictions of the group-driven theory of party evolution fare better 
when compared to the evidence presented here, but that model too ultimately 
fall short. It predicts that as new opportunities for communication arise, the 
groups that make up the party-as-organization will adapt existing information 
networks to ensure those networks stay under party control. As groups jockey 
for influence within the party, it predicts that these interactions will shape 
candidate nominations and policy positions, with citizens outside the party-as-
organization remaining passive recipients of communication rather than its 
creators. As with the elite-led model, it is this assumption of citizen passivity that 
causes the most serious problems. For example, MoveOn began solely through 
the initiative of two citizens who were not in any way involved with formal 
Democratic Party politics, and although the group has since frequently found 
itself in alliance with groups in the Democratic coalition, those groups have not 
been able at any point to move beyond an alliance of equals. Where the model 
had expected older groups to channel new activities and behaviors into existing 
institutional structures, the evidence demonstrates an expansion of the system of 
groups itself, with older groups now forced to coexist with newer ones. Similarly, 
although older groups can be found participating enthusiastically on blogs and 
at the annual Daily Kos-sponsored convention, they are never more than equal 
participants in these new forums. As a result, in many of the instances of new 
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group formation detailed here, including the independent campaign 
organization built by Segal to support for Obama’s prospective candidacy, 
neither the candidate nor the party were involved until well after the new groups 
had been established. Segal was acting entirely as a free agent, and although she 
ultimately leveraged her efforts into a formal position on the Obama team, she 
began her efforts without any intention to become a political professional. Last 
but certainly not least, the contest to select a new party chair began as struggle 
for power between the candidates backed by the party-in-government and the 
candidate backed by the netroots, with members of the party-as-organization 
entering the fray only after the fight began. Even worse for the group-led model, 
at the end of the conflict the balance of power within the party-as-organization had 
been shifted towards a group of outsiders at the expense of groups already 
within the party-as-organization. Given all this, it is clear that the group-centric 
explanation largely fails as an explanation for party organization and 
communication in the current era. 
Finally, the infrastructure-driven theory of parties predicts that as the nation’s 
information infrastructure changes, the boundaries that separate the party-as-
organization and the party-in-the-electorate will shift. Because the changes in this 
era involve the proliferation of decentralized infrastructures, the model expects 
to see increased level of activism among citizens throughout the political system. 
As politically interested individuals are offered new opportunities to 
communicate, they are expected to become more active participants in partisan 
politics, building movements that challenge insiders in both the party-in-
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government and the party-as-organization for influence over party nominations, 
agendas, and resources. Because the rapid expansion of participation will 
destabilize intra-party coalitions and alliance, the model expects some of these 
movements will succeed. Through this process, many previously passive citizens 
will become active members of the party-as-organization, using the 
communication networks they have built as a resource to advance their preferred 
candidates and policies. This will ultimately result in reorganized party 
coalitions, with older groups forced to share power, pushed to the side, or even 
sidelined entirely from the parties they once controlled.  
On balance, each of these hypotheses is confirmed by the evidence presented 
here. Just as the elites who make up the party-in-government and the groups who 
make up the party-as-organization have taken advantage of new opportunities to 
communicate, so too have citizens, many of whom have worked openly and 
explicitly to challenge party leaders. Just as the partisan editors of the 1790s and 
1820s once used their independently developed networks to wrest control of the 
party away from elites, so too have activists of the early 2000s used their 
command of newly-developed digital networks to become a new center of power 
within their party. In opposition to members of both the party-in-government and 
the party-as-organization, they have successfully advanced candidates and policies 
on numerous occasions and in a variety of different venues. In one instance, they 
mobilized to block a sitting U.S. Senator and former vice-presidential candidate 
from securing his party’s nomination because of a policy dispute; in another, 
they successfully backed a candidate for party chair, overcoming the opposition 
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of the members of the party-in-government who had traditionally held near-
complete control over the position. Although these efforts were at times joined 
by others within the party-as-organization, they were at no time controlled by 
them, with the citizens who had initiated the efforts and their chosen allies 
remaining in charge of the campaign at all times.  
Moreover, although networks like Daily Kos and sites like Talking Points 
Memo have become important resources for party elites, they were neither 
initially created by nor subsequently controlled by them, leaving their creators 
and participants free to use them to advance policies and candidates as they see 
fit. In some instances the activities of these independent agents caused problems 
for allied leaders, such as when the MoveOn contest created controversy that 
was used to attack the party’s general election candidates. But in other instances 
these independent activities have created enormous opportunities for their 
partisan allies, sometimes by providing new resources to advance the party’s 
cause, and other times by weakening the opposition through the exposure of 
corruption. As just one example of the later, TPM’s dogged and pursuit of the 
U.S. Attorney’s scandal simultaneously improved its position as an independent 
media organization, strengthened the Democratic Party’s information network, 
and weakened the position of numerous Republican Party officials, all without 
the direct involvement of members of the party-in-government until the final 
stages of the investigation. By pioneering a new method of community-backed 
journalism, TPM’s Joshua Marshall became an important player in partisan 
politics while nevertheless remaining entirely outside of the control of formal 
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party leadership. This is precisely as the infrastructure-driven model predicts. 
Through their innovative use of new information technologies, Marshall and his 
allies rewrote the terms of partisan political participation in ways that only the 
infrastructure-driven theory of party evolution can accommodate. 
As was the case in previous chapters, the evidence presented here suggests 
the need for a reassessment of our model of how party politics changes over 
times. In both the information environments of the early republic and of the 
modern era, neither the elite-led model nor the group-driven model are able to 
accurately capture the full range of activity that drives change. Although the 
elite-led and group-centric models may generate important insights when taking 
snapshots of brief moments in time, they fail to capture all of the forces at work 
when examining the evolution of parties over time. By focusing on both political 
actors and the communication systems that interconnect them, the infrastructure-
driven model is able to identify a source of political change that previous models 
have missed entirely. In the next chapter, the results of this investigation and its 
implications will be discussed in much greater detail.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Information Infrastructures and Political Change 
Evaluating the Model and Looking Toward Future Research 
 
“…technological innovations are similar to legislative acts or political foundings that 
establish a framework for public order that will endure over many generations. For that 
reason the same careful attention one would give to the rules, roles, and relationships of 
politics must also be given to such things as the building of highways, the creation of 
television networks, and the tailoring of seemingly insignificant features on new 
machines. The issues that divide or unite people in society are settled not only in the 
institutions and practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in tangible 
arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and semiconductors, nuts and bolts.” 
 Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” (1986) 
 
 
Throughout this work, the competing claims of three different models of 
party change have been evaluated to determine which is best able to capture the 
behavior of partisan actors in a number of very different political contexts and 
information environments. In this chapter, the results of these investigations will 
be detailed, including a review of the primary elements of each of the models 
and an evaluation of the predictions that each of the models generated. Then, the 
major findings of the infrastructure-driven model will be summarized, and the 
major strengths and weaknesses of the model will be explored. Finally, the 
implications of the model for future research are detailed. 
 
Reviewing the Models 
The first of the three models presented was the elite-led model of party 
formation and change. Most closely associated with the works of Schumpeter, 
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Downs, Schlesinger, and Aldrich, it holds that party activity is best understood 
by examining it from the perspective of the ambitious men and women who 
make up the party-in-government. As the prime movers of party life, they are held 
by this model to be primarily responsible for the creation and evolution of the 
party-as-organization, which operates to assist them in their quest to win elections 
and shape public policy. When change comes to parties and party systems, this 
model insists it will come at the behest of elites, who will alter institutional 
structures and patterns for behavior as they believe necessary to meet new 
political challenges and historical realities. In some cases this change will come 
through deliberate action, but in others it will be the result of conflict among 
elites, who are understood to compete for influence and power both within and 
among parties. Although the members of both the party-as-organization will 
undoubtedly be affected by these changes, they will not be responsible for them, 
and thus are expected by the model to be found reacting to but not creating 
change when it comes. Given this, partisan communication channels and 
information networks are understood to exist for the benefit these elites, and 
although such networks will almost undoubtedly be operated on a day-to-day 
basis by members of the party-as-organization, they will like the rest of party 
organization be managed to meet the needs of those in the party-in-government. 
As new opportunities for communication are embraced by these elites, the 
patterns of interaction among them and their supporters might change, 
producing new patterns of behavior over which the party-in-government will 
continue to preside. If and when independent political media become involved in 
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partisan politics, this model predicts that they will play no role in shaping the 
operation of parties until and unless party elites become involved. Finally, the 
elite-led model predicts that should decentralizing change come to the 
infrastructure that supports partisan communication, it will allow a greater 
number of elites within the party-in-government to communicate directly with 
members of the party-in-the-electorate, altering the experience of politics for voters 
throughout the system. 
The second model presented was the group-centric model of party politics. 
Originally outlined in the works of Key, Eldersveld, and Schattschneider, it has 
recently received renewed attention thanks to an important new work by Cohen, 
Karol, Noel, and Zaller. In this model, the activists who make up the party-as-
organization are seen as the prime movers of party activity, with members of the 
party-in-government competing for their attention and political affection. Here 
parties exist to help activists achieve their policy goals, so when change comes to 
parties, it is rooted in the actions and interactions of the sprawling and diverse 
system that is the party-as-organization. Given this, the details of intra-party 
cooperation and conflict are understood to play a central role in shaping parties 
over time, with both voters and elites expected to be participating in but not 
responsible for any changes that occur. Partisan communication systems and 
information networks in this model are understood to exist for the benefit of 
activists, and although elected officials will frequently involve themselves in 
their operation, these systems will in the end be operated primarily to benefit 
these activists. As the groups that make up the party-as-organization adopt new 
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forms of communication, their visibility and levels of publicity are likely to 
change, altering their position within the party relative to others, potentially 
altering the balance of power within the party. Evidence for this is likely to be 
seen first in intra-party battles over candidate nominations, suggesting party 
primaries to be a particularly important area for investigation. If and when 
independent political media become involved in party politics, the model expects 
that their ability to affect party behavior will depend on how far they are able to 
integrate themselves into the ongoing conversation that is intra-party 
cooperation and competition. Finally, the group-centric model predicts that 
should decentralizing change come to the infrastructure that supports partisan 
communication, activists will embrace new opportunities to communicate 
directly with one another and with the members of the party-in-the-electorate, 
altering the experience of politics for voters throughout the system. 
Finally, as an alternative to these traditional models of party activity, this 
work offered the infrastructure-driven model of party organization and change. 
Rather than focus on which of the various components of party organization are 
primarily responsible for changing patterns of party behavior, it considers the 
possibility that such change might be driven by forces outside of the parties 
themselves. Where the other models see change entirely as an internal 
phenomenon, the infrastructure-driven model argues that party behavior is 
shaped in part by the nation’s information infrastructure. At bottom, this model 
rests on three related observations about the problems of organizing collective 
action in an extended republic. First, without a common source of political 
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information, geographically dispersed individuals are unlikely to recognize that 
they share a common political purpose. Second, without access to a shared 
information infrastructure, individuals will be unable to coordinate around that 
common purpose. Third, because no two communication systems are alike, no 
two systems will offer the same opportunities for sharing information and 
organizing action. From these three assumptions, the model posits that as the 
nation’s information infrastructures changes, the patterns of information 
distribution and interconnection throughout society will change. At the group 
level, this will alter party organization by reshaping the ability of all three 
components of the party – the party-in-government, party-as-organization, and 
party-in-the-electorate –  to interact among themselves and with one another. Thus, 
where both group-centric and elite-led models see infrastructure as one of many 
tools wielded by political actors in pursuit of goals, this new model argues that 
the variability of this infrastructure acts as an exogenous force shaping political 
behavior and organization.  
Because the infrastructure available at any given moment structures the 
interactions of partisans throughout society, the more rapidly or substantially 
this infrastructure changes, the larger the effect will be on partisan politics. The 
central contention of this work is that moments of great change open windows of 
opportunity during which actors inside and outside the political system can alter 
the balance of power within and among the parties. In these moments of flux, the 
distribution of access to the tools necessary for organization and action in an 
extended republic will be both uneven and changing across the polity. Because 
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no two sets of communication systems offer the same opportunities for 
coordination, the terms for participation in partisan politics in any given location 
will reflect the state of infrastructure development at that location, and will 
change as the available systems change. As each new communication network 
reaches each new location, it brings with it access to all of the other partisans 
using that system, altering the range of potential interactions for everyone 
involved. As this process unfolds throughout the polity, long-standing patterns 
of interaction are likely to give way to new ones, as actors throughout the 
political world settle into new forms of behavior and organization adapted to the 
new information environment in which they find themselves. Thus, in addition 
to examining effects of choices made by party actors, our investigations of the 
patterns of partisan behavior and organization must also explore the possibility 
that these patterns have been shaped by changes to the information environment 
that are beyond the control of those involved.  
If, as the model suggests, the spread of new communication technologies 
offers new opportunities for coordination and action, then we should expect that 
actors who find themselves excluded from party politics will be among the first 
to adopt them, innovating new behaviors and organizations in an effort to 
challenge and overcome their marginalization. As previous theories of change 
would predict, their success will depend on a wide variety of factors, including 
the uses to which they put these technologies, the effectiveness with which they 
use them, the reactions of their opponents, and the wider political context within 
which they operate. The infrastructure-driven theory of parties, however, adds to 
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this list the attributes of the infrastructures themselves. In the context of a 
political insurgency, decentralizing communication technologies are likely to be 
particularly useful in that they will allow for greater varieties of local 
organization and action, allowing outsiders to build movements that challenge 
insiders at precisely the moment when the balance of power within the party is 
in flux. Changes that centralize access to the communication system are likely to 
produce the opposite effect, however, allowing those who act as gatekeepers to 
the system to exercise greater control of party activity. Thus, while the spread of 
decentralizing infrastructures should open windows of opportunity for outsiders 
to mount challenges, the spread of centralizing infrastructures should open 
windows of opportunity for insiders to increase their control. 
Finally, as the access to information infrastructures changes, the model 
expects that citizens will find their experience of politics changes. In many 
instances, voters will find themselves presented with information and 
opportunities that spur them to take a more active role in politics, thus altering 
the makeup of all three components of the party. This is because at any given 
historical moment, the party-in-the-electorate can be expected to include many 
individuals who have been made passive more by circumstance than choice, and 
if given the opportunity, many of these individuals are likely to jump at the 
change to become a more active participant in politics. This suggests that the 
location of the boundary between the party-as-organization and the party-in-the-
electorate is dependent in part on the infrastructure that supports party activity. 
In an environment dominated by highly participatory and decentralized forms of 
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media, greater and more varied forms of partisan participation should be 
expected; in an environment dominated by more centralized forms of  media in 
which the average user’s participation is limited, a more passive electorate can be 
expected. In either instance, the level of citizen engagement at any given moment 
will be in part determined by the features of the available information 
infrastructure, and will not be a direct reflection of the desires of voters, activists 
or elites. 
 
Evaluating the Models 
Throughout this work, each of the models was used to evaluate the history of 
partisan politics in three different periods. First, the history of the Jeffersonian 
era was examined, including a detailed exploration of the effects of both the Post 
Office Act of 1792 and the Alien and Sedition Acts on the nation’s information 
infrastructure and its party politics. Next the Jacksonian era was investigated to 
determine how the completion of the postal system and the Panic of 1819 
transformed the nation’s systems of partisan information and politics. Finally, 
the modern era was investigated to explore the potential interconnections 
between changes in the national information environment and partisan politics. 
A full accounting of all aspects of partisan activity in each of these eras would of 
course have been well beyond the reach of any single study, so this work has 
limited its investigations to the ways partisans organized for elections, focusing 
in particular on the formation and evolution of institutions capable of managing 
communication among the three components of the party. 
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The elite-led model performed well in describing the very earliest years of 
party politics, but by the time of Jefferson’s election it was already failing to 
capture many of the most important developments in party politics. As it 
predicts, elites were responsible for the initial creation of both parties, but by the 
mid-1790s the Democratic-Republican Party was already developing institutional 
structures that were entirely outside their control. As the election of 1800 neared, 
Republican elites continued working to organize the activities of their allies, but 
these efforts represented only a small fraction of the coordinated activity taking 
place throughout the country. Moreover, with the passage of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts, political conflict became centered on the terms of political 
participation and leadership itself, with Federalist elites working to outlaw what 
they perceived as illegitimate challenges to their authority by men who were 
explicitly not part of the party-in-government. Just a few short years later those 
same Federalists had been defeated, with elites on both sides of the aisle 
concluding that the activism of newspapermen and editors had determined the 
outcome of the contest. A conception of parties rooted in elite leadership simply 
cannot account for this outcome. Thus, although the elite-led model was useful in 
describing how the parties initially came into being, it fails to describe how and 
why the parties changed around the time of Jefferson’s election. 
The group-centric model acted as the polar opposite of its elite-led 
counterpart in describing the Jeffersonian era. Although it could not describe the 
formation of parties in the first few years of the decade, it fared far better in 
evaluating subsequent  behavior. The rise of the Democratic-Republican Societies, 
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the newspaper network centered on Duane’s Aurora, and the rapid expansion of 
party organization following the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts are all 
excellent examples of policy-oriented activists working to create and manage 
organizations that controlled party nominations and marshaled resources in 
states across the nation. Although the eventual victory of these activist-led 
organizations over the elite-led Federalists created an outcome in line with the 
model, it can neither describe how the parties first came into being nor capture 
how control shifted from elites in the capitol to activists around the nation. Thus, 
although the group-centric model is quite useful in describing important aspects 
of party activity, it too fails to explain the central dynamic of the party activity in 
this era. 
The infrastructure-drive model, however, succeeds where these other 
frameworks do not. By remaining neutral on the question of who leads parties 
and focusing instead on the forces that structure the interaction of all of the 
participants in party politics, it is able to explain how elites founded the parties, 
how activists came to challenge them for control of these organization, and why 
these challenges were successful. Here the Post Office Act of 1792 and the Alien 
and Sedition Acts take center stage, each dramatic changes to the nation’s 
information technology policies that altered the patterns of interaction among all 
three components of each of the parties. Passage of the Post Office Act set off a 
multi-decade transformation of the nation’s communication environment, 
replacing a heavily centralized system that catered to coastal elites with a 
decentralized one designed to provide rural Americans with equal access to the 
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networks that made politics in an extended republic possible. Because the postal 
network in 1792 was so unevenly deployed, and because development under the 
act proceeded so rapidly, its expansion had an enormously destabilizing effect on 
partisan politics, bringing huge swaths of the country into contact with one 
another for the first time, and creating the need for local party organization in 
each of the towns and villages that was added to the system. The Alien and 
Sedition Acts were in large part a response to the changes the Post Office Act had 
wrought, with Federalist elites so unnerved by the expansion of partisan activity 
it had set off that they attempted to criminalize partisanship itself. Confusing an 
effect of this rising tide of partisan activity for its source, they attacked leading 
Republican papers throughout the land, leaving party activists dispersed 
throughout the nation free to establish new party organizations far faster than 
they could be destroyed. The decentralization of the postal system had given rise 
to a decentralized system of Democratic-Republican Party newspapers and 
organizations, allowing the party to both survive and thrive in the face of 
Federalist attacks.  
The infrastructure-driven model can also account for the ways in which 
partisan politics disintegrated into factional conflict in the years following 
Jefferson’s election. As the postal service expanded deeper and deeper into rural 
America, the size of the inter-connected polity continued to expand, bringing 
ever-wider circles of activists into the system. With no mechanism for controlling 
the expansion of partisan networks and the organizations they supported, 
would-be party elites were unable to limit the scope of intra-party conflict. Put 
  
350 
more simply, as the postal network continued to expand, so too did intra-party 
conflict, plunging the Democratic-Republican into a period of fierce factional 
conflict that only ended when war with Great Britain began. As before, a small 
group of elites attempted to push the most enthusiastically partisan members of 
the party out of positions of leadership, and once again these elites failed, their 
efforts fatally undermined by their inability to control the spread of partisan 
newspapers throughout the country. This failure was a direct result of the postal 
infrastructure’s decentralized and open design, which made it impossible for 
them to establish control over their party’s networks as the postal system 
continued to expand. Moreover, because their opponents were more willing to 
take advantage of the opportunities this decentralization afforded, men like 
Duane and Leib were able to once again to gain the upper hand in the conflict, 
the second time in as many decades that the champions of enthusiastic 
partisanship and democratization were able to defeat efforts to centralize party 
control in the hands of a small group of political and economic elites.  
 Once again, party behavior in this period followed neither of the patterns 
predicted by the group-centric and elite-led models. In some areas of the country 
elite-led factions continued to find success, with the Clinton machine in New 
York and the Quids in Philadelphia the most notable examples. In other areas 
parties were clearly managed by groups that these elites desperately sought but 
failed to control, such as the largely independent organizations established by 
country printers in Western Pennsylvania. In yet other areas, parties were led by 
coalitions of editors and elected officials, with the alliance between Duane and 
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Leib in Pennsylvania the best example. In the first type there are forms of 
organization matching the predictions of the elite-led model; in the second, the 
group-centric model finds significant support. But in the third form there is 
evidence for both types of organization. On the one hand, primary control of 
these organizations rested in the hands of partisan editors who clearly operate 
within the party-as-organization. On the other hand, as the decade progressed 
these organizations became increasingly adept at electing their own members to 
office, creating a new situation where these organizations were controlled by 
members of both the party-as-organization and the party-in-government. Given that 
all three forms of party organization existed simultaneously, and given that each 
was forced to contend with the others for political power, it is clear that neither 
the group-centric nor the elite-led models are able on their own to capture the 
full range of party activity that took place in this era. 
The Jacksonian era is equally problematic for the group-centric and elite-led 
models, and for precisely the same reasons. Party politics in the years preceding 
Jackson’s loss to Adams in the 1824 election was largely a state-level affair, with 
each of the three types of parties just described competing for attention and 
influence in all of the states but those of the Old South. In New York, Clinton’s 
elite-led machine faced off against a new hybrid organization built by Martin 
Van Buren and his editor allies, with the new Anti-Masonic party working to 
organize itself as a new grassroots-based “people’s party.” New Hampshire 
followed Pennsylvania’s lead down the path of anti-elite politics, with Isaac 
Hill’s newspaper-centric organization leading the change against the elites of the 
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Old Colony. In Ohio, Federalist elites led a brief resurgence, only to be defeated 
once more by a network of party organizations led by partisan newspaper 
editors across the state. And in Kentucky, the outright refusal of powerful 
politicians like Clay to engage directly in partisan politics cleared the way for 
editors like Amos Kendall to emerge as party leaders. None of these histories 
conform to the predictions offered by just one of the two traditional models, and 
each would appear to provide evidence for both the group-centric and elite-led 
models, suggesting the need for another explanation for party activity in this era. 
As before, the infrastructure-driven model provides just such an explanation. 
In the years immediately following the economic depression triggered by the 
Panic of 1819, the postal network was brought to the point of effective 
completion. Although it would continue to expand at a rapid pace along the 
western frontier, the network had by the time of Jackson’s defeat in the 1824 
election been brought to all of the major and minor towns of every state for the 
first time. Not only had all of the state capitols been connected to one another 
and to the nation’s capitol via major post roads, but all of the outlying towns and 
villages had been connected to one another as well, making possible the 
development of stable interconnections among activists no matter where they 
might go. Rather than race to keep up with the rapid expansion of roads and 
offices in their home states and counties, would-be party leaders could instead 
focus their efforts on building institutions that could bind likeminded citizens 
together in common cause. And between the years 1824 and 1828 that is precisely 
what they did. Taking the diverse array of elite-led, group-centric, and hybrid 
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organizations that they had built over the previous decade, party leaders across 
the nation banded together to create the new Democratic Party. Where in the 
late-1790s the chaotic state of postal development had only allowed for the 
development of a heavily decentralized national party network, by the mid-1820s 
the newly completed postal service made possible a much more well-organized 
system, guided from the center by Duff Green and his Telegraph but still 
sufficiently flexible to allow each state machine the room to run the campaign 
that best fit local conditions. Meanwhile, on the other side of the contest, Adams 
and his allies adopted the failed strategies of the elite-led campaigns of the past. 
Whether it was by ignoring the active role his Postmaster General was playing in 
supporting his opponent’s campaign, working to actively limit the spread of 
editor-led local party organizations, or discouraging the republication of openly 
partisan articles written on his behalf, Adams refused to adapt to the new 
political realities created by the nation’s rapidly evolving information 
infrastructure.  
Last but not least, the recent history of our own era provides one final 
confirmation of the infrastructure-driven model’s ability to accurately describe 
the processes that drive party change. The information environment of the late-
twentieth century was far more complex than that of the early eighteenth century, 
but when the widespread adoption of the Internet began in the mid-1990s, the 
transformation it wrought was no less complete than when the nation’s postal 
service was first created. The political media system of the early 1990s had been 
dominated by large circulation, nonpartisan, urban newspapers and a handful of 
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even larger television networks and wire services, a combination of 
infrastructures that created an environment in which the vast majority of citizens 
had very little opportunity to interconnect with one another through the most 
dominant media forms. But as the use of digital networks spread, citizens found 
themselves with unprecedented opportunities to organize and act independently 
of the political system’s gatekeepers. This led to the creation of, among many 
other things, the multi-million member MoveOn movement, the Daily Kos 
platform for progressive political organization, and the Talking Points Memo 
model of activist-editor-led journalism. None of these developments could have 
been predicted by either the elite-led or group-centric models of party change, 
but each fits quite nicely into the expectations set by the infrastructure-driven 
model. None of these organizations would have been possible but for recent 
changes to the information environment. None of these organizations were 
developed by individuals or groups who had been previously involved in party 
politics, but each immediately made an impact on partisan politics, with both 
Daily Kos and MoveOn becoming important power centers within the 
Democratic Party in just a few short years. As they rapidly evolved, these 
organizations became the means by which millions of previously inactive 
citizens became directly involved in party politics, breaking long-standing 
patterns of interaction and challenging members of both the party-in-government 
and the party-as-organization for party control. Learning quickly from their initial 
failures, the Daily Kos community launched an unprecedented battle for control 
of the Democratic Party itself, spearheading a campaign that elected one of their 
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allies as party chairman over the fierce opposition of party officials both inside 
and outside of government. In each of these cases, activists outside of the party-
as-organization took advantage of the unique opportunities for communication 
and organization provided by the Internet, using them to shift the boundaries 
between the party organization and the electorate, and by extension, the balance 
of power within the party itself.   
 
Major Findings of the Infrastructure-Driven Model of Party Change 
Five major findings emerge from the investigations completed here. 
 
Party Control as a Political Question 
Both the elite-led and group-centric frameworks seek to answer a simple 
question: “Who controls political parties in the United States?” For the elite-led 
school of thought that begins with Downs and ends most recently with Aldrich, 
the answer is “ambitious politicians.” For the group-centric line that can be 
traced from Key and Schattschneider to Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller, the 
answer is “political activists.” By locating the seat of power within parties, both 
frameworks claim to have identified the sources of both party creation and party 
change. But as this work has sought to demonstrate, the history of this nation’s 
parties simply does not align fully with either of the models. In some periods of 
history one of these models has found support, in other periods both models 
have in large part failed, and in yet others each of the models has captured the 
dynamics of one of the two major parties. The infrastructure-driven model, by 
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contrast, better accounts for the dynamics within and among the parties by 
remaining neutral on the question of control, focusing instead on identifying 
forces that might cause the locus of control to shift over time. This new approach 
marks a theoretical advance that better aligns with one of the fundamental facts 
of American political history: the question of party control has from the very 
start been a political question, one inextricably linked to the fight to determine 
who would be allowed to participate in politics at all.  
Take, for example, the period immediately preceding Jefferson’s election to 
the presidency. Although the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans 
undoubtedly had a variety of fierce and quite significant policy disagreements, it 
was the question of political participation itself that in many ways lay at the 
center of their dispute. On one side were the Democratic-Republican partisans, a 
group of men so fiercely committed to a non-elite vision of politics that 
Republican officials often felt the need to distance themselves; on the other side 
were the Federalists, a purely elite-led party that that disagreed so vehemently 
with Republican ideas on political participation that they sought to criminalize 
their expression despite the protections of the First Amendment. But while the 
putative leaders of the Democratic-Republican movement were tied up with 
Federalist-led sedition prosecutions, partisans around the country engaged in a 
fierce bout of party building, stretching their party’s network into new corners of 
the nation and sweeping Jefferson into the White House. The election of 1800 was 
at its core a battle between parties organized along different models, with an 
elite-led party facing off against a more group-centric rival. Although the 
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Democratic-Republican Party in the capital had grown out of a dispute among 
elites, outside of the capitol it was rooted in a protest against the idea of elite-led 
politics itself. In this environment the empirical question of party control was 
entangled in a normative question, with political conflict throughout the nation 
organized more around the later than the former. Thus understood, it is a 
mistake to assume that either the elite-led or the group-centric models alone can 
accurately capture the entirety of party life in this period. They cannot, for party 
life itself is was a fight to determine which of these models should prevail. 
As this work has demonstrated, both the elite-led and group-centric models 
are often quite good at providing snapshots of the internal structures of 
individual parties, and also at describing the internal dynamics of parties over 
the short-term as the balance of power within them changes. What it has also 
demonstrated, however, is that these models are very ill equipped to address 
historical moments when a fight over the right to engage in partisanship itself is 
at the core of political conflict. In these moments, not only might the party 
system be comprised of parties organized along both models, but within 
individual parties there might also be a fight to move the party from one model 
to another. For that reason, when studying party change we must always be alert 
to the possibility that question of “who control parties” will have different 
answers in different eras, and that within even a single era it may have different 
answers for each of the parties competing in the system.  
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Infrastructure Change Can Drive Party Change 
We must also, of course, be alert to the possibility that party change might be 
unrelated to the question of “who controls parties” entirely. One possibility that 
this work considers and finds support for is that the nation’s information 
infrastructure can alter party politics, both by changing the dynamics among 
partisans and by altering the range of possible forms of organization for party 
activity. Because information infrastructure acts as the connective tissue in an 
extended republic, any major change to that infrastructure is likely to have 
significant effects on the ability of citizens to organize for participation in politics. 
In a world where the only available infrastructure caters almost exclusively to 
coastal elites, for example, it should not be terribly surprising that only coastal 
elites participate extensively in politics. Change that infrastructure to a more 
highly dispersed and democratic form, and we should not be surprised to see 
control slip from those elites to the citizens best able to take advantage of the 
new opportunities for communication, participation, and leadership that the 
changed infrastructure affords.  In this new environment, not only is the makeup 
of the active electorate likely to change, but the structure of party organization 
itself will likely change too. As the infrastructure that supports party life grows 
in size and complexity, new methods of interconnection will allow for new 
methods of organization, with simple, highly centralized forms giving way to 
more complex, decentralized ones. 
This pattern of change just described is, of course, the same as the one that 
unfolded in the decades following the passage of the Post Office Act of 1792. In 
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the years immediately surrounding the act’s passage, the postal network was 
confined almost entirely to the major coastal states, with regular service running 
only among those states’ major cities. This created an environment in which 
politics led by small groups of capital city insiders was effectively the only 
option, as citizens outside of those cities had only the most limited of 
opportunities to learn about and participate in politics. For elites this created a 
happy coincidence: their desire to create an elite-led system of politics was 
naturally reinforced by an infrastructure that virtually mandated such a system. 
But the connection between the two went entirely unrecognized, and with the 
passage of the Post Office Act it was severed. As hundreds of offices and 
thousands of miles of roads were added to the system, the ability of citizens to 
participate in party politics was utterly transformed. Soon partisanship was 
everywhere, with citizens of all classes clamoring not just to participate but to 
lead. Newspapers were, as Jefferson would soon explain to Madison, the “engine” 
of this transformation, for to edit a newspaper in this time was to lead a small 
party organization.422  As citizens organized themselves into two competing 
camps, two distinct forms of organization took hold. The vast majority of 
Federalist papers only meekly involved themselves in partisan conflict, 
preferring instead to remain neutral so as to not offend the local subscribers and 
advertisers. As a result, they played almost no role in local party organization, 
leaving it almost entirely in the hands of elites. On the Republican side, by 
                                                
422 Jefferson, Letter to James Madison, February 5, 1799 
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contrast, activists editors gave their papers over wholly to the cause, filling their 
pages with news of upcoming local party meeting and reports of those just held, 
as well as a steady stream of stories reprinted from allied papers around the 
nation. On the one hand, this gave the party the local structures it needed to link 
citizens to the political system; on the other it created a truly national community 
of like-minded partisans, each reading the same stories, ideas, and arguments in 
their local papers at the same time.  
Without the expansion of the postal system, this new system of partisan 
information and organization would have been impossible. The elites who 
supported passage of the Act appear to have believed that they were creating a 
network that would enhance their control of the political system, but they were 
wrong. By building a decentralized system of offices and roads, by subsidizing 
the exchange of newspapers among editors, and by favoring the delivery of local 
papers over national ones, the Post Office Act created a system in which 
hundreds and eventually thousands of independently-operated partisan 
newspaper offices would be dispersed throughout the nation. As the post office 
spread, it provided the platform atop which activist citizens could create party 
organizations and  link them to one another without the involvement of elites. 
Thus, the expansion of the postal system did not just change who could get 
information about politics, or even who could participate, it also changed how 
they could participate, and by extension how they would organize their 
communities for action. The Democratic-Republicans adapted themselves to this 
new environment, creating a party that dominated politics for more than a 
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generation. The Federalists, however, refused to adapt, lingering as a minor 
political force until their eventual replacement by the far more newspaper-savvy 
Whigs. In the end, the patterns of partisan politics reflected the underlying 
design of the nation’s information infrastructure, and as that infrastructure 
changed so too did those patterns. Just as the rapid expansion of the postal 
network created the conditions necessary for the shift from the Federalist to the 
Democratic-Republican models of party politics, so too did that network’s 
completion lead to the transformations that took place around the election of 
Andrew Jackson. In our modern era the shift has been no less dramatic, with a 
system dominated by heavily centralized broadcasting technologies giving way 
to a radically decentralized and highly participatory digital networks 
 
Expansion of Party Activity Follows the Expansion of Infrastructure 
One of the specific ways changing infrastructure can alter politics is by 
linking new people and new communities to the political system. The 
Jeffersonian era was transformed by the rapid geographic expansion of the 
infrastructure, expanding the effective size of the American polity by linking 
thousands of towns and villages to the nation’s system of political information 
for the first time. By the time of Jackson that network had effectively caught up 
to the edge of the Western frontier, ushering in a brief era of stability before the 
spread of the telegraph started the process once more. And in the modern era, 
the spread of Internet access has meant the spread of a new form of political 
access, giving activists new tools to use in their never-ending quest to bring their 
  
362 
party in line with their vision for the nation. Just as activists today are likely to 
engage in very different forms of organization before and after getting Internet 
access, so too did activists in the time of Jefferson and Jackson change their 
behaviors as new methods of communication reached their communities. It is the 
connective potential of each of these networks that makes these transformation 
possible, and as we study the history of party politics, we must be careful to 
understand how the spread of these technologies is changing the opportunities 
to become active participants in political society.  
 
Decentralizing Infrastructures Create Opportunities for Outsiders to Challenge Insiders 
One important attribute of an information infrastructure is the degree to 
which it centralizes information and interaction through its use. The post office 
network began as a highly centralized infrastructure almost perfectly suited to 
supporting a vision of politics in which a small group of distinguished elites 
would be selected by the people to lead. But as the Post Office Act rapidly 
transformed it into a heavily decentralized network, with thousands of offices 
interconnected by tens of thousands of miles of roads that stretched into every 
corner of every state, the possibility of a new style of politics opened. As town 
after town was connected to the network, citizens interested in becoming more 
involved in politics were suddenly presented with a variety of new. Some chose 
to become newspaper subscribers, joining an ever increasing number of their 
fellow citizens in supporting a common vision of partisan politics. Others, 
however, went much further, choosing to establish newspapers of their own, and 
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although most of these papers failed, those that survived nearly always became 
important players in the local political scene. As the network grew, so too did 
this model of politics, and by the very early 1800s it had become impossible for 
both elites and average citizens alike to imagine political participation without 
newspapers and their activist editors. 
A similar phenomenon appears to be happening in our current era. The 
widespread adoption of digital networking technologies has created a rapid 
transition from an environment dominated by centralized broadcasting networks 
and large circulation newspapers to one in individuals are directly involved in 
creating and sharing content. This transition has disrupted every industry it has 
touched, undermining gatekeepers by placing the power to communicate, share, 
and organize directly in the hands of the people those gatekeepers used to 
mediate. Rather than wait passively for new content to arrive, hoping that at 
least some of it might be of interest, citizens are now free to create and share 
content of their own, involving them directly in the dissemination of information 
in ways that would have been unimaginable just a decade or two ago. Rather 
than await news that local parties and associations are hosting political events in 
their local area, citizens are now free to use freely available tools like MeetUp 
and Facebook to create organizations and events of their own, writing a new 
chapter in Americans long history of active association. Just as the infrastructure-
driven theory predicts, this has led to a number of important and quite 
successful challenges from political outsiders and novices, creating a pattern of 
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change strikingly similar to the one found in the much earlier age of activist 
editors.  
Unfortunately, this work was not able to adequately consider the potential 
impacts of an infrastructure change that leaves the environment more centralized. 
It would be a reasonable to assume that it would lead to a centralization of 
political structures and an increase in control for political insiders, but until more 
research can be done this will have to remain in the realm of pure speculation.  
 
Citizen Involvement Is Dependent Upon the Nature of the Available Infrastructure 
Citizen involvement in politics is in part dependent upon the nature of the 
infrastructure available to them as they seek to involve themselves in politics. In 
very early American history, the vast majority of citizens outside of the nation’s 
major cities lived in a state of profound information isolation, with no 
infrastructures available to them for communication beyond the delivery of a 
letter by their own hand. Although many of these citizens might have preferred 
to take a more active role in their own governance, the environment in which 
they lived would not allow it. With the arrival of a post road and office, all of 
that changed. Political information was suddenly available to them and their 
neighbors, transforming what it meant for them to be a members of the national 
political community. At first this usually meant receiving news from afar, but 
eventually for most towns and villages it meant the establishment of newspapers 
and party organizations. In either instance the information available to citizens 
changed dramatically, creating the conditions necessary for both behavior and 
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attitude change. In the end, as each new post office was added to the system, 
many of the citizens who had previously been inactive not by choice but by 
circumstance became active participants in party politics, demonstrating the 
power of information infrastructures to shape behavior. 
A similar phenomena is happening in our politics. As the available social 
networking technologies grown increasingly complex, citizens are being offered 
new ways to find, share, and create political news and information. The 
information environment of the late-twentieth century had demanded that 
individuals sit passively as information was broadcast to them, but now social 
networks such as Twitter and Facebook effectively require that they become 
active participants in shaping the information environment we all share. This has 
led to an explosion in participation, as citizens write and comment on blogs, 
share political videos and news stories, create podcasts and radio programs, sign 
petitions, join movements, and participate in campaigns. Most if not all of these 
activities used to reside in the domain of the political professional, but today 
they belong to everyone thanks to a fundamental shift in our shared information 
infrastructure. As this helps make clear, individual involvement in politics must 
be understood to be dependent in part on the nature of the infrastructure that 
links citizens to one another and to the political system.  
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Implications For Future Research 
Although this work has focused exclusively on the role of communication 
infrastructure in shaping party behavior and organization, there is no reason 
why infrastructural effects should be limited to political parties. To conclude this 
work, its implications for two specific areas of inquiry will be considered: the 
study of individual attitude and mass opinion formation, and the study of 
political associations and social movements.  
 
Implications for the Study of Individual Attitudes and Mass Opinion Formation 
One area particularly ripe for an infrastructure-based analysis is the study of 
political attitudes and opinions. Although the literature on the subject makes 
frequent mention of the role of the media, like the literature on parties it nearly 
always assumes that the system of communication can be treated as a constant 
element within the political context. Even in studies that directly consider the 
inputs and outputs of the media system, networks that transmit information are 
usually assumed to be both static and apolitical, leaving only the changing 
nature of the information being transmitted to consider. But as this work has 
demonstrated, neither of these assumptions hold over anything but the shortest 
of terms, suggesting the need for a reconsideration of some of our most basic 
theories on the connections among information, attitudes, opinions, and 
behaviors. 
Take, for example, Philip Converse’s “Information Flow and the Stability of 
Partisan Attitudes,” the now-classic work that connects fluctuations in voter 
  
367 
behavior to changes in the levels of available political information.423 Although 
variations in the volumes of information available throughout political society 
could result from changes to either the inputs of information or the systems that 
transmit and output that information, the model developed by converse only 
considers the variability of the inputs, assuming that the transmission systems 
change slowly enough to be safely ignored. This allows for a direct connection to 
be drawn between the volumes of information available during different types of  
elections and the predictability of partisan voter behavior. But consider the era 
under investigation. It was during this exact period, 1952 to 1960, that television 
became a truly national phenomenon. In July of 1952, the Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) lifted a freeze on the licensing of new 
stations, unleashing a period of growth that saw television ownership rates climb 
from roughly thirty to ninety percent of American households in just eight years. 
424 Prior to television, Americans received most of their political news from local 
newspapers and radio stations, with national radio networks and wire services 
playing an increasingly important but nevertheless subservient role in supplying 
those outlets with content. With the advent of television, however, Americans 
                                                
423 Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes," Public Opinion 
Quarterly 
424 The number of licensed commercial stations more than quintupled in the first year of 
development, and although it took many stations a year or two to begin broadcasting, 
many others came online far sooner, in some cases within days of being granted a 
license. For more, see Armstrong, "Constructing Television Communities: The Fcc, 
Signals, and Cities, 1948–1957," Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media; Bimber, 
Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power, 80-81; 
Bimber, "Notes on the Diffusion of the Internet." 
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gained access to a common source of information that was overwhelmingly 
national in focus. Although this undoubtedly led to an increase in the overall 
volume of available information, it did so in a non-neutral way. National 
television networks provided information designed to appeal to a national 
audience, increasing the availability of national news stories and tilting the 
overall balance of information available throughout society away from local 
concerns. Presidential campaigns were a particularly important story from the 
very earliest days of television, leading to the production of countless news 
stories and specials for which there was no equivalent in state and local politics. 
The increased national focus provide by the television networks produced 
precisely the sort of “surge and decline” pattern under investigation, with 
presidential elections receiving far more attention that midterms. Rather than 
consider the possibility that the spread of a new technology played a role in the 
pattern, however, the model concludes that only variations in the inputs of 
information could be responsible for the observed surge and decline.  
But what if the speculation presented here is correct, and the adoption of 
television played a role in the process by altering the overall balance of national 
and local political information? If it did, then we would need to consider how the 
pattern of surge and decline has changed as the nation’s information 
infrastructure has evolved. As detailed in the previous chapter, for example, the 
decade prior to the election of 1824 saw a collapse in the coverage of national 
politics, producing a system in which state and local politics were the primary 
concern. Was the pattern of “surge and decline” in this period reversed, with 
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turnout in local elections surging and in national elections declining? And what 
about our current era? As television rapidly fades in importance, will a new 
pattern emerge? Thanks to the near-unlimited transmission and storage 
capacities of the Internet, the freedom to create all manner of political content has 
increased immeasurably. On the one hand, blogs, social networks, and hyper-
local news sites are offering citizens opportunities to follow local politics in ways 
that would have been impossible just a decade ago. On the other hand, the ability 
to share information irrespective of geography has the potential to blur the lines 
between local and national stories, bringing national exposure to elections that 
previously would have received only local coverage. If the system of 
communication is treated as a variable in our models rather than a constant, all 
of these questions become directly relevant to the understanding how the 
patterns of surge and decline have evolved over time. 
A second example of a model ripe for reconsideration is found in Zaller’s The 
Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. To demonstrate how use of the media shapes 
the political preferences of the mass public, Zaller develops a multi-part 
framework in which variations in elite discourse explain fluctuations in mass 
opinion. Following Converse’s lead, the model explicitly assumes that the media 
system acts as a “common carrier,” passing information from elites to citizens in 
a neutral and wholly consistent manner over time.425 This allows the model to 
identify changing patterns of elite messaging as the source of public opinion 
                                                
425 Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, 139 
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change on a variety of issues across multiple decades in the twentieth century. 
Put most simply, the model finds that changes in public opinion follow changes 
in elite messaging. When elites present a unified message on an issue, public 
opinion tends towards unity, but when elites polarizes along partisan lines, so 
too does public opinion. But by ignoring the possibility that the infrastructure 
might play a role in altering the patterns of information throughout society, the 
model overlooked at least three potentially important sources of attitude change:  
First, although it may have been safe to assume that elites provided the 
primary inputs into a media system dominated by a few national television 
networks, it makes no sense to hold that assumption today. Relatively simple 
communication flows have given way to far more complex ones, with 
decentralized networks allowing citizens to bypass the gatekeepers politicians 
once relied on to distribute a relatively orderly series of messages to the public. 
When every computer, tablet, and mobile phone is a potential input to the media 
system, we must consider far more than the partisan balance of elite 
communication if we are to understand the patterns of information flowing 
throughout the political world.  
Second, rather than assume the media acts as a nonpartisan common carrier 
of political messaging, we must recognize that the inherent partisanship of the 
national information environment changes over time, inexorably altering the 
balance of partisan cues that the model holds central to attitude change. By the 
model’s own logic, the shift from a nonpartisan media system to a heavily 
partisan one should on its own create a more polarized public, as the 
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transmission of information increasingly takes place through networks dedicated 
to presenting all of the day’s news deeply embedded among partisan cues. 
Pursuing this line of thought through further research might not only uncover 
some the dynamics at work in our increasingly polarized political environment, 
but also produce a more full understanding of the gradual depolarization of the 
electorate in the early twentieth century that followed the shift from a highly 
partisan system of information to one dedicated to ideologies of objectivity and 
nonpartisanship.  
Third, if the stability of public attitudes on major political issues is best 
understood under this model as a function of the stability of the competing 
streams of information containing partisan cues, then it is quite likely that 
attitudes will grow increasingly unstable in moments when long-standing 
patterns of information distribution are changing. Although one source of 
information instability might be changes in the behaviors of the actors who 
regularly input information into the system, another might be changes to the 
system itself. The shuttering of a newspaper, the opening of a television network, 
or the widespread rapid adoption of a new form of communication all could lead 
to dislocations in the patterns of information that shape the behaviors of 
individual voters. Unless our studies of political change are attuned to this 
possibility, we will miss a potentially important source of instability in voter 
behavior. 
By assuming that the nation’s system of communication operates as neutral, 
unchanging conduits for information, scholars have been able to make significant 
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advances in our understandings of individual attitudes and mass opinion. It is 
time, however, to set such simplifying assumptions aside, building the variability 
of the system into our models in order to better capture a more complete picture 
of the forces that cause opinions to change over time. 
 
Implications for the Study of Political Associations and Social Movements 
If the information infrastructure can shape the interactions among activists in 
political parties, then it will almost certainly shape patterns among activists in 
other groups as well. This opens the possibility that as the nation’s information 
infrastructures change, the structures and patterns of interaction within and 
among political associations and social movements might also change. This 
suggests the need for a reappraisal of the role of communication and media in 
group organization and behavior.  
Consider, for example, the theory of group conflict outlined by E.E. 
Schattschneider in The Semi-Sovereign People. In this model, the outcome of 
conflict is determined by the relative ability of the groups involved to expand 
fights to include previously uninvolved allies. This makes visibility and publicity 
two of the central components of group conflict, placing the communication 
system deep inside the heart of the framework. Despite this, the model never 
considers how changes to that system would affect these components, focusing 
instead on major historical events as the primary drivers of political change. But 
if the ability of a group to reach out to potential allies is central to its ability to 
complete its political mission, then the types of communication networks 
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available in each conflict must be considered in any analysis of how it unfolds. 
As this work has shown, the rapid spread of the postal network was an essential 
component in the story of how the Democratic-Republicans survived Federalist 
attacks, and without the widespread availability of the Internet it is almost 
certain that the political career of Howard Dean would have followed a very 
different arc. In these and many other instances, the precise nature of the 
available communication tools shaped the conflicts and their outcomes, making 
them important variables that must be considered as we work to model group 
conflict. 
To understand how infrastructure-based analysis might be relevant to the 
study of social movements, consider the role of communication in McAdam’s 
“political process model” of movement formation, change, and decline.426 In this 
model, institutional structures combine with shifting perceptions of shared 
information to create new opportunities for marginalized communities to press 
for political change. The inclusion of shared information is on its own enough to 
open the door to infrastructural effects, but by including the communicative 
capacities of the groups within movements among the institutional structures 
under consideration, the model adds a second potential entry point for such 
effects. Because changes to the national information environment alter the 
distribution of information throughout society, it is almost inevitable that 
infrastructure change will cause shifts in perception throughout the population. 
                                                
426 McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970 
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Even more importantly, if the capacity of organizations to share information is a 
key component of movement success, then it is essential to investigate how those 
capacities change as the available infrastructure changes. What effect, for 
example, would the deployment of a new communication technology within a 
politically marginalized community have on its capacity to share ideas and 
coordinate action? And as the capacities of that technology changed over time, 
how would that alter the opportunities and constraints for mobilization within 
the communities it reaches? McAdam’s model indirectly suggests that these 
effects could be significant, but it never pursues them directly, an omission that 
should be corrected in future research. 
More broadly, because the attributes of the infrastructure available to political 
actors shapes how they interact, we should expect that as infrastructure changes, 
the opportunities for organizing movements and forming political associations 
will change. The spread of a decentralizing infrastructure within a marginalized 
population, as one example, might create opportunities for activists within that 
population to evade the gatekeepers who have helped maintain that group’s 
marginalization. The interconnection of networks controlled by members of the 
aggrieved population to national networks, as another example, might alter the 
ability of movement to spread its message to the wider world, attracting new 
allies and enemies in ways that are at least partially beyond the control of the 
movement itself. And much more fundamentally, the spread of new forms of 
information technology might make possible new organizational structure for 
movements, a possibility that can be seen in the stories of MoveOn and Daily Kos 
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that were detailed in the previous chapter. In the end, the evolution of the 
nation’s information infrastructures is likely to affect movements in the same 
ways it has affected parties, a possibility that our studies of movements and 
associations must begin to investigate. 
 
Although scholars have frequently included aspects of communication within 
their descriptions of political change, relatively few have taken the crucial next 
step of including the attributes of the infrastructure as potential variables within 
their models. Instead, these systems have been almost universally assumed to act 
as stable and largely neutral conduits for information, allowing elites within and 
around government to communicate in predictable patterns with the masses. It is 
time for our discipline to set such simplifying assumptions aside. Over the past 
decade, the nation’s information environment has undergone a set of 
transformations so thorough as to make the system utterly unlike anything that 
has come before it. And this is not the first time that such a major transition has 
taken place. Whether it was the spread of the postal system in the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries, the rise of the penny presses and wire services in 
the mid-nineteenth century, the transition between the loss-leading partisan and 
for-profit non-partisan newspapers in the late nineteenth century, or the 
twentieth-century progression through systems dominated by radio, broadcast 
television, and cable television, it is clear that change, not stability, should be 
understood as the norm for the nation’s information environment over time. 
Moreover, given the constantly shifting balance within that environment 
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between partisan and non-partisan infrastructures, between local and national 
information providers, and among a wide variety of media styles and types, it is 
clear that the content within the system is constantly in flux as well, affecting the 
behavior of individuals and the organization of institutions in uneven ways over 
time. Thus, to exclude these infrastructures from our models, or to assume that 
they are nothing more than stable, apolitical conduits through which citizens 
receive information, blinds us to potentially important causal mechanisms that 
need to be considered when studying both short- and long-term political change.  
This work has begun the process of investigating the role of the nation’s 
information infrastructure in the evolution of political parties in the United States, 
but there still remains much work to be done. In addition to investigating the 
history of infrastructure-driven change from the telegraph to the television, 
scholars should begin addressing the variability of the information environment 
in all of the places where communication patterns have been found to exert 
influence on political activities and outcomes. No matter the era, information 
technologies have always acted as the mechanism binding our extended republic 
together, shaping opportunities for political action and altering the nature of 
power relations at every level of the polity. But as our current era so clearly 
reminds us, these technologies are always changing, creating new possibilities 
for interconnection and action while foreclosing others, a fact our models of 
politics must begin to address.  
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APPENDIX 
The Growth of the Partisan Press  
in the Pre-Telegraphic United States 
 
NOTE ON SOURCES AND METHODOLOGIES 
All of the following data on newspapers in the early American republic are 
taken from a database I constructed of the more than 1,900 newspapers known to 
be publishing during the period from 1790 to 1828. The original list was 
compiled using five sources: Edward C. Lanthem’s Chronological Tables of 
American Newspapers, 1690-1820; Clarence S. Brigham’s History and Bibliography of 
American Newspapers, 1690-1820; Harry B. Weiss’ A Graphic Summary of the Growth 
of Newspapers in New York and Other States, 1704-1820; Readex’s listing of Early 
American Newspapers, Series 1-9; and the Library of Congress’ Chronicling America: 
Historic American Newspapers database.  
Newspapers were then assigned partisan affiliations using a diverse array of 
sources, including: Personal inspection of individual newspapers through the 
Readex Database and at the American Antiquarian Society; comments in the 
correspondence and diaries of contemporary political actors; local histories of 
printing and early American journalism; and several comprehensive and highly 
credible surveys of newspapers. Most prominent among that last group were the 
following sources: Donald H. Stewart’s “Appendix: Annotated List of 
Newspapers” in Opposition Press of the Federalist Period; David H. Fischer’s 
“Political Affiliation of American Newspapers, October 1, 1800” and “Federalist 
Electioneering Newspapers, 1800-1820” in Revolution in American Conservatism; 
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Jeffrey L. Pasley’s “Appendix 2: The Sedition Act and the Expansion of the 
Republican Press” in Tyranny of the Printers; Isaiah Thomas’ “Appendix: List of 
Newspapers” in History of Printing in America, Volume II; Michael Durey’s 
“Appendix: Radical Émigré Serial Publications” in Thomas Paine's Apostles: 
Radical Emigrés and the Triumph of Jeffersonian Republicanism; Culver H Smith’s 
“Appendixes” in The Press, Politics, and Patronage; and Donald B. Cole’s “Political 
Parties in 1828” in Vindicating Andrew Jackson, particularly 142-143.  
Affiliations were assigned using material from the critical years of 1796-1800 
and 1824-1828 whenever possible, and were only designated when clear 
evidence of affiliation was uncovered. Newspapers that presented either little to 
no political matter or articles from both sides of the aisle were designated as 
“neutral.” Personal inspection of newspaper archives led to the correction of 
numerous mistakes found in the surveys listed above, and have been noted as 
such in the database for future reference. Although archivists have made 
enormous efforts to preserve and digitize as many newspapers copies as possible, 
many individual editions, and at times even entire volumes, of papers have been 
lost to history. As such, the data presented here undoubtedly underestimate the 
full scope of activity that took place during this period. Nevertheless, by 
comparing the database to both primary source documentation and secondary 
source histories, I have been able to determine that all of the major and a vast 
majority of the minor newspapers known to have published in the era have been 
identified and classified. Although some uncertainty remains around the 
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completeness of the dataset, the trends and patterns identified in the data and 
presented here are reliable. 
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NEWSPAPER GROWTH, 1790-1830 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Total Newspapers in Operation, 1790-1830 
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PARTISAN NEWSPAPER GROWTH, 1790-1802 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Partisan Newspaper Growth, 1790-1802 
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Listed below are all of the partisan newspapers in publication during the years 
1790 to 1802, organized by state. In addition to providing the city of publication 
and the name of the paper, the known years of publication are included. 
 
Connecticut 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Danbury Republican Journal 1796-1800 
Danbury Sun of Liberty (Danbury/Norwalk) 1800-1801 
Hartford American Mercury 1784-1833 
New London Bee 1797-1802 
Norwalk Independent Republican 1802-1803 
Stonington Journal of the Times/Impartial Journal 1798-1804 
Stonington-
Port Patriot; or, Scourge of Aristocracy 1801-1803 
 
Federalist Papers 
Bridgeport American Telegraphe 1800-1804 
Danbury Farmer's Journal 1790-1793 
Hartford Connecticut Courant 1764-1850 
Hartford Hartford Gazette 1794-1795 
Litchfield Litchfield Monitor 1784-1807 
Litchfield The Farmer's Monitor 1800 
Middletown Middlesex Gazette 1785-1824 
New Haven Connecticut Journal 1767-1835 
New Haven Federal Gazetteer 1796-1797 
New Haven Visitor 1802-1803 
New Haven Messenger 1800-1802 
New Haven Herald of Minerva 1802 
New Haven New Haven Gazette 1791 
New London Connecticut Gazette 1763-1820 
New London Weekly Oracle 1797-1799 
Newfield American Telegraphe 1795-1798 
Norwich Norwich Packet 1773-1802 
Norwich Connecticut Centinel 1802-1807 
Sharon Rural Gazette 1800-1801 
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Delaware 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Dover Friend of the People 1799-1800 
Wilmington Delaware Gazette 1785-1810 
Wilmington 
Mirror of the Times and General 
Advertiser 1800-1806 
 
Federalist Papers 
Dover Federal Ark 1802-1803 
Dover Federal Ark 1802-1804 
Wilmington Delaware and Eastern-Shore Advertiser 1794-1799 
Wilmington Monitor 1800 
 
 
Georgia 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Augusta Augusta Chronicle 1785-1830 
Louisville Louisville Gazette 1799-1811 
Savannah Georgia Journal 1793-1794 
Savannah 
Georgia Republican and State 
Intelligencer 1802-1807 
 
Federalist Papers 
Augusta Augusta Herald 1799-1815 
Augusta Southern Centinel 1793-1798 
Savannah Columbian Museum 1796-1801 
 
 
Kentucky 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Frankfort Guardian of Freedom 1798-1805 
Frankfort Palladium 1798-1816 
Lexington Kentucky Gazette 1787-1837 
Lexington Stewart's Kentucky Herald 1795-1803 
Louisville Farmer's Library 1801-1807 
Paris Rights of Man 1797-1798 
Suffield Impartial Herald 1797-1799 
Windham Phenix/Herald 1791-1812 
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Paris Stewart's Kentucky Herald 1795-1806 
Washington Mirror 1797-1799 
 
Federalist Papers 
None 
 
Maine 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
None 
 
Federalist Papers 
Augusta Kennebeck Intelligencer 1795-1800 
Augusta Kennebec Gazette 1800-1805 
Castine Castine Journal 1799-1801 
Fryeburg Russel's Echo 1798-1799 
Hallowell Tocsin 1795-1797 
Portland Eastern Herald 1792-1802 
Portland Gazette / Jenk's Portland Gazette 1798-1841 
Portland Gazette of Maine 1790-1796 
Portland Oriental Trumpet 1796-1800 
Wiscasset Wiscasset Telegraph 1796-1799 
 
 
Maryland 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Baltimore American 1799-1820 
Baltimore 
American & Commercial Daily 
Advertiser 1801-1820 
Baltimore American Patriot 1802-1803 
Baltimore Baltimore Intelligencer 1798-1799 
Baltimore Baltimore Telegraphe 1795-1807 
Baltimore Democratic Republican  1802 
Baltimore Eagle of Freedom 1796-1798 
Baltimore Republican 1802-1804 
Chestertown Apollo 1793 
Easton Republican Star 1799-1832 
Elizabethtown Maryland Herald 1797-1826 
Fredericktown Bartgis's Federal Gazette 1792-1800 
Fredericktown Bartgis's Republican Gazette 1801-1821 
Fredericktown Hornet 1802-1814 
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Fredericktown Republican Advocate 1802-1808 
Fredericktown Rights of Man 1794-1800 
 
Federalist Papers 
Annapolis Maryland Gazette 1745-1832 
Baltimore 
Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily 
Advertiser 1796-1838 
Baltimore Federal Intelligencer 1794-1795 
Baltimore Maryland Journal 1785-1798 
Easton 
Maryland Herald and Eastern Shore 
Intelligencer 1790-1804 
Fredericktown Frederick-Town Herald 1802-1832 
Hagers-Town Westliche Correspondenz 1795-1830 
 
 
Massachusetts 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Boston Argus 1791-1793 
Boston Boston Gazette 1719-1798 
Boston 
Constitutional Telegraph / Republican 
Gazetteer 1799-1802 
Boston Independent Chronicle 1776-1825 
Boston Polar Star 1796-1797 
Boston Republican Gazetteer 1802-1803 
Dedham Columbian Minerva 1799-1804 
Dedham Minerva 1796-1798 
Haverhill Guardian of Freedom 1793-1795 
Newburyport Morning Star 1794 
Newburyport American Intelligencer 1801 
Pittsfield Pittsfield Sun 1800-1801 
Pittsfield Sun 1800-1859 
Salem Impartial Register 1800-1801 
West 
Springfield American Intelligencer 1795-1797 
Worcester Independent Gazetteer 1799-1801 
Worcester National Aegis 1801-1876 
 
Federalist Papers 
Boston Columbian Centinel 1790-1840 
Boston Saturday Evening Herald 1790 
  
386 
Boston Courier 1795-1796 
Boston Federal Gazette 1798 
Boston Federal Orrery 1794-1796 
Boston Massachusetts Centinel 1784-1790 
Boston Massachusetts Mercury 1793-1803 
Boston Russell's Gazette / Boston Gazette 1798-1801 
Boston Times 1794-1808 
Brookfield Moral and Political Telegraphe 1795-1796 
Brookfield Political Repository 1798-1802 
Brookfield Worcester Intelligencer 1794-1795 
Conway Farmer's Register 1798 
Greenfield Greenfield Gazette 1792-1811 
Haverhill Haverhill Federal Gazette 1798-1799 
Haverhill Impartial Herald 1798 
Haverhill Observer 1800 
Leominster Telescope 1800-1802 
New Bedford Columbian Courier 1798-1805 
New Bedford Medley 1792-1799 
Newburyport Impartial Herald 1793-1797 
Newburyport 
Newburyport Herald and Country 
Gazette 1797-1837 
Newburyport Political Gazette 1795-1797 
Northampton Hampshire Gazette 1786-1843 
Northampton Patriotic Gazette 1799-1800 
Pittsfield Berkshire Gazette 1799-1800 
Salem Salem Gazette 1781-1849 
Springfield Federal Spy 1792-1805 
Springfield Hampshire Chronicle 1787-1796 
Stockbridge Western Star 1789-1806 
Worcester Massachusetts Spy 1775-1820 
 
 
 
New Hampshire 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Concord Republican Gazette 1801-1803 
Concord Republican Gazetteer 1796-1797 
Portsmouth New Hampshire Gazette 1756-1844 
Portsmouth Republican Ledger 1799-1803 
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Federalist Papers 
Amherst Village Messenger 1796-1801 
Concord 
Concord Herald; or, Hough's Concord 
Herald 1790-1794 
Concord Courier of New Hampshire 1794-1805 
Concord Mirrour; or, Federal Mirrour 1792-1796 
Dover Political Repository or Phenix 1790-1795 
Dover Sun 1795-1818 
Exeter American Herald of Liberty 1793-1796 
Exeter New Hampshire Gazetteer 1789-1793 
Exeter New Hampshire Spy 1796-1797 
Exeter Ranlet's Federal Miscellany 1799-1800 
Gilmanton Gilmanton Gazette 1800 
Gilmanton Gilmanton Rural Museum 1799-1800 
Hanover Dartmouth Gazette 1799-1820 
Hanover Eagle or Darthmouth Centinel 1793-1799 
Keene Columbian Informer 1793-1795 
Keene New Hampshire Recorder 1787-1791 
Keene New Hampshire Sentinel 1799-1849 
Keene Rising Sun 1795-1798 
Portsmouth Federal Observer 1798-1800 
Portsmouth Oracle of the Day 1793-1800 
Portsmouth Portsmouth Oracle 1800-1821 
Walpole Farmer's Museum 1797-1810 
Walpole New Hampshire and Vermont Journal 1793-1797 
 
 
New Jersey 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Bridgeton Argus 1795-1796 
Elizabeth Town New Jersey Journal 1786-1821 
Morristown Genius of Liberty 1798-1811 
Mount Pleasant Jersey Chronicle 1795-1796 
Newark Centinel of Freedom 1796-1872 
Trenton True American 1801-1829 
 
Federalist Papers 
Morristown Morris County Gazette 1797-1798 
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New 
Brunswick Arnett's Brunswick Advertiser 1793 
New 
Brunswick Arnett's New Jersey Federalist 1795 
New 
Brunswick Genius of Liberty 1795-1796 
New 
Brunswick Guardian 1792-1816 
New 
Brunswick New Jersey Federalist 1795 
Newark (Wood's) Newark Gazette 1791-1804 
Trenton Federalist 1798-1824 
Trenton New-Jersey State Gazette 1792-1799 
Trenton State Gazette 1792-1799 
 
 
New York 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Albany Albany Register 1790-1822 
Ballston Spa Republican Telescope 1801-1802 
Catskill Catskill Packet 1792-1799 
Catskill Western Constellation 1800-1804 
Geneva Impartial American 1800-1801 
Goshen Orange Patrol 1800-1801 
Hudson Bee 1802-1820 
New York American Citizen and General Advertiser 1800-1810 
New York Argus 1795-1800 
New York Columbian Gazette 1799 
New York Forlorn Hope 1800 
New York Greenleaf's New-York Journal 1784-1800 
New York Morning Chronicle 1802-1807 
New York Republican Watch-Tower 1800-1810 
New York Temple of Reason 1800-1801 
New York Time Piece 1797-1798 
Newburgh Mirror 1798 
Newburgh Rights of Man 1800-1806 
Poughkeepsie American Farmer 1798-1800 
Poughkeepsie Political Barometer 1802-1811 
Poughkeepsie Republican Journal 1795-1796 
Sag Harbor Frothingham's Long-Island Herald 1791-1798 
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Salem Times or Nat'l Courier 1794 
Scipio Western Luminary 1801 
 
Federalist Papers 
Albany Albany Centinel 1797-1806 
Albany Albany Chronicle 1796-1798 
Albany Albany Gazette 1788-1821 
Bath Bath Gazette 1797-1798 
Canandaigua Ontario Gazette 1799-1802 
Cooperstown Otsego Herald or Western Advertiser 1795-1821 
Hudson Balance 1801-1808 
Hudson Hudson Gazette 1792-1803 
Hudson Hudson Weekly Gazette 1787-1791 
Hudson Wasp 1802-1803 
Johnstown Johnstown Gazette 1795-1798 
Kingston Ulster County Gazette 1799-1803 
Kingston Ulster Gazette 1802-1821 
Lansingburgh American Spy 1791-1798 
Lansingburgh Farmer's Oracle 1796 
Lansingburgh Lansingburg Gazette 1798-1820 
Lansingburgh Northern Budget 1797-1798 
New Windsor New-Windsor Gazette 1798 
New York American Minerva 1793-1796 
New York Commercial Advertiser 1797-1876 
New York Daily Advertiser 1785-1806 
New York Evening Post 1801-1876 
New York Gazette of the United States 1789-1790 
New York Herald 1794-1797 
New York New-York Daily Gazette 1788-1795 
New York New-York Evening Post 1794-1795 
New York New-York gazette and general advertiser 1795-1821 
New York New-York Herald 1802-1817 
New York Porcupine's Gazette 1800 
New York Spectator 1797-1851 
Newburgh Orange County Gazette 1799 
Poughkeepsie Poughkeepsie Journal 1789-1847 
Rome Columbian Patriotic Gazette 1799-1802 
Salem Northern Centinel 1798-1804 
Salem Washington Patrol 1795 
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Schenectady Mohawk Mercury 1795-1798 
Troy Troy Gazette 1802-1812 
Utica Whitestown Gazette 1793-1803 
Waterford Waterford Gazette 1801-1816 
Whitestown Western Centinel 1794-1798 
Whitestown Whitestown Gazette 1796-1798 
 
 
North Carolina 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Edenton Herald of Freedom 1799 
Edenton State Gazette of North Carolina 1788-1799 
Fayetteville Fayetteville Gazette 1792-1793 
Pendleton Back Country Gazette 1795 
Raleigh Raleigh Register 1799-1841 
Warrenton Messenger 1802-1809 
Wilmington Wilmington Chronicle 1795-1796 
 
Federalist Papers 
Fayetteville North-Carolina Minerva 1796-1799 
Halifax North Carolina Journal 1792-1810 
New Bern Newbern Gazette 1798-1804 
Raleigh North Carolina Minerva 1799-1800 
Salisbury North-Carolina Mercury 1799-1801 
Wilmington Hall's Wilmington Gazette 1797-1798 
Wilmington Wilmington Gazette 1799-1816 
 
 
Ohio 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Chillicothe Scioto Gazette 1800-1867 
Cincinnati Western Spy 1799-1809 
Marietta Ohio Gazette 1802-1811 
 
Federalist Papers 
Chillicothe Scioto Gazette 1800-1827 
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Pennsylvania 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Beula Western Sky 1798 
Carlisle Carlisle Gazette 1785-1817 
Carlisle Telegraphe 1795-1796 
Chambersburg Farmers' Register 1798-1799 
Chestnut Hill Chestnuthiller Wochenscrift 1790-1793 
Easton American Eagle 1799-1805 
Easton Neuer Unpartheyischer Eastoner Bothe 1794-1805 
Germantown Germantauner Zeitung 1785-1793 
Greensburg Farmers' Register 1799-1810 
Harrisburg Farmers Instructor 1800-1802 
Harrisburg Unparteyische Morgenroethe Zeitung 1799-1840 
Huntingdon Guardian of Liberty 1800 
Lancaster Intelligencer 1799-1821 
Lancaster Lancaster Correspondent 1799-1803 
Lewistown Western Star 1801-1810 
Norristown True Republican 1800-1803 
Northumberland Republican Argus 1802-1812 
Northumberland Sunbury and Northumberland Gazette 1793-1813 
Philadelphia American Museum 1787-1792 
Philadelphia Aurora General Advertiser 1790-1829 
Philadelphia Carey's United States Recorder 1798 
Philadelphia Constitutional Diary 1799-1800 
Philadelphia Courier Francais 1794-1798 
Philadelphia Daily Advertiser 1797-1798 
Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer 1782-1797 
Philadelphia Independent Whig 1802 
Philadelphia Journal des Revolutions 1793-1794 
Philadelphia Merchant's Daily Advertiser 1797-1798 
Philadelphia National Gazette 1791-1793 
Philadelphia New World 1796-1797 
Philadelphia Pensylvanische Correspondenz 1798-1799 
Philadelphia Temple of Reason 1801-1803 
Philadelphia Universal Gazette 1797-1800 
Pittsburgh Tree of Liberty 1800-1809 
Reading 
Neue Unpartheyische Readinger 
Zeitung 1789-1802 
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Reading Readinger Adler 1796-1854 
Sunbury Freiheitsvogel 1800 
Washington Herald of Liberty 1799-1802 
Wilkesbarre Wilkesbarre Gazette 1797-1801 
York Unpartheyische York Gazette 1796-1804 
Philadelphia Neue Philadelphische Correspondenz 1790-1799 
 
Federalist Papers 
Carlisle Carlisle Herald 1802-1833 
Carlisle Eagle 1800-1801 
Chambersburg Franklin Repository 1796-1840 
Gettysburg Adams Centinel 1800-1867 
Harrisburg Oracle of Dauphin 1792-1824 
Huntingdon 
Huntingdon Courier and Weekly 
Advertiser 1797 
Huntingdon Huntingdon Gazette 1802-1831 
Lancaster Der Americanische Staatsbothe 1800-1819 
Lancaster Deutsche Porcupein 1798-1799 
Lancaster Lancaster Journal 1794-1818 
Lancaster Neue Unpartheyische Lancaster Zeitung 1787-1797 
Norristown Norristown Gazette 1799-1800 
Norristown Norristown Herald 1800-1830 
Philadelphia American Star 1794 
Philadelphia Claypoole's American Daily Advertiser 1796-1800 
Philadelphia Dunlap's American Daily Advertiser 1791-1795 
Philadelphia Federal Gazette 1790-1793 
Philadelphia 
Finlay's American Naval & Commercial 
Register 1795-1798 
Philadelphia Freeman's Journal 1781-1827 
Philadelphia Gazette of the United States 1790-1804 
Philadelphia Mail 1791-1793 
Philadelphia Pennsylvania Gazette 1728-1815 
Philadelphia Pennsylvania Packet 1771-1790 
Philadelphia Philadelphia Gazette 1794-1802 
Philadelphia 
Porcupine's Gazette and Country 
Porcupine 1797-1799 
Philadelphia Poulson's American Daily Advertiser 1800-1820 
Philadelphia Relf's Philadelphia Prices Current 1801 
Philadelphia 
The Pennsylvania Mercury & Universal 
Advertiser 1784-1792 
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Philadelphia True American 1798-1818 
Pittsburgh Pittsburgh Gazette 1786-1820 
Reading Weekly Advertiser 1796-1816 
Uniontown Fayette Gazette 1798-1803 
Washington Western Telegraphe 1795-1811 
West-Chester West-Chester Gazette 1794 
Wilkesbarre Herald of the Times 1796-1797 
Wilkesbarre Luzerne County Federalist 1801-1810 
York Pennsylvania Herald 1789-1799 
York Volks-Berichter ein Yorker Wochenblatt 1799-1802 
York York Recorder 1800-1821 
 
 
Rhode Island 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Newport Guardian of Liberty 1800-1801 
Newport Rhode-Island Republican 1801-1806 
Providence Impartial Observer 1800-1802 
Providence Providence Phoenix 1802-1808 
 
Federalist Papers 
Newport Companion 1798-1799 
Newport Newport Herald 1787-1791 
Newport Newport Mercury 1780-1842 
Newport Rhode-Island Museum 1794 
Providence Providence Gazette and Country Journal 1762-1825 
Providence Providence Journal 1799-1801 
Providence State Gazette 1796 
Providence United States Chronicle 1784-1804 
Warren Herald of the United States 1792-1812 
 
 
South Carolina 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Charleston Carolina Gazette 1798-1834 
Charleston City Gazette 1787-1834 
Charleston 
Daily Evening Gazette & Tea Table 
Companion 1795 
Charleston Star 1793 
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Columbia Columbia Gazette 1794 
Columbia South Carolina State Gazette 1795-1829 
Georgetown Georgetown Chronicle 1796-1797 
Georgetown South-Carolina Independent Gazette 1791-1792 
 
Federalist Papers 
Charleston Federal Carolina Gazette 1800 
Charleston South-Carolina State Gazette 1794-1802 
Charleston State Gazette of South Carolina 1785-1793 
Charleston The Times 1800-1820 
Columbia South Carolina Gazette 1792-1793 
Georgetown Georgetown Gazette 1798-1816 
 
 
Tennessee 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Knoxville Knoxville Gazette 1791-1810 
Nashville Nashville Intelligencer 1799 
Nashville Rights of Man 1799 
Nashville Tennessee Gazette 1800-1810 
 
Federalist Papers 
None 
 
 
Vermont 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Bennington Tablet of the Times 1797 
Bennington Vermont Gazette 1783-1850 
Fair Haven Farmers' Library 1795-1798 
Randolph Weekly Wanderer 1801-1810 
Rutland Farmers' Library 1793-1794 
Rutland Herald of Vermont or Rutland Courier 1792 
Rutland Rutland Herald 1794-1823 
Windsor Morning Ray 1791-1792 
 
Federalist Papers 
Bennington Ploughman; or Republican Federalist 1801-1802 
Brattleboro Federal Galaxy 1797-1803 
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Burlington Vermont Centinel 1801-1850 
Newbury Orange Nightingale 1796-1797 
Putney Argus 1797-1799 
Vergennes Vergennes Gazette 1798-1801 
Windsor Vermont Journal 1783-1866 
Windsor Windsor Federal Gazette 1801-1804 
 
 
Virginia 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Alexandria Alexandria Expositor 1802-1807 
Alexandria Alexandria Times 1797-1802 
Dumfries Republican Journal 1795-1796 
Fincastle Fincastle Weekly Advertiser 1801 
Fredericksburg Courier 1800-1801 
Fredericksburg Genius of Liberty 1798-1800 
Fredericksburg Republican Citizen 1796-1797 
Leesburg True American 1800 
Lynchburg Lynchburg and Farmer's Gazette 1794-1795 
Norfolk American Gazette 1792-1797 
Norfolk Epitome of the Times 1798-1802 
Norfolk Virginia Chronicle 1792-1794 
Petersburg Petersburg Intelligencer 1800-1840 
Petersburg Republican 1800-1827 
Petersburg 
Virginia Gazette and Petersburg 
Intelligencer 1786-1840 
Richmond Examiner 1798-1804 
Richmond Observatory 1797-1798 
Richmond Recorder 1801-1803 
Richmond Richmond and Manchester Advertiser 1795-1796 
Richmond Richmond Chronicle 1795-1796 
Richmond The Press; or, Friend of the People 1800 
Richmond Virginia Argus 1796-1816 
Richmond Virginia Gazette & Richmond Chronicle 1793-1795 
Richmond 
Virginia Gazette & Richmond Daily 
Advertiser 1792 
Richmond 
Virginia Gazette, Richmond/Manchester 
Advertiser 1793-1795 
Staunton 
Political Mirroror and The Scourge of 
Aristocracy 1800-1801 
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Staunton Virginia Gazette 1795-1797 
Winchester Triumph of Liberty 1799-1803 
 
Federalist Papers 
Alexandria 
Alexandria Advertiser & Commercial 
Intelligencer 1800-1808 
Alexandria Columbian Mirror 1792-1800 
Fredericksburg Virginia Herald 1787-1876 
Lynchburg Lynchburg Weekly Gazette 1798 
Norfolk 
Norfolk Herald, Norfolk & Portsmouth 
Advertiser 1794-1819 
Petersburg Virginia Star 1795 
Richmond Virginia Federalist 1799-1800 
Richmond Virginia Gazette and Public Advertiser 1789-1793 
Richmond Virginia Gazette and Weekly Advertiser 1782-1797 
Winchester Bartgis's Virginia Gazette 1787-1791 
Winchester Virginia Centinel 1788-1826 
Winchester Winchester Gazette 1798-1820 
 
 
Washington, D.C. 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Georgetown Cabinet 1800-1801 
Georgetown Friend of the People 1800 
Washington American Literary Advertiser 1802-1804 
Washington Apollo 1802 
Washington National Intelligencer 1800-1812 
Washington Universal Gazette 1800-1814 
Washington Washington Gazette 1796-1798 
 
Federalist Papers 
Georgetown Centinel of Liberty and Country Gazette 1797-1800 
Georgetown Columbian Chronicle 1795-1796 
Georgetown Washington Federalist 1800-1809 
Georgetown Olio 1802-1803 
 
 
West Virginia 
Democratic-Republican Papers 
Martinsburg Potowmac Guardian 1792-1800 
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Martinsburg Republican Atlas 1800-1801 
Sheperdstown Potowmac Guardian 1791 
 
Federalist Papers 
Martinsburg Berkeley Intelligencer 1799-1807 
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